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Foreword and Acknowledgments
The rapid expansion of international trade during the past
fifteen years has confronted the American business counselor with
a great variety of new problems. Solutions to these problems were
not expounded to him in his pre-war legal education, nor are they
to be found in the rich proliferation of advance sheets, digests, and
loose-leaf services with which the modern American lawyer is
blessed. When he turns to foreign counsel, he finds that a lack of
common legal background makes meaningful professional communication difficult.
This book has been prepared with the primary purpose of helping those American lawyers who, because of their clients' expanding activities, confront for the first time the problems of trading
with and trading in the European Common Market. It is designed
to give them an over-all picture of the new legal framework of the
Market itself and of the laws of business organization, labor relations, industrial property, competition, and taxation which prevail
there. With this background American lawyers should be better
able to select and use the services of the European experts on
whom they must, of course, depend for definitive counsel.
Better books on the European Common Market will no doubt
appear very soon in this country, including particularly analytical
monographs, and we hope they will be better in part because of
the exploratory work done in this one. Eventually, a commercial
publisher, emboldened by this and future studies developing and correcting many of the things said in these pages, may furnish the
American lawyer with a current service on European trade.
We hope, too, that this book-conceived within the framework
of the international and comparative legal studies at the University
of Michigan Law School-may have interesting progeny in the
academic world. We would like to think that it may encourage more
teachers of comparative law to venture from the traditional paths
of civil law into the more rapidly evolving areas of commercial
law; that it may help students of American commercial law to compare American institutions with their European correlatives; and
v
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that it will direct the attention of constitutional and international
lawyers to a new kind of emergent federalism and "supranational"
organization which "breaches the integrity of national legal systems."
The purposes of the book explain its content. Since the American lawyer's job will be to conceive and plan, rather than to execute details, we have sought to explain the legal and administrative
structure of the European Community and the broad outline of
the national legal systems, rather than to tell in detail "how
to . . . . " Since our principal audience is composed of American
business counsellors, we have omitted many aspects of the Community of the greatest interest to Europeans-such as agricultural
and transportation policy-in favor of topics like business organization. The hard choice of priorities has also forced us to omit
or deal only incidentally with many topics of great interest both
to Americans and Europeans-the role of state-owned enterprises,
government purchasing regulations, and price controls, for example.
Even after these and other topics had been eliminated, the
breadth of the subject matter obviously called for a cooperative
effort by scholars and practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic.
It is inherent in a cooperative undertaking of this type that the
completion of the contributions cannot be exactly synchronized in
point of time. While most of the chapters were completed in the
fall of 1959, some carry the story into the early months of 1960.
I wish to record here our profound gratitude for the assistance
and advice we have received from a multitude of sources.
The concept of the book emerged from discussions with my
friend and colleague Alfred F. Conard, whose ideas had a determining influence on the selection of the topics and organization
of the book.
Financial support came from the Ford Foundation and from
the Cook Research Funds of the University of Michigan Law
School. Dean E. Blythe Stason, Professor Allan F. Smith, Director
of Graduate Studies, and Professor William J. Pierce, Editor of
Michigan Legal Publications, deserve our particular thanks for
their consistent support and wise advice.
The late Tullio Ascarelli, Professor of Comparative Law at the
University of Rome, a brilliant scholar and successful practitioner,
helped us greatly in developing the plan for the book. His sudden
death just prior to his planned teaching assignment in Ann Arbor
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cast a tragic shadow upon our effort. The suggestions of Professor
Jean Limpens, Director of the Centre lnteruniversitaire de Droit
Compare in Brussels, were also most useful in the planning stages.
Our expression of profound appreciation goes to Professor Paul
Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty who did not spare time and effort
in instructing us in the intricacies of the Community and offering
extensive comments on parts of the manuscript.
It is more than the usual cliche to say that this book could not
have been written without the help and encouragement of Mr.
Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European
Communities. Mr. Gaudet made detailed suggestions on parts of
the manuscript, answered innumerable queries, and even visited
with us in Ann Arbor. We also obtained valuable counsel from
Mr. Theodor Vogelaar, Director of the Legal Services of the
Euratom Commission, and-in the planning stages-from Dr.
Robert Krawielicki, Director of the Legal Services of the High
Authority of the Coal and Steel Community. Our thanks go also
to Professor Bruyas, Dr. Minunni, and Baron de Vos van Steenwijk,
who commented on parts of the manuscript, and to the numerous
other officials of the European Communities who assisted us. Two
distinguished members of the Commission of the European Economic Community, Dr. Hans von der Groeben and Mr. Jean Rey,
visited the Law School, and our undertaking was discussed with
them at some length during their visits.
Professor Kahn-Freund desires to express his thanks to the
Division for Labor Problems of the European Coal and Steel
Community; to Mr. Van Werwecke and Mr. Ewen of the Ministry
of Labor in Luxembourg; and to Professor Gino Giugni of Rome
for his assistance with regard to Italian Law.
Mr. Ladas received valuable comments on his manuscript from
Dr. G. H. C. Bodenhausen of the Hague, Professor at the University of Utrecht; Mr. Jean Favart of Brussels, Advocate before the
Court of Appeals of Brussels; Mr. Jean Lavoixof Paris, Member
of the Executive Committee of the French Association for the
Protection of Industrial Property; Dr. Attilio Luzzatto of Milan,
Advocate and Editor of the "Rivista della Proprieta lntellettuale e
lndustriale"; Dr. Eugen Ulmer, Rector of the Ludwig-Maximilian
University of Munich and Director of the Institute for Foreign
Industrial Property Law at Munich.
Professor Conard received the helpful collaboration of experts
in the six countries of the Community. These included Mr. Arendt
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of Luxembourg, Professor Ascarelli and Dr. Bruna of Rome,
Professor Bernini of Ferrara, Mr. Deelen and Mrs. van VIis of
Amsterdam, Professor Heenen of Brussels, Professor Houin of
Paris, and Professor Serick of Heidelberg. The respective contributions of these experts are identified in more detail at the outset
of Mr. Conard's chapter.
Dr. van Hoorn, co-author with Professor Wright of the chapter
on taxation, wishes to acknowledge the assistance of the staff members of the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Messrs.
W. H. J. Charbon, J. P. C. Huiskamp, and D. A. van Waardenburg. Dr. van Hoorn's findings concerning tax laws in the Common Market countries other than the Netherlands were verified
by the following national experts who are referred to in more
detail in the chapter on taxation and to whom he extends his appreciation: Dr. Giancarlo Croxatto of Genoa; Dr. Albert J. Radler,
Dip I. Kfm., of Munich; Mr. Jean H. Rothstein, H. E. C., of Paris;
and Mr. Paul Sibille of Brussels.
Professor Wright received able research assistance from Mrs.
Elizabeth Brown, research associate at the University of Michigan
Law School and Mr. Robert Wartell, a senior at the same school.
Mr. Nicholson owes special thanks to Mr. Herman Walker,
Jr., of the Department of State.
Others who offered valuable suggestions on portions of the
manuscript include Miss Miriam Camps of London; Dr. HansWolfram Daig, attache of the Court of Justice of the Communities
in Luxembourg; Dr. Isaiah Frank of the U.S. Department of
State; Professors William W. Bishop, Jr., Frank Cooper, Paul
Kauper, S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, and Hessel Y ntema, all of
the University of Michigan Law School.
We wish to mention the invaluable aid of Dr. Vera Bolgar,
Executive Secretary of the American Journal of Comparative
Law, and Mrs. Lilly Roberts, Bibliographer of the Michigan Law
Library, in translating parts of the manuscript and on bibliographical work.
In completing the research and editorial work we had the
efficient assistance of Mrs. Hortense Berman of Ann Arbor, and
Mrs. Trudy Fisher of Washington, D.C.; of Mr. Dudley Chapman, Instructor at the Michigan Law School; of the graduate
students of the Law School, Messrs. Jacques Bourgeois of Brussels
(Belgium), Geerd Muntinga of Tubingen (Germany), Dr. Hermann Roos of Bonn (Germany), Dr. Peter Ulmer of Heidelberg
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(Germany), Mr. Laurence Ziman of Cambridge (England); of
Mr. Peter Eld of the University of Michigan Law School.
In the early stages of the project Professor Conard and I had
extensive interviews with officials of the American diplomatic missions in Brussels, Luxembourg, Paris, London, and elsewhere in
Europe, with foreign diplomats and other governmental officials,
with parliamentarians, and with officials of the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, with
European attorneys, businessmen, labor leaders, and scholars in
European universities, and with American attorneys and executives
stationed in Europe. In this country we interviewed government
officials, members of the Bar, and businessmen, too numerous to
mention individually. We wish to thank all of them for their
generous help and attention.
Mr. Thomas L. Nicholson joined us in Ann Arbor in the summer of 1959 after a year in Europe, and did most of the editorial
work on the manuscript in addition to contributing his own chapter.
It goes without saying, of course, that the positions taken and
views expressed in this volume are those solely of the respective
authors.

E.S.
Ann Arbor, Michigan
May, 1960
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Chapter I

An American Lawyer Views
European IntegrationAn Introduction
Eric Stein*
I. A PERSPECTIVE

A. A

"PROPHECY"

The next few years will reveal whether the European Economic
Community with its Common Market will in fact become "one of
the most important undertakings of the Twentieth Century" as
prophesied by a group of prominent American businessmen in I 9 59. 1
This is a hazardous prediction in a century which has already been
rich in momentous events, and which, viewed from the mid-century
vantage point, promises such important future developments.
If the Community becomes a reality in the image of the Treaty
of I 9 57, a single market will be created within the territories of
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, comprising some I 70 million people; this
single market will result in rising living standards, rapidly growing
productivity, and a more important role for the six countries in
world trade. If the economies of the six Member States coalesce, a
new and powerful economic entity of obvious economic and political importance will emerge. Should economic integration lead to
political integration, the face of continental Europe would undergo
a profound change-a change which would have world-wide repercusswns.
*J.D., University of Michigan Law School; J.U.D., Charles University, Faculty
of Law, Prague. Professor of International Law and Organization, University of
Michigan Law School. Member of the Illinois and District of Columbia Bars. Formerly of the United States Department of State. Author of a number of articles on
European integration problems.
1
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND ITS MEANING TO THE UNITED STATES, A
STATEMENT ON NATIONAL PoLICY BY THE RESEARCH AND PoLICY COMMITTEE FOR Eco-

NOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (1959).
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In the two years which have elapsed since the Treaty came into
effect most of the steps envisaged by the Treaty have been taken in
accordance with its timetable. Important questions have also arisen
concerning the relationship of the Community to other Western
European as well as non-European states.

B. A

GLANCE AT HISTORY

The European Economic Community is an outgrowth of the European movement, a complex composite of political and economic
forces which have come to the fore in strength since World War II.
Europe, devastated and weakened by war and the loss of colonies,
faced the two emergent giants, the United States and the Soviet
Union. Its division by trade barriers underlined its weakness. Determined to build on pre-war ideas of a United Europe, on the feeling of the people that there must be no more internecine European
wars and on a variety of special national interests favoring such a
movement, a small group of individuals pressed for unification of
Europe. NATO provided the defense shield. The Organization for
European Economic Cooperation ( O.E.E.C.) had paved the. way in
the economic field. This body, which before its reorganization had
as members 18 countries of "Greater Europe," 2 was originally set
up to help distribute the all-important Marshall Plan aid. When
this task was completed, O.E.E.C. worked with substantial, but
nonetheless partial, success to free intra-European trade from
quantitative import restrictions. Through its European Payments
Union it provided a European clearing house for multilateral settlement of accounts. Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (together referred to as "Benelux") agreed on a closer association in
a customs union. The Council of Europe originally conceived of as
a framework for a federated Europe provided a "European" forum
for an organized debate by national parliamentarians of fifteen European states. Finally, in 1952 the Six of "Little Europe" (Benelux, France, Germany, and Italy) established the European Coal
and Steel Community which represents the first serious effort to advance toward a federal structure on the Continent of Europe. Institutionally, the Coal-Steel Community represented a compromise
2
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
United Kingdom. In addition the United States and Canada were associate countries,
Yugoslavia was invited to be represented by an observer at meetings of the Council
and of the subordinate bodies, and both Yugoslavia and Finland participated in certain activities of the Organization.
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between the federalists who would subordinate national states to a
European federal state possessing its own territorial sovereignty,
and those who would not accept any limitations on the sovereignty
of the Member States beyond revocable Treaty obligations directed
at international cooperation within organizations such as the
O.E.E.C. 3
The next move was the r 9 52 plan for a "supranational" European Defense Community among the Six of "Little Europe" which
envisaged a European Army. When it foundered in the French
Parliament two years later, the cognate project for a European
Political Community was also abandoned. Political integration, it
was said, should be deferred until economic integration lays the
necessary ground work; economic integration must proceed by "sectors" within the national economies of the Six.
The movement was given new momentum by a variety of factors:
the intensified efforts of the militant "Europeans" such as Jean
Monnet and his Action Committee, the need for pooling national resources to develop atomic energy in Europe, and somewhat later,
the Suez crisis which emphasized Europe's lack of economic, as well
as of political, independence. The 1955 conference of the six Foreign Ministers in Messina established a group of governmental
delegates and experts which produced the "Spaak Report," named
after its distinguished Belgian chairman. On the basis of this report,
approved by the Ministers in Venice in May 1956, an intergovernmental conference prepared the texts of two new treaties, one establishing the European Economic Community, the other the European Atomic Energy Community. The two treaties were signed in
Rome on March 25, 1957. After rapid approval in the national parliaments, they went into effect on January r, 1958.4
3
Robert Schuman, Preface, in Reuter, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON
ET DE L'ACIER 7 (1953).
• The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (the E.C.S.C.
Treaty) has been published in English translation by the High Authority of that Community. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the E.E.C.
Treaty) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (the
EURATOM Treaty) have been published in English translation by the Secretariat of
the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euratom in Brussels. The English
text may be obtained from the Information Service of the European Communities,
220 Southern Bldg., Washington s, D.C.
The national laws approving the E.E.C. Treaty are:
Belgium: Law of Dec. z, 1957, [1957] Pasinomie 889.
France: Law No. 57-88o of Aug. 2, 1957, [1957] Sirey, Lois annotees 243·
Germany: Law of July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt II, 753·
Italy: Law No. 1203 of Oct. 14, 1957, [1957] Raccolta ufficiale delle leggi e dei
decreti 3973·
(continued on next page)

4

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

C.

RELEVANCE OF THE COMMUNITY FOR
AMERICAN LA WYERS

These two volumes of essays are destined primarily for American
lawyers. The European Economic Community and some of the
concomitant developments are of considerable interest to an American lawyer for at least three reasons:
First of all, the American businessman has been increasingly interested in Western Europe. Rapid economic growth accompanied
by rising purchasing power in that area has indicated attractive market possibilities. This prospect has been the primary reason for the
dynamic upswing in American direct investment in Western Europe
from about $r.7 billion in 1950 to an estimated $4.8 billion in 1959.
The U.S. investment in the six countries of the European Economic
Community amounts to about two-thirds of that in the rest of
Western Europe (mostly the United Kingdom). However, the
share of the Six has been increasing faster than the share held by
the rest of Western Europe or, for that matter, by all foreign areas
combined. 5 The signing of the E.E.C. Treaty increased the attraction for American enterprises by creating a vision of a mass market
within the territory of the Six similar to that of the United States.
In fact, although new American investments decreased during the
1958 recession everywhere else in the world, they increased substantially in the Community countries.
The interest and involvement of the American businessman in
Western Europe is growing then-whether he only sells his products, licenses his patents and trademarks, enters into joint ventures
with local manufactures, or sets up his own plants in the area. His
planning and his decision-making will have to adjust to the novel
economic and legal framework of the Community. This in turn
means that the American lawyer as his legal counselor must make
the necessary adjustments in his own thinking.
The second reason why these developments are of concern to an
American lawyer is because they have an impact upon the policies of
the United States government. This is of importance not only to
lawyers in government agencies and international organizations,
Luxembourg: Law of Nov. 30, 1957, [1957) Pasinomie Luxembourgeoise, Supp. du
vol. XXX, 1.
Netherlands: Law of Dec. 5, 1957, [1957) Staatsblad No. 493, 1029.
5
Buchdahl, U.S. Investment in Common Market Shows Growing Trend, FoREIGN
COMMERCE WEEKLY 19 (Dec. 21, 1959).

5
who deal with these matters professionally, but to all American lawyers, who, because of the influential role they play on the domestic
scene, must keep abreast of foreign policy developments.
Since the end of the Second World War the United States government has advocated free trade on a world-wide nondiscriminatory
basis. Despite the fact that the six Member States form a block
whose members will grant each other tariff and quota preferences
which they need not extend to it or to other non-member states, the
United States has nonetheless supported the formation of the European Economic Community. It has been prepared to accept this discrimination not only in anticipation of an increased market for
American goods but principally for political reasons. It has viewed
the Community not as just a preferential trade arrangement, not as
just a customs union authorized under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.), but as an important step toward
political unification of Europe. The United States has considered
this unification necessary in order to provide a new framework for
Franco-German relations and to preserve economic and political
stability in Europe.
But other Western European countries-and most importantly
the United Kingdom-fear that the successful creation of an integrated community will prejudice their own traditional trade interests in the community area and cause new American investments
to concentrate there; they have therefore urged the formation of
a larger free trade area which would include not only the six Community countries but all of the other members of the O.E.E.C. as
well. The negotiations for the larger free trade area collapsed in
1958.
It is difficult to identify the principal reason for this collapse, but
these reasons have been suggested: the reluctance as a matter of
principle on the part of some Community members (particularly
France) to open their national markets to goods from additional
countries; the concern that the Community would be destroyed if
it were "diluted" in a broader arrangement before its institutions
are firmly established; the unwillingness of the United Kingdom to
accept any limitation on its freedom to control its national tariff visa-vis the states outside the free trade area (presumably because of
the Commonwealth preference arrangements) ; the United Kingdom's need to protect its agriculture; technical difficulties created by
the untried free trade area concept; and finally, the suspicion on the
part of some that the United Kingdom's primary purpose, in line
AMERICAN LAWYER VIEWS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
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with its historic continental policy, was to prevent the emergence
of a single powerful entity on the Continent.
After the negotiations had ended in a deadlock, the United Kingdom, along with Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Austria, Switzerland,
and Portugal (the so-called "Outer Seven") initialed a Convention in
November 1959 establishing a European Free Trade Area Association (E. F. T.A.). 6 This Convention which was ratified in 1960 is to
create a free trade area within the territories of the Seven, but it is
devoid of any institutional, or other, elements of integration.
As a result of these developments the United States finds itself
faced with two groups, the Six and the Outer Seven, which are not
very friendly to each other and which as preferential trade groupings are inherently discriminatory against American-made goods.
This unforeseen situation has occurred at a time when the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit has created a need to increase exports of
American goods to Europe, when previously-existing grounds for
discrimination against dollar goods based on shortages of hard currency have disappeared, when a coordinated Western effort on a far
larger scale in aid of less-developed areas has become imperative,
and when political unity within the Atlantic Community is as urgent
as ever.
In the face of this situation, the United States took the initiative
in January 1960 which led to the creation of a new forum for further study and negotiation concerning these complex questions.
A third reason justifying an American lawyer's preoccupation
with the European Economic Community is this: the Community
represents a new kind of organization. It is sometimes described as
"supranational" because of the significant powers which the Member States have given to the Community institutions. The Community has the power to make Community law with direct and immediate impact upon the national laws of the six Member States and on
enterprises in those States. It has a Community Court with the
power to interpret this Community law and its interpretations bind
national courts. And, finally, the Community envisages harmonization of the six national legal systems in those fields which affect the
functioning of the Common Market. In the long run modifications
of national law will therefore occur which will affect commerce and
industry.
• For the text of the E.F.T.A. Convention see EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA AssociAText of Convention and other Documents approved in Stockholm on zoth November, 1959, Cmnd. 906, London.
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II. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

This brief review will focus on the Community, but will make
some reference to the European Free Trade Association
(E.F.T.A.), since the Association is of obvious relevance to much
that will be said.
A. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY AND
THE E.F.T.A.
When the Six established the Community, their aim was to expand their economies by increasing the effectiveness of their uses of
national resources and to raise living standards; their ultimate aim
was a coalescence of the six economies. The objective of the Seven
in agreeing on the E.F.T.A. was firstly to enlarge trade among themselves and thus to compensate for any trade losses they may suffer in
Community markets by remaining outside the Community; secondly,
they hoped to strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the
Community.
The Six sought to achieve their objectives within a new extensive
institutional framework in two ways: by establishing the so-called
Common Market and by laying the foundation for the development
of a common Community economic policy. The Seven of the
E.F.T.A., on the other hand, sought to achieve their objectives by
means of a free trade arrangement with little institutional machinery
and a minimum of limitation on national policy-making.
B. THE COMMON MARKET vs. THE FREE TRADE AREA
ARRANGEMENT
The Common Market of the Community has three main features:
1) In the first place it involves a customs union like that which
has existed since 1950 among Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Customs duties, import quotas and equivalent governmental
restrictions upon the flow of goods will be gradually removed
within the territories of the Six and a common external tariff on nonmember goods will be progressively established. A common external
tariff distinguishes a customs union from a free trade area such as
the E.F.T.A. Thus within the E.F.T.A. customs duties and equivalent charges and quotas will be removed progressively on a time
schedule substantially synchronized with that of the Community;
but in the E.F.T.A. each of the seven members will retain its own
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national tariff levels on non-member goods. In principle, agricultural
products are subject to the tariff and quota provisions of the E.E.C.
Treaty but are not within the reach of the comparable provisions of
the E.F.T.A. Convention.
2) The second feature of the Common Market which distinguishes it from a simple customs union resulted from the conviction
that free circulation of goods alone is not enough to ensure the most
economical employment of labor and capital. The Common Market
requires the removal of discriminatory governmental restrictions
upon the movement of workers (so that they can move into areas of
labor demand), and the removal of similar restrictions on the flow
of capital and free access of individuals and companies to selfemployed economic activities (so that individuals and companies
may enjoy freedom of establishment and may freely supply commercial, industrial, and professional services across national frontiers). The E.F.T.A. Convention says nothing about the free movement of workers, apparently because the present national laws and
international obligations of the Seven were considered adequate;
although it views the prevailing international obligations with respect to the freedom of "invisible transactions and transfers" as
"sufficient at present," the Convention contemplates possible future
decisions of the E.F.T.A. Council in this field; and it contains a very
flexible and qualified "national treatment" provision with respect to
the right of establishment.
3) The third feature of the Common Market reflects the idea
that effective employment of resources requires competition. Thus
the Common Market includes the so-called "Common Rules" which
are designed to maintain conditions of qualified free competition.
Some of these rules will be enforceable by penalties against enterprises and others by proceedings against Member States. The rules
prohibit specified restrictive agreements and practices by individuals or enterprises, some, but not all, governmental subsidies, dumping practices, protective taxes on imports and excessive drawbacks
on exports within the Community. Public enterprises and state monopolies are to be governed by Treaty rules with certain qualifications. Indirect taxes are to be "harmonized." National laws which
distort competition are to be modified so that the distortion is removed, and generally laws which have "direct incidence" on the establishment or functioning of the Common Market are to be "approximated."
There is, of course, little competition and extensive government
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regulation in the field of agriculture and transportation. The E.E.C.
Treaty recognizes this situation, but it provides that national regulation in these two vital areas is to be superseded by Community
regulation and Community policy to be developed by the institutions of the Community.
The E.F.T.A. does not deal with transportation. Primary agricultural products (but not manufactured foodstuffs) are excluded
from the provisions requiring the removal of customs duties and
quotas and are to be the subject of "agricultural agreements" between members. Until the Community succeeds in the difficult task
of formulating a common agricultural policy, the power of the Six
to protect their agriculture, although it is subject to supervision by
the Community institutions, does not, in effect, differ substantially
from the power of the Seven.
No "approximation" or "harmonization" of national legislation
is envisaged in the E.F.T.A. Instead of the fairly detailed "Common Rules" of the Community, the E.F.T.A. Convention contains
broad and more or less general principles on restrictive practices,
government export subsidies, public enterprises, dumping and the
like. The violation of these principles may lead to a complaint by a
member government before the Council of governmental representatives. The Council is to examine before the end of I964
whether additional measures are necessary to deal with the effects
of restrictive practices or dominant enterprises on trade between the
members.
C. THE BASES FOR "COMMON POLICIES"
OF THE COMMUNITY

The Common Market involves one single common external tariff
against non-member goods. The Six transferred the control over this
tariff to Community institutions and authorized the institutions to
pursue a common commercial policy in relation to non-member
states and to negotiate tariff agreements on behalf of the Community. This common commercial policy is to include uniform principles particularly in regard to tariff amendments and conclusion of
tariff and trade agreements, alignment of measures of liberalization
of import restrictions, export policy and protective measures such as
those to be taken in cases of dumping and subsidies. Although the
Community institutions will determine the tariff levels on imports
from non-member countries, national authorities of the Member
States will continue to collect the customs duties on these goods, and
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the revenue from customs will continue to flow into national treasuries. The Treaty does, however, envisage the possibility of making
customs revenues available to the Community to defray its expenses
in lieu of direct financial contributions by the Member States. This
substitution may be achieved by unanimous agreement in the Community Council of Ministers coupled with whatever implementing
national action may be required under the constitutions of the Member States.
In sharp contrast to the Community arrangement, the E.F.T.A.
members have retained control over their national external tariffs
and commercial policies as well as their individual freedom to negotiate tariff agreements with third countries-subject, however, to
consultation and complaints procedure in the event of trade deflections caused by differences in national tariff levels.
The Member States of the Community declared that their economic policies relating to cyclical boom and slump trends are a "matter of common interest" and agreed to consult on specific remedial
measures. Moreover, the Community Commission may propose appropriate measures to the Council of Ministers; but it is only after
the Council has unanimously agreed on a basic measure that it may
issue implementing directives by a qualified majority. In March
1960 the Council of Ministers established a special committee on
policy concerning economic trends and provided that the governments of Member States will keep the Commission informed of their
projects which might affect economic trends. The E.E.C. Treaty provisions are substantially less specific than the corresponding provisions of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, and they give no indication
of the character and extent of "governmental" intervention by Community institutions which the Member governments may be prepared to accept in the event of economic strain.
The Six have retained separate budgets, currencies, central banks,
reserves, and balance-of-payments. But they undertook in the Treaty
to pursue an economic policy which would maintain sound currency
while ensuring a high level of employment and price stability. They
have accepted an obligation to coordinate their policies in order to
achieve these "magic triangle" objectives. The coordination is to
take place through the collaboration of governmental departments
and central banks but the Community Commission may recommend
to the Community Council of Ministers ways of bringing about
such collaboration. A Monetary Committee helps to coordinate
national policies in monetary matters but it has purely advisory
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functions. The Six undertook further to treat their exchange rate
policies as a matter of common interest and to accept national counter-measures, taken under the Community Commission's control,
against unilateral alterations in exchange rates. Escape clauses and
mutual assistance measures under the control of the Community institutions are also available to Member States which find themselves
in balance-of-payments difficulties. In the present state of sound currencies and generally favorable balance-of-payments situation of
the Member States, the objectives of coordination appear to be
achieved; the test will only come if adverse changes occur in one or
more of the Member States. But the fact that the Members have relinquished the right to re-impose restrictions and tariffs unilaterally
should prove a powerful incentive to coordinate policies.
Apart from specific Treaty limitations (such as those concerning
the free flow of capital) national policies regarding investment of
public funds or the channeling of private investments will be circumscribed only to the extent that a common Community economic
policy emerges by agreement among the members. The European
Investment Bank, with a subscribed capital of $1 billion and established by the E.E.C. Treaty as a Community body, was conceived
of as a supplementary source of capital patterned after the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Its establishment reflects the concern expressed during the negotiations that new
investment capital will tend to move to those areas of the Community which are already industrialized, with the result that the
less developed regions like southern Italy will fall still further behind.
In the field of social policy the Community members stated their
intention to improve the working conditions of labor by means of
gradual equalization in an upward direction. This result is to be
achieved not only through the changes brought about by the advent
of a Common Market economy but also through Treaty procedures
and "approximation" of national laws.
In viewing the E.E.C. Treaty provisions in the area of economic,
financial and social policy, it is apparent that the specific legal commitments of the Member States are quite limited. Yet the Community machinery offers ample potential for the development of
common Community policies through Community institutions if the
Member States should wish to utilize the institutions for this purpose. Should the Community institutions be allowed to make important economic policy decisions, a move towards political integra.
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tion would appear unavoidable since economic policy cannot be formulated without making important political choices. However, there
is no indication at this time that the governments are willing to take
such a step. A unified policy is more likely to emerge as a result of
national action taken in response to the economic realities of the
Common Market than as a result of the decisions of Community institutions.
The E.F.T.A. Convention contains no reference to social policies
nor to a common investment agency. It limits itself to providing for
periodic consultations on economic and financial policies and for
consideration of balance-of-payments difficulties in the Council. In
general, the Council may hear complaints of member governments,
recommend remedies and authorize suspension of benefits against
any member government which refuses to comply with a recommendation. The basic philosophy of the E.F.T.A. is one of economic
cooperation among independent states coupled with a minimum of
institutional machinery and only such institutions as are fairly common in public international organizations.

D.

THE TIMETABLE

Some of the Member States of the Community like France and
Italy, which have a long-standing protectionist tradition, were concerned during the negotiations for the E.E.C. Treaty that their industries would suffer from the new competitive conditions. To cushion the anticipated impact of the changes envisaged by the Treaty
it was agreed that the various steps toward the realization of the
Community should only be gradually taken-this step-by-step progression to be effected in three stages over a longish transitional
period of twelve to fifteen years. This meant that the Common
Market could have been in full operation by the end of 1969, and,
in any case, by the end of 1972.
One of the most interesting and unexpected later developments
has been the demand by industrial groups in the Community that the
transitional period be shortened. These groups have accepted the
Common Market, have made their investment plans on the basis ·
of a large market and now wish that large market to come into being as quickly as possible. Some of the industries which opposed the
Common Market in the earlier stages now favor acceleration. One
reason may be that they have concluded that their earlier fears of
competition were groundless. Another reason which may be suggested, if one chooses to be cynical, is that industrialists have now
made restrictive arrangements with their potential competitors in
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the other Member States of the Community which will prevent competition, although this may be contrary to the Common Rules of the
Community. It is certainly true that there has been a wave of industrial mergers and agreements for cooperation and specialization
across national frontiers in the Community in anticipation of the
larger market. The overriding factor favoring accelerated reduction of internal tariffs and quota barriers and the erection of a common external tariff has, however, been the prosperous state of national economies.
In May I960 the Council of Ministers, acting as an intergovernmental conference of the Member States, approved a modified acceleration proposal of the Commission. According to this decision,
the tariff reduction within the Community on industrial goods was
to be increased by the end of I 96 I from 30% to 40% and, subject
to a further Council decision in the light of the economic situation, to so%. The first step toward the establishment of the common external tariff was to be advanced from the end of I 96 I to
the end of I 960. Because the external tariff is calculated on the
basis of the arithmetic average of the national tariffs of the Member States, however, the low-tariff Member States, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, would have to increase their current
customs duties on some non-member goods to approach the new
external tariff level. An acceleration would require a speed-up in
such increases, which in turn would create problems not only for
the Member States concerned but for non-member states (such as
the United States) whose exports will be affected by such increases.
To meet this problem the Council decided that for the purpose of
calculating the adjustments in national tariffs involved in the first
step toward the establishment of the common external tariff, that
tariff be reduced provisionally by zo% for the benefit of goods from
non-member states on the assumption that non-members will grant
reciprocal concessions in the G.A.T.T. negotiations in I961. This
step was to stress the liberal trade policy of the Community towards
the outside world. The Council decided further that all quantitative
import restrictions on industrial products of Member States must
be removed by the end of I 96 I, while such restrictions on nonmember products were to be removed "as soon as possible" in accordance with the obligations derived from G.A.T.T. and in the
light of recommendations by the International Monetary Fund. Special provision was made with respect to agricultural products.
In a simultaneous "declaration of intention" the Council affirmed
its desire to hasten the application of the Treaty with respect to
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social measures particularly concerning occupational training of
workers, their freedom of movement, equal pay for men and women
workers, and the adjustment in social security systems. The Council
also indicated its intention to move forward correspondingly in the
fields of competition, transportation, and right of establishment and
to ensure progress in the economic development of the associated
overseas areas. The Commission was directed to submit the necessary proposals. The Council stressed the liberal trade policy of the
Community toward third countries and called for negotiations particularly with the E.F.T.A. countries with a view to reciprocal reduction of trade barriers on the basis of G.A.T.T. principles.
Despite the complexities and difficulties arising especially with
respect to agricultural products it is quite likely that the Community
schedule will be substantially accelerated.

E.

THE GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE COMMUNITY

The E.E.C. Treaty applies to the European territories of the
Member States and to a substantial extent to Algeria and to French
overseas departements. The other overseas dependencies of the
Member States located mostly in Africa are tied to the Community in a special "association." The link between Europe and Africa
involving territories almost ten times larger than the metropolitan
areas of the Six and 55 million people is of obvious political significance. The tariff provisions governing the "association" are contained in the Treaty itself while the rules on import restrictions,
right of establishment and financial assistance are included in a separate Implementing Convention annexed to the Treaty which is to be
renegotiated in five years.
By virtue of this "association" the dependent territories will acquire free access for their products to metropolitan markets but
may retain protection against the products of the Member States
to the extent necessary for the development of their economies.
Moreover, the Treaty established a Development Fund under the
administration of the Community Commission to provide some $5 So
million for economic development of the overseas territories during
the first five years. The rapidly evolving changes in the political ties
between the Member States and their dependent territories have,
however, already brought about modifications in the membership of
the "association."
If an overseas dependency associated with the Community becomes independent, its "association" with the Community terminates, as did that of the former French Guinea when it achieved
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statehood. However, if such a newly independent state chooses to
maintain a special relationship with a Member State, there appears
to be no obstacle to a continuation of its "association" with the
Community. There is a possibility that the new Malagasy Republic
and Mali Federation, both former French dependencies, may choose
this course.
The Community may negotiate an agreement of "association"
with any third country, a union of states or an international organization. Such agreement is to embody reciprocal rights and obligations, provide for joint action and may or may not require a Treaty
amendment.
Those independent overseas countries with which a Member State
has maintained special relations have been invited to associate themselves with the Community. The negotiations for an "association"
with one such country, Tunisia, appear to have been interrupted.
Turkey, Greece, and Dutch East Indies (through the Netherlands
government) have asked to be "associated" with the Community,
and separate negotiations are in progress concerning association of
each of the three.
As distinguished from "association," full membership in the Community is open only to European states; admission to full membership can be effected only after the necessary Treaty amendment has
been ratified by all Member States.
III. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

A.

THE TREATY:

A

QuADRILINGUAL LABYRINTH?

The legal basis for the Community is a multilateral Treaty, a
formidable instrument of 248 Articles with four Annexes, thirteen
Protocols, and one Convention; another Convention relating to certain institutions common to the European Communities; and the
Final Act concerning both the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties with
nine annexed Declarations. All these documents were drafted in the
four official Community languages (Dutch, French, German, and Italian) and all four versions are equally authoritative.
Two members of the Paris Law Faculty disagree in their estimate
of the E.E.C. Treaty. Professor Daniel Villey says:
[The Treaty] is interminable, complex, impossible to disentangle. This is not the form of the great texts which
heralded and brought about the great transformations in
history. . . . This then is how Europe-still in the proc-
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cess of gestation-falls head first into byzantinism. . . .
What is this mixed salad of eloquent declarations of
principle, minute and at times ridiculously detailed regulations, platonic protestations of good intentions, technical rules of economic disarmament, pious wishes, principles and exceptions to principles and exceptions to exceptions? There is not an article affirming a proposition that
another article hidden in another corner of the Treaty
would not render almost meaningless. The judges of the
Court of Justice better have their spectacles handy! The
text which it will be their chore to interpret is a maquis,
a labyrinth, a brain-twister, a puzzle. 7
On the other hand Professor Paul Reuter of the same faculty, a
leading authority in the field of European integration, points out
that despite the vastness of the subject matter the Treaty is not any
longer than the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. He describes its text
as
terse and clear . . . without being sketchy. . . . [D]espite the resort to four languages . . . a comparison
with the Havana Charter or with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade would redound to the advantage of
the Treaty; only a few questions were resolved in too
great a haste, . . . and thus are expressed in extremely
defective formulae. . . . While not achieving the precision and clarity of the Treaty establishing Euratom, the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
reflects a certain conciseness. . . .s
The exceptions, the escape clauses and safeguards written into
the Treaty, particularly at the insistence of France, give an impression of undue complexity. But if one considers the novel character of
the Treaty, its scope and the need to accommodate vital national interests, as well as the continental approach to constitutional documents, it would be naive to expect a simple instrument. The Treaty
extends to all economic activities of a complex industrial societywith the exception of those activities which relate to coal, steel, and
atomic energy, to the extent that such activities are regulated either
by the Coal-Steel Community Treaty or by the Euratom Treaty.
Article 232 of the E.E.C. Treaty seeks to avoid conflicts in the application of the three Treaties by providing that the E.E.C. Treaty
does not "modify" the Coal-Steel Community Treaty or "detract
7
Les Communautes Europeennes et leur incidence sur Ia profession d'avocat, Rapport
de M. Claude Lussan, 1958 LE DROIT EUROPEEN 49, at 52 (No.2, Aug.-Sept. 1958) (this
author's translation).
8
Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE DU
MARCHE CoMMUN 6, at 8 (No. 1, Mar. 1958) (this author's translation).
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from" the Euratom Treaty. Consequently, the latter two have
priority as leges speciales. On the other hand the broader E.E.C.
Treaty as lex generalis would apply to coal and steel products and
nuclear materials where it does not conflict with the other two
Treaties. This formula, however, does not provide simple solutions to a number of problems concerning the relationships of the
three Communities. For instance, while the E.E.C. institutions will
have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to commercial policy toward
non-member states, under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty the
Members retain in principle their freedom to determine national
commercial policies with respect to coal and steel. The Coal-Steel
Community Treaty, however, confers on the Community institutions powers under specified circumstances to restrict imports and
exports to and from non-member countries, to determine maximum
export prices and minimum or maximum tariffs on non-member
goods, and to review trade agreements concluded by the members
with non-member countries. Thus coal and steel appear excluded
from the jurisdiction of E.E.C. institutions over general commercial
policy; yet as a practical matter such exclusion seems hardly feasible. The answer lies perhaps in coordinated action by the institutions of the two Communities. Special problems arise from the fact
that the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, unlike the other two
Treaties, does not apply to the overseas areas. Again, the E.E.C.
Treaty prohibits certain restrictive agreements unless they are specifically authorized; the Euratom Treaty contains no corresponding
provision. Thus such agreements concluded among enterprises engaged in the production of nuclear materials would be illegal unless authorized in accordance with the E.E.C. Treaty procedure. 8"
Obviously, problems of this kind will have to be considered on a
case-by-case basis and, if necessary, resolved by the Commurtity
Court. In the long run the logical solution would be to replace the
three Communities by a single Community.

B.

THE LEGAL NATURE OF THE EUROPEAN
EcoNOMic CoMMUNITY

As suggested in the chapter entitled "The New Legal Remedies
of Enterprises-a Survey," the Treaty provisions range from policy
declarations and obligation~ imposed upon Member States to "selfexecuting" provisions applicable to individuals and enterprises.
8

° CATALANO,

LA COMMUNITA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM, 227, 101-102; cf. Carstens,
18 ZEITSCHR. FtiR AUSL. OFF. RECHT U.
VoLKERRECHT 459 at 461-462, 522-525 (1958).

Die Errichtung des gemeinsamen Marktes,
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The Treaty confers upon the Community an international legal
personality (including the power to enter into international agreements, diplomatic immunity for missions of third states accredited at
the Community, and the like) as well as "domestic" legal personality
(including such rights as the right to sue and hold property) under
the laws of the Member States. Interestingly, the Treaty does not
guarantee the Community immunity from judicial process: it may be
sued in national courts of the Member States or, in specified circumstances, before the Community Court.
In its legal foundation the Community resembles other public
international organizations such as the United Nations, which was
also established by a multilateral treaty. Unlike the Coal-Steel Community Treaty which was concluded for a period of fifty years, and
like the United Nations Charter, the E.E.C. Treaty was concluded
for an indefinite period of time, and no provision is made for withdrawal. Presumably, however, the E.E.C. Treaty could be terminated by mutual agreement of the Member States. A Treaty revision requires ratification of the amendment by all Member States
in accordance with their constitutions, but, by unanimous agreement
in the Community Council of Ministers, the institutions may take
action necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty even if the
Treaty does not expressly grant the requisite power. The Member
States retain, of course, their own international legal personality;
moreover, their role in the selection of the principal personnel and
in the functioning of the institutions is a crucial one. The Community is financed by contributions of its Member States and has no
independent source of revenue at the present time. If a Member
State violates a Treaty obligation, the matter can be brought before the Community Court for binding adjudication; but there is no
general enforcement procedure available against a Member State.
In many respects the Community therefore resembles a public international organization rather than a federal state based on a constitution.
It has been said that the Community is a "supranational," rather
than an international, organization because it can have direct impact on individuals and enterprises, because important powers have
been "transferred" to it irrevocably rather than merely "delegated," because important binding decisions can be taken by majority vote in the Community institutions, and because the institutions
have the task of fostering the development of a common policy and
of enforcing its impartial execution.
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The Community has also been called a "union of states," "a partial federal state," "a partial economic state," "a functional federation," and it has been likened to the German Zollverein as it existed
after 1 8 67. The analysis of the institutional framework in the next
chapter concerning the new institutions and the description of the
sources of the Community law in the chapter on the new legal remedies of enterprises will suggest the conclusion that the Community
is a body which is sui generis, defying classification in any existing
categories.
C. THE TREATY As A "CoNSTITUTION" AND "STATUTE"

Whatever the label which is most appropriate for the Community, the techniques and procedures of the Community resemble in
many respects those of the public law of a state-predominantly of
administrative law, but also those of constitutional law-rather
than those of international organizations and international law.
It may help to understand the character of the Community Treaty
if it is compared with the United States Constitution, providing of
course, that fundamental differences, not only in the legal foundation
but particularly in the functions and objectives of the Community
and of the United States, are kept in mind. Obviously no comparison
is possible between the scope of the powers granted to the federal
institutions in the United States-power to tax, power over defense
and foreign affairs, over interstate and foreign commerce, over currency and post offices, immigration, citizenship-and of the powers
granted to the Community. But the Constitution and the Treaty
both establish institutions, define the mutual relationship of the institutions and their jurisdiction with respect to the Member States,
and provide legal protection for states as well as individuals. In
addition, however, the Treaty incorporates, in more or less general terms, substantive policies which in the United States would be
contained not in the Constitution but in federal statutes.
For example, the Constitution grants to Congress the right to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce and deprives the individual states of the power to impose import or export duties. Apart
from certain principles concerning commercial policy derived by the
courts from the commerce clause, American commercial policy is
not defined in the Constitution but in federal statutes, such as the
Tariff Act and the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, and is implemented by reciprocal trade agreements concluded with other
nations.
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The Treaty also prohibits internal customs duties and grants exclusive power over the external tariff to Community institutions; but,
in addition, it establishes a detailed time schedule of steps that must
be taken by the Member States in order to remove intra-Community tariffs and to set up a common external tariff. These obligations
are relatively well defined, and their fulfilment is subject to the supervision of the Community institutions.
Similarly, the antitrust policy of the United States is defined in
federal statutes rather than in the Constitution; the statutes are
based on the very general grant of power by the Constitution to the
Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. On the other
hand, the Treaty, in addition to granting certain powers to the
Community institutions in the antitrust field, defines Community
policy in some detail in the Common Rules and accords to the Community institutions the power to issue implementing provisions with
penalties enforceable directly against enterprises.
The six governments obviously sought to include in the Treaty as
tnuch substantive content as they were able to agree upon. Some
portions, such as those dealing with internal tariffs, are elaborated
in great detail while others contain little more than vague directives
requiring the institutions to evolve general programs or calling for
action by Member States. In such fields as agriculture or transportation, these directives in effect call for continuation of the negotiations which were not completed in the Treaty. Some of the gaps were
unavoidable since the Treaty in some respects deals with national
policies dependent on factors that are neither predictable nor necessarily subject to institutional controls. Because of its general character the Treaty is often referred to as a traite cadre or traite institutionel as distinguished from the Coal-Steel Community Treaty,
a traite normatif. Since the latter Treaty was limited in scope-covering only the fairly concentrated coal and steel industries-it lent
itself to a more detailed and elaborate statement of policies and law.
One consequence of the general character of the Treaty is the
difficulty of predicting the ultimate character of the Community.
The second and related consequence is the importance of the role
assigned to the Member governments and to Community institutions
in filling in the gaps in the Treaty.

IV. LEGAL PROBLEMS FOR AMERICAN LAWYERS
The brief sketch of the Community's objectives, scope and legal
basis drawn above leaves unanswered the question of the impact of
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the Community on the concrete problems of an American lawyer
advising a client who exports to, or does business, in Europe. The
principal purpose of our book is to explore this question as far as
it is possible at this very early date of the Community's existence.
Only a few thoughts will be offered in this introduction in the hope
that they will orient the reader before he embarks upon the detailed
study of the various aspects considered in the individual chapters.

A. ExPORTING TO THE CoMMUNITY
If, for example, an American client has been exporting Americanmade goods to France, his lawyer will still have the problem, as the
Community develops, of making sure that the client does as little
as possible that would subject him to French tax laws or to the jurisdiction of the French courts. The French authorities will still collect customs duties and French import restrictions and other regulations and laws will still have to be observed. But there will be new
problems.
As the tariff and quota barriers are progressively lowered within
the Community the American exporter will be in an increasingly difficult position vis-a-vis his German competitor who exports a similar
product from Germany to France unless, of course, steps are taken
to reduce the customs duties against non-member goods also. By the
end of 1969, and possibly earlier, German goods will move into
France freely while American goods will face the common Community tariff and whatever quota restrictions may be left.
Neither this introduction nor the book itself purports to inquire
into the economic impact of the Community upon American exports
to the Community area. Estimates of this impact vary and in any
event only a detailed product-by-product analysis would be of practical value. One view holds that only a slight fraction of American
exports will be injured severely. 9 If the forecasts of a steep increase
in the growth rate within the Community prove correct (one estimate suggests that by I 97 5 the Six will increase their gross product
by I 20% and perhaps I 50;-,~) / 0 the increased demand for imported
raw materials such as foodstuffs, fuel, and special machinery is expected to cause an increase in absolute terms of imports from non"Kreinin, European Integration and American Trade, 49 AM. EcoN. REv. 615, at
620 (1959); cf. Piquet, First Effects of the Common Market in AMERICAN MANAGEMENT
ASSOCIATION REPORT, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET, NEW FRONTIER FOR AMERICAN
BUSINESS, 124-159 (1958); Les Etats-Unis et le Marche Commun, 1959 REVUE DU
MARCHE COMMUN, no-II8 (No. 12, Mar. 1959).
10
The European Economic Community, Problems It Confronts, .A Statement by
C.E.P.E.S., op. cit. supra note x, at 84.
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member countries. But rhe share of non-members countries, including that of the United States, in the Community market in certain
groups of products may well diminish, 11 and there is concern that
the evolving agricultural policy of the Community will restrict imports of American agricultural products.
Mr. Marc Ouin analyzes in his chapter the Treaty formula for
the computation of the common Community tariff against non-member goods and the progressive steps to be taken toward the erection
of this tariff. Since the completion of Mr. Ouin's study, the basic external tariff has been formulated except for a few gaps still to be
determined.
A lawyer will also have to keep in mind that new procedural requirements exist-for instance, if American goods initially exported
to France are to be re-exported to Germany during the transitional
period while internal tariffs are being reduced but are still in existence. Moreover, the common Community tariff differs from the national tariffs not only with respect to the level of customs duties but
also in its structure and headings. Finally, modifications will occur in
the national customs laws and regulations of the six Member States
since they are, in the words of the Treaty, to be "approximated,"
by the end of 1961.
The first IO percent reduction in the internal tariffs within the
Community has been made as prescribed by the Treaty. With some
important exceptions, benefits of the first reduction have been extended voluntarily to all members of G.A.T.T. including the U.S.
Mr. Ouin also offers a detailed analysis of the Treaty provisions
concerning the gradual removal of the quantitative import restrictions within the Community. The first two steps prescribed by the
Treaty were taken on the specified dates and the Member States
offered to extend certain benefits of the first step on the basis of
reciprocity and-with certain reservations-to grant advantages
"similar" to those involved in the second step, to all members of the
O.E.E.C. The current trend towards an elimination of industrial
(not agricultural) import restrictions in Europe-which certainly
was not anticipated during the Treaty negotiations-may render
moot the question whether the Members of the Community would
infringe their G.A.T.T. undertaking by continuing to maintain
quota restrictions against non-member goods despite their favorable balance-of-payments situation.
As far as the E.F. T.A. is concerned, the American client, exportu Ibid. at 85.
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ing for instance to the United Kingdom, will continue as before to
face the national United Kingdom tariff, but here also his competitive position will become weaker, in relation for instance to Swedish
exporters who will in due course introduce their goods into British
markets unhampered by tariff or quota barriers. Because the different national tariffs will continue to exist, the E.F.T.A. Convention
contains provisions intended to prevent the trade deflection which
might occur if outside raw materials or semi-finished products could
enter in large quantities the E.F.T.A. country with the lowest tariff
and, after processing, move to the other Member States.
B. DOING BusiNEss IN THE CoMMUNITY

The American client who thus far has exported his products from
the United States into France may conclude that he should obtain
a foothold within the Common Market for at least two reasons:
first, because of the anticipated tariff disadvantages just mentioned
and second-and probably more important-because he may have
discovered that he can manufacture the same product at a substantially lower cost, for instance, in the Netherlands where labor costs
are considerably lower than in the United States. In fact, he might
calculate that the same product manufactured in the Netherlands
will be competitive not only in the other Common Market countries
to which it will move freely but also in the United States and perhaps in other markets thus far supplied from the United Statesfor instance those of Latin America.
Another client may have been doing business on the Continent for
some time. He has a manufacturing plant in Germany and assembly
plants in Belgium and in the Netherlands. In anticipation of the
Common Market he sees little purpose in maintaining the assembly
plants. He wants to liquidate the assembly operations and to expand
his German manufacturing facility. This client may estimate that
the E.F.T.A. will function at least for some time as a tariff grouping
against both American and Common Market manufactured goods,
and so he decides to establish a manufacturing plant also in Britain
or to expand an existing British facility with a view to supplying the
E.F.T.A. markets. British-manufactured goods, incidentally, will
also benefit from the Commonwealth trade preferences if exported
to Commonwealth countries.
Finally, still another client has manufacturing facilities in several
European countries. He decides to simplify his line of products and
to manufacture a standardized product in a single country for dis-
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tribution in the entire Common Market area. This may require centralization of management and development of a "European" policy
for investments, patent licensing, marketing and advertising.
Obviously some, if not most, of these situations will not become
realities in the immediate future. But very little imagination is necessary to identify the legal problems involved in implementing the
policy decisions of the client, if and when they are made.
·
The law at the basis of any legal advice on these problems will
as before be predominantly the national law of the countries concerned: company law, tax law and tax treaties, patent and trademark law, the law of unfair competition, foreign exchange and credit
regulations, labor legislation, and a host of other national laws and
regulations. But as the client to an increasing degree comes to view
the area of the Six as an economic unit, his lawyer (with the assistance of foreign counsel) must increasingly frame his advice in
terms of the six (instead of one or a few) national legal systemsand, keeping in mind the E.F.T.A., perhaps in terms of the laws
of other European countries as well.
In addition, new legal problems and new possibilities will arise for
the client as individual provisions of the Treaty are applied. It would
be unwise to expect far-reaching changes in the immediate future, but
examples in seven areas dealt with in this book are suggested to illustrate the possible developments.
I) As Professor Conard and Mr. Nicholson point out in their
contributions, the Council is to adopt by 1962 a general program
which will ensure that nationals and companies of a Member State
will not suffer discrimination by reason of nationality in regard to
the freedom of establishment and to the supply of services in the
other Member States. When this program is put into effect, an
American subsidiary organized under German law and carrying on a
bona fide operation in Germany should be able to establish itself in
Belgium or sell its services there on the same basis as a Belgian company. This would still leave untouched the multitude of license and
permit requirements and restrictions which condition access to industrial, business and professional activities for nationals and foreigners alike. But here also the Treaty calls for "coordination" with
a view to making access to such activities easier. The obligations of
the Member States in this latter respect are less precise and the exceptions and escape possibilities are many. The progress will, no
doubt, be slow but a proposal for progressive action has already been
developed by the Commission in cooperation with experts in the
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national governments. For a long time to come an enterprise will be
concerned primarily with the national laws of business organization
explored by Professor Conard with the aid of advice from his expert consultants.
2) Will an American parent-given exchange controls-be able
to transfer profits of its wholly-owned subsidiary in France to Belgium in order to invest them in a Belgian company? The Council of
Ministers, by the end of 1960, is to adopt directives to remove restrictions on capital movement of this kind, and the Council has already adopted the first directive. Maitre Jeantet suggests, in his
chapter dealing with French exchange controls, that the implementation of the Treaty will sooner or later result in virtually complete
freedom of transfer of funds within the Community except in case
of emergency-and the Community institutions will decide, subject
to review by the Community Court, whether an emergency exists.
3) When the program for the free movement of workers is put
into effect-and it is to be in effect by the end of the transitional period-a German manager or engineer employed by an American
subsidiary will be freely transferable to a sister subsidiary in Italy.
Again, an American subsidiary which faces a labor shortage in Germany will be able to recruit in the surplus labor pool in Italy, since
German regulations must be adjusted to allow entry and employment of Italian workers in Germany without discrimination. The
reverse of the coin is that the enterprise will not be allowed to fire
these Italians because of their nationality when German labor later
becomes available. Perhaps the most important regulation adopted
by the Council thus far was designed to help labor mobility by making transferable social security rights acquired by a worker in one
country when he moves to another country. As Professor KahnFreund points out in his chapter, whether these provisions and other
measures including the special Social Fund for temporary unemployment assistance will in fact bring about large scale mobility comparable to that in the United States is an open question in view of differing European mores.
The Treaty anticipates that the substantial differences in social
benefits and working conditions generally within the Community
will be equalized upward by virtue of the normal operation of the
expanded single market (for example, under collective bargaining
pressures) ; but intervention of the institutions and harmonization
of national laws is also contemplated as a secondary means of advancing this process. The scope of this intervention and the extent
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of the modification of national laws cannot now be foreseen. Pointing to the great diversity obtaining in national laws and practices in
the Six, Professor Kahn-Freund concludes that the immediate effect
on the national laws in not likely to be striking. The tendency towards harmonization of the various legal systems, he feels, is unmistakable, but it is anyone's guess how far harmonization will go.
In any event, for a long time to come the lawyer will have to continue
to consult the national legal sources which Professor Kahn-Freund
surveys in his contribution.
4) A similar conclusion is reached in the chapter by Dr. Van
Hoorn and Professor Wright concerning tax problems facing
American enterprises in the Community. The national tax systems
manifest important differences predicated on historic forces which
cannot be easily deflected. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers
has been given the power under the Treaty, on the Commission's
proposal, to take measures to harmonize national indirect tax laws
"in the interest of the Common Market"; and in response to
pressures from industry, studies have already been instituted to
determine ways of harmonizing turnover taxes.
5) Mr. Stephen Ladas, viewing the industrial property laws of
the Six against the background of the emergent Common Market,
foresees limited modification of the patent laws, but a substantial
harmonization of trademark laws with the possibility, for instance,
of a "European Community Trademark."
6) In conducting its foreign operations in the Community an
American enterprise must comply with national legislation pertaining to restrictive practices and mergers in the Community countries.
Some such legislation exists in three of the Six and the remaining
three may be expected to adopt measures in this field in due course.
Professor Riesenfeld discusses this national legislation and the new
problems which the Treaty rules governing competition create.
7) Enforcement of Treaty rules is to be provided for by Council
regulation establishing penalties for violations by enterprises. Problems of the legal protection of enterprises are considered in the
chapter entitled "The New Legal Remedies-a Survey."

C.

CONCLUSIONS

The preceding observations viewed from an American lawyer's
standpoint suggest three conclusions:
I) A client's policy decisions will obviously not be determined
solely or even preponderantly by legal or tax considerations; for in-
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stance, a decision to locate in France rather than in the Nether lands
might be dictated by an opportunity to buy into a going concern in
France which is not available in the Netherlands. But it is obvious
that as the area of the Six tends to become a single economic unit a
comparative investigation of the national laws of the Six will be
increasingly necessary as a basis for competent legal advice.
2) In due course the Treaty provisions and acts of the Community institutions will have some impact on national laws and on enterprises.
3) In the long run differences in national laws and regulations
will tend to lessen, particularly where these differences distort competition or otherwise interfere with the proper functioning of the
Common Market. One commentator would include here legislation
in the field of commercial law, negotiable instruments, law of business associations, unfair competition, indirect and even direct tax
laws and civil procedureP Although the Treaty confers substantial
powers on the Community institutions in this field, there is no indication that the institutions will embark on a systematic effort to
bring about a large scale assimilation of national laws. Instead, the
Community Commission has proceeded, in cooperation with national officials, on the basis of a priority list which includes subjects
where a disparity among the laws has already created or is expected
to create practical problems and where pressures for action are
exerted by trade organizations, by the European Parliamentary Assembly or by national governments. Studies and negotiations are in
progress directed at assimilation of laws governing industrial property, indirect taxes, public bidding, sale of goods, health regulations,
such as those governing contents and packaging of food products,
safety regulations, and laws on recognition of foreign judgments
and arbitral awards and some phases of company law. Such assimilation may be achieved by Council directives (particularly under
Article 100) and by new international agreements.
V. A LONGER RANGE VIEW

A.

THE COMMUNITY AND THE INVESTMENT CLIMATE

Although some of the Six, such as Belgium, have made more intensive efforts to attract American capital than have others, the
climate for American investment has been generally favorable in
12
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all the Community countries and the rate of return high. With the
increased demand for capital necessary for the development of the
Common Market there is little reason to anticipate any change. Dr.
Hallstein, President of the Community Commission, addressed an
American audience in the .. following terms:
It seems to me that our Community has received no more
gratifying vote of confidence than American industry's
rapidly mounting investment in the Common Market. I
can assure you-and I wish to make this point emphatically clear-that we welcome this import of capital and
know-how from America, and we hope in the future to see
a reciprocal movement of European investment to your
country. Not only is this good economics for all of us, but
it is a great force for unity. The more our businessmen become partners-the more our economic eggs are scrambled-the greater will be the strength and solidarity of
the Western W orldY
The experts differ in their estimates of the role which American
capital will play in the industrial growth of the Community. Pointing to the current drive of the Community industries to marshal their
resources and streamline their facilities and methods, some believe
that the American role, while substantial in absolute terms, will be
no more than marginal in the context of the over-all development in
the Community.
In any event, one problem deserves consideration from the longer
range viewpoint of American enterprise. It is reflected in the very
first "parliamentary" question addressed in the spring of 19 58 to
the newly organized Community Commission. The question was
asked in the just-born European Parliamentary Assembly by M.
Michel Debre, then a parliamentary representative and later the
first Prime Minister of the French Fifth Republic. M. Debre pointed
to the investment plans of foreign and particularly American companies seeking to take advantage of the Common Market, which
in his opinion, if unsupervised, might cause economic as well as
political and social unbalance. He inquired of the Commission
whether "strict regulation" should not be considered on an urgent
basis to ensure that all the Member States of the Common Market
would share the benefits and burdens of foreign investment on an
·
equal basis. The Commission replied:
13
Remarks by Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European
Economic Community, at the National Press Club Luncheon in Washington, D.C., on
June II, 1959.
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The Commission favors maximum development within
the Community of private investment originating in third
countries and believes it necessary to avoid discouraging
it; it is, however, conscious of the problems which may
result from an excessive concentration of such investment
in any one country or in any given industry. . . .
The Commission went on to recall Article 72 of the Treaty which
requires Member States "to keep the Commission informed of any
movements of capital to and from third countries as are known to
them" and authorizes the Commission to address to Member States
appropriate "opinions." It indicated its intention to call promptly
for the necessary information. "To the extent that investment projects known to it will call for concerted action," the Commission will
issue opinions to governments and "seek, in accord with them, the
bases for an effective collaboration." 14 Since then the Commission
has stated that it has completed the classification of capital movements and a study of methods of obtaining information concerning
them and has invited the governments to supply it with specified
information "known to them." The arrangement for the supply of
information to the Commission is reported to be functioning regularly.
The implication of this exchange for long range investment plans
of American enterprises is self-evident. Difficulties must be expected
if an entire industry or an important part thereof in one or more
Member States should come under American control. Similarly,
problems would arise if American investment should tend to concentrate in one Member State at the expense of others with equal or
more urgent capital requirements. It might be of interest to mention
a few figures showing the relative level of saturation of the Community Members with American direct investment. In 1957, measured in terms of the relation of these American investments to the
respective national incomes, the degree of saturation amounted in
Italy to 1.1%, in France and in the Federal Republic of Germany to
1.2 %, in Belgium to 1.9%, and in the Netherlands to 2.9%. These
figures may be compared with 3·9% for the United Kingdom and
35·3% for Canada where the predominance of American capital has
been the subject of considerable discussion. 15
14

15

II4

[1958] ]OURNAL 0FFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES 25-26.
1959 REVUE ov MARCHE CoMMUN no, at

Les Etats-Unis et le Marchi Commun,
(No. 12, Mar. ·1959),
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B.

THE UNITED STATEs AND EuROPE

The re-emergence of Western Europe as an economic power of
the first order has modified profoundly the relationship between
the United States and Western Europe. The change from economic
dependence to economic partnership requires adjustments in the
forms of cooperation. The need for such adjustment was recognized
at the Western Summit meeting at Paris in December 1959. The
subsequent conference of Ministers of thirteen O.E.E.C. countries
and the European Economic Community Commission led to the
appointment of "Four Wise Men" who produced a report in April
1960 recommending a scheme for a reorganization of the O.E.E.C.
The United States and Canada, which heretofore held the status of
"associates" in the O.E.E.C. are to become full members of the remodeled "Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development."
The Report suggests as the first, and perhaps foremost, task of
the organization continuous economic policy consultations to ensure
coordination of national policies toward sustained economic growth
under conditions of stability. The growing interdependence of national economies clearly requires coordination. The annual country
review procedure developed by the O.E.E.C. under which each member submits its economic situation and policies to the examination of
all its partners would continue to be the basis for the consultations.
It is logical that the new Western Europe must carry its share in
what is perhaps the most vital undertaking of this century, the aid
to developing countries. The Report recognizes the common interest
in this "challenge of our time" and foresees that the Organization's
role will be to coordinate technical and financial assistance. The
"Development Assistance Group" consisting of capital-exporting
O.E.E.C. countries and Japan, which was formed in January 1960,
would become affiliated with the Organization. It would seem to this
writer that wise policy will seek to utilize existing instrumentalities
such as the World Bank and the United Nations in which all the
states concerned, including the developing countries and other nonEuropean capital exporting states, are full participants.
In the trade field the Report notes that the O.E.E.C. has largely
achieved its regional European objectives: "balance of payments
difficulties have, in general, disappeared; external convertibility of
the principal currencies has been restored; and the liberalization of
trade in industrial products is almost complete." Recognizing that

3I
the context within which the O.E.E.C. operated has now changed,
the Report recommends that the O.E.E.C. Code of Liberalization
and the other O.E.E.C. decisions on commercial policy be terminated. However, the Report also suggests that commercial policy,
as an element of general economic policy, will be within the responsibility of the Organization. The availability of G.A.T.T. as a permanent forum for trade matters is noted. Because it may prove difficult to transplant some of the O.E.E.C. methods to G.A.T.T. (such
as the almost continuous confrontation of views of all interested
members), the Report suggests that such methods might be adopted
by the new Organization in considering "trade problems of a general
and recurrent nature as well as for concrete problems causing special
difficulties."
A draft Convention attached to the Report would retain in substance the institutional framework of the O.E.E.C., consisting of a
Council composed of representatives of all member governments, a
small Executive Committee, the Secretary-General with a Secretariat and certain subordinate bodies and agencies. In principle, decisions would require unanimous consent in the Council. The Convention is to enter into force not later than September I, I 96 I, if by
that time at least I 5 signatories have completed the ratification or
acceptance process required by their national constitutions.
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There is little question that the present division of Western Europe into two groups, the Community and the E.F.T.A., harbors
seeds of discord and threatens the unity of the free world. Germany
for economic reasons and France for reasons of political policy are
likely to oppose further integration of the Six in the immediate future. Nevertheless, the continuing co-existence of the Community as
an economic grouping of increasing economic impact and of
E.F.T.A. must be anticipated. Since Greece and Turkey are in the
process of associating themselves with the Community and Finland
is gravitating toward the E.F.T.A., only Iceland, Ireland and Spain
of the I 8 members of the old O.E.E.C. remain outside the two
groupings. An important problem will be, on the one hand, to prevent conflict between the two groups which could have grave political consequences and, on the other hand, of course, to avoid trade
arrangements between them which would prejudice non-member nations. Some observers discern a trend in the United Kingdom toward
accepting membership in the Community providing that the Com-
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munity functions will be limited to those of a customs union. The fact
that both the Community and the E.F.T.A. depend greatly on
trade with each other as well as with the outside world holds promise
of a satisfactory solution-a general reduction of trade barriers.
Efforts to achieve such a reduction would be most effective in the
Geneva forum of G.A.T.T., since that forum assures broad participation of free world countries. The negotiations for tariff concessions scheduled for 1961 offer an opportunity to lower tariff barriers against American exports to Europe before the effects of the
regional groupings on trade patterns are felt strongly. The emergence of other regional trade groupings, one in Central America
and the other in South America, underlines the necessity for
strengthening G.A.T.T. as an instrument for increasing world-wide
non-discriminatory trade.
The countries of the \Varsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union have
been engaged in a massive regional integration undertaking of their
own designed to create "a socialist market" as a corollary of their
drive toward large-scale industrialization. The free world must be
prepared to continue to face unrelenting and increasing pressures
from the East. For this, if for no other reason, the strength and
unity of the free world remain the overriding policy goals to which
regional interests must be subordinated. 16
10

Portions of this chapter were included in an address delivered before the Institute
on Legal Aspects of the European Community held by the Federal Bar Association in
Washington, D.C., on February II-I3, 1960.

Chapter II
The New Institutions
Eric Stein
Even a cursory review of the Treaty indicates that the tasks assigned to the Community institutions range across the entire spectrum of economic activities in the Community, but this general
statement is subject to three reservations.
In the first place, the areas in which exclusive jurisdiction has been
granted to the institutions are limited. In other areas the institutions
have concurrent jurisdiction ":ith national authorities and their
primary role is to supplement and supervise national action. In many
of these areas their powers of decision are granted for the purpose
of "prohibiting certain practices rather than substituting themselves
for national authority." 1 In others the institutions are limited, as
a matter of Treaty law, to the issuance of recommendations or
opinions addressed to the national governments.
Secondly, because of the very general character of major portions
of the Treaty the eventual scope of the power of the institutions
cannot yet be assessed. Only the Investment Bank, the Overseas
Development Fund and in a lesser degree the Social Fund now have
direct operational responsibility, although proposals have been made
for the establishment of new agencies, such as a European Fund for
Structural Improvement in Agriculture 2 or a European Center for
Fuel and Power Policy to coordinate action in the energy field. 3
Thirdly, in any organization the legal powers and structure created
[The author is greatly indebted to Professor Paul Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty
and to Mr. Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European Communities, for their detailed and most helpful comments on this chapter.]
l Reuter,
Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REvUE nu
MARCHE COMMUN 160 at 166 (No. 3).
"Proposals by the E.E.C. Commission summarized in POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PLANNING (P.E.P. LONDON), PROPOSALS FOR A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN E.E.C.
( 1960).
"443 PRESS BULLETIN EUROPE, EURATOM AND COMMON MARKET (supplement) (June 24,
1959) [hereinafter cited as EUROPE].
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by its constitutive document are only a part of the story. An institution, once created, tends to develop in ways which often differ
substantially from the intentions of the drafters of its basic document. The United Nations offers a startling example of this developmental process.
In the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, provisions regarding the
institutions figure prominently at the beginning of the Treaty. In
the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties these provisions are placed at
the end. The former Treaty employs the term "supranational,"
the latter two do not. The chapter on institutions of the Coal-Steel
Community Treaty begins with the "executive" while the chapters
of the latter two deal first with the Assembly. There is reason to
believe that these differences reflect an evolution in the attitudes of
the national governments toward the role of the institutions in the
Communities.
I. THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: THE

INSTRUMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTS

A.

THE COUNCIL AS THE PARAMOUNT INSTITUTION

In the Coal-Steel Community Treaty the "supranational" High
Authority, composed of independent Community officials, is conceived of as the central organ. The primary task of the Council of
Ministers is to approve the most important decisions of the High
Authority and to harmonize its work with the general economic
policies of the national governments. 4 In the E.E.C. Treaty, on the
other hand, the principal decision-making power is given to the
Council of Ministers, whose members are subject to national government control, rather than to the independent Commission. This
change from the Coal-Steel Community pattern was due as much to
the substantially broader scope of the E.E.C. Treaty as to the political necessity of soft-pedaling "supranationality." 5 The Coal-Steel
Community Treaty extends to the production and some phases of
distribution of coal and steel only; it does not deal with the general
·• See Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging "Political Control," 13 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233, 239 (1959).
5
A spokesman for the French steel industry complained of the "premature" supranationality of the E.C.S.C. and proposed that the E.C.S.C. be gradually merged in the
Common Market. N.Y. Times, July 6, 1959. The French Government spokesman indicated that the French Government may propose a revision of the E.C.S.C. treaty to
align it to some extent with the E.E.C. Treaty. See 1959 Bulletin of the European
Community 10 (No. 38, Oct.-Nov., 1959) quoting Agence France to the effect that
such revision is unlikely.
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economic policies and does not encompass the commercial or agricultural policies of Member States. This relatively narrow scope
made an independent High Authority with strong regulatory
powers palatable to national governments. The E.E.C. Treaty on
the other hand extends to all economic activities and affects national
policies in vital areas such as agriculture and commerce with nonmember countries. Given the domestic political repercussions which
important Community measures therefore might have, the national
governments insisted that the political Council rather than the independent Commission be given preponderant power.
The difference between the Coal-Steel and the Economic Community patterns may not be as striking as it first appears. In some
important instances the High Authority has acted independently,
but as a rule it has hesitated to make important decisions without a
prior assurance of support from the Council. The center of decisionmaking in the Coal-Steel Community has therefore in fact shifted at
least in some measure from the High Authority to the Council. 5 a
The relationship between the Council and the Commission is defined in the E.E.C. Treaty with considerable care. This relationship
and the Council voting formula are among the most original features of the Treaty. Both represent a compromise between opposing
views as to the relative weight to be given to Community as opposed
to national interests. In most instances the Council can act only
upon a formal proposal by the Commission, which ensures that
Community interests to which the Commission has given recognition will be considered by the Council before it makes a decision. 6
In some instances-generally those involving matters of intense
political concern to Member States-even though no formal proposal is required, the Council must obtain at least a report, opinion
or recommendation from the Commission. 7 The Council acts without any reference to the Commission only in determining its own
•• Marjolin, Cooperation intergouvernementa/e et autorite supranationales, 1958 REVUE EcoNOMIQUE 266 at 272 (No.2, Mar. 1958). On the Coal-Steel Community generally
see DIEBOLD, THE SCHUMAN PLAN (1959) and LISTER, EUROPE's COAL AND STEEL CoMMUNITY (1960). On European organizations generally see POLITICAL AND EcoNOMIC
PLANNING (P.E.P. LONDON), EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS ( 1959).
6
For a list of those instances see La Communaute Economique Europeenne: Aspects
fnstitutionne/s, ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 491, annex 2, at 506
( 1957); France, ASSEMBLEE NATION ALE, TROISIEME LEGISLATURE, SESSION 0RDINAIRE
1956-1957, No. 5266, Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des affaires etrangeres

sur le projet de loi (No. 4676) autorisant le President de Ia Republique a ratifier: / 0
Le Traite instituant La Communaute economique europtienne ... par MM. Savary
et July, deputes, annexe B, 2366-67.
7
France, ASSEMBLEE NATION ALE, supra note 6.
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internal affairs or in matters concerning control over the Com•
miSSIOn.

B.

THE VoTING FoRMULA

The Council acts either by a unanimous vote or by "simple" or
"qualified" majority.
A vote by a "simple" majority of four out of the six Ministers (in
effect a two thirds majority) applies only in a·handful of relatively
less important instances where the Treaty fails to specify another
formula. 8
Council measures which are most important to the creation and
maintenance of the Common Market require a unanimous vote either during a part of, or during the entire, transitional period. 9 In
specified matters of essential political interest (including most in~
stances of harmonization of legislation) and in those instances
where gaps in the Treaty are to be filled or its provisions are to be
modified, unanimity is required during and after the transitional
period. 10 The right of veto accorded to any one of the six Member
States by these provisions may not be as potentially paralyzing as
would appear at first glance.n In the first (and most numerous)
group of instances mentioned above the veto power is, after all,
temporary only and vanishes upon the expiration of the transitional
period. In other instances, moreover, unanimity is required to relieve the Members of their Treaty obligationsP Finally, in some
instances the Treaty itself provides a means for circumventing a
veto 13 or at least makes available to Member States measures of
safeguard and retorsion in case ot paralysis. 14
A "qualified" majority vote based on weighted voting is required
in some instances during the transitional period and will apply to a
large majority of all measures after the termination of the transitional periodY The weighted voting formula accords four votes to
each of the Big Three (Germany, France, Italy), two votes each to
8
These matters, it has been said, include either problems in which smaller members
have an interest equal to that of the larger, or questions of internal procedure.
ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, at 493 and annex 5, at 510.
9
Cf. ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, annex 4, at 508-10.
10
E.g. Arts. 99, para. 2, 100 para. I, 235·
11
Cartou, Le Marchi Commun et Ia technique du Droit Public, 74 REVUE DU DROIT
PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER IS6 at 216-17 ( 1958 ).
"E.g., art. 93 (2) para. 3·
. .
13
E.g., arts. 54(2), 63 (2) when no general program has been adopted.
"Arts. 70(2), 107(2).
15
ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, annex 6, at 510, 5II.
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Belgium and the Netherlands and one to Luxembourg. Of the, total
of I 7 votes, I 2 are required for a measure to be adopted on proposal of the Commission 16 but the Council may modify such
proposal by a unanimous vote onlyP Each Member State, in effect,
may therefore exercise a veto in defense of the Commission's proposal. Where no proposal by the Commission is required for Council action, the I 2-vote majority must include the votes of at least
four members.
This ingenious formula obviously has a number of purposes. In
the first place it excludes a veto by any one Member State acting
alone or by Benelux acting as a unit in cases where the Council acts
on a proposal of the Commission and thus presumably in the Community interest. If the Big Three agree, they can override the three
smaller Member States, but only if the Community interest reflected
in the Commission's proposal is the basis for the Council's action.
The Big Three must enlist the support of at least one of the others
-Luxembourg is enough-in instances where no Commission proposal is required. The Big Three are thus encouraged to agree
among themselves, and the Community interest as well as the interests of the smaller members are given a measure of protection.
If the Big Three do not agree, no two of them can, without the support of both Belgium and the Netherlands, force their position on
the third. The purpose of this limitation appears to be to discourage
alliances among two of the Big Three to the prejudice of the other
members, and is particularly interesting in the light of the much
plJblicized Franco-German "alliance" (or better DeGaulle-Adenauer entente) of recent vintage, which apparently has created
some concern in the Benelux countries. 18
A Minister can vote by proxy for not more than one other Minister-a corporation law concept transplanted into public law. 19
Abstention does not prevent a decision even where unanimity is
16

Art. I48.
Art. I49·
18
In three instances the Treaty provides for special qualified majorities. Thus the
establishment of minimum agricultural prices is to be decided by a majority of nine of
the seventeen votes. Art. 44 ( 6). The budget of the Social Fund is to be adopted by
a majority of 67 of the IOO votes, of which Germany and France command 32 votes
each, Italy 20, Belgium 8, Netherlands 7 and Luxembourg I. Art. 203 (s). Finally, in
administering the Development Fund for the overseas territories, the Council acts
by a majority of 67 of the IOO votes, of which France and Germany command 33
votes each, Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands II votes each and Luxembourg I.
Art. 7 Implementing Convention relating to the Association with the Community of
the Overseas Countries and Territories.
10
Art. I 50.
17

38
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
required if the abstaining Minister is present or represented by
proxy. Unlike the practice of the Security Council of the United
Nations, absence of a Minister would seem to prevent action where
unanimity is required. 20
Although the Treaty is silent on the point, the Council has kept its
deliberations and its voting secret-which has been a matter of
some chagrin to the Assembly.
C.

THE CoMPOSITION OF THE CouNCIL

Since it is composed of Cabinet Ministers, the Council is a political body par excellence. Ministers change as governments change
so that the Council reflects the prevailing political constellation in
the Member States. Even though the Treaty conceives of the Council as a Community organ, it will act primarily as a center for composition of national governmental differences, particularly in the
earlier stages.
As Ministers in the national Cabinets the Council members are
responsible (to a larger or smaller degree depending on national
constitutions) to their national parliaments. Although the European Parliamentary Assembly claims that the Council is politically
responsible to it as well, the Assembly has no means of enforcing
this responsibility. Acts of the Council, which are legally binding,
are subject to attack on specified grounds before the Community
Court by states, other institutions and individuals.
A government is free to designate any one of its Cabinet Ministers to represent it on the Council. It appears likely, however, that
Foreign Ministers will continue to appear at the meetings of the
E.E.C. and Euratom Councils at least whenever basic matters are
to be discussed. 21 The Foreign Offices seem concerned that they will
lose control over "European" affairs if Ministers other than those
of Foreign Affairs should sit on the Councils. By the same token
no Foreign Office of the Six would, presumably, favor the creation
of a new cabinet post of "Minister for European Affairs." The
creation of such a post obviously would raise a variety of administrative problems, but it has been suggested as one method of establishing in fact a single Council of Ministers common to all three
Communities, even if in law under the treaties the three Councils
20
Although there is no specific provision in the Treaty to this effect, this conclusion
may be reached from art. 148(3).
21
Ministers of Foreign Affairs often recess a Council meeting in order to meet as
members of the governments of the Member States to discuss such matters as the
selection of the seat of the institutions (art. 216).
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remain separate organs. The E.E.C. and Euratom Councils sometimes meet jointly to deal with matters pertaining to both Communities. 22
In practice Cabinet Members other than Foreign Ministers (for
example, Ministers of Finance, Transport, Agriculture) meet on
Economic Community matters, but not as the Council, and suggestions have been made that these important meetings should be
brought within the official Community framework.
The Councils have built up a Secretariat at Brussels composed of
some 270 employees, and the large size of the Secretariat has been
strongly criticized in the Assembly. 23 Taking advantage of the authorization of the Treaty/4 the E.E.C. Council established a Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States to which
national governments have appointed high ranking diplomats with
supporting staffs totalling some 150 persons. The Council has met
as a rule not more than once a month 25 and has relied heavily on
this Committee for preparatory work and to take follow-up action. 26
II. THE COMMISSION: THE COMMUNITY
"ADMINISTRATION''

A.

THE ROLE OF INITIATIVE AND SUPERVISION

In the Community jargon the Commission is referred to as "the
executive," 27 but the neutral term "Commission" is a substitute for
the more impressive "High Authority" of the Coal-Steel Community Treaty and the adjective "supranational" it contained was,
as already indicated, omitted in the corresponding article of the
22
In the E.E.C. Council the members are generally repre~ented by their Foreign
Ministers except for the Federal Republic of Germany which is represented by the
Minister for Economic Affairs. In the Euratom CouncB the members are represented
generally by Foreign Ministers or Ministers for Atomic Affairs. The Council of the
Coal and Steel Community, perhaps because of its more specialized and less crucial
role, is attended usually by Ministers of Economic Affairs or Ministers of Industry
and Commerce and at times by other Ministers principally concerned with the subject
under discussion. ANNUAIRE MANUEL DE L'ASsEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE
1958-1959, 127-28. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 159 (1959).
23
Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] JouRNAL 0FFICIEL DES CoMMUNAUTES
EUROPEENNES (hereinafter cited as J'L OFF.) 15-17; La Communaute
l'Cpreuvc
des faits, 1-La Commission et les Gouvernements, 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN
425 at 426 (No. 20).
24
Art. 151.
26
396 EUROPE item 2274 (April 25, 1959).
26
E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY
27 (1958).
27
Thus, the High Authority, the E. E. C. Commission, and the Euratom Commission
are referred to as the "three European executives."

a
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E.E.C. Treaty. 28 These differences in terminology emphasize the
fact that the Commission's power of independent decision has been
curtailed as compared with that of the High Authority. The Commission's principal power is that of initiative in preparing and proposing action by the Council (and the Assembly). In addition, it
ensures and supervises the application of the Treaty provisions and
of Council measures. It has a limited power of independent decision
("under the conditions laid down in the Treaty") but it may issue
recommendations and opinions "where the Commission considers
it necessary" as well as where "the Treaty expressly so provides." 29
Again, the Council may charge the Commission with implementation of its measures. The Commission represents the Community in
national courts, 30 in contacts with international organizations, 31 and
in negotiations for international agreements (under the direction
of the Council) .32 According to a reported internal arrangement
between the Council and the Commission, any request from a foreign government for accreditation of a foreign mission is made to
the Commission and forwarded by it to the Council which approves
the request and the head of the mission. The official accreditation is
then performed by the President of the Commission. 33
The Commission submits an annual report and special reports to
the Assembly which are the basis of the Assembly's work. It is politically responsible to the Assembly which can force its resignation in
a body (but not that of individual members) on a motion of censure
by a vote of a two-thirds majority. 34

B.

THE COMMISSIONERS AND THEIR STAFF

The Commission is composed of nine members, nationals of the
Member States, ':chosen for their general competence and of indisputable independence" 35 and appointed by the Member States,
28
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 9, E.E.C. Treaty art. I 57, Euratom Treaty art. I26. Both the
E.E.C. and Euratom Commissions call themselves officially "European Commission."
E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 26, at I5.
29
Art. I 55·
30
Art. 2II.
31
Art. 229.
32
Arts. 228, I I r ( 2) of the Treaty and art. 6 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities ; cf. art. 23 8 in connection with art. 228.
33
Cf. ~the announcement that President Hallstein received the Chief of the Japanese
Mission who presented to him his letters of accreditation, [I959] J'L OFF. 1127. As of
March I96o, ten governments have accredited diplomatic missions to the Community.
(United States, Greece, Israel, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Norway, Ireland), [r96o] ]'L OFF. 526-27 .
.. Arts. I 56, I44·
35
Art. I 57·
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"acting in common agreement," for a four year term which is renewable.36 Thus each Member State has a veto over any candidate.
The Treaty directs that the Commissioners act in the Community
interest; it specifically prohibits them from accepting instructions
from their national governments and obligates the latter to refrain
from seeking to influence them. The members are not allowed, while
in office, to engage in any other occupation, 37 paid or unpaid, and
their obligation of "honesty and discretion" with respect to their
official duties extends beyond their term of office under the penalty
of loss of pension. They are subject to provisional suspension by
the Council and removal by the Community Court for serious misconduct.38
At present each of the Big Three has two nationals and the Benelux countries have one each on the Commission. Professor Hallstein,
former State Secretary of the German Foreign Office, is the President and there are French, Dutch and Italian Vice-Presidents. 39
While nationality was obviously a factor in their selection (the
Treaty provides that not more than two nationals of any one Member State may be appointed), the present group appears competent
and well qualified. 40 It includes three former ministers in national
governments and represents a variety of educational and professional backgrounds ranging from law, diplomacy, and economics
to finance, agriculture, journalism, colonial administration, and social work; it reflects experience in business, government, and university teaching.H As a new body it has attracted top-notch personalities; past experience with other bodies points up the difficulties
of retaining men of high caliber in similar positions.
The staff of the Commission (the 1960 budget authorizes 1,686
persons) 42 is grouped into eight functional departments (General
Directorates), corresponding broadly to the principal areas of the
•• The High Authority is also composed of 9 members while the Euratom Commission
has only 5· For considerations underlying these numbers see REUTER, CouRS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 54 (Paris 1958-1959).
37
Art. 157(2). The German text speaks of "Berufstiitigkeit."
33
Art. 160. The German text of the Treaty refers to a "Verfehlung."
30
Art. 161 provides that the President and the Vice-Presidents are appointed from
among the Commissioners by the governments acting in common agreement. (Although
the Treaty provides for two Vice-Presidents, three Vice-Presidents have been appointed.)
40
See CAMPS, THE FIRST YEAR OF THE E.E.C. 4-5 (1958), on the distribution of the
presidencies in the three Communities.
41
See 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 23-24 (No. 1), for names and biographic
sketches of the. original members.
'"Budget de Ia Commission economique europeenne pour l'exercice 1960, [1960]
]'L OFF. 466.
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Treaty, and an administrative department. 43 Each department contains three or four divisions (Directorates) .44 The members of the
Commission have organized themselves in eight standing working
groups of three or four. Each group supervises the work of one
department. A group composed of the President and the three VicePresidents has responsibility for the department of administration.
The President may place any matter before the Commission for its
consideration at any time. 45
The Commission makes its decisions by a simple majority of five
in meetings held, as a rule, weekly in Brussels.

C.

POLICY MAKERS OR ADMINISTRATORS?

If one conceives of the Council of Ministers as analogous to the
Head of the State in a parliamentary democracy, the members of
the Commission could be deemed to have the status of Cabinet Ministers, and the heads of departments of the Commission the status
of the ranking civil servants. The Commission seeks to stress its
non-bureaucratic and "executive" character. In the words of its
President, it sees itself primarily as a policy-making and coordinating authority with direct administrative functions limited to the
operational responsibilities for the various Funds mentioned earlier.
It is to act as a general staff relying on selected experts and specialists.46
There may be some doubt whether the organizational pattern as
well as the size and the character of the staff recruited at a brisk
pace reflect the "general staff" concept. 47 Unquestionably the staff
includes a number of exceptionally able and well-trained experts.
Yet, a keen American observer felt that preoccupation with balanced
distribution of nationalities throughout all staff levels, coupled with
a somewhat elaborate staff hierarchy, created an impression of overorganization and possibly of temporary over-staffing. The latter
may be due partly to the fact that the Commission has hardly begun
to develop its policy in a number of fields and partly to the fact that,
13
The eight general directorates are: External Relations, Economic and Financial
Questions, Internal Market, Competition, Social Affairs, Agriculture, Transport, Overseas Countries and Territories. E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 26, annex A at
129-30 (1958).
" I d., annex B at r 3 r-32.
'"I d. at 21.
•• Speech by E.E.C. President Hallstein of October 21, 1958, Community Publication
2089/2/58/5, at 36-37.
47
At least one Member government was reported as believing that the Commission
(and for that matter even the Council of Ministers) have become bogged down in
detail. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1959.
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because the Council must approve the budget, the Commission fears
an early "freeze" of personnel at a too low level. 48
The Council did, in fact, reduce the Commission's first draft
budget substantially. 49 When the Assembly debated the budget,
the Christian Democratic group limited its criticism to what it considered the excessive size of the Secretariat of the Councils, and the
Assembly resolution appears to reflect this position. 50 The resolution was interpreted, however, (particularly by the Liberals) as
censuring also the size of the staff of the Commission, one Liberal
speaking of a "pathological inflation" of administration, threatening administrative paralysis and usurpation of the policy-making
functions of the Commission by its high-ranking staff. 51 The Commission members, on the other hand, complained that the reduction
ordered by the Council will gravely impair the preparation of the
necessary studies, statistics, analyses of legislation for purposes of
harmonization in the tax field and the like. 52 The spectacle was, in
short, reminiscent of budgetary debates in American legislatures
and for that matter in any parliament. More recently the Assembly manifested its concern that the Commission would not be
given adequate personnel to perform its tasks, and particularly
those in the social field. 53
The fact that three "executives" operate independently under
three different treaties is an absurdity explainable on political
grounds but hardly compatible with effective administration. Efforts
have been made to coordinate their work through joint committees
and by other means. "Common services" have been established in
the legal, statistical and information fields to serve all three "executives," but apparently only the statistical "common service" in fact
operates as a unit. 54
•• CAMPS, op. cit. supra note 40, at 5; the nationality key allows each of the Big
Three 25% of all positions and the Benelux countries share the remaining 25%.
•• Stein, suPra note 4, at 248-49.
60
Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] }'L OFF. 15-17; Resolution of April II,
1959, para. 6, [1959] J'L OFF. 548, 550.
61
For a "liberal" view see also Margulies, Die Kosten der Klein-europiiischen
Gemeinschaften, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 292-94 (No. IZ) (1959).
60
E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY
16 (1959).
G3 [1959] J'L OFF. 1052.
64
The problem of a "European Civil Service" has engaged the attention of the
Council of Europe. Its consultative Assembly called-without noticeable success-for
standardization of conditions of service, common recruitment methods and coordinated
training of personnel in the numerous European organizations. 1959 CouNCIL OF
EUROPE NEWS 9-10 (No.4).
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III. THE EVOLVING PATTERN OF COUNCILCOMMISSION RELATIONS

A.

THE TREATY PROCEDURE

The Treaty contemplates a close and continuing relationship between the Council and the Commission. The Commission proposal,
as suggested, is a prerequisite of Council action in most instances.
On the other hand, if the Commission fails to submit a proposal,
the Council may request it to do so; and if the Commission fails to
act as it is required to under the Treaty, the Council may bring the
matter before the Community Court for adjudication. 55 The Commission, for its part, has the right to request that a meeting of the
Council be held and likewise may bring the Council before the Court
in specified circumstances. 56 The Treaty calls for consultations between the two bodies and the details of their collaboration are to
be settled by "mutual agreement." 57 The essence of the Treaty
pattern may thus be described as follows: the Commission develops
proposals concerning Community policy, and, if they command the
required support, the Council adopts them, after consulting with
other bodies as prescribed.

B.

THE EVOLVING PRACTICE

In practice the pattern of Council-Commission relations has developed somewhat differently. The Commission has been in close
and continuing contact with the Committee of Permanent Representatives representing the governments of the Member States at
the Brussels seat of the Communities. Through the Permanent Representatives the Commission obtains the views of national governments before making proposals to the Council. Through them
it also arranges for conferences with experts supplied by national
governmental departments. A number of mixed working groups
composed of officials drawn from national administrations and the
Commission staff meet regularly on problems under consideration
by the Commission. For example, some nine groups of this type have
been working on the general program for the removal of the restrictions on the right of establishment and supply of services which
the Commission is to propose to the Council-each group examining
""Arts. 152, 175.
58
Art. 147.
57
Art. 162.

45
the national legislative and administrative provisions governing
a given category of activities (insurance, banking, trade, crafts,
agriculture, etc.) Similarly, negotiation in a number of working
groups under a central group has produced agreement on most items
of the common external tariff which the Treaty left to be determined
by negotiation among the members. Groups of national experts have
been considering with the Commission staff outlines of proposals
for a common agricultural policy, and others concerning anti-dumping measures, state subsidies and the like. A conference of national
experts under the chairmanship of a Commission member established three working groups on taxation problems. 58
Conferences and groups of this type have served to coordinate
national action and to provide information to the Commission. 59
Experts from national administrations also bring to these conferences complaints against actions of other Member States which they
view as violations of Treaty commitments. Even in the field of
restrictive practices, where the Community was given powers of
direct intervention, the Commission has proceeded with caution: the
head of the Commission department concerned with competition
chairs conferences of national experts designated by the governments. In these conferences agreement is sought on interpretation
of the rather loosely-drawn provisions of the Treaty, and cases of
restrictive practices suggested by national experts are examined to
determine whether they fall into the categories proscribed by the
Treaty. 60 While, of course, there are direct contacts between the
Council and the Commission, the emerging pattern discloses continuing negotiations between the Commission and the national governments on various levels and particularly through the Permanent
Representatives. As a result, where the Treaty requires the submission of a Commission-prepared proposal to the Council, the governments in fact pass upon it before it is submitted to the Council.
In exercising its power of supervision and enforcement the Commission has also communicated with the member governments concerned before concluding that the Treaty has been violated or taking
other steps. In several instances where new customs duties, allegedly
in violation of the Treaty's "standstill" provision, were introduced,
THE NEW INSTITUTIONS

08
See the communique of the Commission reported in 443 EUROPE, item 2694 (June
24, 1959)·
•• E.E.C. COMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 52, at 8-9.
00
/d. at 86-89. Mixed Council-Commission committees have been established in a
few instances, for example, to examine the problems raised by a possible European
Economic Association.
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the Commission, after discussion with the government concerned,
took the preliminary steps of the enforcement procedure envisaged
by the Treaty, but there has been no official public notice from the
Commission on the outcome of this action. In one instance, the
Commission is reported to have issued a "reasoned opinion" under
Article r69 advising the French government that the imposition of
a customs duty on paper pulp was in violation of the Treaty and
inviting that government to remove the duty within a given period. 61
On another occasion the Commission, acting under Article 93 ( 2),
rendered a "decision" directing the same government to remove a
subsidy in the form of tax benefits accorded to French industries
only. The "opinion" and the "decision" respectively are prerequisite
preliminary steps to bringing the matter before the Community
Court for adjudication. But in both cases compliance by the government concerned made further steps unnecessary. Again, the Commission disclosed in its reply to a parliamentary question that it had
instituted an investigation of an agreement concluded between producers and merchants of earthenware to determine whether the
agreement infringes upon the antitrust provisions of the Treaty. 62
The pattern of negotiations, in which the Permanent Representatives play such a major role, may well be the only realistic modus
operandi in view of the present powers of the Commission, the lack
of information in its files, the time it will take to build up truly expert knowledge, the still limited awareness on the part of the public
of Community issues and the unwillingness of some governments
to support a stronger role for the Commission. The failure of the
governments in the spring of I959 to support the High Authority's
proposals for the handling of the coal crisis has undoubtedly made
the Commission even more inclined to seek to persuade national
governments before making formal proposals to the Council. 63
IV. ADVISORY COMMITTEES: THE VOICE OF
"OUTSIDE" EXPERTS AND SPECIAL
INTEREST GROUPS
The Treaty creates a number of advisory bodies of which the
three most important merit consideration here. The Economic and
01
Cf. Les Echanges dans le Marchi Commun, pt. II, 1959 REVUE ou MARCHE CoMMUN
239 (No. 15) •
.. [1959] ]'L OFF. II22-23·
63
E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
COMMUNITY 63--76 (1959); also E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, RAPPORT SPEciAL DE 'LA
HAUTE AUTORITE A L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE CONCERNANT LA QUESTION
.
CHARBONNIERE (1959).

THE NEW INSTITUTIONS

47

Social Committee is endowed with the broadest advisory functions. 64
It serves both the E.E.C. and Euratom. The Treaty provides that
in specified instances the E.E.C. Council or the Commission must
seek the Committee's opinion, which, however, is not binding on
them. In addition, the Council or the Commission may seek the
advice of the Committee whenever either deems it appropriate. 65
The Committee membership is rather large, consisting of 101
members serving in their personal capacities and therefore not subject to instructions from their governments. The Big Three are each
allotted 24 seats, Belgium and the Netherlands 12 each and Luxembourg five. 66 Each member government submits to the Council a list
of candidates containing twice as many names as there are positions
and the Council makes the appointments from these lists after consulting the Commissions. 67 Under the Treaty the Committee is to
include representatives of "the various categories of economic and
social life, in particular, representatives of producers, agriculturalists, transport operators, workers, merchants, artisans, the liberal
professions and of the general interest." 68
The Treaty reflects an intention of the governments to maintain
fairly strict control over this Committee of uninstructed individuals:
any Member State may veto in the Council the appointment of any
representative; the Council must approve by unanimous vote the
Rules of Procedure of the Committee and the Committee is to be
convened "at the request of the Council or of the Commission." 69
In working out the Rules of Procedure a difference arose between
•• Katzenstein, Der Arbeitnehmer in der europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 12
DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 at 1083 (1957) is of the opinion that the Committee
has a more far-reaching right to be heard by the executive institutions than the European Parliamentary Assembly.
65
Art. 198.
66
Art. 194·
01
Art. 195·
68
Art. 193, para. 2.
The Committee comprises a great variety of interests with emphasis on producers
and labor both in industry and agriculture. The precise balance varies from one
national contingent to the other. Among the members are officials of labor and white
collar employees' unions and unionists from overseas areas; officials and executives
of trade associations (composed of agricultural and industrial producers, merchants,
and craftsmen) and of chambers of commerce and agriculture; bankers, shipping and
river navigation company executives, import-export wholesale executives; experts in
transportation, tourism, radiology, nuclear energy, and nuclear economics; university
professors of chemistry and economics; representatives of cooperatives; a few government officials concerned with economic planning and agriculture; a single Italian
lawyer representing liberal professions; a housewife-consumer expert, etc. For the
original membership, see 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 131-137 (No. 3); for a
more recent Jist, see ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'AsSEMBLEE PARI.EMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE
1958-1959, at 185-94.
69
Art. 196.
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the Councils on one hand and the Committee on the other, as to the
scope of the latter's right of initiative; a "compromise" was reached
after considerable delay under which the Committee may meet on
its own initiative and in the absence of a formal request for an
opinion but only if one of the Councils or Commissions has given
its prior approval and only on those questions on which it "must
or may be consulted" under the Treaty. 70
Control of publicity by the Committee may have been considered
a possible instrument of pressure upon the institutions: thus the
Rules provide that the opinions of the Committee can be published
only "under conditions and by means determined" by the institution
concerned. 71 No provision is made to preclude publicity originated
by an individual Committee member concerning his attitudes or
those of other members, however, and the right to seek assistance
from outside expert consultants 72 may also provide a method of
circumventing the limitation on publicity.
The Assembly recommended that labor and employers be assured
parity on the Committee and expressed formally its regret when the
recommendation was not heeded. 73 The composition of the Comittee was termed "thoroughly unbalanced" in certain labor quarters.74 An early conflict between labor and employers over the allocation of the offices of the Committee President and Vice-President
was solved by a compromise based on an overall increase in the
number of Vice-Presidents: 75 it took time and considerable doing
to complete the organization of the Committee. 76
The Committee is required by the Treaty to establish "specialized
sections" in the fields of agriculture and transportation, in which
the Community institutions are to develop common Community
policies. It established similar sections in five other fields obviously
in an attempt to overcome the handicaps of unwieldiness stemming
70

Reglement interieur, art. IS, para. 3 [I959] }'L OFF. 496.
n /d., art. 45, para. 3·
72
/d., art. I4.
73
Resolution of March 2I, I958, [I958] ]'L OFF. II; Resolution of January IS, I959,
pt. VI, [1959] }'L. OFF. 167 at I69.
74
Rosenberg, Zusammenarbeit und Organisation der Gewerkschaften West-Europas,
2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT I65 at I66 (No.7) (I959).
7
" The labor group claimed that a Vice-President elected to represent the "general
interest" group in fact represented the employers. By way of a compromise the total
number of Vice-Presidents as well as the number of Vice-Presidents representing labor
interests was increased. 278 EuROPE, item 1350 (November 28, I958).
76
The Euratom Commission made it clear that the present composition of the Committee reflects only partially its suggestions concerning the number of nuclear specialists. EURATOM COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CoMMUNITY 34 (I958),
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77

from its size. The work is done principally by the sections and by
working groups within the sections and any proposed opinionsof which it had already rendered several by the beginning of 1960
-are ratified in plenary meetings of the Committee. The institutions may not approach the sections directly. 78
The Committee's relations with the Commissions appear satisfactory. Several E.E.C. Commissioners have already addressed a
plenary meeting of the Committee in order to describe the Commission's working plans in the social and other fields in which requests
for opinion may be forthcoming, and, although not required to do
so by the Treaty, the E.E.C. Commission asked the Committee for
an opinion on a proposed directive concerning the application of
the right of establishment to the overseas areas. 79
It is much too early to say to what extent this Committee will be
more significant than a similar committee of the Coal-Steel Community.80 It is important in that it offers a forum for private individuals and interest groups in the Community, and despite its circumscribed powers, it may play a useful role.
When the E.E.C. Commission asked the Committee for an opinion on the very topical question of harmonization of certain aspects
of national commercial policies, for example, the Committee produced a provisional urgent recommendation addressed to the governments of the Member States urging them to adopt certain positions with respect to imports from third countries with exceptionally
low wages, multiple exchange rates, and state trading systems. The
Rules of Procedure provide for no such provisional recommendation, but this fact was brushed aside by the Committee.
Another advisory body, the Monetary Committee, may become
of considerable importance particularly because the Committee
may offer opinions to the Council or to the Commission on its own
initiative as well as at their request. 81 Its function is to assist in the
coordination of national policies in monetary matters in accordance
with a charter ( Statut) 82 established by the Council. Each Member State has appointed one executive of its central bank and one
high official of its Ministry of Finance and the Commission has
designated two officials from its own staff to serve on the Com77
78
70

[1959] J'L

Orr.

503-507.

Art. 197, para. 3·

E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY
23 (1959)·
80
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 169 ( 1959).
81
Art. 105.
""[1958] J'L Orr. 390.
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mittee. The work of the Committee may be facilitated by the fact
that the governors of the central banks have been discussing common problems regularly over many years in the sessions of the Board
of Governors of the Bank of International Settlements in Basel
and have established close personal relationships. The Committee,
with the assistance of the Commission staff, has been engaged in a
quarterly examination of the monetary and financial situations of
the Six, in studies of convertibility and in working out a program
for lifting restrictions on flow of capital. 83
A third advisory body, the Transportation Committee "composed of experts appointed by the Governments" 84 has been established to advise the Commission on matters relating to transportation. 85 In accordance with this committee's charter ( Statut), formulated by the Council, 86 each government ultimately appointed two
high level officials and three transportation experts (with alternates) to membership. The members serve in their personal capacity
and must not receive instructions from their governments. 87 The
Committee elects its Chairman and Vice-Chairman from among
the members who are government officials. 88 It may meet and render
opinions at the request of the Commission. 89
Controversy arose at the outset in connection with the composition of the Committee with the result that it was not formed until
more than a year after the Treaty had come into effect. Moreover,
the Commission has since been closely questioned in the Assembly
because the role of experts as compared with that of government
officials in the Transportation Committee was thought to be disproportionately small, the Parliamentary Assembly Committee on
Transportation having expressed the view that the Committee
should be composed of independent experts rather than governmental officials or spokesmen for special interest groups. 90 The
labor unions have also demanded that at least one representative
83
E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 79, at 24.
•• Art. 83.
85
This committee must be distinguished from the specialized section for transportation of the Economic and Social Committee mentioned above.
•• Statut du Comite des Transports, [1958] ]'L OFF. 509.
87
I d., art. 3·
88
ld., art. 5, para. 1,"
•• I d., arts. 6 and 7·
00
Parliamentary question and answers of the E.E.C. Commission and the E.C.S.C.
High Authority in [1959] ]'L OFF. 685-86. Speeches by Rapporteur Kapteyn and
Commissioner Schaus in the European Parliamentary Assembly, AssEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE, DEBATS, COMPTE RENDU IN EXTENSO DES SEANCES, EDITION PROVISOIRE [hereinafter cited as Pari. Debates] (No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) 147 at 149-50 and
165 at r68-7o.
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be appointed to this Committee from their ranks by each government.91
The Committee has already been called upon by the Commission
to give its opinion on a proposed regulation for the abolition of
certain forms of discrimination in transportation. 92
The Treaty provides for other advisory bodies. Because of its
"triangular" composition, mention may be made particularly of the
mixed Committee which is to assist the Commission in the administration of the European Social Fund. It is chaired by a Commission
member and composed of representatives of governments, labor
unions and employers' associations. 93
V. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY:
94
THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE?
A. COMPOSITION AND ORGANIZATION OF THE AssEMBLY

The Assembly and the Court of Justice are the two institutions
common to all three Communities. 95 The Assembly's functions under the three treaties differ somewhat. It succeeded the Common
Assembly of the Coal-Steel Community which was in existence from
1952 until 1958. Although technically a new institution, the European Assembly has adopted in substance the practices and procedures of the Common Assembly and has been seeking to perfect
them. It has been able to profit from the expertise and experience
accumulated in the more than five years of its predecessor's work.
When the Rome Treaties were in the process of negotiation, the
French delegation insisted that an entirely new assembly be created
91
317 EUROPE, item 1622 (January 19, 1959). Only the Benelux countries included
labor union representatives among the three experts; France appointed a unionist as
an alternate expert. Ibid.
92
Art. 79(3). E.E.C. CoMMISSION, op. cit. supra note 79, at 25-26 (1959). 246 EUROPE,
item 1858 (February 24, 1959); 373 id., item 2083 (March 27, 1959); 407 id., item
2381 (May 12, 1959); 415 id., item 2455 (May 22, 1959).
03
Art. 124. Cf. also Committee of Control which is charged with auditing the budget.
Art. 206. Its Statut (charter) is contained in [1959] J'L OFF. 861. For a description of
the E.E.C. Administrative Commission for Social Security of Migrant Workers see the
chapter of this book by Otto Kahn-Freund. The Statut of this Commission is contained in [1959] }'L OFF. 1213 .
.. This section is based in part upon this writer's article: Stein, The European Parliamentary Assembly: Techniques of Emerging "Political Control," published in XIII
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 233-54 (1959); on the European Parliamentary Assembly generally see HEIDELBERGER, DAS EUROPAISCHE PARLAMENT (1959).
05
Arts. 1 and 3, Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities. Both the E.E.C. and Euratom treaties speak of "the Assembly," but
the Assembly ass1.nned the name "European Parliamentary Assembly" in its first
session.
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for the E.E.C. and Euratom. This would have meant a fourth Assembly in Western Europe, to be added to the Common Assembly
of the Coal-Steel Community, the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe and the Assembly of the Western European
Union. The strong and coordinated opposition on the part of the
three Assemblies then in existence was an important factor in creating the single European Assembly. 96
The Assembly has been called the most "supranational" of the
Community institutions. 97 Composed of "representatives of the
peoples" 98 independent of national governments and independent
of the other institutions, the Assembly has exclusive control over
matters of its own organization 99 and votes in most instances by
simple majority. 100 Yet it is in no sense a legislature and its powers
are limited.
The 142 representatives are members of the national parliaments
of the six Member States and are selected by them. 101 The assembly
hall in Strasbourg, borrowed from the Council of Europe Assembly,
has the semi-circular design typical of national parliaments and for
the first time in the history of international assemblies, the representatives are seated not according to nationality but according to
political affiliation. 102
Three political "groups" currently exist in the Assembly. These
are, from left to right, the Socialists, the Christian Democrats and
the Liberals with affiliates. Just as the United States Constitution
contains no reference to political parties, so the three tr~aties setting up the Communities make no mention of political groups.
Nevertheless, political groups are as much the mainspring of political action in the Assembly as are political parties in the U.S. Congress. Political groups are regulated by the Rules of Procedure of
96
ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS 167 (1959); France, CONSEIL DE LA REPUBLIQUE,
SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 1956-1957, ANNEXE AU PROcES-VERBAL DE LA 1' 6 SEANCE DU IZ
JUILLET 1957. No. 873, Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des Affaires etrangeres

sur le projet de loi .•. autorisant le President de Ia Republique a ratifier: z• le
Traite instituant Ia Communaute economique europeenne ... par MM. Cartassonne
et Biatarana, senateurs, at 7239. On European Assemblies see LINDSAY, EuROPEAN As-

SEMBLIEs-THE EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD 1949-1959 (1960); LINDSAY, TOWARDS A EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT (1958).
97
Heraud, Observations sur Ia nature juridique de Ia Communaute economique
europeenne, 62 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 26 at 45 ( 1958).
98
Art. 137.
'"Arts. 140, 142.
100
Arts. 141.
101
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 21, E.E.C. Treaty art. 138(1), Euratom Treaty art. 108(1).
102
E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY

19 ( 1958 ).
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103

the Assembly, which require a minimum membership of I 7 for
the formation of a group, 104 since both political and financial considerations make it desirable to avoid proliferation. There was also
some concern that groups under the guise of political affinity might
serve as cover for national rather than Community-wide blocs. 105
The treaties _do not expressly prohibit the representatives from
receiving instructions from their parliaments, but such instructions
would obviously impair the Assembly's role as a representative of
Community interests. The practice of the Coal-Steel Common Assembly had already established the independence of representatives
from their parliaments, 106 and in order to encourage it, the Common
Assembly made arrangements for funds to provide the political
groups with independent secretariats. 107 When the Assembly convenes in Strasbourg, one therefore finds the secretariats of the three
political groups, 108 as well as offices of the national contingents.
While the political groups meet frequently under their respective
presidents, the national contingents meet only rarely, and it has been
said that in the past the French contingent, for instance, met only
to note that it was divided. The differences within the national contingents have moreover led to spirited exchanges on the floor. 109
The key to the composition of the Assembly is nationality: the
Big Three (France, Germany, and Italy) hold 36 seats each, Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each, and Luxembourg six. 110 This
103

Rules of Procedure, art. 34(5), [1958] J'L OFF. 217.
There are seventeen members in the smaller of the thirteen standing committees.
Resolution of March 20, 1958, 1958] J'L OFF. 4·
105
Doc. No. 17 AssEMBLER PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (JUNE, 1958), Rapport fait
au nom de Ia Commission du Reglement, des questions juridiques, des petitions et des
immunith sur le Reglement de L'Assemblee Parlementaire Europeenne par A. van
Kauvenbergh, Rapporteur, para. II at 12; cf. also Pari. Debates (No. 7, June 1958)
( mimeo.) s-6.
106
C.E.C.A., L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE DANS L'EUROPE DES SIX (P. Wigny, rapporteur) 24 ( 1958) [hereinafter cited as Wigny Report].
107
Decision of June 16, 1953, id. at 25.
108
HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 411 (1958).
1011
See, for instance, the debate of two German parliamentarians, Mr. Deist (Christian Democrat) and Mr. Burgbacher (Socialist), on the German coal-oil cartel. Pari.
Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959) 38 at 44 and 48.
110
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 21, as modified by art. 2(2) of the Convention Relating to
Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities; E.E.C. Treaty art. 138(2);
Euratom Treaty art. 108(2).
The representation of the Big Three in the new Assembly was doubled from what
it was in the Common Assembly while the representation of the Benelux countries was
increased by 40 to so per cent. The· object was to equal the number of representatives
plus substitutes of each of the member countries in the Consultative Assembly of the
Council of Europe in order to permit the appointment of one "set" of European parliamentarians. Belgium, CHAMBRE DES REPRESENTANTS, Rapport fait au nom de /a Commission Speciale, 727 (1956-1957), No.2, at 23-25; CATALANO, LA CoMUNITA ECONO104
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distribution of seats resulted in a larger representation of the Benelux countries than is justified by their population, but the Big Three
agreed to it in order to permit the smaller countries to send politically diversified delegations. However, it was pointed out in the
German ratification debates that the distribution of seats may have
to be reexamined when the Assembly is elected directly by universal
suffrage as eventually contemplated in the three treaties.m
In the June 1959 session there were 69 Christian Democrats, 32
Socialists, and 40 Liberals and affiliates. 112 The Liberals have since
increased substantially in number, principally as a result of the shift
in the composition of the French National Assembly resulting from
the De Gaulle landslide in the I 9 58 elections.
The national contingents are composed of members of both
chambers of the national parliaments, with the exception of that
from Luxembourg, which has a unicameral system, and that of Germany. The German upper chamber (Bundesrat), with the support
of the government, claimed the right to participate in the German
contingent, but the lower chamber (Bundestag) proceeded to fill
the entire German contingent from its own membership on the
ground that the Bundesrat is an appointed and not an elected body. 113
The procedure for designating the national contingents varies
from parliament to parliament. As a rule, the political parties within
the parliament divide the total number of seats among themselves
and select their own candidates; this selection is then formally ratified by the parliament. The national parliaments have excluded the
Communists (and the Poujadists) from their Strasbourg contingents.114
In contrast to the national parliaments, the Assembly has no true
MICA EUROPEA E L'EURATOM 20 (1957); von Stempel, Die ]nstitutionen der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschajt, I EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 167 at
168 (1958) No. 9·
111
Germany, DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG, 2 WAHLPERIODE 1953, DRUCKSACHE 3440 ANLAGE
C, Erliiuterungen zu den Vertriigen zur Griindung der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, 142 ( 1957). It is reported that
the French delegation took the same position during the negotiations for the Rome
Treaties.
112
[1959] }'L OFF. 791-93.
113
Germany, BuNDESRAT, Niederschrift iiber die Sitzung des Sonderausschusses
"Gemeinsamer Markt und Euratom" vom 2¢ April, 1957, 65-68; BUNDESRAT, DRUCKSACHE NR. 146/57, Anlage zu dem Schreiben des Priisidenten des Bundesrates an den
Bundeskanzler vom 3 Mai, 1957; BUNDESRAT, No. 181 SITZUNGSBERICHT 744 (July 19,
1957); Gesetz zu den Vertriigen vom 25 Miirz 1957 zur Grundung der Europiiischen
Wirtschaftgemeinschaft und der Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt II, 753·
1U Reuter, Les Institutions de Ia Communaute
l'epreuve, 17 DROIT SociAL 518, 522

a
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"administration" and "opposition" parties. The Assembly is not
"organized" by ony one of the three groups, but the principal offices
(President and eight Vice-Presidents) and the composition of the
thirteen standing committees reflect an effort to assure fair national
as well as political representation. In this respect the Assembly has
characteristics both of an international assembly and of a national
parliament.
In the Common Assembly the Christian Democrats were said to
have been forced into the position of the "administration" party,
particularly because of their opposition to Socialist attacks against
the High Authority of the Coal-Steel Community. The Liberal
group was composed of a variety of political parties with varying
objectives, but they joined with the Christian Democrats whenever
the latter took a position favoring free enterprise. When the Christian Democrats were divided on High Authority policy, as was frequently the case, the Liberals tended to use their influence to block
action. 115 While it may be too early to draw any definite conclusions
concerning the European Assembly, a similar pattern apparently is
emerging in it. The Socialists, certainly the most cohesive group,
would seem to be playing an even more "activist" role than they did
in the Common Assembly, pressing for Community planning, action
and direct intervention in a variety of fields.

B.

INTERNATIONAL AssEMBLY OR PARLIAMENT?

What are "the powers of deliberation and of control" 116 which
are entrusted to the Assembly by the E.E.C. Treaty?
The Commission is obligated to submit to the Assembly an annual
general report. 117 The Assembly and the individual representatives
may address questions to the Commission, which is required to
answer orally or in writing. 118 The Assembly may force the resignation of the Commission at any time by a motion of censure based on
any of the Commission's activities and adopted by two-thirds of the
votes cast representing a majority of all representatives. 119 In instances specified by the Treaty, the Assembly must be consulted by
the Council: these include important matters of Community policy,
110

HAAS, op. cit. supra note 108, at 436.
Art. 137. The German text speaks of "Beratungs-und Kontroll-befugnisse," the
French of "pouvoirs de deliberation et de controle."
117
Arts. 143, 156. Cf. E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES
OF THE COMMUNITY (1958); and E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE CoMMUNITY (1959).
118
Art. 140.
119
Art. 144. Cf. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 24.
116
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some of the measures affecting national legislation, 120 "extension"
of the powers of the institutions, 121 the calling of conferences to
amend the Treaty 122 (but not the amendments themselves) and the
conclusion of agreements of association with other entities (but not
the decision to admit a new member to the Community) .123 The
Assembly must also be consulted on the budget and has the right to
propose modifications. 124 The Assembly "consultations" are not
binding on the Council.
In terms of its power the Assembly resembles in some respects
an international organization assembly, and in other respects a national parliament. 125 Like the United Nations General Assembly,
it discusses, obtains facts, and recommends. Its powers over the
budget are inferior to those of the United Nations Assembly which
determines the budget of the Organization. Like a national parliament the European Assembly exercises a measure of control over
the "executive" organ and may force its resignation. Unlike a parliament, it has no power to legislate and thus to impose its policy, nor
does it possess "the power of the purse" in the parliamentary sense.
Both the Common Assembly and its successor, the European Assembly, have consistently stressed their parliamentary characteristics. One report states, "if legitimate doubt arises with respect to
a question concerning the status of this Assembly one must seek the
solution in the traditional parliamentary law and not in the unfounded comparisons with commissions, assemblies or organizations
of an international character." 126
Since the Council and not the Commission is the principal decision-making body, it could be argued that the Assembly's power of
""'E.g., arts. 43 {2), 75(1), 87{1), 100.
121
Art. 235.
,., Art. 236.
123
Art. 238; but see art. 237. Although the decision to admit a new Member State is
not subject to consultation with the Assembly it cannot be implemented without Treaty
amendment and the Assembly plays a role in the amending procedure.
124
Art. 203 (3).
For other instances in which the Assembly must be consulted see Soule, Comparaison
entre les dispositions institutionelles du Traite C.E.C./1. et du Traite C.E.E., 1958
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 95, 102 (No. 2); La Communaute Economique Europeenne: Aspects /nstitutione[s, ANNUAJRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, annex 10,
at 513 (1957). The obligatory consultation is an innovation not known in the E.C.S.C.
Treaty.
,.. Doc. No. 2. ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE {November 1955), Rapport sur !'organisation a
donner a l'Assembtee Commune pour rendre plus efficace son action dans le cadre des
dispositions actuelles du Traite, presente par M. Poher, Rapporteur, para. 13 at 14-15.
,.. Avis sur Ia participation des observateurs du Conseil de !'Europe a l'Assemb!Ce
Commune et sur Ia conclusion d'un accord a cet effet, as cited in the Poher Report, id.
at 14, n. 3, this author's translation.
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control under the E.E.C. Treaty is narrower than under the CoalSteel Community Treaty, according to which the High Authority,
the central body, is subject to Assembly motions of censure. Yet, as
suggested, the practical difference between the schemes of the two
Treaties may be less significant than would appear from the texts.
Moreover, even though the Council makes final decisions, the Commission plays an important part as a result of its power of initiative.
Thus the Assembly's control over the Commission and its right to
be consulted by the Council have given it a measure of authority,
and this it has sought to develop with vigor and ingenuity. In doing so it has drawn upon "general principles" governing national
parliamentary procedures and has assumed what it considered implied powers.
C.

THE WoRKING OF THE AssEMBLY

The Assembly has sought to assure the continuity and effectiveness of its activities by greatly increasing the frequency of its meetings. In 1959 seven meetings of two to seven days duration were
scheduled.12i The schedule reflects the thorny problem of coordinating the meetings of the Assembly not only with those of the
national parliaments, but also with the Consultative Assembly of
the Council of Europe and of the Western European Union, in
view of the joint mandates held by a number of representatives in
all of these bodies. 128 A Belgian Senator predicted that a parliamentarian will have to spend about 100 days annually on his "European
mandates" and at the risk of neglecting his national parliamentary
activities. 129 The many vacant seats commonly seen in the Assembly
are due, at least in part, to conflicting sessions of national parliaments.
The Assembly has established a substantial number of standing
committees. Most of the Assembly's work and most of the compromising is carried out by these committees, which meet throughout
the year, ordinarily in private sessions, to examine sections of the
general reports of the "executive." On the basis of this examination
the committees prepare their own reports and draft resolutions
127

284 EUROPE, item 1381 (December 5, 1958).
See Speech by Representative Santero, No. 8 ASSEMBLER PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE, COMPTE RENDU STENOGRAPHIQUE PROVISOIRE 18 (June 1958).
129
Speech by Senator Motz, Belgium, SEN AT, ANN ALES PARLEMENTAIRES, SEANCE DU
MERCREDI, 27 NOVEMBRE, 1957, at 137. The problem of co-ordinating the work in the
European Assemblies and the national parliaments was also mentioned by LINDSAY,
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 31, 32, 81 (1958), with respect to the Council of
Europe.
128
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which then form the basis for floor debate. A large majority of committee reports has received unanimous approval by both the committee and the Assembly. 130 This contributes to the impression that
no real "opposition" exists in the Assembly. The number of amendments to resolutions offered from the floor during plenary debates
is, however, increasing. In debate the rapporteur of the committee
introduces and defends the report, and Assembly representatives
frequently speak for an entire political group.
In their private meetings the committees hear members of the
Commission and of the other two "executives", as well as their expert staffs, and consider whatever documentation is submitted by
them. Independent experts and missions of study and inquiry are
also employed. 131 One such mission of representatives was dispatched to overseas areas of the Community. 132 In addition, the
social, transportation, and agriculture committees have heard private interest groups representing labor, management and the like.
In contrast to committees of the United States Congress, however,
the Assembly committees (and for that matter the Assembly itself)
do not have the power to subpoena witnesses. Moreover, because
most committee meetings are private, they have not performed the
public-opinion-forming function which is such a striking characteristic of American congressional committee hearings. In some areas
of Community activity, such as the application of antitrust provisions or in dealing with social affairs, public hearings of formal
testimony by the committees might well be advantageous, even
though foreign to European parliamentary practice.
Voting on the various draft resolutions often takes place in the
final plenary meetings after a number of representatives have departed from Strasbourg. As a rule the representatives vote by a
show of hands. 132a

D.

THE AssEMBLY's "PoLITICAL
CoNTRoL" ovER THE COMMISSION

The members of the Commission (but not staff members) 133
have the right under the Treaty to attend "all meetings" of the
Assembly and "to be heard," 134 although the Assembly has made
130

HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 41o-12 (1958).
'"'Rules of Procedure, arts. 37(4), 38(2}, [1958] ]'L OFF. 229.
132
Resolution of April 15, 1959, [1959] J'L OFF. 554-55; also [1959] ]'L OFF. 674, 797·
=• Rules of Procedure, art. 33 (r), [1958] ]'L OFF. 227.
133
/d., art. 29 (4), at 226.
134
E.E.C. Treaty art. 140.
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attendance by Commission members at committee meetings subject
to invitation. 135 Correspondingly, the Commission members have
the obligation under the Treaty to reply orally or in writing toques~
tions put to them either by the Assembly or by individual representatives.136 Commission members most directly concerned with
agenda items have invariably been in attendance at Strasbourg.
As national parliaments do, the Assembly has sought to act as a
"watchdog" over the "executive," particularly in connection with
the Commission's budgetary functions. The Assembly has done this
by means of parliamentary questions, some of them obviously motivated by party politics. The questioning has related to such subjects as the size of the severance payments and pensions of former
members of the "executive" 137 and the involvement of one of the
Commission members in a national court proceeding 138 and the
activities of one of the judges of the Community Court. 139
More important, however, have been the efforts on the part of
the Assembly to influence, and help develop, the policies of the "executive." The technical nature of the problems in the coal and steel
industry initially proved to be an obstacle to a similar effort by the
Common Assembly. That Assembly urged the High Authority to
formulate broad and long-range policies as distinguished from its
day-to-day operations and to state them distinctly in its reports in
a long-range context lest the trees obscure the forest. When the
policy issues were presented, the political groups in the Assembly
were forced to develop policy positions, no easy matter in the absence of experience and specialized knowledge.l4° By now a number
of representatives have developed considerable expertise and, as a
result, some Assembly committees are capable of producing policy
reports whose impact promises to exceed that which the formal
powers of the Assembly would give them. This is particularly obvious at present in the fields of agriculture and transportation.
The debates and resolutions reflect the Assembly's desire to encourage the Commission in-and sometimes to prod it into-independent and vigorous exercise of its functions. The Commission has
been urged to reject restrictive and formalistic interpretations of
the Treaty in dealing with national measures designed to circumvent
135

Rules of Procedure, op. cit. supra note 131, art. 38 (2).
E.E.C. Treaty art. 140.
[I959] }'L OFF. 682, 687.
138
[1959] }'L OFF. 686-88.
139 [I959] }'L OFF. 849-59·
140
See Speech by High Authority President Monnet, DEBATS DE L'ASSEMBLEE CoMMUNE (No. I, September u, I952) IS; Wigny Report, supra note Io6, at I2-13.
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reductions in customs duties 141 and to propose the required directive
for the removal of charges equivalent to customs duties. 142 The
Socialists have pressed strongly for action in the antitrust field; one
Socialist has blamed the "executive" inaction for the emergence of
the new (and short-lived) German oil-coal cartel. 143 The Assembly
as a whole has gone on record in support of the Commission's position that the antitrust articles are applicable even before promulgation of the Council regulations required by the Treaty. It called for
prompt and practical solutions which would allow present application of these articles. 144 The Commission has also been pressed by
Assembly resolutions to take an active role in social affairs, in the
coordination of economic policies, 145 in the development of a coordinated policy embracing the different sources of energy (coal,
nuclear energy, oil), 146 and in organizing investments. 147 In the investment field differences in the Assembly are apparent in the points
of view of those who see the European Investment Bank as a main
investment source and "liberals" who view it as a source of capital
supplementary to private investment. 148 Some representatives have
even cautioned the Commission not to rely excessively on national
governments, 149 also warning that the conferences with national
experts through which the Commission has become accustomed to
seek prior agreement of national governments to its proposals have
no standing under the Treaty. 150 The Commission has been promised support even if it should take action in areas not clearly within
its jurisdiction.151 Suggestions have been made in Assembly reports
141
Representative Illerhaus, presenting the report of the Internal Market Committee,
Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8, I959) 7; Resolution of January IS, I959, [I959] }'L OFF.,
para. 3, at I6 5·
142
Representative Kreyssig, speaking on behalf of the Socialist group, Pari. Debates
(No. I, Jan. 8, I959) IO.
143
Speech by Representative Conrad, id. (No.2, Jan. 9, I959) 38 at 39-4Ij Speech
by Representative Deist, id. (No. z, Jan. 9, I959) 48 at 56-58.
144
Resolution of January IS, I959, [I959] ]'L OFF., para. 5; cf. Speech by Representative Deringer, Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8, I959) I3-I4•
145
Resolution of April IS, I959, [I959] J'L OFF. 557; Resolution of January IS, I959,
[I959] id., para. 15, at 167; id., part IV, para I2, at 168; id., part I, para. 3, at I67.
""Resolution of January 15, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF., para. 3, at 169-70.
147
See Speech by E.E.C. Vice-President Malvestiti, Pari. Debates (No. I, Jan. 8,
1959) 16-19; speech by Representative Deist, supra note 143, at 57; Resolution of
January 15, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF., paras. 5-7, at I66.
148
See speeches by Representative Battaglia, Pari. Debates (No. sA, Jan. I3, I959)
I85 at 189; by Representative Lindenberg, id. (No. sB, Jan. I3, 1959) 201-<13; and by
Representative Nederhorst, id., 193-201.
149
Representative Kapteyn as quoted by E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus, Pari. Debates
(No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) 165 at I68.
100
Speech by Representative Deringer, supra note I44, at I3·
161
Speech by Representative Kreyssig, supra note 142, at 12.
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and statements that Community regulation of transportation, now
limited to road, railroad and inland waterway transportation,
should be extended to include pipe lines and civil aviation, that the
Monetary Committee and the Council be given additional powers
similar to those of the United States Federal Reserve System. 152
Moreover, the Commission has been urged to consult with private
interested parties 153 as well as with governments. Only relatively
rarely (for example, in the debates on the budget and on the Free
Trade Area negotiations) have complaints been heard on the floor
thatthe Commission has not provided sufficient information to the
Assembly. 154
· -In statements before the Assembly, Commission members have
expressed appreCiation for the Assembly's support and have sought
to explain and defend the steps taken by the Commission, giving
assurances of further study of any Assembly suggestions. It is especially interesting that members of the Commission have lectured the
Assembly on the Commission's lack of legal power under the Treaty
to take action suggested in the Assembly/ 55 asserting that increases
in powers of the Commission in a given field 156 may not be necessary
or desirable, that, since the power of decision currently lies with national governments in some fields such as transportation, negotiation
rather than independent Commission initiative is essential 157 and
that the establishment of "joint services" for all three Communities
would be illegal in the transportation field 158 and unwise in the
energy field. 159

E.

THE AssEMBLY AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS:
AN UNEVEN PowER CoNTEST

The legal basis for the development of relations between the Assembly and the Council is limited. 160 The first problem for the
102

Speech by Representative Troisi, Pari. Debates (No. sA, Jan. 13, 1959) I89 at I9I.
Reference to statements by Representative Deringer in speech by E. E. C. Commissioner von der Groeben, Pari. Debates (No. r, Jan. 8, 1959) 19 at zr.
154
Speech by Representative Leverkuehn with reference to the negotiations for a
European Economic Association, Pari. Debates (No. 6, Jan. 14, 1959) 238; para. 6 of
the Resolution of April II, 1959, [1959] J'L OFF. 548, 550, with reference to the budget.
'"' E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus with respect to control of pipelines, supra note 149,
at r 87; E.E.C. Vice-President Malvestiti with respect to investments, supra note 147;
E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin with respect to fuel policy, Pari. Debates (No. z, Jan.
9, 1959) 67 at 69, 70.
156
E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, supra note I 55107 E.E.C. Commissioner Schaus, supra note 155.
lGS /d, at 170,
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E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, supra note 155, at 68.
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Assembly was one of communication with the Council. The Treaty
provides that the Council "shall be heard" by the Assembly "under
the conditions which the Council shall lay down in its rules of procedure." 161 Obviously, it was important to have the Ministers attend.
Nevertheless, the Assembly took the position that the Ministers,
like Commission members, may attend the meetings of its committees upon invitation only. The Ministers objected, but acquiesced
when the Assembly stood firm. 162 Nevertheless, the Ministers have
made it clear that for practical reasons they will not attend meetings
of Assembly committees except in unusual circumstances. At least
one Minister now attends part of each plenary session of the Assembly but the absence of all Ministers during important phases of
the debate continues to be the subject of strong criticism from the
floor. 163
In its rules of procedure, the Assembly asserted its right to address resolutions to the Councils and passed some such resolutions,
which have received varying responses from the Ministers. 164 The
three treaties contain no provision relative to addressing questions
to the Councils. The Committee on Procedure of the Common Assembly ruled in 195 5 that a written question submitted by a representative could not be transmitted to the CounciJ.l 65 However, the
argument was advanced in the committee drafting the Rules of
Procedure for the new Assembly that, since the decision-making
process under the new treaties had shifted to the Councils, the
Assembly must have the formal power, first, to address questions to
the Councils, and second, by way of "a sanction," to adopt a motion
of disapproval of the Councils' policies-an idea taken from the
Charter of the Western European Union. 166 The argument in favor
101

E.E.C. Treaty, art. 140.
Does a member of the Council have the right to be heard "at any time?" The German version of art. 29 (4) of the Rules of Procedure includes the word "jederzeit"
while the French version only states "sur leur demande." Cf. Pari. Debates (No. 7,
June 1958) (mimeo.) 42-45. The additional German word being superfluous, members
of the Council may speak "upon demand," which is tantamount to "at any time." van
Kauvenbergh, id. at 42.
1
.. COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, REGLEMENT DE L'ASSEMBLEE
CoMMUNE (edition of March 1956), art. 38(2); Rules of Procedure, art. 38(2), [1958]
J'L OFF. 229; LYON, L'ASSEMBLEE COMMUNE DE LA C.E.C.A. 51 ( 1957).
163
Speech by Representative Duvieusart, Pari. Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959) 58-59;
Resolution of April n, 1959, [1959) J'L OFF. 548.
1
.. Rules of Procedure, art. 25, [1958) J'L OFF. 225. There was a similar provision
in art. 26 of the Rules of Procedure of the Common Assembly, op. cit. supra note r62.
Cf. LYoN, op. cit. supra note r62, at 52.
1
. . Decision of May 12, 1955, Kauvenbergh Report, supra note 105, para. 23, at
28-29. In the Common Assembly, resolutions addressed to the Council in a sense
provided a substitute procedure.
166
Kauvenbergh Report, supra note ros, para. 22, at 27-28; Speech by Representative
van Kauvenbergh, supra note r6r, at 12.
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of the power to question the Council prevailed, but the committee
decided not to pursue the suggestion concerning the motion of disapproval "at the moment." 167 Accordingly, the Rules were adjusted
to create the power of addressing oral or written questions to all
three Councils 168 not only for the Assembly itself, but also for the
individual representatives. The Assembly agreed, however, that the
Councils have no legal obligation to respond. 169 Nevertheless, an
interesting provision was included in the Rules to the effect that, if
the Council should fail to respond within two months to a question
addressed to it, the question will be published in the Official Journal
of the Communities.l7° In fact, the Councils have answered in writing questions directed to them by representatives although some
answers were quite perfunctory and not at all enlightening. The
questions and the answers have been published in the J ournal. 171
More recently, the Ministers have taken the position-although not
quite consistently-that they shall reply only to questions within
the jurisdiction of the Council but not to questions which, although
pertaining to the Community, under the Treaty fall within the jurisdiction of the national governments. They have also indicated unwillingness to reply where the Council has not yet made a decision
on the matter raised in the question. These attitudes have been criticized by the Assembly. 171a
The Treaty requirement that the Assembly be consulted before
certain measures are taken is the most important legal link between
the Council and the Assembly. While the Treaty is not explicit, the
consultation formula seems to indicate that the Council, having
received a proposal from the Commission, will transmit it to the
Assembly. 172 The Commission will be able to explain and defend the
proposal in the Assembly and, possibly, to modify it on the basis of
the Assembly debate before the Council makes a final decision. 173
The Assembly committee which prepared the Rules of Procedure
noted that parliamentary concepts would be applied more effectively
167

Ibid.
Rules of Procedure, arts. 25, 41, [1958] ]'L OFF. 225, 23o-31.
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"We are convinced," said Mr. Deringer, speaking for the Christian Democratic
group, "that independently of the letter of the treaties, the Council will answer these
questions." Pari. Debates (No. 7, June 1958) (mimeo.) 20, (this author's translation).
170
Rules of Procedure, art. 41 (4), [1958] ]'L OFF. 231.
m Cf. [1958] }'L OFF. 629; [1959] ]'L OFF. 18o-82, 258-59, 509-10, 849-53.
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• Doc. No. 71 ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (Nov., 1959), Rapport fait au
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if the Commissions themselves consulted the Assembly before they
made their proposals to the Councils. This would enable the Assembly to express its view at the outset of the decision-making process,
although it could obviously not deprive the Councils of their independent right to consult the Assembly. A joint Assembly-Commission position on any question, agreed to before the Council came
into the picture, would have "unquestionable weight" in the eyes of
the Council. 174 The intent of the Treaty formula may have been,
however, to preclude precisely this kind of prior understanding between the Commission and the Assembly, which could create political pressures on the Council, in the hope of encouraging instead cooperation between the Council and the Commission.m The final
text of the Rules of Procedure does not preclude direct AssemblyCommission consultations.176 In fact the Assembly committee on
agriculture, in examining the Commission's annual report and preparing its own recommendations, has formulated common policy
suggestions in advance of the Commission's proposal to the Coun·
cil. 177 Although the Commission apparently has cooperated in this
effort and participated in the Assembly debate thereon, it has made
it clear that it feels free to frame its own proposal to the Council
independently of any prior position taken by the Assembly.l7 8 An
Assembly committee suggested recently that the procedure followed
in connection with the Euratom health rules and the rules for the
European Social Fund has now established a pattern of consultation
along the following lines : the Commission informs the Assembly
committee concerned of any proposals it intends to make to the
Ministers; the committee, "in the normal exercise of parliamentary
control," discusses the proposals and offers suggestions; when the
Commission submits the proposals to the Councils the latter consult
the Assembly. 178a
The Assembly has not been happy about its relationship with the
Councils. As a demonstration of this dissatisfaction it proposed that
a substantial amount be included in the first budget for the purpose
of developing this relationship. 179 The Assembly's resolution on
"'Kauvenbergh Report, supra note 105, para. 22 at 24.
175
La Communaute Economique Europeenne: Aspects Institutionnels, ANNUAIRE
FRANc;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 491, 499 (1957).
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Rules of Procedure, art. 23, [1958] ]'L OFF. 224.
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413 EUROPE, item 2499 (May 20, 1959).
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See statements made by Vice-President Mansholt as reported 444 EuROPE, item
2697 (June 25, 1959).
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Rapport Janssens, note 171a supra.
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Resolution of April II, 1959, para. 5, [1959] }'L OFF. 548, 549· The Council did not
accept this proposed modification. See Budget of the European Economic Community,
sec. II, ch. II, para. 243, art. 24. [1959] }'L OFF. 885, 907.
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the budget of December I958 contained 27 paragraphs bristling
with criticisms of the Councils and was adopted despite the efforts
on the floor by the President of the Council of Ministers to offer explanations and to sooth ruffled feathers. The basic complaint was
the failure of the Councils to supply timely information on which
the Assembly could form intelligent opinions concerning various
budgetary questions.
Other paragraphs of the resolution reflect concern that the Committee of Permanent Representatives, mentioned earlier, may usurp
the powers of the Councils of Ministers, and also gradually assume
the preparatory functions of the Commission, thus destroying a
crucial institutional feature of the Treaty. 180 Primarily because of
this desire to preserve the constitutional balance, the Assembly
called for reduction of the size of the Secretariat of the Councils
and protested the employment by the Councils of another special
committee of national experts (not envisaged in the Treaty) for
the review of the budget. 181 For the same reason the Assembly
formally warned against an undue increase in the staffs of the Permanent Representatives. 182 Still other criticisms were directed at
delays in the transmission of the proposed budgets to the Assembly.183 Indications are that at least some of the difficulties which
arose in connection with the first budget will be avoided in the
future. 183a
During the recent economic crisis caused by the surplus of coal
in the Community, the High Authority appealed to the Assembly
after the Council rejected its proposed solutions. The Assembly
adopted a resolution, by a vote of 44 to I 2, supporting the Authority's proposals and placing principal responsibility for the failure in
evolving a Community solution on the Council.l 84 German liberals
and French Gaullists formed the nucleus of the opposition. Less
than one-half of the representatives participated in the vote on a
decision which placed the Assembly in open conflict with the Council on an important problem.
The Assembly's power under the two Rome Treaties to file a
complaint in the Community Court against the Councils (or against
the Commissions) whenever their failure to act constitutes a violation of the Treaty 185 is, perhaps, of theoretical interest only. In any
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Stein, supra note 94, at 250.
/d. at 249; also [1959] ]'L OFF. 550.
Resolution of December 17, 1958, para. 17, [1959] J'L OFF. 16.
183
Resolution of December 17, 1958, [1959] ]'L OFF. 15.
183
" But see Assembly Resolution in [1959] }'L OFF. 1257.
1
.. Resolution of April 16, 1959, [1959] }'L OFF. 560.
185
E.E.C. Treaty art. 175; Euratom Treaty art. 148.
181

182
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case it is impossible at this juncture to estimate its practical value.
In cases brought before it under the Coal-Steel Treaty the Court
has demonstrated no tendency to assert vigorous policy control over
the Community of the kind encountered in judgments of the Supreme Court of the United States.

F.

THE AssEMBLY AND THE MEMBER GovERNMENTs

The United States Congress has the power in the areas defined by
the Constitution to determine policies binding upon the States of
the Union. The decision-making institutions of the Communities
may also determine policies, within the areas defined by the treaties,
that have binding effect upon the Member States, but the Assembly's role in the decision-making process is extremely limited, and
its powers over Member Governments are practically non-existent.
Despite the absence of any grant of authority by the treaties
the representatives have not hesitated to discuss individual national
policies which in their view could impair the functioning of the Communities. The Common Assembly had already asserted the right
"to draw the attention of Member States by appropriate resolutions and after debate" to such harmful policies. 186 The Common
Assembly had also claimed the right for itself, its committees, and
its Secretariat to receive pertinent information from national administrations.
The six governments reserved to themselves under the treaties the
important prerogative of appointing the "executive," leaving no
role to the Assembly comparable to that played by the U.S. Senate
in confirming executive appointments as required by the U.S. Constitution. The Assembly has, however, sought to influence the appointments by means of resolutions and informal contacts of its
President, but concrete recognition of any Assembly role in this
important area has not been forthcoming. 187
The principal complaint of the Assembly against the governments
has related to their failure to select a seat for the Community's
institutions as required in the Treaties. 188 The institutions are presently dispersed in Luxembourg, Brussels and Strasbourg. 189 The
18
' Doc. No. 5, AssEMBLEE CoMMUNE, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des
A!faires politiques et des relations extirieures de la Communaute sur les pouvoirs de
controle de l'Assemb!Ce Commune et leur exercice, 17 para. 19 (Rapport Teitgen) (November 1954). This author's translation.
187
Stein, supra note 94, at 25o-51.
188
E.E.C. Treaty art. 216, Euratom Treaty art. 189, E. C. S.C. Treaty art. 77·
1
. . The High Authority had been located in Luxembourg, the E.E.C. and Euratom
Commissions in Brussels. The Assembly's own work is dispersed between seven
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dispersal of the institutions, requiring, as it does, excessive travel
and hindering communication, causes time and energy to be wasted
and creates morale problems among the staff. The annual expense
resulting was estimated by the Assembly at $2 million. Perhaps an
even more important consideration is the fact that concentration of
the institutions in "a European district" would provide further
impetus for integration. Indeed, this may be one reason why some
of the governments seek to delay a final decision on the location of
the "single seat."
In response to a request for an opinion, the Assembly suggested
in June, 1958 that the seat should be located-in order of preference-in Brussels, Strasbourg, or Milan, 190 and it endorsed the idea
of a "European district" similar to the District of Columbia, the
seat of the U.S. Government. 191 This suggestion and numerous subsequent appeals by the Assembly have achieved no action by the governments. Because of this lack of progress, which is partly due to
the French government's insistence on delay, the Assembly has
threatened to select its own seat and to construct its permanent
quarters, if the governments do not respond to the entreaties of a
special Assembly delegation led by President Schuman. 192
Because the treaties rely to such considerable measure on the
cooperation of the Member States, Assembly resolutions frequently
contain more or less urgent appeals to the governments of the l\1ember States to take specified action either singly or jointly with Community institutions. 193
The Assembly may also attempt to influence national governments through the national parliaments to which they are responsible. This avenue would seem particularly promising in view of the
fact that the Assembly is composed of national parliamentarians
who could very easily raise Community problems in their respective
national parliaments by introducing bills or resolutions or by utilizing the government questioning procedure with a view to obtaining
desired action. To date, however, the extent of the influence of the
buildings in the three cities and the fact that it must share the Maison d'Europe in
Strasbourg for its plenary sessions with the Council of Europe causes further inconvenience. The Committees of the Assembly have been meeting in Brussels, Luxembourg,
Strasbourg and even in Paris, and its staff must travel from Luxembourg to Strasbourg
at meeting time. Similarly, the Commissions and the High Authority and their staffs
must travel to Strasbourg from Brussels or Luxembourg.
100
(1958] )'L OFF. 234·
1
m Resolution of May 14, 1959, para. 4, [1959] }'L OFF. 678.
102
193

Ibid.

E.g., Resolution of January 15, 1959, para. E, [1959] }'L OFF. 163; Resolution of
May 14, 1959, para. 2, [1959] }'L OFF. 674-75.
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Strasbourg representatives does not appear to have been significant.
Debates in Strasbourg and in the national parliaments are not coordinated,194 and some of the Strasbourg delegations do not even.
report regularly to their national parliaments. 195 In recent Assembly'
debates and resolutions, exhortations to use the available means
have been voiced, 196 since it is clear that the Assembly and the individual parliamentarians have not even come close to exhausting
the possibilities of exerting influence over the governments through
this channel.
VI. THE COURT OF JUSTICE

A Court of Justice is established to "ensure observance of law
and justice in the interpretation of" the Treaty. 197 It is a common
institution for all three Communities. 198 It has succeeded the Court
of the Coal and Steel Community which existed from I 9 52 to I 9 58
and developed a sizeable body of jurisprudence. For most practical
purposes, the new Court is a continuation of the Coal-Steel Community Court to which new jurisdictional powers have been given by
the E.E.C. and Euratom Treaties. 199
A. CoMPOSITION OF THE CouRT: THE
jUDGES AND ADVOCATES GENERAL

The Court is composed of seven judges who must be qualified to
be judges of the highest courts of their rellpective states or "jurists
of recognized competence." 200 They are appointed "by the governments of Member States acting in common agreement" for a six-year
term and are eligible for reappointment. This arrangement has been
criticized by a distinguished writer because it results in practice in the
unilateral appointment by each nation of as many judges as, by agree, •• Apparently only the Netherlands Parliament has debated the Coal and Steel
Community problems annually. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 407 (1958).
""'LYON, L'AssEMBLEE COMMUNE DE LA C.E.C.A. 55 (1957).
'""For instance, the Assembly urged its members to press for a solution of the problem
of the seat for the Community institutions in their national parliaments. Resolution of
May 14, 1959, op. cit. supra note 191, para. 5; see speech by Representative Kreyssig,
Pari. Debates (No. r, Jan. 8, 1959) ro at u.
.
197
Art. 164.
198
Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, arts. 3-4.
199
The new Court was formally established on October 7, 1958. [1958] ]'L OFF. 453·
Its Rules of Procedure were published in [1959] J'L OFF. 350. Four of the seven judges
sat on the E.C.S.C. Court. For a discussion of the question as to the extent to which
the new Court is likely to draw on the jurisprudence of the E.C.S.C. Court, see Chapter VII infra.
,.,. Art. 167.
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ment, are to be its nationals. This method of appointment and the
relatively short term of office compare unfavorably with those of
the International Court of Justice and perhaps attest to a desire on
the part of the governments to preserve a degree of influence which
may not be compatible with the independent status of the Court. 201
The treaties do not specify the nationality of the judges, but the
present bench is composed of a national from each of the Six, the
seventh judge being the second Italian national on the Court. The
judges were drawn from national law faculties, benches and bars.
The Chief Justice, a Dutch national, is just over 40 years of age.
The Court is assisted by two Court Advocates General, an institution originating in the French Conseil d'Etat. As institutionalized "amici curiae" they present to the Court independent opinions
on the cases before it. They must have the same qualifications and
are appointed in the same manner as the judges. Advocate General
Roemer of German nationality has primarily private law background in the corporate field. The French Advocate General Lagrange held a high post in the Conseil d'Etat and served as a member
of the French delegation in the negotiations concerning the CoalSteel Community Treaty. The differing experience of these two men,
who also served the Coal-Steel Community Court, is reflected in their
differing approaches to the problems before the Court.
The discussions of law and the conclusions based on them of the
Advocates General-for example, M. Lagrange's classic comparative analysis of the meaning of "detournement de pouvoir" (misapplication of power) as a ground for review of administrative
acts 202-are of great assistance to the Court. They acquire added
significance in view of the fact that the Court works as a "collegiate
body": it renders judgments without any indication of authorship
and publishes neither votes nor dissenting opinions. On the other
hand the conclusions of the Advocates General are published and,
like dissenting opinions, frequently offer alternative solutions which
may be of relevance for the development of law. The Court rarely
indicates the sources of law on which it relies except to mention the
relevant Treaty articles and its own earlier judgments. In this respect also the Advocates' discussions, drawing on a variety of the
available sources of law, fill the gap somewhat and facilitate the
understanding of the judgment as well as the development of law.
001

Reuter, Aspects de la Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE ou
CoMMUN 3II (No. 6).
209
Case 3-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, Vol. I, at 157-871
(1954-J.955),
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Unlike a common law court, the Community Court is not bound by
precedent. Yet this Court, not unlike the common law courts, and
particularly those of early periods, will have to play a vital role in
the development of law of the Community.

B.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

The Court's jurisdiction is varied and in some respects unique,
defying categorization. For the purposes of illustration and at the
admitted risk of drawing loose analogies, one might say that the
Court's jurisdiction is analogous to the federal jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court, to the "administrative" jurisdiction
of the French Conseil d'Etat or the German Bundesverwaltungsgericht, and is at the same time a "civil" jurisdiction, and in a sense
the jurisdiction of an international tribunal.2° 3
The Court's jurisdiction is similar to that of a federal court in
regard to controversies between Member States concerning the application of the Treaty-controversies similar to those between
States of the Union which the U.S. Supreme Court is asked to resolve under the Federal Constitution or statutes. 204 The Court's
jurisdiction may also be viewed as "federal" in disputes between
Member States and Community institutions, between the institutions
themselves, and in cases where the Court decides whether proposed
international agreements to be concluded by the Community are
compatible with the Treaty. 205 Finally, one might mention in this
category the jurisdiction of the Court to rule on questions arising
in national judicial proceedings which concern interpretation of the
Treaty and the validity and interpretation of the acts of the institutions. National courts of last resort are bound to refer these "federal" questions to the Court for binding determination. This obligation on the part of the national courts has been substantially
strengthened in the Rome Treaties as compared with the CoalSteel Treaty. 206
The Court's jurisdiction is "administrative" ("public municipal")
203
Cf. INSTITUT DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES (!.R.I.), LA C.E.C.A. 222 ( 1953).
Bebr, The DeveloPment of a Community Law by the Court of the E.C.S.C., 42 MINN.
L. REV. 845, 850 (1958) .
..,. It has been argued that the Community Court's jurisdiction in such a case is one
of international Jaw. See jERUSALEM, DAS RECHT DER MONTANUNION 44-47 ( 1954) ;
MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA C.E.C.A. 74 (1958); Hay, Book Review, 8 AM. J. CaMP. L.
243-244 (1959).
205
Art. 228 ( r), para. 2.
2fJfl Cf. Vedel in preface to CARTOU, LE MARCHE COMMUN ET LE DROIT PUBLIC III
(1959). It would seem that the "municipal public law men" in the negotiating delegations for the new treaties prevailed over the "public international law men" who
did not wish to press legal integration so far.
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where it affords legal redress to individuals and enterprises praying
that administrative acts of the Community institutions be annulled. 207
The right of access of private parties to the Court-their governments need not intervene-is a necessary corollary to the power of
the institutions to act with direct effect upon these parties. This right
marks a radical departure from the conventional international tribunal, enables the Court to exercise its powers of control over the
institutions and adds to the "public municipal" characteristics of
the Communities.
The ucivil" jurisdiction (in the common law sense) of the Court
extends to cases in tort against the Community and on contracts to
which the Community is a party. In contract cases the jurisdiction
of the Court must have been stipulated. 208
Finally, the jurisdiction of the Court may be said to resemble
that of an international tribunal where the Court determines controversies between the Community and a non-member state arising
out of an international agreement or possibly out of a contract in
which the parties stipulated such jurisdiction. 209
National authorities in the Member States are bound to execute
money judgments of the Court against individuals and enterprises.
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C.

THE RoLE oF THE CouRT

The Coal-Steel Community Court and the new Court have already decided well over fifty cases-all arising under the Coal-Steel
Community Treaty, and most of which on appeals brought by enterprises praying for annulment of acts of the High Authority. Any
new move by the High Authority to exercise its power in a manner
affecting enterprises has almost invariably caused a flurry of such
appeals. Some of these (particularly during the first years) were
filed with a primary view to strengthening the hand of the enterprises involved in their negotiations with the Authority and were
subsequently withdrawn. In January, 1960, sixty-four actions were
pending before the Court, 6o under the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty and four under the F.E.C. Treaty, which compares favorably with the work load of the International Court of Justice and
of the U.S. Supreme Court in the first years of its existence.
201

Cf. I.R.I., op. cit. supra note 203, n. 7·
Arts. 178, 181, and 215. In at least some Member States certain cases in this
group would be viewed as falling within the administrative type of jurisdiction.
Complaints brought by Community employees against its institutions (Art. 179)
would certainly be considered "administrative." Pinay, La Cour de Justice des
Communautes Europeennes, 1959 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 145 (No. 12).
209
Art. 181. See also art. 182 for jurisdiction over disputes between Members "in
connection with the object of this Treaty" submitted to the Court by a "compromise."
208
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The exclusive power of review of Community acts and the controlling power of interpretation of the Community law enables the
Court to assume an important role in the development of the Community law.
In its first judgment the Coal-Steel Community Court-feeling
its way in its novel task-preferred to adhere to the letter of the
Treaty. The case involved a decision of the High Authority seeking
to support competition in the steel market. The High Authority had
interpreted the Treaty obligation of the steel producers to publish
their prices and adhere to the published price schedules as one allowing minor deviations from the prices published. Interpreting the
Treaty literally, the Court struck down the High Authority's decision.210 During the brief 1958 recession in the steel market, the
ghost of this judgment returned to haunt the Authority. However,
the tenor of subsequent judgments suggests that, if the same problem would come before the Court for the first time now, the outcome might be different.
In forty of the forty-eight cases brought against the High Authority the Court upheld the Authority, frequently justifying the
Authority's policies by virtue of the spirit of the Treaty. 211 In doing
so, however, the Court has not been insensitive to the need of protecting enterprises. It has interpreted the right of appeal for annulment broadly 212 and it has sought to assure "procedural due process" by forcing the High Authority to give sufficient reasons for its
decisions. 213 In a case concerning scrap iron the Court protected an
enterprise against what it considered excessive and unlawful delegation of power by the Authority to a subsidiary organ. Holding
that such delegation would disturb the "balance of power" under
the Treaty, the Court developed a constitutional concept of some
importance. 214 On appeal from an enterprise in another case the
Court struck down, on procedural grounds, certain High Authority
decisions concerning the Ruhr coal which apparently had been taken
under strong pressure from national authorities and in circumstances impairing the independent position of the Authority. 215
21
°Cases 1-54, 2-54, 3-54 and 4-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes
(hereinafter cited as Sammlung), Vol. 1, at 7, 79, 131, and 189, respectively. Cf. Stein,
The European Coal and Steel Community: The Beginning of Its Judicial Process, 55
CoL. L. REV. 985 (1955).
211
E.g., Case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, at 9· Stein, The Court of Justice of the
European Coal and Steel Community: 195¢-1957, 51 AM. J. INT'L. L. 821 (1957).
212
E.g., case 9-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 331 at 365.
213
Cases 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, at 9 and 51.
""See Case 9-56, supra note 213.
2lli Case 18-57 of March 20, 1959, advance mimeographed text. For a more detailed
discussion of the Court see Chapter VII infra.
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VII. ENTERPRISES AND THE COMMUNITY
INSTITUTIONS

A.

EMERGENT PROBLEMS OF THE SCOPE OF THE
"LAw-MAKING" PowER

Article I 89 of the Treaty enumerates the various kinds of action
which the Council and the Commission may take to accomplish their
functions and defines the different legal effects of each. "Regulations," "directives" and "decisions" are legally binding according
to Article I 89 while "recommendations" and "opinions" have no
binding effect on the Member State, individual or enterprise to
whom they are addressed.
Two practical problems have already arisen, if in blurred outline only, concerning the scope of the authority of the Council and
of the Commission, which are of direct interest to enterprises in
the Community.
I. HOW MUCH IMPLIED AUTHORITY?

The first of these questions is whether the Commission may issue
regulations, directives and decisions only where expressly authorized
to do so by a specific provision of the Treaty or whether it may claim
an implied authority to do so whenever necessary to the proper performance of a function entrusted to it by the Treaty. 216 For instance,
although the Commission with some exceptions is specifically required in the Treaty only to study, issue opinions and consult with
Member States on social affairs, may it also issue a regulation or a
decision if it deems it necessary for the achievement of its tasks in
this field? Again, where the Council has issued a regulation in accordance with a specific Treaty provision, may the Commission issue
a more detailed implementing regulation without specific delegation
by the Council and in the absence of any specific Treaty authorization?
This problem actually arose under the Euratom Treaty. The
Euratom Commission is to publish production programs indicating targets for nuclear energy activities and types of investment
required for their attainment. The purpose is to "stimulate the
initiative of persons and enterprises and to facilitate coordinated
development of investment." The industry is required under the
216
The Commission clearly may issue non-binding recommendations and opinions
without specific treaty authorization whenever it "considers it necessary." Art. 155 and
corresponding Euratom Treaty art. 124.
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Treaty to communicate investment projects in this field to the
Commission before they are undertaken. The Commission is to
discuss with "the persons or enterprises all aspects of any investment projects relating to the aims of this Treaty" and "communicate its views thereon to the Member State concerned." The Council,
on a proposal of the Commission, is to establish "criteria" as to the
"type and scope" of the projects which are to be communicated to
the Commission. 217
After the Council had issued a regulation in accordance with these
provisions, the Commission proceeded to enact a regulation of its
own establishing an extensive and detailed questionnaire to be answered by the enterprises.218 The legality of the Commission's regulation was questioned in some quarters on the ground that it was not
authorized by any specific Treaty provision or by the Council's regulation,219 and on the further ground that even if the Commission
had an implied power to issue a regulation without specific authorization, the Commission had exceeded its power by extending the
scope of the information required beyond the criteria of the Council. If allowed to stand, the argument went, the Commission's regulation would serve as a precedent permitting the Commission to
broaden its powers considerably and thereby to upset the balance
of powers carefully worked out in the Treaty. 220 It was argued in
support of the regulation that the Commission must have the power
to specify with a binding effect the information required from the
industry if it is to perform its task properly. A working group of
the Euratom Council and Commission was appointed to explore
possible solutions to this disagreement. Subsequently the Commission issued an interpretative statement under the heading "Application of Regulation No. I of the Commission," 221 which provides
217

Euratom Treaty, arts. 4o-44.
Euratom Commission Regulation No. r, [1958] ]'L OFF. 5II; later renumbered
to No 5, [1959] ]'L OFF. 6so; Euratom Council Regulation No.4 [1958] ]'L OFF. 417.
219
Everling, Die erst en Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europai"schen Gemeinschaften, 14 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 52 (1959); Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe
der Europalschen Gemeinschaften, id. at 127. It was argued that the Treaty excludes
the implied powers concept because under art. 203 Euratom Treaty (art. 235 E.E.C.
Treaty), if any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve one of the
aims of the Community, and the Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers,
the Council may enact the appropriate pro.visions. The Euratom Commission relied
upon arts. 41, 124 and x6r of the Eur.atom Treaty. Cf. Glaesner "Obertragung rechtsetzender Gewalt auf internationalc Organizationtfiz in der volkerrechtlichen Praxis,"
(1959] DIE .OFFENTLICHE. VERWALTUNG 6S3-s8 ..
""'Cf. Haedrich, Die ersten Euratom- I' erordnungen: Investitionen und Sicherheitskontrolle, 1959 (No.6) ATOMWIRTSCHAFT 232, 233·
221
[1959] }'L OFF. 571,
218
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that the confidential nature of any communication will be safeguarded and states that if "in certain cases a detailed answer . . .
cannot be given because of special circumstances in which a person
or enterprise finds itself," the Commission will be able to accept
supplementary information in a discussion between the Commission
staff and the person or enterprise concerned. Since the Commission
is to determine which aspects must be discussed, this statement does
not seem to settle the question of how much information the Commission may require. Unquestionably a great deal will depend upon
how the Commission applies this interpretation in practice. Although any Member State which considered the Commission regulation illegal or any enterprise which the Commission directed to
reply to the questionnaire could have raised questions in the Community Court, none did, and the period for appeal against the regulation itself has lapsed. It was, indeed, probably wise not to bring
the matter before the Community Court at this early state of the
Community development.
In a subsequent regulation the Euratom Commission again prescribed the information which must be made available to it for purposes of control against diversion of nuclear materials. The Commission did so without any specific Treaty authorization, or m
other words, clearly on the theory of implied powers. 222
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2. REGULATION OR DIRECTIVE?

The second problem concerning the authority of the Council and
the Commission arises from the fact that in a number of instances
Treaty provisions authorize the institutions to act by "regulations
or directives," or are entirely silent with respect to the legal form
which an authorized act may take. 223 A "regulation," it will be recalled, modifies national law directly, while a "directive" imposes an
obligation on a Member State to conform its national law to the
rules contained in the directive by whatever means it desires to adopt
in accordance with its own constitution. One view is that, because of
the basic nature of the Community, its institutions should, in principle, rely on Member States to incorporate Community rules into
national laws, and should therefore resort to regulation only where
the act, in order to be effective, must directly accord rights to, or
impose obligations on, individuals or enterprises. If this standard
is the proper one, it could be said that several regulations is••~ [1959] J'L OFF. 298. The Commission relied on Euratom articles 77, 78, IZ<h r6r,

•~ E.g., art!~. 43 (2), 49, 75, 127.
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sued thus far should have taken the form of directives or decisions.224
Some German writers have discerned an inclination on the part
of the institutions to favor regulations over other forms. One writer
points out that, although the German Constitution sanctions the
delegation of law-making powers to international organizations,
such as the Community, it requires some measure of democratic
control over the law-making process, 225 and regulations-which
have a direct effect on national law-are adopted by the Council or
Commission without the participation of national parliaments.
Moreover, the European Assembly, because of its limited powers
(if not because of its composition) cannot today provide the type
of parliamentary control required. Thus, the argument goes, excessive recourse to regulations might raise the question in Germany
of the Treaty's constitutionality. 226
On the other hand, the employment of "directives" obviously
may raise practical difficulties where uniform rules are required
promptly. Thus, when the Euratom Council adopted health and
safety standards for nuclear installations by a directive, it was necessary for the European Assembly to urge the Members to adjust
their national laws to conform to the directive-an indication of a
224
Thus, the identical Regulations No. 2 of the E.E.C. and Euratom Councils concerning identity cards for members of the European Parliamentary Assembly ( [1958]
}'L OFF. 387, 403, respectively) did not create substantive rights of immunity for the
parliamentarians since those had already been given by a Protocol to the Treaty
(Protocol on Privileges and Immunities art. 6) ; the form of the identity card could
therefore have been established by a simple decision. Everling, supra note 219, at
53· Likewise, it is argued that Regulation No. 5 of the E.E.C. Council ( [1958] ]'L OFF.
68r) concerning the manner of payment of the financial contributions of the Member
States to the Development Fund does not create rights or obligations with regard to
individuals and should therefore have been issued in the form of a directive. Everling,
supra note 219, at 53; Meibom, supra note 219, at 130. In contrast to these two examples, the E.E.C. and Euratom Council Regulations No. r concerning the official languages of the Community ( [1958] }'L OFF. 385, 401 respectively) and the E.E.C. Council Regulation No. 6 ([1958] }'L OFF. 686) were properly issued as regulations. In
the former definite rights were given to individuals to be answered in their own
language by the Community institutions, while the latter regulation establishes rules
for the liability of the auditor and accountants of the Development Fund. Ibid. In
between these two sets of regulations are the E.E.C. Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 concerning the social security benefits of migrant workers ( [1958] J'L OFF. 561 and 597,
respectively). Because of the far-reaching impact of these regulations on the national
insurance systems, one writer (Everling, supra note 219, at 53) suggests that a directive to Member States would have been the wiser political course to follow, while another writer (Meibom, supra note 219, at 130) points out that this question of political
expediency does not change the propriety of these acts as regulations since legal
rights were conferred upon individuals.
"""Cf. art. 20 of the German Constitution; Everling, supra note 219, at 55·
226
Art. 24 of the German Constitution. The argument is that art. 24 of the German
Constitution requires parliamentary control of some form. Everling, supra note 219,
at 55·
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problem of compliance which does not arise in this form when a
regulation is issued. 227
Finally, an analogous problem arises because the Council is
"Janus-headed" : it is both the Community organ authorized to
adopt regulations and a conference of ministers who possess authority to enter into international understandings and agreements
on behalf of the Member States, subject possibly to approval in
national parliaments. In some instances the Treaty does not state
clearly which of the two methods is to be employed. The CoalSteel Community practice has already caused some obfuscation.
E.E.C. Council Regulation No. 3 concerning social security of
migrant workers was first embodied in a convention signed-but
not ratified-by the six governments. When the Treaty came into
effect, the six governments, instead of obtaining ratification by
their parliaments, chose to have the Council of Ministers adopt
Regulation No. 3 pursuant to Article 51 of the Treaty. 2 !!8
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B.

LEGAL POSITION OF ENTERPRISES IN
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE INSTITUTIONS

Basic to the conception of the Treaty are the relationships among
governments and those between the institutions and governments.
The E.E.C. Treaty contains substantially fewer rules directly applicable to enterprises, and fewer provisions envisaging direct action
by the institutions with respect to enterprises than the Coal-Steel
Community Treaty. Instances of both may, of course, increase to
the extent that the Council with the Commission draw upon the
broad potential powers conferred upon them by the Treaty and
enact appropriate regulations. The question thus arises concerning
the procedural rights which an enterprise may invoke for its protection in a "quasi-judicial" proceeding in which the Commission by
a decision applies a general rule to an enterprise, as well as in cases
where the Council or the Commission formulate general rules in
the form of regulations or directives.
I. QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COMMISSION

The Treaty requires that all decisions be "supported by reason." 229 A "reasoned" decision is specifically prescribed where the
227 See Resolution of January 15, 1959, para. (E), [1959] J'L OFF. 163.
128-·132 (1958-1959)• See also
Meibom, Zur rechtlichen Systematik der Beschlussfiihigkeit der Organe der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 14 DER BETRIEBS- BERATER 584 ( 19 59).
229
Art. 190.
"'"REUTER, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
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Commission acts to "confirm the existence" of an infringement of
the antitrust principles of the Treaty. 230 No decision addressed
to an enterprise takes effect until the enterprise is notified of it. 231
The enterprise may appeal to the Community Court for annulment
of any decisions addressed to it on grounds specified in the Treaty,
an important legal remedy discussed in some detail in the chapter
on The New Legal Remedies of Enterprises. The appeal, however,
has no staying effect unless the Court orders suspension.
Beyond this, however, the Treaty contains no code of procedural
safeguards applicable in proceedings before the Commission, analogous for instance to the Administrative Procedure Act governing
federal agencies in the U.S. 232 The Treaty contains, moreover, no
provision requiring the Commission to give an enterprise an oral
hearing, an opportunity to make written submissions, access to evidence, a right of rebuttal or the like. The Coal-Steel Community
Treaty specifically authorizes the High Authority in a number of
instances to impose penalties upon enterprises. Correspondingly,
Article 36 of that treaty requires the Authority to give the interested enterprise "an opportunity to present its views" prior to imposing a penalty upon it. The E.E.C. Treaty contains no general
provision analogous to Article 36, probably because penalties under
the E.E.C. Treaty may be imposed only if prescribed by Council
regulations. Where the Council prescribes penalties, it may also
confer jurisdiction upon the Community Court to impose them. 233
In a proceeding before the Court the defendant enterprise would
receive the basic protection of procedural safeguards including, of
course, full hearing. However, the Treaty may be interpreted as
empowering the Council to charge the Commission as well with the
imposition of penalties. 234 In that case there is no specific Treaty
provision for a hearing before the Commission, but the hearing
could be prescribed in the Council regulation. In any event the enterprise would, of course, be free to request the Community Court
to review and annul the Commission decision imposing the penalty.
It is interesting that the Treaty does require the Commission to
grant to a Member State charged with a violation of its Treaty
obligation an opportunity for "comments" in written or oral form.
The Treaty also prescribes consultations with, or notice to, MemJl00Art.89(2).
mArt. 191, para. 2.
232
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1009 ( 1952) .
... Art. 172. Cf. art. 87 (2) (a) •
... See Chapter VII infra.
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her States before certain decisions are taken including some decisions which may affect enterprises. 235
In the absence of Treaty provisions assuring an enterprise the
opportunity to present its case to the Commission, the burden of
developing minimum procedural safeguards lies, in the first place,
upon the Council and the Commission and, secondly, upon the Community Court. As is suggested in the chapter on The New Legal
Remedies of Enterprises, there is a basis in the Treaty for the
Community Court to establish such safeguards in its jurisprudence
by striking down any decision brought before it for review if the
decision was adopted in disregard of these safeguards. The French
Conseil d'Etat, despite the absence of a statutory requirement, has
progressively imposed procedural safeguards on lower administrative authorities. Moreover, there is substantial support for such
a course in the legislation and jurisprudence governing administrative procedures in the other Member States of the Community, even
though national systems differ somewhat in the emphasis placed,
for instance, on the requirement of an oral hearing. 236 As indicated
earlier in this chapter, the Community Court has already begun the
development of some minimal safeguards. For this purpose the
Court has drawn principally upon the rules recognized by the legislation, principles of law, and judicial decisions in Member States. 237
2. <~LAW-MAKING" PROCEEDINGS

The Treaty provides that regulations of the Council and of the
Commission must be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities and that they become effective 20 days thereafter
unless the regulations themselves otherwise provide. The Journal,
an official publication of all three Communities, is published in the
four "official" languages. 238 From the viewpoint of the national
legal systems, publication in the Journal has the same effect as publication in national official journals as required by national law. 239
"""Arts. 169, 170, 79(4), 8o(z), 93(2).
An international group of experts which recently considered this problem from
the viewpoint of procedures for the enforcement of the antitrust provisions in the
Treaty prepared a brief survey of national procedures and suggested specific principles for the Commission's guidance. See Nebolsine et al., The "Right of Defense" in
the Control of Restrictive Practices under the European Community Treaties, 8 AM.
J. COMP. LAW 433 (1959).
287
Cf. Joint Cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, Vol. III (1957), 3 at II8 and 127.
288
Dutch, French, German, Italian. E.E.C. Regulation No. 1, [1958] J'L OFF. 385.
289
See Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, 1958 REVUE ou
MARCHE COMMUN 161, 168 (No. 3).
2.'l8
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Nevertheless, in Germany, for example, regulations are also published in the German official journal ( Bundesgesetzblatt, Part II)
but such publication has only a declaratory effect. Addressee Member States must be notified of directives, and they take effect upon
such notification. 240 Directives (and for that matter decisions also)
are published in the Official Journal of the Communities for information purposes if the issuing institution so decides, which as a
rule has been the case. 241 Again, regulations and directives must be
supported by reasons stated therein. 242
Depending on their substantive content, regulations may be compared to federal statutes or administrative regulations in the United
States. In the United States, legislative hearings before congressional committees offer enterprises an opportunity to present their
views on contemplated legislation. The purpose of the hearings is
to ensure that the legislator has all the relevant facts necessary to
the formulation of legislation. Federal rule-making procedures in
administrative agencies also provide ample opportunities for interested enterprises to submit their views, even where private rights
may not be directly affected. Such a procedure is apparently not part
of legislative or administrative "law-making" on the Continent,
and the Treaty provides no analogous procedures. Nor does it contain a provision like that in Article 7 r of the United Nations
Charter authorizing the Economic and Social Council (composed
of instructed government representatives) to consult directly with
important non-governmental groups, national and international,
which are given for this purpose a special status in relation to the
Council.243 Instead, the Treaty allows and even requires the Council and the Commission to consult with a variety of advisory bodies
some of which are so composed as to reflect the various economic
interests within the Community.244 Where the Treaty requires consultation with an advisory body as a prerequisite to the adoption of
""As to the question of what constitutes notification, the E.C.S.C. Court has held
that a party is deemed to have notice of a letter when it has come "within the internal sphere of the addressee." Case 8-56, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes, Vol. III, 189 at 200.
211
In Germany, decisions are published either in the Bundcsgesezblatt, Part II, or in
the Bundesanzeiger, but according to Meibom, the need for publishing "directives"
has not been determined as yet. Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 14 DER BETRIEBS-BERATER 127, 128-29 ( 1959).
242
Art. 190.
213
These groups have the right to propose matters for inclusion in the Council's
agenda and to present their views formally. EcoSoc Rules of Procedure, arts. 9,
77-79, U.N. EcoSoc OFF. REc. 8th Sess. Annex, 142 at 147, 168-170 (E/1130) (1952).
"''See PART IV supra.
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a regulation, directive or decision, any such act must expressly refer
to the opinion obtained in such consultation under the penalty of
annulment by the Court for a defect in form. The opinion of the
advisory body is not, of course, binding on the institution which
requested it.
Consultations with advisory bodies such as the Economic and
Social Committee (and, in a sense, consultations with the Assembly)
provide an organizational structure within which interchanges of
views between the institutions and private interests can take place,
and of course, the national governments will take private interests
into account in instructing their Ministers in the Council to the extent that considerations of policy or national laws so dictate.
C.

ORGANIZING FOR CoMMUNITY AcTION
I. COMMUNITY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS OF INDUSTRY
AND COMMERCE

The organizational foundation for cooperation of European industries with the emerging international organizations was laid
by the creation of the Council of Industrial Federations of Europe
( C.I.F.E.) in I 949· The Council, established at the initiative of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), embraces national industrial federations of the 17 member countries
of the organization. 245 The Council's "Steering Committee for Information and Cooperation with the O.E.E.C." has worked with the
O.E.E.C. "Group for Liaison with Non-Governmental Organizations." A permanent Secretariat has functioned in Paris and the
Assembly of members has met periodically. A number of expert
working groups have studied special problems, such as economic coexistence with the Communist world, the coordination of European
transportation systems, sources of energy, the influencing public
opinion through mass media and, more recently, the problems of a
free trade area in Western Europe.
When the Coal-Steel Community became reality, a special Union
of Industries of the Six Nations was organized as a special group
within the Council. In February I958, after the Rome Treaties
became effective, 10 national federations of industries in the six
Member States formed an independent "Union of Industries of the
European Community" (U.N.I.C.E.). All but two of these federations are also members of the Council of Industrial Federations of
245

Spain joined O.E.E.C. as the eighteenth member in 1959.
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Europe ( C.I.F.E.) .246 According to its charter the purposes of the.
Union are "to stimulate the elaboration of industrial policy in the
European spirit" and to act as the authorized spokesman of the industries before the Community institutions "on all problems of general interest or affecting questions of principle relating to the common policy" of the member federations. For these purposes the
Union is to assure "permanent liaison" with the institutions, to undertake studies, to coordinate positions and action (demarches) of
the member federations, and to foster "common attitudes" of industrial representatives in international organizations. Of particular interest is the undertaking by the member federations to keep the Secretary General of the Union informed and to consult with each other
prior to taking a position before Community institutions. The organs of the Union are: the President, the Council of Presidents of
the member federations (which is the policy-making body) , a Secretary General, a Committee of Permanent Delegates and various
special committees and committees of experts. The Council of Presidents has been meeting in Brussels under the Presidency of Mr. L.A.
Bekaert of the Federation of Belgian Industries, to examine Common Market problems, particularly those under consideration by
the institutions. This examination of problems is reported to have
covered policies concerning prices and government controls of
prices, commercial policy problems, discrimination in transportation, industrial property, harmonization of indirect taxes and the
like. 247 The primary purpose is to establish common positions on
matters with which the Community institutions are concerned. Only
rarely are such common positions made public. 248
Special commissions and expert working groups have been organized to deal with problems of cartels, taxation, social questions,
harmonization of national legislations, financial and monetary questions, freeing of capital, economic trends, investments and tariffs
and quotas.
The Chambers of Commerce in the six Member States created
no new organization comparable to U.N.I.C.E. Instead, they organized a "Permanent Conference of the Chambers of Commerce
of the European Economic Community." Each chamber designates
up to six delegates (supported by a certain number of experts) who
meet every three months in one of the six Member Countries. Re246

On U.N.I.C.E., see Nagels, Die Zusammenarheit der industriellen SpitzenverI EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 444 (No. 22) (1958) .
418 EUROPE, item 2477 (May 26, 1959); 422 EUROPE, item 2685 (June 23, 1959) .
... E.g., a memorandum, Le Probleme des Transports dans le cadre de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne (July 19, 1958).

hiinde in Europa,
7
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ports, prepared on the basis of replies to questionnaires by the individual chambers, and draft resolutions are studied by experts
before they are submitted to a General Assembly. The Conference,
in meetings held in Strasbourg, Brussels, Berlin, Milan, and Paris,
has dealt with such matters as the troublesome distinction between
fiscal and "economic" duties, certain items of the future common
external tariff, right of establishment, transport organization, and
labor costs. 249
In addition to these Community-level organizations comprising
all national industries, an impressive number of industrial and trade
groups have formed new Community-level associations in their own
specialized fields. Other groups have established autonomous sections of their international or all-European federations, or created
permanent committees, "congresses," liaison offices, or study and
working parties to deal with Common Market problems, or at least
held special meetings to consider these problems. A number of these
new associations and committees plan to employ liaison secretariats
at the seat of the institutions; some have already established offices
in Brussels. 250 Where new specialized associations are formed on the
level of the six Member States, liaison is established with corresponding associations of broader European or international membership and with U.N.I.C.E. 251 Some of the new industrial associations, although formed because the E.E.C. Treaty has gone into
effect, include industrial groups in other European states, such as
the United Kingdom, Austria, and Switzerland, in addition to those
in the six Member States.
The new Community-level organizations of the various branches
9
"' See La Con/irence Permanente des Chambres de Commerce de la C.E.E., 1959
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 238-239 (No. 15).
"""A partial list of the new E.E.C. level organizations is contained in 1959 REVUE
DU MARCHE CoMMUN 309-3II (No. 17). This list includes some 28 organizations in
the field of industry (wood-working, paper, rubber, shoes, clothing, construction,
agriculture and food processing, flax, dairy products, fodder, vinegar, beer brewing,
malt, fruit juices, sugar, mustard, flour milling, pasta, margarine, edible oil, powdered
milk, meat packing, chocolate, vegetable canning), and some 38 organizations in the
field of commerce. The Bulletin EUROPE lists the new organizations as they come into
being (e.g., Feb. 16, Mar. 3, 10, Apr. 6, 22, 23, May 25, June 26, 1959). See also the
list of permanent representatives of producers, users and transporters of coal and
steel at the E.C.S.C. in Luxembourg in ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'AsSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE ( 1958-1959) 241-43. Dr. F. Nagels of the Federation of German
Industries lists Community-level organizations among the following industries: chemical, metal workings, non-ferrous metals, clothing, iron producing, food, coal mining,
sugar 'manufacturing, wood working, shoe, beer brewing and construction. Nagels,
supra note 246.
m Thus, COLI ME, representing the Metal, Mechanical and Electrical Industries
on the level of the Six, maintains close liason with ORGALIME-the federation of
these industries on the level of the 17 (later 18) O.E.E.C. countries-and with U.N.I.C.E.
290 EUROPE, item 1435 (Dec. 12, 1958).
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of industry and other European industrial organizations will no
doubt wish to represent the interests of their specific industries before the institutions in Brussels. The liaison committee of
U.N.I.C.E.-it has been suggested-will have to make certain that
where the interests of several branches of industry or of Community industry generally are involved, a uniform position is presented to the Community institutions which would have the support
of the national general federations. If conflicting positions were
taken, it was said, the institutions would "have the choice of picking from the bouquet of positions presented the most agreeable
one." 252
In a sense, this organizational surge transcending national frontiers is a corollary to the intensive drive toward concentration and
specialization effected by means of agreements among Community
enterprises-which is perhaps the most noticeable economic effect
of the E.E.C. thus far. The view was expressed in some labor circles
that the primary purpose of the new organizational arrangements
was to facilitate agreements among Community enterprises, some
of which may not be compatible with the Treaty rules governmg
competition.
2. COMMUNITY-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS OF LABOR

It is not surprising that labor has not lagged behind in the drive
toward Community-level organization, particularly in view of the
fact that, with perhaps one exception, all major non-Communist
labor unions in the six Member States have been among the most
consistent supporters of European integration. All three leading
international labor organizations responded promptly to the Rome
Treaties.
The mammoth International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (I.C.F.T.U.) with headquarters in Brussels, which comprises some 55 million non-Communist workers on both sides of the
Atlantic (including the American AFL-CIO) has maintained a Regional European Organization (O.R.E.) since 1950. In 1958, the
I.C.F.T.U. established a new Community-level organization under
an executive committee composed of representatives of the national
confederations in the Community States which are associated with
I.C.F.T.U. The Secretary General of O.R.E. also sits on the executive committee. Two standing committees, one for the Coal-Steel
252

Nagels, supra note 246, at 446.
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Community and the other for the E.E.C. and Euratom, and anumber of other committees have been established. The General Assembly of the new organization meets bi-annually and its Secretariat
is located in Brussels. An I.C.F.T.U. office to effect liaison with the
Coal-Steel Community operates in Luxembourg. Several committees of craft unions affiliated with the I.C.F.T.U. coordinate their
activities within the six Member States in such fields as agriculture,
transport and the construction trades. 253
The International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions
(I.C.C.T.U.) of some 5 million workers draws its European membership principally from the six Member States. In 195 5 it organized a Federation of Christian Trade Unions of the Coal-Steel Community countries. In I 9 58 it established a European organization
under an executive committee composed of representatives of national I.C.C.T.U. confederations in Europe and in the African areas
associated with the Community. On Community matters only the
representatives from the Six and from the associated African areas
have the right to vote. This committee coordinates I.C.C.T.U.
activities in all European organizations including the Council of
Europe, O.E.E.C., United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, as well as in the Communities. A number of subcommittees have
been appointed. The Secretary General has his office in Brussels. An
advisory European conference of representatives of national confederations and craft federations meets annually.
In these organizational arrangements one may discern an effortstemming perhaps from the relative weakness of labor unions in
some of the Community countries-to avoid weakening unduly the
ties with the powerful trade unions elsewhere in Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom. 254
The Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions
(W.F.T.U.) which claims a membership of 93 million (with threefourths in the Soviet Union) established in I 9 58 a "coordination
and action committee" which includes representatives of its national
federations in Italy, France, Netherlands, Luxembourg and in
Africa. Reflecting the position of the Communist parties (and of
the Soviet Union) this group is opposed to the Communities; it sees
in the Common Market an effort of "monopolistic capital" to
2

r.a ANNUAIRE-MANUEL DE L'ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE

244-47·

1958-1959, at

Cf. Rapport du Secretariat a Ia Deuxieme Assemblee generale des Syndicats Libres
des Etats Membres des Communautes Europeennes, Oct. 12, 1959.
254
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strengthen its "grip over the working people" and calls for a united
action by the people. 255

D.

EFFECTIVE CoNTACT PoiNTs BETWEEN
INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE GROUPS

One logical function of the secretariats of the private groups at
the seat of the institutions is to serve as listening posts for their organizations, and to receive, digest, and disseminate to their members the documentation published by the institutions. Some of the
reports 256 are of considerable value both to industry and labor as
a source of economic, social, technical, and other information. 257
Another function is the representation of the views of their organizations before the appropriate bodies and officials in the institutions.
I. CONTACTS WITH THE COMMISSION

While the Euratom Treaty provides for contacts and consultations between the Commission and the enterprises particularly for
the purpose of coordinating investment and research, the E.E.C.
Treaty contains no comparable provisions. 258 The E.E.C. Commission has the right "[FJ or the performance of the tasks entrusted to it, to collect any information and verify any matters" but
only "within the limits and under the conditions laid down by the
Council in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty." 259
The Commission has not developed any regular, formalized procedure for dealing with non-governmental groups, and occasionally
complaints are heard from both labor and industry that their views
have not been obtained on matters of interest to them. 260 The Com255
Tessier, L'Organisation du Syndicalisme Ouvrier dans le Cadre Europien, 1959
REVUE DU MARCHE CoMMUN 242 (No. 15). Rosenberg, Zusammenarbeit und Organisation der Gewerkschaften West-Europas, 2 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFT 165 (No. 7)
(1959).
256
E.g., E.C.S.C.: Les Regimes de Securite Sociale, 2 vols. (1957-1958); the bimonthly Bulletin Statistique; the periodic trade analyses Commerce exterieur de Ia
Communaute.
E.E.C.: L'evolution recente de Ia situation economique ( 1958) ; Document de travail
sur Ia situation de !'agriculture dans Ia Communaute (1958).
Euratom: Report on the Position of Nuclear Industries in the Community (1958).
257
The public information services of the three Communities have been consolidated
into a "common service," but each "executive" has its own official spokesman. See
E.E.C. CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY
28-30 (1958); SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 17
(1959).
258
E.g., Euratom, arts. 5, 40, 41.
256
Art. 213 .
... 359 EuROPE, items 1976-77 (March II, 1959).
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mission's avowed attitude, however, was announced m the First
General Report on the Activities of the Community:
9· While the common institutions and the Governments
of Member States have a special responsibility for the
attainment of the objectives of the Community, it will not
be possible to attain them without the cooperation and
help of the men who exercise leading functions in all fields,
an? _in the last resort, of the active support of public
opm10n.
It is for these reasons that the Commission has decided
to let its actions be fully known to the public, keeping in the
picture the representatives of those economic and social
groups concerned, consulting them, advisin_q them, even associating them with the work where possible. In this connection the Commission attaches great value to the advice
it will have to ask from the Economic and Social Committee. In its endeavours to take account of all legitimate interests, the Commission will listen to the opinions and
comments submitted to it by the representatives of these
interests, whether organizations or individuals.
This Commission also notes with pleasure the many
endeavors that have already been made to arrange for the
exchange of ideas among those responsible for the various
fields of activity in the six countries or for a better understanding of the objectives of the Community; in the
firm belief that such action will further the realization
of the objectives of the Treaty and will develop a sense
of community, the Commission gives them its unstinted
support. 261
In a recent statement before an industrial group, President Hallstein reportedly confirmed that the Commission has been in constant
contact with representatives of industry; he welcomed the fact that
politicians who make decisions affecting the European idea are subjected to increasing pressures from interested groups. 262 Similarly,
in Assembly debates Commission members have declared that they
will consult interested groups, for instance, in investment matters. 263
As could be expected, the Assembly has encouraged the Commission
to establish direct contact with both labor and industry particularly
in the social field. 264
201
E.E.C. COMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY
14-15 ( 1958). Italics added.
"""456 EuROPE, item 2805 (July 9, 1959); Resolutions of the Assemblee generale des
Syndicats C.I.S.L., Nov. 5 and 6, 1959, Brussels.
263
Speech by E.E.C. Vice-President Marjolin, Pari. Debates (No. 2, Jan. 9, 1959)
67 at 70, referring to a statement by Representative Van Campen, id., No. 5B, 210 at
213.
26
•Resolution of January 15,1959, para. 16, [1959] J'L OFF. 167.
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The Commission is reported to have consulted representatives of
agricultural producers and labor in developing its proposals for a
common agricultural policy. 265 It also has announced that it will
seek the advice of industry and labor groups in drafting the Rules
for the Social Fund. 266 In fact, consultations are reported to have
taken place on the basis of a Commission draft with the two nonCommunist labor groups (I.C.F.T.U. and I.C.C.T.U.) as well as
with U.N.I.C.E., simultaneously with the Commission's discussions
with government officials from national labor and finance ministries.267 These consultations were in addition to those with the
Economic and Social Committee which are required by the Treaty.
In response to a request by the unions, a Vice-President of the
Commission and members of its staff are reported to have met in an
"economic round table" with leaders of the two labor groups for a
general discussion of major Community problems, and suggestions
were made in labor quarters to make "round table" sessions of this
type a regular feature. 268 The belief prevails in union circles that
labor has not been given as much voice and representation in the
institutions of the new Communities as it has in the Coal-Steel
Community. Union efforts for closer contact are directed not only
at the Commission, but also at the governmental expert groups
working with the Commission. Specific suggestions have been urged
by the unions upon the Commission, such as the appointment of an
African as the head of the Department of Overseas Territories. 269
2. CONTACTS WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEES
OF THE COMMUNITY

Where the Community advisory committees comprise individuals
selected from industry, labor and other such sectors of society, private interest groups will naturally seek contacts with their respective
spokesmen. This tendency has already been particularly evident as
far as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on
"'"'The Committee of Agricultural Associations of the Community (C.O.P.A.) is
reported to have been asked for comments on specific memoranda prepared by the
Commission staff. 411 EuROPE, item 2412 {May 16, 1959); 448 id., item 2733 (June
30, 1959); 455 id., item 2792 (July 8, 1959).
200
E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT ON THE AcTIVITIES OF THE CoMMUNITY 114 ( 1959) •
267
377 EUROPE, item 2IIO (April 3, 1959); 451 id., item 2757 (July 3, 1959).
268
455 EUROPE, item 2793 {July 8, 1959).
269
337 EUROPE, item 1794 (Feb. 13, 1959).
The Euratom Commission will of course be in increasingly close contacts with private enterprises and groups, particularly with the public utilities participating in the
construction of nuclear power plants under the EURATOM-U.S. program.
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the Social Fund are concerned. Some feel, however, that although
the Economic and Social Committee may be suitable for general
debates on policy matters and on important aspects of policy implementation, it is not effective for purposes of continuing consultation.
The general criticism of some that government officials play an excessive role in certain of these committees-the Transportation
Committee, for example-has already been mentioned. 270 Similarly,
some members of the Economic and Social Committee have reportedly complained that the Administrative Committee on Social
Security for Migrant Workers should not have been composed
only of government officials, 271 and both the transportation industry
and labor spokesmen have criticized the composition of the Transportation Committee. 272
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3·

CONTACTS WITH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES,
THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY

The Permanent Representatives of the national governments in
Brussels offer another avenue of contact. Their position is somewhat
analogous to that of permanent missions to the United Nations in
New York-the United States Mission, for example, which holds
regular briefings for American non-governmental organizations particularly during General Assembly sessions. The role of the Permanent Representatives is of importance not only because they prepare
documents for the Council of Ministers, but also because of their
influence on the Commission as spokesmen for national governments. An important labor group has reported, however, that it has
been difficult to establish relations with the Council because not only
Ministers of Foreign Affairs but other ministers as well are involved
in the Council's work. Moreover, ministers have tended to consult
national employer and labor organizations in their respective countries and to rely on the Permanent Representatives of the six governments in Brussels to work out the problems. "We are categorically opposed to this tendency," this labor group reported, "because
we do not want to lose on the European level what we had gained on
the national level in terms of consultation and co-determination." 2 n
The Council appointed a special Committee to assist the Commission in future tariff negotiations with third countries. This Com07
° Cf. parliamentary question by Representative Muller-Hermann, [1959] }'L OFF.
818-19.
271
376 EUROPE, item 2015 (April2, 1959).
272
317 EUROPE, item 1615 (Jan. 19, 1959).
073
Rapport, supra note 254.
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mittee is composed of governmental representatives, and there are
no indications that it or the Commission will seek the views of interested private groups by means of public hearings like those conducted by the United States Committee on Reciprocity Information
in connection with tariff negotiations or by any other organized
means. However, the Commission, through its Department of External Relations, is reported to have been consulting informally on
tariff problems with the representatives of U.N.I.C.E. 274
A number of European Assembly members have cooperated
closely with labor union representatives in Brussels.
If the role of the Assembly in the Community increases, pressures
might develop to increase the number and scope of informal hearings of private interest representatives before the standing committees of the Assembly. 275 Individuals and enterprises have at present the right to address petitions to the Assembly on matters falling
within the scope of activities of the Communities, but no such petitions appear to have been received thus far. 276
4·

CONTACTS VIA NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

Because of the important role they play in making the policy decisions of the Community, the executive branches of the national
governments remain, of course, the most important avenue of contact for private interests. The Minister of Foreign Affairs who sits
on the Council, his ministry, and other ministries concerned, the
national experts assigned by the ministries to work with the Commission, and finally the Permanent Representatives and their staffs
may all be helpful. A Community enterprise also has access to its parliamentary representatives who may raise questions in the national
parliament directed at the Minister concerned. If a given representative is also a member of the European Assembly, he may take similar
action in that body and in addition encourage the adoption of positions in the standing committees of the Assembly favored by his
constituents. Membership in the Assembly does not thus far seem
to have significantly increased the election appeal of parliamentarians running in national elections. However, their service in the
Assembly has marked them as experts in the various areas of Com454 EUROPE, item 2780 {July 7, 1959).
Some recent instances were the consultations in the Agriculture Committee, mentioned by Representative Torsi in Pari. Debates, (No. 7, June 1958) (mimeo.) 276 at
278, and in the Social Committee, mentioned by Representative Sabatini, Pari. Debates (No.4, Jan. 12, 1959) 128.
l!7"Rules of Procedure, art. 42 (1958) ]'L OFF. 231; HEIDELBERGER, DAS EUROPAISCHE
PARLIAMENT 37 (1959).
J!7•
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munity work (such as agriculture, social affairs, transportation),
and this fact has measurably strengthened their positions in their
own political parties. Political parties have a major, if not determining, influence on individual political careers-a substantially
greater influence, for example, than political parties in the United
States. With growing electorate interest in Community matters, an
Assembly membership may become increasingly desirable for national politicians who, in turn, may become more sensitive to the
views of their constituents on Community matters.

5.

A CASE OF INTER-ACTION

An interesting instance of inter-action between private enterprise
'groups, national governments, and Community institutions arose in
connection with a recent acute scarcity of untreated hides which was
due in part to extensive purchases by Eastern European countries
and which caused a spectacular rise in prices. The affected leatherprocessing industries demanded export controls, and, in fact, export
limitations in varying degrees were imposed by national governments. They were directed not only at exports to third countries but
also at exports to other Member States. The industry is reported to
have approached formally both the Commission and the Council,
but the Permanent Representatives decided to defer submission of
the matter to the Council pending consideration by the Commission.
In obvious response to a request by the industry, a French liberal
member of the European Assembly addressed a parliamentary question to the Commission implicitly presenting the industry position.
In its answer the Commission pointed to the undesirable differences
among the national export controls and called for an examination
of the over-all situation. 277 Shortly thereafter the Commission convened a meeting of national governmental experts and Commission
staff in which the suggestions of the industry were considered. It is
reported that an agreement was reached on a harmonization of
national measures which would decrease the undesirable features
affecting industries in other Member States. Subsequently, a Dutch
socialist representative addressed another parliamentary question
to the Commission. He inquired what measures the Commission
proposed to take to prevent what he considered violations of the
Treaty resulting from Belgian and French prohibitions of the export of hides. 278 The Commission replied that the French measures
277

Parliamentary question by Representative Rochereau and answer of the E.E.C.
Commission, [1959] J'L OFF. 709-10.
278
[1959] }'L OFF. 1097·
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did not constitute a Treaty violation and that the Belgian government had lifted its export prohibitions in response to recommendations of the Commission.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In the institutional framework of the Community the Council possesses the power of final decision concerning questions of Community legislation and policy. As the transitional period progresses
the number of instances in which the Council cannot act without
unanimous agreement of all national governments will be reduced;
to that extent at least the control of the individual governments will
be loosened somewhat. Surrounded by an extensive Secretariat and
served also by the Permanent Representatives of the governments,
with their large national staffs in Brussels, the Council has as a rule
considered questions only after agreement had already been reached
among national administrations or a deadlock had developed in the
negotiations which could be resolved by political decision only. A
number of important matters relating to Community policy-for
instance, in the field of transport and agriculture-are explored outside the Council in informal sessions of national ministers whose
departments are directly concerned with the questions under consideration. This development, which is not contemplated by the
Treaty, may well advance the policy formation in the Community
but obviously detracts from the central role of the Council. 279
Experience in the O.E.E.C. and in other organizations has shown
that where important national interests are involved governments
represented by their Ministers find it difficult to agree. The Commission has been established on the theory that, as an independent
"executive," supported by an independent expert staff of civil servants and acting by simple majority vote, it will be able to agree on
policy proposals for the Council, thus facilitating the Council's
policy decisions. The Commission has also been given supervisory
and implementing functions. In the exercise of its tasks the Commission has relied heavily on negotiations with national governments
on all levels. This has been required where the Treaty calls for
negotiations on matters not resolved by the Treaty itself. Moreover, in these and in other matters national administrations have
been the obvious and principal source of factual data required by the
279
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Commission. National governments have responded with varying
degrees of readiness to the Commission's requests for information
and to its suggestions, frequently insisting on a clear indication of
the specific Treaty provision under which the request was made.
Some concern was expressed that if the Commission should seek
agreement of national governments in all cases before making its
proposals to the Council it would dilute its independent position
and its right of initiative. Considering the fact that a Commission's
proposal cannot become law without the Council's decision, it is not
surprising, however, that the Commission wants to avoid rejections
of its proposals by seeking to obtain the support of national governments before submitting them to the Council.
In several instances where national governments disagreed the
Commission has stepped into the breach and have offered compro·
mises reflecting its own views which have eventually been accepted
by the Council. This was essentially the case in the important negotiations for a wider free trade area, in which the French government, finding itself in a minority position in the Council, tended to
rely on the Commission despite the opposition in principle on the
part of the French government to a strong Commission. Whatever
success the Commission has achieved in these instances has been due
in a significant measure to the personal ability of its present members, a factor not to be underestimated in the institutional picture.
It may well be that in the future the Commission's approach in controversial matters will be first to persuade at least the required
majority of the Council members to accept a proposal and then to
rely on the European Assembly and on public opinion generally to
generate pressures on the national governments forcing favorable
action in the Council. Such a plan of action assumes, of course, the
existence of an informed and active public opinion and that the Assembly has real political influence, two indispensable factors if the
Commission is to play its part successfully as the driving force of
the Community.
The fact that both the Council and the Commission have had to
devote so much time and energy to the problem of Community relationships with non-member countries explains in part the relative
slowness of progress in other areas of Community activities, particularly in the development of common policies. On the other hand
the pressures exerted on the Community by the contracting parties
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, by the United
Kingdom and by other O.E.E.C. countries particularly during the
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unsuccessful negotiations for a free trade area association, have
proved a strong unifying factor.
The Court of Justice and the Assembly-the two institutions
common to all three Communities-have shown considerable sensitivity to the need for a balanced development of the institutions.
The desire to assure to enterprises the broadest possible access to
the Court and the incipient tendency to interpret the treaties as constitutions are of particular interest in the judgments of the Court.
The deputies from the six national parliaments to the Assembly
have been seated by political affiliation rather than nationality-a
historical innovation in international assemblies. The Assembly has,
moreover, been remarkably successful in establishing practices and
procedures which not only facilitate cooperation with the High
Authority and the E.E.C. and Euratom Commissions, but also provide a basis for a measure of control over these executive bodies.
It is impossible, however, to state at this juncture that the Assembly
has in fact succeeded in influencing or controlling the activities of
the "executives" in any significant fashion.
The Assembly has developed fairly successful techniques to bring
its views before the Councils. However, evidence of any significant
influence, not to speak of control, over the Ministers, remains nonexistent. Decisive power in the Communities remains in the hands
of the Councils and, to a substantially lesser degree, in the hands of
the "executives." For those who consider parliamentary or popular
control an essential component of democratic government, this is
a matter of great concern, since the treaties will very likely lead to
a substantial concentration of executive-administrative power both
on national and Community levels.
On the national level officials of national administrations form
the staff of the Permanent Representatives in Brussels, and national
official experts are called in to work with the staff of the "executives." These same officials advise their respective Ministers on the
Councils as well as their own governments generally. The staffs of
the Commission and of the other "executives" as well as the staff
of the Councils' Secretariat have been recruited to a large measure
from national administrations. Some former Ministers have become
members of one of the "executives," and former representatives in
the Assembly have become Ministers or members of an "executive."
This interplay of national and Community administrations, the
growing expertise and the development of vested interests of Com-
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munity officials will inevitably increase the influence of a compact
bureaucracy.
Under the scheme of the treaties, executive branches of the governments in the Member States, acting through their Ministers in
the Councils, will be able to assume important obligations in matters
heretofore within the scope of parliamentary control without participation by their national parliaments. The Councils may, it will be
recalled, adopt regulations directly modifying national laws and
enter into international agreements with .third parties of the type
normally subject to parliamentary approval. Each Minister is, of
course, responsible to his national parliament as a member of his
government for what he does in the Council and must follow national law. There is some question, however, as to the effectiveness
of this responsibility considering particularly the fact that a Minister
can be outvoted in the Council. These implications may seriously
impair support for the Communities in the Member States. During
the recent coal crisis the French Minister explained in the Council
his opposition to the exercise by the High Authority of direct control over French coal production on the ground that the French
government and not the High Authority would be responsible for
the social and political consequences of such controls. Again, the
concern of the German Parliament is reflected in the German statute
approving the Rome Treaties. This statute requires the German
government to advise the parliament before action is taken in the
Councils affecting German law. 280 This requirement apparently has
been interpreted so broadly as to require parliamentary approval
even to conduct factual surveys proposed by the Commission. 281 A
general trend in this direction would seem to contain seeds of serious
difficulty for the Communities.
In these circumstances the case for a strengthening of the European Assembly as a chosen instrument of democratic control over
the Community institutions is quite impressive. This control in regard to the "executives" may be in the process of development, but,
the influence of the Assembly would increase substantially if it were
given a meaningful role in the selection of the members of the
"executives." The Assembly has carried its efforts to assert some
influence over the Councils abol.lt as far as is possible within the
!l8<l Gesetz zu den Vertriigen vom 25. Marz 1957 zur Griindung der Europaischen
Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der Europaischen Atomgemeinschaft, art. z, [1957]
Bundesgesetzblatt II, 7S3·
·
··
·
281
See Commission's answer to written question No. 28, [1959] ]'L. OFF. 851.
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present legal framework. If it is to go further it must have a true
"power of the purse," at least over the administrative expenses of
the Communities, if not over the operational programs of the various Funds. A logical concomitant would be to give the Assembly a
decisive voice in determining the size of the tax presently levied by
the High Authority upon coal and steel producers. This raises the
question of assuring a similar independent source of revenue to
the other two Communities, subject to the control of the Assembly 282-a system of financing which would replace that of annual
contributions by the Member States.
Again, under present provisions the Councils are required to
consult the Assembly on specified matters but no such consultation
is required on a number of important decisions such as those relating to overseas territories. Moreover, even where consultation
is required the Councils are free to disregard the Assembly's advice. It could be provided that decisions on all important policy
matters would require approval not only in the Council but also in
the Assembly. 283 This change, which would require an amendment
of the Treaty, would in a sense elevate the Assembly to a position
comparable to the lower chamber of a bicameral legislature in which
the Council would play the role of the upper chamber.
There is some question whether the Member States are willing
at this time to countenance a significant increase in the role of the
Assembly. The De Gaulle government, it will be recalled, has
opposed any effort on the part of the French National Assembly
to increase its powers in relation to the national executive beyond
the strict letter of the new Constitution. 284 One reason for the
opposition to such an increase of the European Assembly's power
may be the fact that the Assembly has discussed rather freely
steps toward further integration. 285 Nevertheless, the Assembly it282

The Rome Treaties envisage that the expenses of the two Communities will
eventually be financed from their own resources, e.g., for the E.E.C. from the revenue
from the customs duties collected on the basis of the common external tariffs (E.E.C.
Treaty, art. 201) and for the Euratom from the revenue from Community levies in
the Member States (Euratom treaty, art. 173). The Assembly asked the Commissions
to accelerate their studies on this subject. Resolution IV of Nov. 24, 1959, [1959]
]'L OFF. 126 I.
M. Marjolin, Vice-President of the Commission supported a similar proposition
in his interview with Le Monde of Sept. 22, 1959.
28
' Cf. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1959; cf. also the decision by the Constitutional Council,
as reported in N.Y. Times, July 2, 1959.
285
E.g., the proposal that the three Communities enter into an agreement for closer
formal integration among themselves under E.E.C. Treaty art. 238, and Euratom
Treaty art. 206. Doc. No. 14 ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE (June 1958),
Rapport fait au nom de Ia Commission des affaires po/itiques et des questions institu-
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self appears determined to press at least in one direction. All three
treaties envisage direct elections of Assembly representatives by
universal suffrage of the people of the Member States. 286 The Assembly working party has reported progress on a plan which might
make such elections possible in 1962 or 1963.287 In order to conduct such elections the political parties would have to organize
themselves on a Community level. An Assembly so elected would
not have the direct access to national parliaments which the present
Assembly enjoys. 288 On the other hand, if the understanding and
support of the public opinion develops sufficiently to permit a meaningful election (and some doubts have been expressed on that
score), the new Assembly may constitute an important further step
toward integration. Moreover, the increase of its powers might well
prove more acceptable if linked with direct elections.
As seen by General de Gaulle, "the realities of Europe" require
the cooperation of sovereign states through organized consultations of governments rather than "extranational" institutions with
policy-making powers. 289 If this concept prevails, the Community
institutions will remain technical agencies for the execution of
policies determined by national governments.
tionelles sur Ia coordination des trois Communautes Europeennes, para. r8 at 22. See
also speech by Representative Van der Goes van Naters, Pari. Debates (No. 8, June,
1958) (mimeo.) II-12.
"""E. C. S.C. treaty, art 21, para. 3, as amended by the Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communitiers, art. 2(2); E.E.C. Treaty art.
138(3), Euratom Treaty art. ro8(3). The original version of the E.C.S.C. treaty art.
21 did not contain the requirement of a "uniform procedure in all Member States"
which was added by the Rome Treaties and the Convention. The added requirement
may make the speedy adoption of a scheme for direct elections more difficult. Spitaels,
Les Elections Directes Europeennes, 8 LES CAHIERS DE BRUGES 23, 26-27 (1958) No. I.
The Assembly appointed a working party within its Committee on Political Affairs
and Institutional Questions to study the problem. Its composition is given in [1959]
}'L OFF. 794·
2
"' See statement by Representative Dehousse, Chairman of the Working Party, 416
EUROPE, item 2465 (May 23, 1959).
288
It has been suggested that during a transitional period only a portion of the
representatives should be elected directly. Doc. 22 AsSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE EUROPEENNE, DOCUMENTS DE SEANCE 196o-r96I, APRIL 30, 1960. Rapport . . . sur /'election

de l'Assembllfe parlementaire Europeenne au Suffrage universe/ direct par MM. Battista, Dehousse, Faure, Schuijt, Metzger.
289
Ambassade de France, Service de presse et d'information, Speeches and Press
Conferences No. 152, Full text of President De Gaulle's third press conference in
Paris on September 5, 1960, at 8.
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APPENDIX

List of Selected /1 cts of the
E.E.C. Council and Commission Issued
During the First I8 Months of the Community's Existence
Regulations
Regulation No.

I

(Council)

The official languages are French, German, Italian and Dutch. A Member State
and an individual or an enterprise have the right to choose any official language when
corresponding with the institutions. The institutions must employ the language of the
addressee. [1958] ]'L. OFF. 385.

Regulation No.

2

(Council)

An identity card (laissez-passer) is made available for members of the European
Parliamentary Assembly under Art. 6 of the Protocol on Privileges and Immunities.
[1958] ]'L. OFF. 387.

Regulation No. 3 (Council)
This regulation concerning the social security of migrant workers was issued under
Arts. 51 and 227, par. 2 E.E.C. Treaty. The regulation covers sickness, maternity, invalidi•m, old age, accident, death, unemployment, and other benefits. The purpose of
the regulation is to assure that migrant workers do not suffer prejudice with respect
to their social security benefits as a result of their employment in different Member
~tates. For this purpose the regulation lists in the annex relevant national laws under
which migrant workers will acquire the benefits and lays down which of these laws
are applicable for the purpose of determining benefits in a given case. The burden
of payment is apportioned according to various formulae between the state of origin
and the state of residence.
An Administrative Commission promotes cooperation among Member States and
acts as a liaison agency and as administrative tribunal in resolving differences arising
from the application of the regulation and interpreting its provisions.
The regulation does not provide any direct recourse by individuals to the Community
institutions. If a Member State fails to extend its social security benefits to a migrant
worker, the latter will have to avail himself of the legal remedies provided by the
national law. The case will, however, reach the Community Court on a reference
from the national court if a "prejudicial question" is involved (Art. 177 of the
Treaty). [1958] }'L. OFF. 561.

Regulation No. 4 (Council)
This regulation supplements and contains implementing proviSions for Regulation
No. 3 (e.g. it determines which national authorities are competent, how to "add"
the periods of insurance, etc.). [1958] ]'L. OFF. 597·

Regulation No. 5 (Council)
This regulation contains provisions with respect to calling for and transferring
financial contributions, budgeting, and administration of resources of the Development
Fund for the overseas countries. (See Art. 6 Implementing Convention). [1958] }'L.
OFF. 681.

Provisional Regulation No. 6 (Council)
Supplementing Regulation No. 5, this regulation defines the responsibilities of the
auditor and accountants of the Development Fund. [1958] }'L. OFF. 686.
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Regulation No. 7 (Commission)
In accordance with the Council's instruction under Regulation No. 5, the Commission establishes the "reglement organique" of the Development Fund. [1959] ]'L. OFF.
24I·

Directives
None.

Some Published Decisions
I) Council Decision establishing the Journal Officiel. [I958] J'L. OFF. 390.
2) Commission Decision concerning the use of a certificate for goods coming from
non-member countries under arts. 9 and IO. E.E.C. Treaty {libre pratique).
[I958] ]'L. OFF. 688.
3) Commission Decision containing provisions applicable, as regards trade between
Member States, to goods originating in another Member State in whose manufacture products were used on which customs duties were not levied or which
benefited from drawbacks on such duties. (Cf. Art. IO par. 2 E.E.C. Treaty)
[I958] ]'L. OFF. 694·
+) Decision of the Administrative Commission prescribing the first series of forms
to be used in the application of Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 on the social security
of migrant workers. [I959] ]'L. OFF. 37·
5) See No. 4, supra: Decision prescribing the second series of forms. [I959] ]'L.
OFF. 5s.
6) Council Decision directing the E.E.C. Commission to function as the secretariat
of the Administrative Commission established by Regulation No. 3 supra. [1959]
J'L. OFF. 703.
7) Council Decision apportioning funds of the Development Fund to social and
economic projects. [I959] J'L. OFF. 864.
8) Council Decision approving special aid to Madagascar from the Development
Fund. [I959] }'L. OFF. 865.
9) Council Decision allowing certain exceptions from Regulation No. 5· [I959] J'I..
OFF. 866.

Miscellaneous (examples)
I) "Statut'' (charter) of the Monetary Committee. [I958] J'L. OFF. 390.
"Statut'' (charter) of the Transport Committee. [I958] J'L. OFF. 509.
3) "Reglement Interieur" (Rules of Procedure) of the Economic and Social Committee. (1959] ]'L. OFF. 493•
4) "Statut'' (charter) of the control committee of auditors established by Art. 206
E.E.C. Treaty and Art. 180 Euratom Treaty. [I959] J'L. OFF. 861.

2)

Agreements
1) Agreement of Cooperation with the International Labor Organization. [1959]
J'L. OFF. 521.

Chapter III

The Establishment of the Customs Union
Marc Ouin

*

I. INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community is, above all else, a customs
union. The provisions of the Treaty establishing it which directly
relate to the customs union make up, it is true, only forty-odd of its
two hundred and forty eight articles. Nevertheless, the point of
departure of the Treaty doubtless was and remains the establishment of a customs union.
A customs union groups countries each having a national geographic and economic area generally protected at the outset by customs barriers and, with regard to certain products, by import quotas
vis-a-vis the rest of the world. These countries agree to eliminate
among themselves customs duties and quotas, and thereby to form a
single territory within which goods may circulate wholly without
obstacles, regulation or limitation. Commercial unification of such
a group of countries also involves agreement to enforce, within the
newly-unified territory, a single tariff schedule which, vis-a-vis the
rest of the world, replaces national tariffs. This common external
tariff must at the same time be combined with a common commercial
policy vis-a-vis non-member countries.
The elimination of the obstacles to trade among the countries
which thus form a customs union, and the establishment of an external tariff common to its members necessitate a series of progressive steps. The importance of a step-by-step progression is increased
whenever differences among the points of departure of member
countries are pronounced.
* Licencie en Droit, Paris. Deputy Director of the Directorate of Trade and Payments, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, Paris. Formerly Administrateur Civil in the French Ministry of Finance. Author of publications on European
trade problems.
IOI
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In the case of the European Economic Community, the problem is
to establish a customs union among the following:
1) The three Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg), who have already established a customs union among
themselves, which has been in existence since I950. In that year
these three countries abolished customs duties among themselves at
a single stroke and adopted a common external tariff. On the other
hand, the elimination of quotas on their mutual trade (even today
there still exist a few) and the creation of a single list of liberated
goods in regard to imports from member countries of the Organization for European Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) and from the rest of
the world required several years. A list of liberated goods was
established in I 9 56 valid for imports from O.E.E. C. countries, but
no similar list is yet in force in regard to imports from certain nonO.E.E.C. countries. The general level of tariff protection in the
Benelux countries is quite low, although their duties on certain manufactured products are relatively high. These countries are poor in
raw materials and to a large extent have traditionally depended
for economic survival upon foreign commerce. Their imports per
capita average $450.00 annually and their exports $400.00.
2) Germany, a country whose tariffs in the past have been fairly
high. In keeping, however, with Professor Erhard's policy of freeing its economy from controls, Germany has, since I 9 55, reduced
its tariffs of its own accord, and is therefore considered today as
having relatively low tariffs. Germany is characterized by its highly
dynamic policy of commercial expansion. Per capita imports attain
a yearly average of $200.00, and exports of $250.00. Germany's
quota policy is also a very liberal one. Because her balance of payments is flourishing and her exchange reserves are considerable, she
has progressively eliminated almost all quotas on imports from
countries of the non-communist world.
3) Italy, whose foreign commerce represents a smaller share of
national income-per capita imports averaging $8o.oo yearly and
exports $8o. Italy has, however, systematically developed her foreign trade, especially since the war, to a point where she is emerging
as a great commercial country. She very early adopted a remarkably
liberal policy in regard to quotas on imports from European countries. In fact, she has since 1950 removed almost all quotas on imports of goods produced in the member states of the O.E.E.C. Her
restrictions on goods from other countries are stricter, but these
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are now being progressively removed. Italy is considered to be a
high-tariff country, even though she has unilaterally suspended
duties in a very substantial degree.
4) France, which, because of traditionally protectionist attitudes
and balance-of-payments difficulties, maintains both a very rigid
system of import quotas and high tariffs. Foreign commerce generates a relatively small portion of France's national income, imports averaging $1 8o.oo per capita annually and exports $170.00.
Since the end of 1958, however, France has pursued a policy of
progressive elimination of quotas on imports from O.E.E.C. countries, a policy which will in the future be applied to imports from
other countries.
Among countries whose situations are so disparate at the outset,
unusual efforts are required to achieve the elimination of obstacles
to the exchange of goods and the establishment of a common external tariff as well as of a common commercial policy vis-a-vis third
countries. The economies of these countries can be subjected only
progressively to foreign competition. More abrupt changes in competitive conditions would create the risk that economic activity
(which in one of the Six had always been protected either by high
tariffs or quotas or both against foreign competition, including the
competition of its new partners within the Community) would be
endangered by the competition of similar activity of the other members of the Six. The goals of the Common Market, it is true, are to
stimulate a better division of labor among the Six, to increase productivity and the like, but the sudden disappearance of any significant economic activity within a Member Country would create economic, financial, and social problems which the Community would
not survive.
This emphasizes the necessity of proceeding slowly in order to
extend the impact of the consequences of coordination of the industries of the Six over a period of time. Clearly this necessity is
more imperative for those countries of the Six which at the begining enjoyed the protection of the highest tariffs and quotas. To the
Benelux countries, which enforced few quotas and low tariffs and
were therefore accustomed to world competition (with th~ exception of a few Benelux industries which. enjoy greater than average
protection), the delil:>eration with .which the Community. will. be
created is less important than to France.
A "transitional period" of twelve to fifteen years beginning on
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January I, 1958, was therefore agreed to in the course of which the
customs union is to be progressively created. During this transitional
period, the Six are to undertake to :
I) abolish altogether tariffs among themselves,
2) abolish all import and export quotas on trade among themselves,
3) establish a common external tariff,
4) establish a single list of quota-free imports from non-member
countries and, as to products which are not free from quotas, adopt
a common quota policy.
In addition and concurrently, other more technical measures must
be taken. For instance, methods of applying customs duties are to be
unified: a common tariff is not adequate if methods of evaluation in
Hamburg, Rotterdam, Marseilles, and Genoa differ. It is therefore
appropriate not only to fix common tariffs but also to establish common rules for the application of such tariffs. In short, customs rules
and regulations in their entirety must be unified.
But the solution of tariff and quota problems requires contemporaneous settlement of a great number of other questions as well.
The problem of coordinating basic economic policies aside, steps
closely connected with the elimination of tariffs among members
of the Six include the establishment and enforcement of equitable
rules of competition, and the harmonization of fiscal legislation affecting imported products. These problems, all of foremost importance, are in part treated elsewhere in this book. These remarks are
merely intended to emphasize the fact that, even though the rules
directly relating to the customs union constitute only forty or so of
the two hundred and forty-eight articles of the Treaty, the majority
of the other provisions contribute to its creation.
A direct connection has, moreover, been established between the
progressive formation of the customs union and the other steps
which are related to it. This connection is a characteristic of each
of the stages of the transitional period.
The Treaty provides that the Common Market shall be established in the course of a transitional period of twelve years divided
into three stages of four years each. 1 It further provides that, "to
each stage there shall be allotted a group of actions which shall be
undertaken and pursued concurrently." This provision ensures the
necessary contemporaneity between the creation of the customs
1
European Economic Community Treaty art. 8. The E.E.C. Treaty is generally referred to herein as "the Treaty."
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union in the strict sense of that term and other measures, like harmonization of fiscal legislation, to which reference has already been
made. In addition the Treaty provides that a condition of the progression from the first to the second stage of four years shall be confirmation that the purposes envisaged for the first stage have in
their essentials been achieved and that the obligations incurred by
the Member States in accordance with the terms of the Treaty have
been fulfilled. 2 These objectives and obligations are, of course, those
related to the initial creation of the customs union, but they also include those not specifically related to tariffs and quotas.
At the end of the first stage a statement shall, subject to the
unanimous agreement of the six Member States, be issued that the
objectives have been reached and the obligations fulfilled. If unanimity cannot be achieved, the first stage shall automatically be extended for a period of one year. At the end of this year (the fifth
after the coming into force of the Treaty) the Six shall again seek
a unanimous vote that the obligations fixed by the Treaty have been
effectively fulfilled. If unanimity still cannot be achieved, the first
stage shall be extended for a further period of one year (the sixth).
At the end of this further year the vote of a majority of the Member
States shall decide. If no majority can be obtained, the Member
States shall designate an arbitration board to determine whether the
required statement should issue. Its decision shall bind the Member
States.
What would result if the arbitration board decided that the obligations had not been fulfilled? The Treaty is silent on this question.
Clearly, however, in such a case the extremely serious political situation resulting would bring about either a complete failure of the
Treaty, or the Member States, on the highest governmental level,
would be forced to take political measures to save the situation.
If, as a result of a unanimous vote at the end of the fourth or the
fifth year, or of a majority vote at the beginning of the sixth year,
or of a decision by the arbitration board, the statement is issued that
the objectives of the first stage have been attained, the Member
States must proceed with the execution of the second stage. The
Treaty is silent on the transition from the second to the third stage;
therefore it is to be assumed that this transition is automatic. The
Treaty also provides that the second or the third stages may not be
extended or curtailed, except pursuant to a unanimous decision of
the Council.
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The Treaty further declares that the provisions which may permit the extension of the first stage in the manner described, or those
which permit modification of the duration of the second and third
stages, shall not have the effect of extending the transitional period
beyond fifteen years. Consequently, the customs union among the
Six should become a reality in all particulars in the period between
December 3 r, 1969, and December 31, 1972.
Obligations arising from the Treaty do not excuse the Six from
meeting outstanding national obligations which individual Member
States may owe to other countries.3 The substance of these -obligations is contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(G.A.T.T.) of which each of the Six is a signatory. This Agree. ment, to which about forty countries on six continents are parties,
establishes a number of rules which bind the signatories in fixing
commercial policy. The basic philosophy of the Agreement is that
reflected by most-favored-nation clauses. If certain countries decide to abolish tariffs among themselves, without extending such
benefits to the other signatory countries, the most-favored-nation
principle is obviously not respected with regard to those countries.
The G.A.T.T., however, authorizes the formation of customs
unions, but it stipulates specific conditions with a view to giving certain guarantees to those contracting parties of the General Agreement who are not to be union participants. The Six must respect
those conditions in establishing the Common Market, and these
same conditions will govern, to a large extent, the commercial policy
of the new Community towards the rest of the world.
The two categories of actions to be taken by the Six-those designed to abolish the obstacles to trade among themselves, and those
designed to establish a common external tariff and a common commercial policy-conveniently define an outline of a study of their
customs union. Part II of this chapter will therefore be devoted to
relations of the Six with one another and Part III to the relations of
the Six with third countries. Agricultural and food products will
not be considered. Although it is true that basic principles are the
same whether these or industrial products are at issue, the means
of giving effect to such principles where agricultural and food products are concerned differ somewhat. The measures envisaged are,
moreover, not so clearly defined as those in the area of industrial
products since the Treaty generally leaves them to be spelled out and
implemented by decisions of the Community institutions.
3

Treaty art. 234-
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II. RELATIONS AMONG THE SIX
A. ABOLITION OF TARIFFS

The Treaty provides that tariffs shall be frozen as of the date of
the entry into force of the Treaty. 4 Consequently, since January,
I958, the Six have no longer had the right to raise their tariffs visa-vis each other.
I. THE BASIC CUSTOMS DUTIES TO WHICH THE TREATY
RULES APPLY

The tariffs to which the rules governing the abolition of tariffs are
to be applied are precisely dcfined. 5 The Treaty calls these tariffs
"basic duties," and provides that the basic duties which are subject
to successive reductions are those applied on January I, I 9 57. This
means that the "freeze" applies to duties actually in force on J anuary I, 1957. More precisely, if a country had increased its customs
duties between January I, I957, and the date of the first tariff reduction (January I, I959), it was obliged at that date to revert to
the level in force on January I, I 9 57, and to use this level as the basis
for the reductions provided for by the Treaty.
This rule is all the more strict since the basic duty is the one that
was in fact applied on January I, I957· If, at that date, a country
had temporarily suspended, either in whole or in part, a customs
duty previously obtaining, the basic duty would be the tariff actually
collected on merchandise on January I, I 9 57, taking into account the
suspension, and not the tariff which would have been applicable had
there been no suspension. This interpretation of the provisions of
the Treaty has been confirmed in particular by the ruling of the
Commission directed at France, which in I958 had re-established a
customs duty on paper pulp which she had suspended in I957· The
Commission ruled that France must abolish the re-established duty.
2. THE TIMING OF THE PROGRESSIVE ABOLITION
OF CUSTOMS DUTIES

The timing of the progressive abolition of customs duties among
the countries of the Community is determined as follows : 6
I) In the course of the first stage of four years, the first reduction
• Treaty art. 12.
6
Treaty art. 14.

• Ibid.
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was to be made one year after the date of the entry into force of the
Treaty (that is, on January r, 1959); the second reduction is to
be made eighteen months later (on July I, I 960) ; the third reduction is to be made at the end of the fourth year (on January I,

I962).
2) In the course of the second stage (which may begin either
immediately after the first stage, or one or two years later, or even
a little later) 7 a reduction is to be made eighteen months after the
beginning of the second stage, a second reduction eighteen months
later, and a third reduction one year later. If it is assumed that the
second stage will begin immediately after the end of the first stage,
the reductions of the second stage will occur on July I, I963, January I, I965, and January I, I966, respectively.
3) The reductions which still remain to be made at the end of the
second stage are to be carried out in the course of the third stage,
according to a time-table to be determined by a majority of the
Council of Ministers of the Community.
The amount of the tariff reductions is determined in the following manner : 8
I) At the time of the first reduction (which was effected on J anuary I, I 9 59) all tariffs (i.e., the basic duties) between Member
States of the Community were to be reduced by IO%.
2) At the time of each subsequent reduction, each Member State
is to reduce the total of its customs duties towards its partners in
the Community in such a way that its "total customs receipts" will
be reduced Io%, it being understood that the reduction of duty on
each item shall be equal to at least 5% of the basic duty.
The "total customs receipts" are to be calculated by multiplying
the value of the imports of each Member State from other Member
States during the year I 9 s6 by the basic duties. 9 The "total customs receipts" provide a basic point of reference which remains
unchanged throughout the period during which the Treaty is in
effect. Each country within the Community has therefore established this figure by applying to a table of its imports for the
year I956 the relevant customs duty in effect on January I, I957
(basic duty). The sum of the products of the multiplication of these
two elements is the "total customs receipts." With each reduction
pursuant to the Treaty, each country must reduce customs duties in
this table to the extent necessary to ensure that the application of the
new duties will result in a Io% reduction of the "total customs re7

See text at note
Treaty art. 14•
• !hid.
8

2

supra and discussion thereafter.
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ceipts." The new duties thus arrived at are to be applied to imports
of 1960, I96I, and so forth.

3·

FLEXIBILITY OF THE RULES ABOLISHING
INTERNAL TARIFFS

The first reduction-that which took place on January I, I959is therefore the only one which involves a diminution of 10% of
each customs duty. A reduction of 5% of each customs duty is thereafter obligatory each time reductions are to be made, but each country remains free to choose those duties which will be reduced more
drastically in order to achieve a reduction of total customs receipts
of 10%. It would seem, however, that the Six plan an equal allround reduction on July I, I96o. The freedom thus given to Member States exemplifies the flexibility of the Treaty system of tariff
reductions. In effect it permits each country to maintain for as long
a period as possible customs protection of products with regard to
which it most fears the competition of other Member States. In the
course of the first two stages six reductions are thus contemplated
which are to reduce the total customs receipts by 6o% as compared
with the duties in force on January I, I 9 57. A country can, by a pplying the minimum reductions to a given product, that is 10% at
the first reduction, and 5% at each of the five subsequent reductions,
keep reduction of tariff protection of that product to a minimum
3 5% as of the end of the second stage. This means of course, on
the one hand, that it shall have applied a reduction as to other
products which exceeds 6o% in order that the over-all reduction of
total customs receipts shall equal 6o%, and on the other hand, that
the efforts to be made in the course of the third stage with regard
to products enjoying the greatest amount of protection during the
first two stages will be greater.
Consequently, at the end of the second stage, and solely on the
basis of the rules described above, the level of over-all tariff protection of each Member State will have been reduced to one which is
40% of the initial level. With regard to certain products, however,
the level may still be as high as 6 5% of the initial level, the level
with regard to other products being, correspondingly, less than 40%
of the initial level.
4·

SAFEGUARDS AGAINST EXCESSIVE FLEXIBILITY

To avoid, however, the situation which might result at the end
of the second stage-namely, that the Member States will have
maintained a degree of tariff protection which cannot be abolished

I IO

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

in the third stage without creating serious difficulties-the rules
elaborated above are supplemented by three provisions:
I) On the one hand, it is provided that duties exceeding 30% at
the time of any reduction must be reduced at least ro%. Therefore
any duty remaining above 30% is deprived of the benefits of the
rules creating flexibility. If, as a result of any reduction, the duty
falls below 30%, the rules creating flexibility are then applicable to
it and the minimum reduction is thereafter s%. 10
2) On the other hand, goals are established for Community
countries. They must endeavor to arrive at a reduction of the duties
on each product amounting to at least 25% of the basic duty at the
end of the first stage, and at least so% at the end of the second
stage. The Commission may make recommendations to Member
States to encourage them to achieve these goals. 11
3) FinalJy, the Member States, having declared their willingness
to reduce tariffs among themselves more rapidly than provided for
in the rules-if general economic conditions and the situation of
the industrial sector concerned so permit-the Commission may,
with this end in view, make recommendations to the Member
Sta tesP
As suggested/3 the timing of reductions remaining to be achieved
at the end of the second stage is not fixed by the Treaty. The Council must determine such timing at the appropriate moment. In principle, only the timing itself should thus be defined, the system of
reduction continuing to be as flexible as it is in the first two stages
(the first reduction of the first stage apart). But it must be emphasized that the Member States have incurred an unconditional
obligation to abolish completely customs duties among themselves
by the end of the third stage. 14 Even though there is a right, therefore, to invoke the rules creating flexibility as a matter of law, this
right will become more and more illusory in fact. For instance, if a
country has, with regard to a given product, made full use of the
flexibility of the system in the course of the first two stages, and
maintains on that product at the beginning of the third stage a duty
which is 65% of the basic duty which obtained on January r, 1957,
it will necessarily be obligated to eliminate this 65% within the four
years of the third stage.
10

Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Treaty art. 15.
13
See note 7 supra •
.. Treaty art. 13.
n

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION

5·

METHODS OF IMPLEMENTATION ON JANUARY

III

I, 1959,

OF THE RULES ABOLISHING INTERNAL TARIFFS

The uniform Io% reduction on January r, I959, of customs
duties among Member States pursuant to the Treaty caused no difficulties. In fact, implementation proved to be remarkably simple.
Implementation of the Treaty rules in subsequent stages will be
complicated to the extent that Member Countries, seeking to postpone the day when certain sectors of their economies must forego
tariff protection, invoke the rules creating flexibility. Obviously
special interest groups in each country may try to convince their
governments that their economic activities, more than any others,
need the maximum protection permissible and for as long a period
as possible. On the other hand, many industries-having strenuously prepared to meet new competition in the Common Market,
and having invested heavily to this end-are now interested in
speeding up the removal of economic frontiers so that they may
more rapidly obtain access to a larger market and a return on
their investments.
On January I, 1959, each Member State effected, then, a Io%
reduction of its tariffs vis-a-vis other Community countries. Because of Germany's unusually favorable balance of payments and
in keeping with the liberal policies pursued by Dr. Erhard, during
r 9 57 she unilaterally reduced tariffs on a substantial number of imports from the rest of the world. Given the fact that the basic duty
of the Treaty is the duty in force on January r, 1957, Germany was
under no obligation to reduce tariffs on imports from other Member
Countries on January I, I959 1 where it had already reduced them
more than ro% of the basic duty during 1957. As a result, Germany
was obliged to reduce customs duties on January I, 1959, only on a
few products, notably those on textiles and leather. 15

6.

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE RULES ABOLISHING INTERNAL TARIFFS

The Treaty also provides 16 that taxes having an effect equivalent
to that of customs duties shall be progressively abolished during the
transitional period. No definition of such taxes is given, however.
The Commission is to define them, and to determine the means and
'"The difficulties encountered by France arising from the fact that it had not correctly determined its basic duty on paper pulp have already been mentioned.
16
Treaty art. 13.
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timing of their abolition; in doing so it is to be guided by the Treaty
rules governing the abolition of customs duties. The Commission
has not yet collected the necessary information from industry with
regard to taxes which have an effect equivalent to that of customs
duties and which may be in effect in Community countries. No specific measures have been taken, therefore, with respect to taxes.
In connection with the relations of the Six to one another, one
problem arises which has so far been only rarely discussed: that of
customs evaluation. When products are to be imported, the customs
authorities examine the documents which the importer (or his
agent) produces to establish the price of the products. When the
authorities decide, on the basis of these documents, that the declared price is reasonable, was freely negotiated by the buyer and
the seller, and has been correctly declared, they accept it and calculate the duty with that price as a base. In all Community countries customs authorities enjoy, however, a very large measure of
discretionary power. They may decide-virtually without being
required to give any justification therefor-that the declared price
is too low, and they may themselves fix another price as the basis
upon which the duty to be paid is determined. By systematically increasing prices declared by importers, customs authorities could,
therefore, partially annul the effects of customs reductions to be
achieved in keeping with the Treaty. Given the customs laws presently in force in the Six, importers would have few ways of combatting such arbitrary action, even though international conventions,
and in particular those elaborated by the Council of Customs Cooperation, have established certain rules concerning the calculation
of values for customs purposes. Customs authorities do not, however, appear to have misused their powers up until now, and no complaint seems to have been voiced by any of the Community countries.
It should also be noted that as the customs reductions increase with
the passing of the years, increases in customs evaluation would be
less and less effective as a means of defeating the intended effects of
the Treaty.
Such is the rather complex system created by the Treaty for the
abolition of tariffs among the Six. It has the advantage of being
flexible enough to permit each country to maintain protection of its
most vulnerable industries for longer periods of time. The obvious
disadvantage of this flexibility is that, if the Member States take
full advantage of it, final tariff reductions will be particularly difficult for industries which continue to enjoy protection unless the
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respective countries also take advantage of the first years of the
transition period to reorganize or convert them effectively.

B.

THE ABOLITION OF QUOTAS
I. THE RULES OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Since its creation in I948 the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) has endeavored to abolish import
quotas among the seventeen member countries of Western Europe.
The obligations of these countries, which O.E.E.C. imposed with
a view to abolishing quotas, have taken the form of "percentages
of liberalization." A "year of reference," the year I948, was chosen,
and each country agreed to abolish, on specified dates, quotas on a
given list of products. This list was to be determined according to the
following formula: the volume of I948 imports of the products included in the list from other Member States (and their territories)
must at least have equalled a determined percentage of the total
volume of all products imported by the country in question in I948
from the other Member States (and their overseas territories).
Having fixed this minimum percentage at so% in I949, 6o% in
I950, 75% in I9SI, the O.E.E.C. raised it to 90% in I955·
The Six are all members of the O.E.E.C. and as such they have
been-and remain-subject to these rules. With the exception of
France, each of the Six has of its own accord adopted, and even gone
far beyond, the minimum percentages of liberalization established
by the O.E.E.C. Germany had thereby achieved liberation of 91.8%
of her intra-European trade, the Benelux countries 95.6%, and
Italy 98.4%. France, on the other hand, was forced to invoke, in
June, I957, the safeguard clauses to which O.E.E.C. obligations
are subject; until December I 9 58, she therefore applied a global
quota on imports from O.E.E.C. countries, including those from
Community countries. In December 1958, in conjunction with the
return to partial convertibility of European currencies, and as a
result of the program to achieve sound economy and finance initiated
by the government of General de Gaulle, France also liberalized
90% (based on I948) of its imports originating from other
O.E.E.C. countries.
On January 1, I959, therefore, only a relatively small percentage
of imports from one of the Six were subject to quotas in another of
the Six. This percentage varied, however, from country to country,
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and the kinds of goods involved varied greatly. Generally the imports still subject to quotas were those which, in the view of the
governments concerned, would have endangered domestic production of similar products if no quotas had existed.
Germany, the Benelux countries, and Italy maintained quotas only
on a limited number of imports of industrial products. On the other
hand, France, even though she had liberalized more than 90% of
her imports compared with I948, applied quotas to a large list of
products. If quotas on these goods had been removed, imports
would doubtless have increased greatly and would have represented
much more than 10% of French imports. These facts explain the
rules of the Treaty concerning the abolition of import quotas. As
will become clear in the following discussion, developments have
proved that the authors of the Treaty were, in this regard, overly
pessimistic.
2. THE RULES OF THE TREATY

As is true in the case of tariffs, the Treaty provides, first of all,
that quotas be frozen as of the effective date of the Treaty. 17 This
measure takes two forms:
I) on the one hand, the reinstatement of quotas which had been
abolished as of January I, I 9 58, is prohibited, and
2) on the other hand, a quota may not be made more restrictive
-in other words, the level of imports envisaged by the quota may at
no time be reduced.tB
These rules apply, of course, only among Member States. Each
country is perfectly free to reinstate quotas vis-a-vis third countries,
or to make them more restrictive.
The Treaty provides, moreover, that quotas are to be totally
abolished by the end of the transitional period. 19 To this end, the
Treaty provides that:
I) each Member State shall, one year after the Treaty takes
effect, convert bilateral quotas into global quotas open, without discrimination, to all other Member States. 20 European countries which
maintain quotas on given products generally do not, in fact, fix them
unilaterally. Quotas are negotiated with each European supplier
country, and each negotiating party attempts to gain as great an
advantage as possible for its exports to the markets of the other
1
I.e., January I, I958. Treaty art. 3 I.
'" Treaty art. 32.
18
Ibid•
.., Ibid.
'
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while increasing as little as possible quotas on the sales of the
other's goods in its own markets. Accordingly, if the quid pro quo
which country A receives from country B is larger than that _
from country C, country A will open a larger quota to country B's
goods than to those of country C. Discrimination exists as between
countries B and C in the market of country A, therefore. The globalization of quotas or, in other words, the transformation of bilateral
quotas on the same product, each of which is open to one country,
into a single quota open to all will put an end to such bargaining,
abolish bilateral negotiations, and assure, in principle, non-discrimination.
2) The global quota must at least equal the sum of the bilateral
quotas previously applicable to that product. Moreover, when each
state has globalized its bilateral quotas, it must increase the total
of its global quotas to such an extent that their total value as compared with the preceding year is increased not less than 20%, it
being further understood that the global quota for each product
must be increased by not less than 10%.
3) The global quotas must be increased each year in accordance
with the same rules and in the same proportions ( 20% of the total
value of the preceding year's global quotas and a minimum of w%
per quota).
4) The fourth increase of the quotas shall take place at the end
of the fourth year after the Treaty becomes effective, and, taking
account of the problem of the transition from the first to the second
stage of the transitional period, the Treaty further provides that
the fifth increase shall take place one year after the beginning of the
second stage. Therefore, if the first stage is extended, as is permitted, 21 there will be no increase of quotas during the period of
the extension.

3·

FLEXIBILITY OF THE TREATY RULES AND THE
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST EXCESSIVE FLEXIBILITY

As is true of the rules concerning tariffs, the rules in regard to
the elimination of quotas are flexible. This results from the fact that
each country, although obligated to increase by 20% each year the
total volume of its quotas, may limit the increase to Io% in connection with goods of its own industries which have reason to fear
a too-rapid growth of foreign competition. If a Member State does
so, however, it must increase to a greater extent its remaining quotas
"' See note 7 supra.
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in order to attain the required over-all increase of 20% of its quotas.
It became evident, however, that these rules might not prove
adequate to bring about a total liberalization by the end of the
transitional period. It was, in fact, difficult to measure the degree of
restrictiveness of any particular quota and to say whether its annual
increase by 20% over the preceding year for a period of twelve
years would certainly result in the total liberation of the product
from quotas by the end of the transition period. For this reason
these rules have been supplemented by a number of other provisions.
In the first place, special rules have been established for low or
nonexistent quotas. 22 The Treaty provides that if, for a product
which cannot be freely imported, the global quota does not amount
to 3% of the national production of the nation concerned, a quota
equal to not less than 3% of such production shall be established
one year after the date of the entry into force of the Treaty (that is,
on January I, I 9 59) . This quota is to be raised to 4% at the end of
the second year (i.e., on January I, I96o), and to 5% at the end of
the third year (i.e., on January I, I96r). Thereafter, the State
concerned must increase the quota by not less than I 5% annually.
The Treaty also indicates that in the case where there is no national
production, the Commission must fix an appropriate quota.
By these special procedures, the drafters of the Treaty intended
to establish quotas at relatively high levels at the outset in the hope
that at the end of the transitional period there would be every chance
that the affected products could be freed of quotas or that such
liberation would create no problems. The establishment of such
points of departure was obviously necessary in the case of certain
countries which today, in effect, prohibit the importation of certain
products. For such products the annual global increase of 20% and
the Io% increase per quota would not have sufficed to assure
liberalization after the twelve quota increases.
In the second place, the Treaty provides that, at the end of the
tenth year of the transitional period, each quota shall be equal to
not less than 20% of the national output of the product in question. 23
This rule strengthens even further the rules concerning low or nonexistent quotas, 24 since, the application of the other rules relating
to them would not normally raise quotas higher than I3·3% of the
national production at the end of the tenth year of the transitional
period.
23

Treaty art. 33·
I bid.
~• See note zz supra.
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In the third place, the Treaty contemplates that, if in the light
of experience, the Commission finds that the rules concerning the
progressive abolition of quotas, and in particular the rules relating
to percentages, do not assure the complete abolition of import
quotas at the end of the transitional period, the Council may, pursuant to a proposal of the Commission, modify these rules and,
specifically, may raise the percentages. Decisions of the Council
must be made by a unanimous vote during the first stage, and thereafter by a majority vote.
Finally, as is true of the abolition of tariffs, the Member States
have declared their willingness to abolish import quotas, in relation to other Member States, more rapidly than is provided for by
Treaty rules if general economic conditions and those relevant to
the economic sector concerned so permit. 25
Another quite interesting rule concerning the abolition of quotas
should be mentioned. 26 It provides that, in case the Commission finds
that in the course of two successive years the imports of any product have been below the level of the quota fixed for it, this quota may
not be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the
total value of global quotas. In such a case, the interested country
must liberate the product in question. If no such rule existed, a country could, in order to achieve the 20% over-all annual increase of
quotas for which the Treaty provides, effect a considerable increase
in the quota on a product for which it knows that the domestic demand is small with the certainty that no imports of consequence
would result. This would avoid the necessity of increasing quotas
on products for which a strong domestic demand exists-increases
which would result in a larger volume of imports. It is a rule which,
m a sense, is designed to prevent fraudulent calculations of quota
increases.
4- IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULES ELIMINATING
QUOTAS ON JANUARY

I, I959

The application of these rules on January I, I 9 59, created a great
number of difficulties and a great number of problems had to be resolved in order to give them effect. At first they did not seem to
have been observed in all countries to everyone's satisfaction, and
complaints were fairly frequent. The net result, however, of the
initial application of these rules has been definite progress. More""Treaty art. 35·
Treaty art. 33·

26
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over, the return of European currencies to convertibility, as will
become clear, set off a much faster movement towards the elimination of quotas, which has made the problem far less acute, not only
among the Six, but also between them and the rest of the world.
Each country had, at the outset, to establish a "quota framework"
-a list of products still subject to quotas in the country concerned.
Opposite each of the products on this list the country indicated the
bilateral quotas it had granted to other Community countries in the
course of I958, as well as, for each product, the global quota that
was to be established in the course of 1959, pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty.
For the purpose of calculating the quota for I 9 59, the rules of the
Treaty were applied in the following manner:
I) In the first place each country increased by ro% on each product the total of the quotas granted to other Community countries
in the course of 1958.
2) With regard to those products on which no quota had been
opened in the course of I958, or on which the quotas opened in
I 9 58 were, in sum, inferior to 3% of the national production of
the product in question, the country fixed a quota equal to 3% of
its national output. Generally, this resulted in quotas far higher than
10% of the total of comparable quotas opened in I958.
3) The country in question then compared, with reference to
the total volume of products under quota, the total of the quotas
opened in I958 with the total of the quotas opened in I959 1 taking
into consideration the rules cited in paragraphs I) and 2) above. If
the sum total of the quotas of 1959 was higher by at least 20% than
the sum total of the quotas of I958, the country was considered as
having accomplished its obligations within the terms of the Treaty.
If the sum total of the quotas of 1959 was not higher by 20% than
the sum total of the quotas for I958, the country, in order to fulfil
its Treaty obligation to effect a 20% over-all increase, had to increase some quotas. Each country was free to choose those products
whose quotas were to be increased.
The application of these rules, and especially of the 3% rule, has,
in fact, led two countries of the Community to increase by much
more than 20% its aggregate quotas of I958. France, whose I958
quotas reached the sum total of one hundred billion francs, increased
its quotas in I 9 59 to two hundred-fifteen billion francs, or by I I 5%.
Italy increased them to twenty-eight billion lire in I959, compared
with the eight billion lire in I958, an increase of 250%.
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The application of the 3% rule had noteworthy results with regard to certain products, for instance, passenger cars. The national
production of cars in Italy and France is substantial, and until 1958
both pursued a very restrictive import policy. As a consequence of
the 3% rule, France increased the quotas open to other Community
countries from four-and-a-half billion francs in 19 58 to seven billion
in 1959, and Italy her quotas from three-and-a-half billion lire in
1958 to five billion in 1959. In the Benelux countries and Germany
which, in general, followed liberal policies in regard to industrial
imports even before the Treaty came into force, the rule of 3%
has been only rarely applied, and the increases of 19 59 quotas over
those of 1958 were not much higher than the 20% fixed by the
Treaty, at least they were not in connection with industrial products.
No decisions have been reached in regard to products of which
there is no national production and in connection with which the
Commission therefore must fix quotas.

5·

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE RULES ELIMINATING QUOTAS

The application of the quota rules caused great difficulties, and
protests of producers, importers, and exporters of the Community
against the manner in which given countries implemented the rules,
either in whole or in part, were frequent early in 1959. Criticisms
were directed particularly at the conditions under which the 3%
rule was applied and against the way in which global quotas were
handled.
With respect to the rule of 3%, the difficulty obviously lies in
determining national production. Certain countries demonstrated
a strong tendency to make use of every available means of reducing
the valuation of their national production with a view to reducing
the amount of the 3% quotas. Long discussions have been conducted
within the Community in an effort to determine the following:
I) Should the production be calculated by quantity or by value,
calculation by value generally permitting more arbitrary figures
than calculation by quantity?
2) Is that part of the production of a given product not utilized
as such, but incorporated as a component part of another product,
deductible? For instance, should the quota to be opened be 3% of
the entire national output of car tires or should it be 3% of car tire
production marketed as such, deducting that part of tire production
which is mounted on new cars, since the latter have obviously been
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figured in the calculation of car production and its corresponding
quota?
3) May a country deduct from the value of its national production the amount of customs duties which would have been paid
with respect to such products had they been imported instead of being produced within the country? The reason for this question is
the fact that the comparison between national production and imports should take into account the disparity in costs of goods produced domestically and of those produced abroad which results
from the duties payable by the latter. The Commission decided to
authorize a fixed reduction of a maximum of 20% of the value of
national production in order to take this factor into account.
4) In calculating the value of production, should deductions be
made for all indirect taxes?
The result of the various methods used in certain countries to
achieve a systematic reduction of national production values was
that the quotas opened in I 9 59 on certain products were less than
half what they would have been had the calculation been based on
quantities.
A particular problem resulting from the devaluation of the
French franc in December I958 must be noted. France calculated
her quotas in French francs, and this, in view of the devaluation,
had the result of reducing by I 5% the value of authorized imports
calculated in foreign currencies.
The administration of global quotas also created difficultiesfor example the issuance of licenses was delayed or limitations were
placed on the periods of time within which they may be used. Some
importers feared that licenses which had not been used as of December 3 I, I959, would be annulled, even though their issuance
was so delayed that it would have been materially impossible to
effect the relevant imports within the period of time for which
the licenses were valid. Moreover, even though distribution of
licenses should be non-discriminatory, complaints have occasionally
been heard that, within given quota categories, a large proportion
of the total value of the licenses issued was for products having
only a few potential buyers (for example, luxury passenger cars),
while the total value of licenses in the same quota categories for
products which are much in demand (for example, popularly-priced
passenger cars) was very low.
These difficulties are fairly serious. Nevertheless, in general the
application of the Treaty clearly has initiated an irreversible move-
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ment towards the abolition of quotas among the countries of the
Community. Community authorities have made every effort to carry
out the provisions of the Treaty as faithfully as possible, but at the
same time they have been relatively tolerant in those instances where
certain provisions of the Treaty, especially the 3% rule, in fact imposed an extremely heavy burden on the importing country because
of the risk of serious difficulties for its industries. The country concerned could in such cases invoke the safeguard clauses, 27 but, for
fairly evident psychological and political reasons, partisans of the
Treaty wished from the outset to avoid crises which might justify
resort to these clauses. The initial implementation of the Treaty was
greeted with some enthusiasm in Europe, and it would be extremely
regrettable if this enthusiasm were dampened by social or other
crises. Prudence is therefore advisable during the early stages.
Moreover, it should be noted that, as mentioned above, the provisions of the Treaty concerning the abolition of quotas will gradually lose their raison d' hre as trade is progressively liberalized on
a world-wide scale, notably under the stimulus of the International
Monetary Fund and the G.A.T.T. This aspect of the problem will
be dealt with in the second part of this chapter.

c.

THE MEANING OF "LIBRE PRATIQUE"
UNDER THE TREATY

In regard to relations among Member States the important question of which products are to benefit from the tariff and quota advantages mutually available in accordance with the Treaty required
resolution. This question has been resolved by a Treaty provision
according to which the benefiting products shall be: 28
I) those originating in Member States,
2) those coming from third countries which are deemed to be in
fibre pratique in the Member States.
The Treaty declares 29 that products in fibre pratique are those
products coming from third countries in regard to which, in any
Member State, import formalities have been complied with, customs duties collected, and no total or partial drawbacks (rebates)
granted.
The interpretation and the implementation of these provisions
have created practical problems which the Commission must solve.
To this end, the Commission introduced a certificate of libre
"'See infra Part II, Subsection D.
28
Treaty art. 9•
•• Treaty art. 10.
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pratique which must accompany all goods circulating among Member States and which are to benefit from the advantages of the Common Market. The certificate serves to indicate that:
I) the goods originated in one of the Member States; or
2) the goods have been imported from a third country, and
that the Member State which first imported them has actually collected the usual customs duties in accordance with its tariff schedules;
or
3) the goods in question were imported from a third country,
but have been transformed or finished in a Member State, and that
the appropriate custom duties on the constituent parts imported
from third countries into the transforming Member State were collected either upon entry into the territory of the Member State, or,
in certain cases, upon their leaving the transforming Member State
destined for another Member State.
The principle is, therefore, that to be deemed free to circulate
within the Community, a product must be free to circulate within
one of the Member States. The customs duties on the product must
have been collected in that Member State, and the product must
not have benefited from customs drawbacks, as products so often
do in Europe upon being exported. The product also must not have
been admitted temporarily.
This apparently simple system nevertheless may cause difficulties
until the common external tariff of the Community has been established. At the end of the transitional period all merchandise coming from abroad will pay the same duties, irrespective of its point
of entry, whether this be one of the Benelux countries, Germany,
Italy, or France. Meanwhile, however, as long as the common external tariff is not in force, merchandise coming from abroad will
pay different duties depending on the country of entry into the Community. Therefore, exporters in third countries could bring their
goods into the Community through that member of the Six which
at a given moment applies the lowest tariffs vis-a-vis third countries,
or the least restrictive quotas, thereby creating risks of trade diversion and diversi·on of other commercial activity within the Community.
In fact, however, these risks are limited by Community rules:
I) In the first place, the fact that drawbacks of customs duties
are prohibited on a product which is imported by a Member State
from a third country and re-exported, either in its original form or
transformed, to another Member State, results in two duties being
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paid on it-that of the first importing state, and that of the second
importing state. This second customs duty is, it is true, lower than
the duty which would have been levied on the product had it been directly imported from a third country to the second Member State.
The difference is, however, minimal during the first years of the
transitional period and it is, in the majority of cases, made up by
the duty of the first importing country. It is even certain that, at
the beginning of the transitional period, it will be worthwhile in
many cases of products manufactured in one of the Member States,
incorporating materials imported from a third country, not to ask
for a certificate of libre pratique, but rather to request a drawback. 80
""This is all the more true since, on January x, 1959, the Member States made, as
to a great number of products, the first tariff reduction of xo% applicable to imports
from non-member countries, and there are as yet no substantial tariff preferences ex·
tended by the Member States to each other. In order to make clear how this works
take the following example: an importer of Member Country A buys $xoo worth of
raw material in a non-member country on which there is a 2o% duty on entry into
Member Country A; he therefore pays $20 import duty to Member Country A. With
this raw material he manufactures a product of which the ultimate total cost is $300.
He exports this product to Member Country B. On entry into B this finished product
would have been subject to a duty of 30% before the Treaty went into effect. During
the transitional period the manufacturer-exporter of country A has the choice, when
he exports the finished product to country B, between two solutions:
(a) either not to request that the product be considered in "libre pratique," to benefit in this case from the drawback of the duty collected on the raw material and to pay
the full tariff ( 30%) on the finished product when it enters countJY B; or
(b) to demand a certificate of "libre pratique," not to request a drawback of the
duty paid on the raw material and to pay the preferential tariff of the Community on
the finished product when it enters country B. Obviously this choice will be dictated
by the desire to sell his product at the lowest possible price in Member Country B.
If the manufacturer-exporter chooses solution (a), he receives a drawback of the
duty paid on the raw material of $20. His product therefore costs only $280, and this is
the basis for the calculation of the duty owed upon entry of the finished product into
Country B. The cost of the product upon being imported into Country B is therefore
28o

+ zSo X 30 = $364.

100
If he chooses solution (b), he does not ask for a drawback, and the cost of the final

product after it has been imported into Country B is· 300

+ 3oo100
X 30 = $390.

After the first tariff reduction of ro% pursuant to the Treaty the tariff in Member
Country B on the finished product will be 27% instead of 30%. The product can there300 X 27
·fore be brought into Country B at 300
$381.
100
Since this is a higher cost than that of solution (a) the manufacturer-exporter will
still have no reason to ask for the benefit of a certificate of "libre pratique."
After the second reduction of xo% the tariff of Country B will be 24%. The product
300 X 24 = $372-still higher than the
can then be delivered in Country B for 300
100
cost of solution (a).
After the third reduction of xo%, however, the tariff of Country B will be 21% and
the product can be delivered in Country B for: 300
300 X 21
$ 36 3•
100
Thus after the third tariff reduction, but only then, solution (b) will be more advantageous than solution (a).

=

+

+

+

=
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Of course as the Member States reduce tariffs among themselves
without making such reductions available to third countries, the
difference between the tariff that one Member State will apply towards third countries and the tariff that it will apply to other Community countries will be increased to the point where it will be economically beneficial, despite the prohibition against drawbacks, to
effect the diversions of traffic described.
2) In the second place, another factor which will compensate
for these risks is the mechanism of the first stages of the establishment of the common external tariff. This mechanism 31 will reduce
the differences in the external tariffs of the Member States, increasing the tariffs on imports from third countries of Member States
with the lowest duties, and decreasing the corresponding tariffs in
Community countries where they are highest. Combined with the
drawback prohibition, this reduction of the differences among tariff
rates towards third countries will abolish the possible profits which
merchants could otherwise obtain by trade-flow diversions. The
differences between intra-Community tariffs and Community country tariffs vis-a-vis third countries will, of course, increase as the Six
grant each other progressively increasing tariff preferences during
the transitional period.
3) Thirdly, in cases where, despite these factors, trade diversions
occur which prejudice the interests of certain Member States, the
Commission must take all necessary steps to eliminate them. 32 The
nature of permissible Commission action is not defined by the
Treaty, but the Treaty provides that such action should cause the
least possible disturbance in the functioning of the Common Market
and should take into account the necessity of advancing, whenever
possible, the establishment of the common tariff. If these diversions
of traffic occur as a result of the disparities between intra-Community tariffs and tariffs of Member States on goods from third
countries, the best curative measure would logically be a more rapid
establishment of the common external tariff.
Other measures are also conceivable, however. For instance, a
Member State might refuse to consider a product in libre pratique
which had been imported from a third country by another Member
State. Such national measures would prove extremely serious because they would impose obstacles to the free circulation of goods
within the Community. Some Member States, although they do not
81
32

See Part III of this chapter.
Treaty art. us.
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go so far, do, in fact, require for imported products, which may have
originated in and been imported from a third country, a certificate of
origin as well as a certificate of libre pratique. If this certificate of
origin shows that the product in question does, in fact, come from
a third country, the Member State reserves the right to refuse to
grant to this product the quota and tariff advantages of the Treaty
and the right to treat the product as if it had been imported directly
from a non-Community country. Until now measures designed to
achieve this kind of protection have generally not been directed
against diversions of commercial traffic due to the differences in
tariffs, but against diversions due to differences among quota policies
vis-a-vis third countries. These measures are directed notably at
commerce in goods finished in the Community but originating in nonCommunity low wage countries, countries with multiple exchange
rates, or countries of which foreign commerce is a state monopoly
(Japan, Uruguay, and the countries of the East). The particular
industrial products affected are natural and fabricated textiles, photographic and movie equipment, and the like. In fact, taking into
account the low prices at which such products are sold by the producing country, some Member Countries can protect their own industries only by recourse to a quota system or to an absolute prohibition of imports. If such products could enter under cover of a
certificate of libre pratique issued by another Member State whose
import policy is less restrictive with regard to third countries, the
more restrictive policies of the first country would be frustrated.
Finally, and again with a view to avoiding diversions of traffic, the
Commission envisages the imposition of advance charges in lieu of
customs duties on products originating in third countries when they
pass from one Member State into another Member State, but there
is as yet little information available in this regard;
The free circulation of goods within the Community will remain
a serious problem so long as the common external tariff of the Community is not in force and the countries. of the Community have not
adopted a common quota policy towards third countries. In order
to avoid the rather complex formalities, which could obstruct intraCommunity trade, the drafters of the Treaty refused to provide a
means for checking on the origins of goods. Protectionist reflexes
are quasi-automatic, however, and ultimately the certificate of origin
will reappear in acute cases. Community countries will no doubt be
forced to make considerable efforts to rid themselves effectively of
red-tape and of the useless nuisances which, either by force of habit
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or under the pressure of protectionists, national governments tend to
multiply.
D. CLAUSES PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE
ELIMINATION OF QUOTAS

The Treaty provides safeguard clauses permitting a Member
State, when difficulties arise, to take protective measures with a view
to limiting the volume of its imports. These are:
1) a clause which may be invoked in case of balance-of-payments
difficulties; and
2) a clause which may be invoked in case of special difficulties in
a given sector of its economy.
I. THE CLAUSE PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST

BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS DIFFICULTIES

The clause concerning balance of payments is similar to the usual
clauses included in all international trade agreements. To prevent
Member States from invoking it too often, however, the Treaty
imposes very strict conditions on its applicability.
In the first place, the Treaty envisages a procedure which is, in a
sense, preventive. The economic, financial, and monetary policies
of each Member State are kept under constant review in order to
avoid disequilibriums in the balance of payments.33 Each Member
State must therefore pursue economic policies which will ensure
equilibrium of its over-all balance of payments, maintain confidence
in its currency, and at the same time ensure a high level of employment and stable price levels. In order to facilitate the attainment of
these objectives, the Member States are to coordinate their economic
and monetary policies. The institutions of the Community, and
notably the Commission, a special consultative committee, and the
Monetary Committee are to formulate opinions for the Member
States concerning the polici~s which they should follow to assure
normal functioning of their economies as well as of the economy of
the Community as a whole. Obviously constant supervision of the
evolution of the economy and of financial, economic, and monetary
policies constitutes the best means of avoiding disequilibriums.
Secondly, if despite supervision and coordination of current policies of the Member States, disequilibrium in balances of payments occur, the consultations for which the Treaty provides must take place.
The Treaty describes disequilibrium as difficulties or serious threats
33

Treaty arts. I<J3-IOS.
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of difficulties as regards a Member State's balance of payments
resulting either from an "over-all disequilibrium of the balance of
payments or of the kinds of currency at its disposal and where such
difficulties are likely, in particular, to prejudice the functioning of
the Common Market or the progressive establishment of the common commercial policy. . . . " 34 The Treaty takes into account,
then, such disequilibriums as might constitute a threat for the internal functioning of the Common Market-that is, which might
impel a country to re-establish protective measures with regard to
imports originating in other Member States-or a threat to the
common commercial policy-that is, which might bring a Member
State to follow, in regard to third countries, a different policy than
that of other Community countries. An accentuation of policy differences in regard to third countries would in fact create the risk
of larger trade diversions and, as a consequence, of reinforcement
of controls on the circulation of goods among Member States.
The procedures contemplated in these cases do not permit the
country in question to re-establish protective measures in regard to
imports. The Treaty provides that the Commission shall, without
delay, proceed to an examination of the situation of the country in
question, as well as of the measures that country has taken or may
take in order to bring its economy into balance. The Commission
shall make recommendations with these ends in mind. Even though
the Treaty does not say so explicitly, it is clear that at this stage the
recommendations of the Commission are to be directed at reform
of the internal economic and financial policies of the country involved (reduction of public expenses, reduction of credit to private
enterprises, increase of taxes, higher discount rates or, even, monetary revaluation) but not at the direct or quantitative control of its
imports.
The procedure contemplates that, if these measures prove inadequate, the Commission thereafter shall recommend to the Council
that it institute the mutual assistance measures for which the Treaty
provides, subject to a majority vote of the Council. The essence of
the notion of mutual assistance is its Community character. Mutual
assistance signifies that the associated countries of a country in difficulties are obliged to aid it in overcoming them, thereby emphasizing
the interdependence of the Six.
The Treaty contemplates that mutual assistance may take the
following forms:
1) Concerted action within such international organizations as
"'Treaty art.

108.
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may be asked for help by the countries of the Community-that is,
within those organizations which can grant credits in foreign currencies to the country in difficulty.
2) Action to avoid trade diversions when the country in difficulties maintains or re-establishes quotas on goods imported from
third countries. The country in difficulties will not always be authorized at this stage to re-establish restrictions vis-a-vis other Community countries, although it can vis-a-vis third countries. The aim
of such restrictions may well be defeated, however, if other Member States continue unrestricted importation from third countries
of the products subjected to quotas by the country in difficulties,
since the entry of such products, accompanied by a certificate of
libre pratique from another Member State cannot be restricted.
Because this is true, the other Member States must, in such cases,
take the necessary steps to prevent the products in question from
being re-exported to the Member State which finds itself in difficulties.
3) The grant of credits by other Member States, if they agree
this is indicated.
4) Finally, and during the transitional period, a recommendation by the Commission to the other Member States to reduce tariffs
more rapidly or effect larger quota increases in order to facilitate
the increase of exports from the country in difficulties to them,
thereby permitting it to increase its foreign exchange receipts.
If mutual assistance recommended by the Commission is not
granted by the Council, or if mutual assistance is granted but the
measures taken are insufficient to mitigate the difficulties of the country concerned, the Commission is to authorize the country in difficulties to take protective action with regard to exports of the other
Community countries. The Commission must define the conditions
applicable to such measures, their timing and the like, but the Treaty
does not indicate the form which they are to take. It is likely, however, that, during the transitional period, they may, for example,
delay the elimination of obstacles to trade (i.e., of tariffs and quotas)
or even reverse the process, and that they might, before anything
else, introduce quantitative restrictions on imports during the decisive period.
The process thus described is obviously quite long and complex.
The Treaty expressly provides that the country in difficulties may
initiate no protective measures without prior authorization of the
Commission. The time required for the Commission to intervene
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may be unduly long if a sudden crisis in the balance of payments
occurs, however. 35 In this case the Member State concerned may
take the necessary steps without preliminary authorization-but
purely to prevent the situation from deteriorating. The Treaty
provides that these steps shall cause the least possible disturbance
in the functioning of the Common Market and shall not be more
extensive than is absolutely indispensable in order to remedy the
sudden difficulties which have arisen. Even after these steps have
been taken, the Commission may recommend that the Council grant
mutual assistance, which in turn may lead the country in difficulties
to suspend its own protective measures. In this regard the Treaty
provides that by majority approval of an opinion of the Commission
the Council may require the country in difficulties to modify, suspend, or abolish its safeguard measures.
The safeguard against continuing balance-of-payments difficulties
may be invoked during or after the transitional period. Because of
the interpenetration of the economies of the Member States-which
will be increasingly significant as the transitional period expiresand because of ever-closer economic, financial, and monetary cooperation, the likelihood that balance-of-payments crises will be
Community-wide rather than national in scope will approach inevitability.
2. THE CLAUSE PROVIDING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
DIFFICULTIES IN PARTICULAR SECTORS OF
THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES

The safeguards against difficulties in particular areas of economic
activity are only applicable during the transitional period. 36 The
reason for this is that during this period the progressive abolition
of obstacles to trade and the resultant competition among economic
activities of the various Member States may create "serious difficulties which are likely to persist in . . . [a] sector of economic
activity or difficulties which may seriously impair the economic situation . . . [of a] region." Such difficulties might manifest themselves by a decrease in the activity of enterprises in a given sector
of the economy, by unemployment, or by substantial economic stagnation or retrogression of a given region.
Obvious problems result, but it is also obvious that recourse to
safeguards must be viewed with a certain reserve. No government
35
Treaty art. 109.
•• Treaty art. zz6.
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may remain unmoved in the face of a deteriorating situation in a
sector of its economy or of a depression in a region of the country,
especially where either seems to be caused by foreign competition.
If it took no action, the public reaction would be violent. But, on the
other hand, if the goal of the Common Market is better distribution
of labor among the Six, and the elimination of uneconomic activity
in one country in favor of more efficient activity in another (and
thereby, the attainment of a higher level of productivity for the Common Market as a whole), then it is inevitable that certain enterprises
will disappear in some countries because they are subject to economic, financial, technical, geographical, or natural conditions which
prevent them from meeting the competition of enterprises capable
of increasing productivity. A balance is, then, to be sought, which
will permit progressive elimination throughout the Common Market of inefficient enterprises, and will, at the same time, avoid violent
economic disruptions which could provoke serious social or even
political crises.
The entire structure of the Treaty was, moreover, determined by
the need to maintain this balance as is indicated by:
I) the duration of the transitional period,
2) the flexibility of the program of progressive abolition of tariffs and quotas among Member States,
3) the provisions relative to the harmonization of legislation,
4) the creation of the European Investment Bank, and
5) the creation of the European Social Fund.
It is evident, however, that implementation of the Treaty is conditioned, not only on these provisions, but also, and above all, on
economic stability and a continually developing prosperity both in
Europe and throughout the world. Only under these conditions can
the Community countries accept the disappearance of some of their
enterprises for it is only under such conditions that their highlydeveloped economic structures will be flexible enough to permit the
people affected to re-establish themselves in other pursuits without
too much difficulty.
Nevertheless, a safeguard clause remains necessary where, in
spite of the flexibility of the provisions of the Treaty and the steps
which each country is obligated to take to adapt itself in order to
allow enterprises in their turn to adjust themselves to foreign competition, a grave crisis develops. For the reasons already indicated,
recourse to this clause is, however, strictly regulated.
The government concerned may not invoke this safeguard clause
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unilaterally, but must request authorization from the Commission,
and its purpose must be to "restore the situation and adapt the sector
concerned to the Common Market economy." Moreover, the Commission itself must determine the measures of safeguard which it
deems necessary, stating precisely the conditions, the means, and the
duration of their application. These measures, and their duration,
may be only such as are absolutely necessary to permit restoration of
the situation. Finally, the Treaty provides that priority should be
given in the choice of measures to those which will least disturb the
functioning of the Common Market.
The Treaty does not specify the measures which the Commission
may decide to authorize, but leaves the Commission absolutely free
to determine them. Nevertheless, it seems entirely likely that, in the
case of activities which-once reorganized-give every indication
that they will be able to survive, the Commission will elect measures
which will both assure that the reorganization will take place as
rapidly as possible and will afford the activity more and longer-lasting protection. Thus protected, the reorganization will take place
-perhaps with the aid of subsidies or of the continuation of quotas
or tariffs on the importation of the products concerned or other
such aids. If, however, the activities concerned ought to disappear
because, for one reason or another, it is impossible to improve
their productivity sufficiently to make them reasonably profitable,
the Commission will probably elect measures permitting as gradual
a disappearance as possible. At the same time, of course, steps must
be taken to find employment for workers losing jobs and to develop
in the region in question economic activity better adapted to the conditions obtaining.
III. THE RELATIONS OF THE SIX WITH
THIRD COUNTRIES
The problem of the relations of the Community with the rest of
the world are of extreme importance to both. The Community is,
after all, the world's second largest commercial power (in I957•
the U.S. share of world trade was J7.6%, that of the Community
I 7 ·4%, and that of the United Kingdom I 1. 2% ) ; and yet this vi tal
problem is far from solved. The Treaty creates some rules directed
at the Community relationship with third countries, but it leaves a
great number of questions to be resolved during the transitional
period by an interplay of the various political and economic forces
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which will confront each other both within the Community and without it.
The most debated question today is whether the Community will
be turned in upon itself or outwardly oriented-that is, whether the
Community will develop a protectionist or liberal commercial character. No attempt to answer that question will be made in this chapter. At this juncture one can only describe the context within which
this question arises-that is, describe the Treaty rules regarding
the tariff and foreign commercial policies of the Community, the
way they have been applied to date, and the place of the Community
in the European and world setting, taking into account the factors
which, for the last two years, have influenced its relations with the
rest of the world (the free trade area and the Dillon proposals).

A.

THE EsTABLISHMENT OF THE CoMMON
ExTERNAL TARIFF
I. METHODS OF DETERMINING THE TARIFF

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, of which the Six
are members, excepts customs unions in applying the most-favorednation principle to tariffs. 37 In order to qualify for this exception, a
customs union must conform to a certain number of conditions fixed
by the G.A.T.T., however. One condition is that the incidence of
the external tariff of the union should not, taken as a whole, be
greater than that of the national tariffs replaced.
By virtue of this condition, the Treaty, as a general rule, envisaged a tariff corresponding roughly to the arithmetical average of
the tariffs of the four constituent customs territories. 38 ( Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Belgium, having for the last ten years
been part of a customs union, are considered as a single customs territory.)
The question of whether or not the arithmetical average of the
tariffs of the four territories conforms to the rules of G.A.T.T. has
long been debated. Within as well as outside the Community, it has
been argued that a weighted average which would take into account
not only the present level of tariffs of each of the four territories,
but also the value of goods imported by these territories would more
nearly conform to the spirit of G.A.T.T. Those in favor of this
thesis calculate that on the basis of a weighted average the external
87

88

See Introduction at note 3 supra.
Treaty art. 19.
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tariff of the Community would be, on the whole, lower than that
resulting from the arithmetical average, given the fact that the two
largest importers of the Community, Germany and the Benelux
countries, are also the territories with the lowest tariffs. This would,
of course, be true only of the external tariff viewed as a whole, since
as to certain products a tariff based on a weighted average would be
higher than one based on the arithmetical average. Discussions in
G.A.T.T. of the choice between the two methods of averaging have
not yet resulted in a decision.
As in the case of the abolition of tariffs among countries of the
Community, January 1, 1957, was chosen as the date for determination of the tariff levels to which the Treaty rules would apply. 39
Italy, however, has for the last ten years or so, in fact, applied
a tariff which is generally ro% lower than the tariff for which her
laws provide. The Treaty provides that in calculating the arithmetical average, the legal tariff (consequently the higher of the two) is
to be used.
Although they adopted the arithmetical average in principle, the
drafters of the Treaty also wished to establish certain ceilings on
the results which the calculation of such an average could produce.
The Treaty therefore provides that the common external tariff shall
not exceed:
I) 3% on some products of which the most important among
industrial products are: iron pyrites, raw graphite, calcium phosphate, flax, arsenic sulphur, natural gas, tar, bitumen, sodium nitrate, raw rubber, raw furs, wools, wool linters, combed cotton,
cotton linters, etc. (List B).
2) 10% on other products of which the most important among
the industrial products are: glycerine, resin, petroleum bitumen,
tannins, coloring matters of vegetable origin, essential oils, liquid
resin, colophene; sheets and leaves of natural or synthetic rubber;
leather and hides of cattle, sheep, and goats; newsprint in rolls,
wool yarn (not yet finished for retail sale), linen, ramie, hemp,
cotton, jute; iron and steel, iron bars and sheets, sheet iron, iron
wire; bars, sections, and wire of brass, nickel, aluminum, lead, and
zinc (List C).
3) 15% on other products of which the most important among
industrial products are: alkaline metals, mercury, ammonia, zinc
oxide (List D).
4) 2 5% on another list of products of which the industrials are;
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organic chemical products, synthetic organic coloring matter, artificial plastics, with the exception of products manufactured from
plastic (List E). It should be added, however, that where, on January I, I 9 57, the Benelux countries applied to the respective products
a duty lower than 3%, this duty is, according to the Treaty, to be
raised to I 2% in calculating the arithmetical average. The result is
plainly an attempt -at the-same time that a ceiling of 25% on the
external tariff of the Community is fixed-to avoid establishing too
low a tariff on these products by increasing the amounts upon which
the calculation of the average is based.
On the other hand, for specified products the Treaty fixes a list
of duties which France must take into consideration in calculating
the arithmetical average. These duties are higher than those in fact
applied by France on January r, 1957 (List A).
With regard to other products, the common tariff is fixed by the
Treaty itself (List F), and is, in some instances lower, and in others
higher, than the duty which would have been obtained had the arithmetical average been calculated. List F products are predominantly
agricultural, but some are industrial, such as phosphorus, ironoxides, sheets of veneer, and veneered panels, on all of which the
tariff will be high, and some basic textiles (cotton, hemp, jute) and
minerals (brass, zinc) on which Community tariff will be nonexistent.
Finally, the Community tariff on a last category of products will
not be determined according to the arithmetical average, but by
negotiation among the Member States. These products are found
in the much-discussed list G. 40
2. MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS
CONCERNING THE COMMON EXTERNAL TARIFF

Once the Community tariff is determined, Member States must
progressively put it into effect. Since in toto it corresponds to
the arithmetical average of the tariffs in force on January I, 1957,
in the four customs territories of the Community, some countries
will have to increase, and others to decrease, duties in order to arrive
at the common tariff. These changes are to be made during the transitional period so that at its end the common tariff will be in force.
They are not to be initiated, however, until December 3 I, I 96I, a
•• See text of this Part III, Section A at Subsection 4·
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date which, absent extension of the first stage, will also mark the end
of that stage. At that time 41 Member States must, in cases where
the duties applied on January I, I957, differed no more than IS%
in either direction from the common tariff, put the common tariff
into effect. Each Member State will have fulfilled its entire Treaty
obligation as far as products thereby affected are concerned. In
respect to products on which the difference in either direction is
greater than I 5%, the state in question must, on December 3 I,
I96I, reduce this difference by 30%. A second reduction of 30%
of the difference is to be made at the end of the second stage.
The Treaty does not indicate when and how the difference still
existing after the second reduction is to be eliminated. It specifies,
however, that the common tariff is to be in force in its entirety at the
end of the transitional period, which means that each country must,
one way or another, eliminate during the third stage the remaining
differences.
An example with figures makes it easier to understand how the
system works. Given a product to which the Benelux countries applied (on January I, I 9 57) an import duty of I I%, Germany a duty
of q%, France a duty of 23%, and Italy a duty of 29%, the arith2
2
9 = 20%. Since the
metical average would be: I I + I7 + 3
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German and French duties of I7 and 23% respectively differ by IS%
from the common tariff of 20%, Germany and France will put the
common tariff into effect on December 3 I, I 96 I. The Benelux countries, on the other hand, will reduce by 30% the difference between
the I I% duty in effect on January I, I 9 57, and the 20% common
tariff. The Benelux duty will therefore become I4 %. By virtue
of the same rule, Italy will reduce her duty to 26%. At the end of the
second stage Benelux will raise its duty to q%, and Italy will reduce hers to 23%. In the course of the third stage, both Benelux and
Italy will attain the 20% rate.
The Treaty also provides 42 for the case where some duties of
the common tariff-those which have to be negotiated by the Member States (List G)-are still unknown at the end of the first stage
of the transitional period. In this case the rules described above
are to be applied six months after the date these duties are established.
u Treaty art. 23. In the spring of 1960 the feasibility of advancing the Dec. 31,
1961, date was, however, being discussed. See also Chapter I supra.
42
Treaty art. 20.
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The Treaty also provides that the Member States shall be free,
in order to align their duties with the common customs tariff, to
modify these duties more rapidly than indicated above. 43

3·

TECHNICAL PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
RULES ESTABLISHING THE EXTERNAL TARIFF

If the Member States are to adopt duties which conform with the
external common tariff, they must, of course, know the amount of
the latter. The determination of this tariff raises a great number of
technical problems, however, and the Treaty is of little help in resolving them. The Commission is to suggest solutions to the Council 44 and reference must therefore be made to the work of the Commission since the Treaty went into effect to know the context within
which these problems are to be progressively solved.
In the first place, a comparison of national tariff schedules must
be made in order to define the bases upon which the arithmetical
average is to be calculated. Present schedules, in fact, differ from
one another. For instance, in one schedule duties are levied on cars
in accordance with their weight, whereas in another the number of
cylinders is determinative. One of the first tasks therefore was the
juxtaposition of the various customs headings of the four tariffs
of the Community: the result was the elaboration of a list comprising 20,000 headings, whereas an average tariff list rarely includes more than s,ooo.
In the second place, a single tariff schedule must be established
for the Community which will give a basis upon which the common
tariff can be established. This schedule should normally comprise
about 5,ooo headings. Obviously this will entail choices, in the
sense that, to return to the example cited above, it must be decided
whether for passenger cars tariffs are to be calculated according to
weight or according to the number of cylinders.
Thirdly, a "table of concordance" between the headings of the
Community schedule and those of the national schedules must be
created. Such a table will make calculation of the arithmetic'al average possible and, at the same time, will provide a basis for determination of the tariffs which each Member State will have to increase
or decrease in the course of the successive stages of tariff equalization. Determination of these tariffs obviously raises another delicate
43
Treaty art. 24 •
.. Treaty art. ZI.
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technical problem, since certain Member States levy an ad valorem,
and others a specific, 45 duty on the same product.
However, the calculation of the arithmetical average under these
conditions may bring to light internal disequilibriums in national
tariff structures. Indeed, a rational tariff structure should provide
higher and higher tariffs on goods as they are subjected, beginning
with the raw material, to progressively greater degrees of transformation. For example, there should be a progression in the amount of
duties levied on raw wool, carded wool, wool yarn, wool cloth, and
wool clothing. Application of the arithmetical average could, as far
as the common external tariff is concerned, result, however, in the
application of a duty to wool yarn which is lower than that applicable to carded wool. An equilibrium must therefore be established
within tariff schedules which will take account of the degree to which
various goods have been finished.
The work begun with this end in view almost two years ago by
groups of customs experts was virtually completed by the beginning
of 1960. It was, in fact, indispensable that the tariff of the Community be known by this time to permit G.A.T.T. tariff negotiations to begin. 46
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LIST G: EXTERNAL TARIFF ITEMS YET TO BE
NEGOTIATED AMONG THE SIX

In the course of the Treaty negotiations, it was impossible for
the Member States to agree on the application of the rule of the
arithmetical average, or on a maximum ceiling, or on a common duty
with regard to several products. These products are ennumerated
in list G which was annexed to the Treaty. This list includes, most
importantly, raw materials on which certain countries of the Community levy very high duties and others very low ones. Those states
which apply high duties do so because the cost of their national
production is in general much higher than the average world price.
If a lower duty were put in effect, these countries would have to cease
production, since they are unable to produce competitively. Serious
economic, financial, and above all, social consequences would result.
But should the external tariff of the Community be fixed at the level
of the higher tariffs, the transforming industries of those countries
45
A specific duty is one which takes into account the nature only and not the value
of the product imported: for example, regardless of its value a given raw material
is subjected to a duty of $I per pound or a given electrical appliance to a duty of
$I per appliance.
•• See text of this Part III, Section E at Subsection 5·
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which levy a low, or even no, duty would be forced to procure the
raw materials affected at a higher price than the present-that is,
the world market-price. Their ability to compete in the sale on
world markets of goods manufactured from these raw materials
would be correspondingly diminished.
The conflict among the Member States concerning list G exemplifies a more general problem which the Community as a whole faces.
If the Community is to be a world commercial power, capable of
exporting at competitive prices, its industries must procure raw materials at the most advantageous prices, which is to say, at world
market prices. If these prices are to be increased by heavy duties, the
export position of the interested industries will be worsened. If, on
the other hand, the Community protects the raw materials it produces with high tariffs, it will encourage their exploitation even
though they can only be sold at higher than world prices, and it will
run the risk of developing tendencies toward autarky.
Because the products in list G are, with regard to the determination of the common external tariff, subject to a special procedure,
special Treaty rules were provided for them. 47 The Treaty provides
that the Commission shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that
negotiations among the Member States will be undertaken before
the end of 1959, and concluded before the end of 1961 (that is,
before the initiation of the first changes in the tariffs of the Member States directed at the establishment of the common external
tariff). If, however, in the case of any product no agreement has
been reached by that date, the Commission is to submit proposals to
the Council recommending the duty to be levied. The Council is to
accept or reject the proposals of the Commission by means of a
unanimous vote during the second stage, and by means of a majority
vote during the third stage.
In any case, duties on products in list G must be determined by
the end of the transition period at the latest. If problems are then
still outstanding, political decisions will obviously be necessary to
resolve them. The conclusion seems justified even now that the
requisite compromises will, in one way or another, be achieved.
Consequently, as long as the customs duties of list G were unknown, the Member States could take no steps to reduce differences among the tariffs that each levied on these products-which,
by definition, varied greatly from one another. For this reason they
created the greatest risks that trade diversions would occur. On the
47

Treaty art. zo.
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other hand, since these products are generally of considerable importance in world commerce, and since some third countries have a
vital interest in exporting them, the uncertainty was particularly
resented. This explains the lively criticism of list G within G.A.T.T.
Finally, the lack of information on list G tariffs complicated the
G.A.T.T. tariff negotiations initiated pursuant to the Dillon proposal.48
Because of these several difficulties the Commission did not wait
until the end of I 9 59 to bring pressure on the Member States to
begin negotiations. As a result of the Commission's initiative, negotiations were in fact begun at the beginning of 1959. Working
groups composed of the representatives of the Commission and of
the governments of the Member States have met together on several
occasions. Discussions of these groups involved-it may be addeda profound examination of the situation of each product on the list:
production, imports, exports, prices, capital invested in the producing enterprises of the Community, labor expended, perspectives
of development, possibilities for the increase of productivity, and
the like. Ultimately, in March, 1960, the Six reached agreement on
the tariffs of list G (with the exception of those on petroleum products). Their successful compromises in this sensitive area indicate
their political determination to proceed with the establishment of
the Common Market.
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THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE WITH
THIRD CouNTRIES

Strictly speaking the Treaty imposes no precise obligations on
the Member States concerning quotas on imports from third countries. It merely indicates in general terms that the Member States
shall coordinate their commercial relations with third countries in
such a way as to bring into existence, not later than the expiration of
the transitional period, the conditions necessary for the implementation of a common policy with regard to foreign commerce. 49 It adds
that the Commission shall submit to the Council proposals regarding the procedure to be followed in the course of the transitional
period to coordinate action, and to achieve a uniform commercial
policy. The Council shall accept these proposals by unanimous vote
during the two first stages of the transitional period, and thereafter
by majority vote. Finally, the Treaty establishes, as a goal for the
<s See note 46 supra.
49
Treaty art. I II.
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Member States, uniform lists of third-country products not subject
to quotas which are as inclusive as possible. To further this aim the
Commission shall make appropriate recommendations to them.
The relative vagueness of these provisions, if compared with
those which regulate the relations among the Member States and
those relative to the common external tariff, may seem astonishing.
It has in fact both legal and factual justification.
One fact which justifies this vagueness is the extraordinary complexity of the problem. The points of departure of the Member
States were, in fact, very different when the E.E.C. Treaty was
negotiated. On the one hand, the lists of liberated third-country
products of each Member State differed among themselves and
still differ. Germany's lists of liberated products imported from
her partners in the O.E.E.C. differ from those of products imported
from the dollar area, and neither is the same as that of products
imported from countries which belong neither to O.E.E.C. zone nor
to the dollar area. Italy has different lists for these areas, but, in
addition, has lists in regard to products of countries which belong
neither to the O.E.E.C. nor to the dollar area which differ among
themselves. Moreover the differences in these lists in regard to a
given area are differences in scope as well as of composition. The
situations are even more disparate in regard to the relations between each of the Six and those countries which do not belong either
to the dollar area or to the area of the O.E.E.C.-and this remark
relates only to over-all percentages. If one examines the lists of
products, a comparison becomes practically impossible.
Firm obligations to unify lists of liberated products would create
inextricable problems from a practical standpoint and have grave
consequences with regard to commercial policy. In fact, if these lists
were harmonized on· the basis of the lowest common denominator,
some Member Countries would be forced to retrogress and to reestablish quotas on a great number of products. They are not prepared to do so, and moreover, as will be clear from the following
discussion, to do so would be to violate international obligations
imposed by O.E.E.C. and the G.A.T.T. If the lists were harmonized
at the most liberal level, some Member Countries would be forced
to make efforts which, either because of their balances of payments,
or for reasons of national commercial policy, they are not in position to make immediately or soon. If the mean between the two were
chosen, it would be practically impossible to determine it. Each
Member State has, moreover, bilateral commercial agreements with

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION

141

most third countries in each area, fixing quotas on the imports of
goods from them. In exchange for the import concessions involved,
these third countries grant concessions in regard to Member State
exports. The counter concessions obviously are different for the
various Member States and also vary according to the third country
granting them. If the lists of Member States of liberated products
from third countries were made uniform, coordination of the bilateral negotiations between the Six on the one hand and each of the
third countries on the other should be a consequence. This would
create complex problems which neither the Member States nor the
third countries are now prepared to face. One of the avowed objectives of the Community is, of course, to achieve complete uniformity at the end of the transitional period. But the fact remains
that it was not possible to write into the Treaty specific obligations
of the Member States as to the steps to be taken in this direction
during the transitional period.
To these factual considerations must be added legal ones. The
Six are members of the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) of
G.A.T.T. and of the O.E.E.C. Each of these international organizations has rules regarding quotas on commercial imports which
increase the difficulties of achieving uniform lists of liberated products-at least as things stand at present. G.A.T.T. is an international agreement to which approximately forty countries are parties
and which has as its object the creation of something like a code of
good conduct in international commercial relations and thereby a
world as free of obstacles to trade as possible. Based on nationaltreatment and most-favored-nation clauses, G.A.T.T. hopes to
achieve its ends by outright prohibition of import quotas (except
in cases of balance-of-payments difficulties) and by the reduction of
tariff barriers through negotiation.
Sixty-eight nations participate in the International Monetary
Fund. Its purpose is to make possible the liberation of financial
transactions on a world-wide and non-discriminatory basis ·and to
create a better equilibrium of international financial relations, specifically by means of realistic exchange rates. It has important resources
at its disposal to aid countries suffering from temporary balance-ofpayments difficulties. Because these difficulties are often due to the
internal management of the finances of member countries, it also
has certain powers of inspection and recommendation.
These two organizations were created at the end of the last war.
Because of reconstruction needs and the situation which obtained
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generally at the time of their creation-which made it impossible to
apply their rules without reservation-th·ese rules were to become
effective only gradually during periods of transition. The time is now
coming when the end of these transition periods can be foreseen.
O.E.E.C. imposes upon its members a level of liberalization at
least equal to 90% of their I948 intra-European imports. At the
time the Rome Treaty was negotiated, all Member States, with the
exception of France, had effectively reached, and even largely surpassed, this level. But France was far from doing so. Indeed, after
the Treaty was signed difficulties in her balance of payments forced
France (in June, I958) to re-establish quotas on all imports. Thus,
even if France-pointing to her difficulties and invoking the safeguard clause provided for this purpose by the rules of the O.E.E.C.
-could suspend liberalization within the O.E.E.C., other Community countries, having no balance-of-payments difficulties, could
not have invoked the same clause for the same purpose even if they
had wished to do so. In December I 9 58, on the eve of the effective
date (January I, I 9 59) of the first measures affecting commerce
contemplated by the Treaty, France had-as to O.E.E.C. countries
-achieved the 90% level. Since then she has gone even further, and
has now reached 94%. Since each country is, according to O.E.E.C.
rules, free to choose the products on which it abolishes quotas (provided it attains the obligatory percentages) the lists of liberated
products within O.E.E.C. of the respective Common Market countries differ from one another, to the point that unification of these
lists would :
1) either force certain Member States to re-establish quotas on
certain products and to fall below the 9oj·~ liberalization level
without being able to invoke the safeguard clause to justify this
regressiOn; or
2) force other Member States to liberalize immediately certain
products within the O.E.E.C.-which they are not now ready to do.
Because, moreover, immediate liberation of these products would
in their opinion create serious difficulties, even within the Community, the Treaty drafters established the rules for a progressive
increase in quotas. 50
In relation to the G.A.T.T., the question is even more delicate,
and its present development particularly interesting. The G.A.T.T.
prohibits absolutely quantitative restrictions on imports, recognizing only tariffs as legitimate means of protection. This is its basic
50

See Part II supra.
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principle, and only one exception is recognized: difficulties in balances of payments. Moreover, the G.A.T.T. categorically affirms
the principle of non-discrimination in the administration of quantitative restnctwns maintained or newly established by a country
which is suffering from balance-of-payments difficulties. It recognized derogations from this principle only to the extent that the
International Monetary Fund also permits differences in treatment
with regard to the restrictions on foreign exchange.
In the post-war years, G.A.T.T. applied these two principles
with a great deal of flexibility. Because of their reconstruction and
development needs, most of the European countries had balance-ofpayments difficulties. Moreover, because of the absolute separation
introduced before, during, and after the war among the monetary
systems of countries, and the fact that transactions were effected according to bilateral agreements-in short, because of non-transferability among currencies-G.A.T.T. accepted the maintenance of
quantitative restrictions and their discriminatory application. It
even went so far as to close its eyes to the intra-European liberalization which the O.E.E.C. had introduced among its members, and
which was in essence discriminatory in regard to the other contracting parties to the G.A.T.T. since the O.E.E.C. countries abolished
quotas among themselves without according, necessarily, the same
treatment to other G.A.T.T. members. This tolerance on G.A.T.T.'s
part was obviously motivated by the fact that the O.E.E.C. countries had made their currencies transferable among themselves by
virtue of the creation of the European Payments Union, which also
comprised a system of automatic credits among its members.
However, as balances of payments of the countries of Europe
improved, G.A.T.T. exercised an increasing pressure on them to
liberalize their imports with respect to countries outside Europe.
Indeed, the O.E.E.C. had itself contributed to this geographical extension of liberalization by urging its members to abolish quotas
on their imports, notably those from Canada and the United States.
With the disappearance of the European Payments Union, and the
advent of external convertibility of most European currencies in
December 1958, the pressure of the G.A.T.T. and of the International Monetary Fund for integral and non-discriminatory liberalization strongly increased.
The result of the liberalization of their imports on a worldwide
scale, which is gradually being achieved by the Six, is that the practical difficulties of a common quota policy are becoming greater and
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greater. In fact, although the G.A.T.T. envisages the possibility
that a customs union may create a preferential tariff system among
its members, it apparently envisages nothing of the kind concerning
quotas. The result is that, as things now stand, each country of the
Community (as is true of the other countries of G.A.T.T.) is examined individually by the International Monetary Fund and
G.A.T.T., and is encouraged to liberalize its imports towards all
of the other countries of G.A.T.T. and of the International Monetary Fund, in accordance with the state of its individual balance of
payments. Since the decisions of G.A.T.T. are directed at individual
countries, it may be that it will consider that one country of the
Community should free all of its imports vis-a-vis the rest of the
world but that another is justified in maintaining certain quotas
provisionally-with the understanding that in conformity with the
basic principle of the G.A.T.T. and the Monetary Fund, it must
administer these quotas in a non-discriminatory manner as to all
G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. members. This means that no preferential
treatment shall be accorded to Community members.
The legal and factual elements of the common-quota-policy problem which deserve emphasis are :
I) the virtual impossibility of establishing a common policy of
the Member States in regard to import restrictions, the only point
on which, theoretically, coordination may be achieved in conformity
with the obligations of these countries to G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. being a complete liberalization of imports from all G.A.T.T. and
I.M.F. members;
2) the gradual desuetude of those rules of the Treaty which relate to the progressive increase of quotas among the Member States
of the Community. It is evident that if, under the pressure of nonmember states united within G.A.T.T. and the Monetary Fund,
each Member State is led to abolish import quotas on industrial
products originating in G.A.T.T. and I.M.F. countries, the complex rules of the Treaty concerning the progressive relaxation of
quotas among its Members will lose their justification. Naturally,
each country of the Community, in removing quotas on imports
from G.A.T.T. countries, will also remove them on goods from
Community Countries, because Community Countries are members
of G.A.T.T., and because the Treaty provides in Article 111 that,
"if Member States abolish or reduce quantitative restrictions in regard to third countries, they . . . shall accord identical treatment
to the other Member States."
This is the current legal and factual context of the problem of
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liberalization vis-a-vis therest of the world of the imports of Member States. Three additional comments are appropriate.
1) The legal situation described applies to the relations between
the Member States of the Community and the countries of the
O.E.E.C. and G.A.T.T. It does not apply to relations with those
countries which do not belong to these organizations, meaning,
largely, the countries behind the Iron Curtain.
2) The situation has also been described on the assumption that
in the years to come it will in fact be possible to apply in full the rules
of G.A.T.T. and of the Monetary Fund. 51
3) Safeguard clauses must also be considered.
C.

SAFEGUARD CLAUSES

There are, strictly speaking, no safeguard clauses in the Treaty
which relate specifically to the establishment of an external tariff and
lists of liberated goods. The sole provision of any relevance is Article 26 of the Treaty, which provides: "The Commission may authorize any Member State encountering special difficulties to postpone
the lowering or the raising, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 23, of the duties on certain headings of its tariff." But the
freedom of the Commission in this connection is limited by what
follows in Article 26: "Such authorization may only be granted for
a limited period and for tariff headings which together represent
for such State not more than five percent of the value of its total
imports coming from third countries in the course of the latest year
for which statistical data are available." Obviously these provisions
could come into play if one of the Member States should encounter
difficulties in lowering a customs duty vis-a-vis third countries which,
initially, was higher than the future common external tariff. These
difficulties might result from the fact that some third country was in
a particularly strong competitive position with regard to a product
to which that duty was applicable. But if the Member State's domestic industry cannot withstand the competition of third-country
industries-even with continued customs protection-there is every
chance that it is not in a position to withstand the competition of the
corresponding industries of other Member States whose products
will not, ultimately, have to cross customs barriers. Recourse to
Article 26 is therefore more or less tied to recourse to Article 226. 52
51
At the moment, this is disputed, and the underlying theory of the work pursued
within the Community for the elaboration of a common external commercial policy
assumes non-application of G.A.T.T. rules.
52
See text at note 36 supra.
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But the most interesting problem is the one which balance-ofpayments difficulties of a Member State could create, given the obligations of that state to the Monetary Fund and G.A.T.T. One aim
of the rules of the Treaty is to avoid, or failing that, to delay as long
as possible, situations in which one Member State will be forced,
by balance-of-payments difficulties, to adopt protective measures in
regard to its imports from Community countries. The first action
envisaged for the Community will, it is true, be designed to allow
the country in question to maintain as liberal an import policy, vis-avis non-Community countries, as possible. Specifically, the first measure envisaged 53 consists in concerted action with those international
organizations to which Member States may have recourse. Should
one of these organizations, for example, grant credits to the country in difficulties, that country would have to follow the organization's recommendations concerning its commercial policy towards
non-Community participants of the organization.
If such steps prove inadequate, the Treaty provides other means·
to prevent trade diversions when the country in difficulties maintains or re-establishes quotas on products from non-Community
countries. This implies that the country in question will be able to
re-establish quotas on non-Community products but that it will not
do so on Community products, particularly if Community countries
grant mutual assistance. Only in the absence of mutual assistance, or
in case of its inadequacy, could the Commission authorize the country in question to re-establish quotas on Community goods. Even
here the implication of the Treaty's spirit is that quotas on Community goods should be less rigorous than those applicable to nonCommunity goods.
One may well wonder, however, whether these provision can be
given effect in their entirety, in view of the obligations of the Community countries towards I.M.F. and G.A.T.T. now that European
currencies have become convertible. If it is true that, on the one
hand, the rules of the G.A.T.T. relating to customs unions do not
contemplate the possibility of preferential treatment within the
union in regard to import quotas, 54 and on the other hand, that the
import quotas applied by countries subject to balance-of-payments
difficulties must be applied in a non-discriminatory way, it is legally
impossible for a Member State to impose quotas on non-Community
goods and not on goods originating in other Community countries.
'"'See text at note 35 and following paragraphs .
.. See pp. 142-44 supra.
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From a legal viewpoint it would seem that this will continue to be
true so long as the Member States have separate currencies and
separate quotas in the eyes of I.M.F.
These are legal conclusions, and it is not absolutely certain that
the Six would agree with the interpretations of G.A.T.T. here suggested. It is quite possible, however, that events will obviate the
need to consider such problems, for at present both the Six and the
other industrial countries of Europe are moving towards as complete and rapid an elimination, on a non-discriminatory basis, of
the whole quota system as is possible.

D.

THE PRINCIPLEs OF THE CoMMON
CoMMERCIAL PoLICY

In establishing their customs union, the Six of course had to take
into account its repercussions on their commerce with third countries. This preoccupation became more and more central as the
months passed, and it is now the major one of the Community and
of its European and non-European associates.
A number of Treaty articles define the Community position in
regard to the important international commercial problems raised.
Article I 8 provides: "Member States hereby declare their willingness to contribute to the development of international commerce and
the reduction of barriers to trade by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the reduction of
customs duties below the general level which they could claim as a
result of the establishment of a customs union between themselves."
Pursuant to this article the Community can negotiate reductions of
its common external tariff in exchange for similar reductions by
third countries. The G.A.T.T. negotiations in 1960 pursuant to the
Dillon proposal will be undertaken in accordance with Article I 8.
Similarly, Article 29-the last in the section of the Treaty dealing
with the common external tariff-states that in carrying out the
tasks entrusted to it, the Commission shall be guided by:
(a) the need for promoting commercial exchanges between the Member States and third countries;
(b) the development of competitive conditions within
the Community to the extent to which such development will result in the increase of the competitive
capacity of the [sic] enterprises.
Allusion to the competitive capacity of Community enterprises
recurs in Article I 10, which reads as follows:
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By establishing a customs union between themselves the
Member States intend to contribute, in conformity with
the common interest, to the harmonious development of
world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on
it?-ternational exchanges and the lowering of customs barners.
The common commercial policy shall take into account
the favourable incidence which the abolition of customs
duties as between Member States may have on the increase of the competitive strength of the enterprises in
those States.

If the over-all result of the creation of the Community is an increase
of the productivity of Community enterprises as a whole, they will
in fact need less tariff and quota protection against non-Community
competition than they now enjoy or even than that which the establishment of a common external customs tariff based on the arithmetical average of present tariffs will afford.
In addition to these declarations of principle, the Treaty provides
procedures for the adoption of a common policy and for establishing
relations with third countries. Article 111 provides that the Member States shall coordinate their commercial relations with third
countries in such a way as to create, by the end of the transitional
period, the conditions necessary for a common foreign commercial
policy. The Commission must submit to the Council proposals concerning the procedure to be followed during the transitional period
to ensure common action and the unification of commercial policy.
The Commission is also to submit to the Council recommendations
concerning tariff negotiations with third countries affecting the common tariff. These negotiations are to be conducted by the Commission in consultation with a special committee designated by the
Council to assist the Commission. Finally, Article 111 provides that
the Member States shall, in consultation with the Commission, take
all necessary measures to adjust prevailing tariff agreements with
third countries in order that the common external tariff may be put
into effect without delay. 55
Finally, the Treaty makes clear that the Member States must, in
respect to all matters of particular interest to the Common Market,
act in common in international economic organizations ( I.M.F.,
G.A.T.T., O.E.E.C., Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N.
Economic and Social Council, and international groups concerned
55
This problem, which relates to rights already vested, is treated in this Part III,
Section E in Subsection 5 dealing with the Dillon proposal.
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with basic raw materials) . During the transitional period, Member States are to consult with each other in order to coordinate their
action and, as far as possible, to adopt common positions.
The provisions contained in these articles of the Treaty require
no special comment. They make abundantly clear that the objective
of the Treaty is, in regard to questions of commercial policy, to
make of six states one. The following section of this chapter, dealing with the history from its inception of the relations of the Community with third countries, illustrates how these provisions have
worked until now and what problems Community and non-Community countries face under existing circumstances.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
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E.

THE ExTERNAL CoMMERCIAL PoLICY oF THE
CoMMUNITY SINCE

ITs

CREATION

I. NEGOTIATIONS WITH REGARD TO A

EUROPEAN FREE TRADE AREA

The problem of the relations of the Community with other European countries arose before the Treaty was signed (March 19 57).
In July r 9 56, the Council of the O.E.E. C. decided to study the pas~
sibilities of creating in Europe a free trade zone associating, on a
multilateral basis, the customs union envisaged by the Six and the
other countries of the O.E.E.C., who would not belong to the union.
An expert report published by the O.E.E.C. in January 1957, 57
concluded that the establishment of such an area was a practical
possibility.
In a free trade area, as is true of a customs union, all barriers to
trade-notably, customs duties and quotas-are abolished in regard
to goods from the countries which compose the area. In contrast
to a customs union, the free trade area does not involve the establishment of an external tariff common to the countries of the area.
Each member state continues to set its own tariffs on goods originating outside the area.
If the free trade area had been established, the result would have
been a vast European area, including the Six, within which goods
would have circulated freely. The Six would, at the end of the transitional period, have applied the same tariff to goods originating
outside the area as they now will-the tariff of the Community56

Treaty art. I 16.
Report on the Possibility of Creating a Free Trade Area in Europe. O.E.E.C.,
Paris, ] anuary, 1957.
07
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while each of the other countries would have applied its national
tariffs.
Why did O.E.E.C. envisage the creation of a free trade area
rather than the formation of a customs union among its members,
that is, rather than a geographical extension of the union contemplated by the Six at that time? The reasons were both political and
economic. The European Economic Community is not merely a customs union, and its aims include political unification of Europe in
forms which prevent the association of several European countries
for various reasons (for instance, Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland
for reasons of neutrality).
Moreover, several European countries are low-tariff countries.
Should they become members of the Community, they would be
forced to raise their tariffs to the level of the future common external tariff of the Member States. This they are not ready to do.
Finally, the United Kingdom for obvious reasons could not relinquish the preferential system of the Commonwealth-which she
feared would be necessary in order to join the Community.
The choice of a free trade area as the vehicle for unification was
imposed by G.A.T.T. rules. As to tariff questions, G.A.T.T. is based
on the principle of the most-favored-nation clauses. This principle
prohibits new tariff preferences, with the exception of customs unions (which the Six chose) and areas of free trade. These O.E.E.C.
countries which are not part of the Community could not agree to
form a customs union and had, therefore, only one choice-the free
trade area.
The maintenance within a free trade area of different external
tariffs in each country of the area obviously raises an important
problem which is nonexistent in a customs union once its common external tariff is effective. Since this common external tariff is the same
for all customs union countries, all goods originating outside the
union pay the same duties regardless of the country of entry into the
union. Consequently, such goods may pass from country to country of
the union, either in their original form, or after transformation,
without the necessity of establishing their origin, since they will have
paid-at whatever point of entry into the union-the duty contemplated by the common external tariff.
In a free trade area this would not be the case. The countries of
the area maintain autonomy over external tariffs. Some of these
countries would necessarily apply lower tariffs to given goods imported from outside the area than would others. As obstacles to

IS I
free trade within the area are abolished, goods coming from outside the area might enter through the country with the lowest tariffs, or with none at all, passing thereafter into the other countries
of the area, and arriving therein at a lower cost than they would
have paid had they entered directly.
Where this is possible, the creation of a free trade area could
entail abnormal upheavals within the commercial structure. To
avoid this, a mechanism is necessary which will permit determination of those products which are absolved from paying duties when
traded within the area (such products being considered as having
originated in the area) and those which continue to pay duties when
they pass from one country of the area to another (these products
being considered as having origin a ted outside the area).
Within a customs union then, all products will circulate freely at
the end of the transitional period, whereas, within the free trade
area, customs barriers will be maintained indefinitely between the
various countries of the area in order
I) to determine the origin of goods, and
2) to collect duties on those goods which are not considered to
have originated within the area.
The situation within the customs union during the transitional
period is analogous to that which obtains permanently in a free
trade area. The Six have solved these problems by the rules relative
to libre pratique, but, as has been indicated, 58 the countries of the
Community have found it difficult to resist the temptation to verify
the origin of goods. It must be emphasized, however, that the problem is transitory in a customs union and permanent in a free trade
area.
Initiated as early as July 1956 (before the Treaty was signed),
pursued in other forms in the spring of I 9 57 (after the signing of
the Treaty), taken up again in the fall of 1957 (after the ratification of the Treaty by the Parliaments of the Six), the negotiations
relating to a European free trade area, including the Six, were
finally suspended in December I 95 8. The fundamental reasons for
this failure cannot be examined in detail here. One, among others,
was the opposition of France, which had strongly criticized the very
concept of a free trade area, viewing with a jaundiced eye the possibility of subjecting her industry not only to the competition of the
other five Member States but also to that of other European countries. Moreover, the creation of a free trade area including the
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customs union of the Six would have, in the view of some, weakened
the Community to the point where it would have lost its special
character, thereby compromising the realization of those political
objectives which it is also pursuing.
More significantly, however, the European countries were unable
to agree on a system of definition and determination of the origin
of goods. Moreover, it ultimately became clear that this problem is
directly related to the problem of the freedom of the countries of
the area to modify, during the existence of the area, their commercial policies vis-a-vis third countries. A system of origin definition designed to avoid diversions of trade, and taking account of
tariff levels of the respective countries of the area, might well become ineffective if these countries were to preserve absolute freedom to alter tariff levels vis-a-vis third countries.
Assume, for example, that one country of the zone applies a duty
of 20% and another a duty of 30% to imports of a given raw material from countries outside the area. If, according to the rules of
the area, products manufactured from this raw material will be
considered to have originated in the area if their value is double
that of the raw material, the difference in customs costs incorporated
·
In

· h e d pro d uct
t h e fi ms

WI"11

be 3o% -

2

1
zo% or 5Jo.
A t t h e outset

this difference may not be thought to falsify competitive conditions,
because transportation costs and levels of productivity may compensate, and the difference can therefore be absorbed. If the country which applied a duty of 20% now reduces it to zero, the difference in customs costs becomes 3o% or r 5%, which represents a
2

substantial difference in the cost of bringing the product to market.
This difference could cause diversions of trade and other commercial activity, and the only way to alleviate its effect would be to
change the rules concerning the determination of origin-for example, by providing that a finished product cannot be considered to
have originated in the area unless its value is five or six times that
of the imported raw material which it contains. In order to avoid
the necessity of constant modification of the rules for determining
origin and to keep countries from abusing their freedom to modify
tariffs at a moment's notice, that freedom must be limited.
All of the European countries were ready to agree that freedom
in this area should be limited by controls or sanctions, but they were
unable to agree on the scope of the limitations to be imposed. Some
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wanted a rule that no member could alter its tariffs on goods from
non-members without prior agreement of the other members.
Others, rejecting controls of this kind, suggested that it should be
possible to change the rules concerning definition of origin if a country were to change tariffs vis-a-vis third countries to an extent which
would create trade diversions within the area. In such a case, it
would be possible to deny to the relevant goods the customs benefits
otherwise granted by members of the area to goods of the others.
The suspension of the free-trade-area negotiations created certain difficulties in Europe, and no one yet knows how they can be
resolved. After the negotiations had been broken off, seven countries
of Europe which do not belong to the Community (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom)
discussed the possibility of creating among themselves a free trade
area which would be independent of the Community, 5 ~t and the Community found itself confronted by a new situation which brought
it to adopt concrete measures with regard to third countries, and to
take up the general problem of its relations to non-Community countries with a particular sense of urgency.
2. SPECIFIC MEASURES TAKEN ON JANUARY I,

I959,

WITH REGARD TO THIRD COUNTRIES

The halting of the free-trade-area negotiations, the European
crisis which resulted, the accusations of discrimination brought
against the Community, and the fact that it was considered guilty
by many of provoking a split of Europe into two groups-all
motivated the Community to take certain measures vis-a-vis nonCommunity countries on January I, I959· On that date-it should
be recalled-the Six were required, as among themselves, to
I) lower their customs duties by 10% and
2) increase import quotas by zo% on Community goods (having first combined those applying to goods from the other five into
single global quotas).
By a decision dated December 3, I958, the Council ruled that the
Member States should, on January I, 1959, reduce by 10% duties
on industrial products with a rate higher than that of the future
common external tariff but not to a level below that of the common
external tariff. This reduction was effected in regard to O.E.E.C.
members, G.A.T.T. members and non-members of G.A.T.T. who
have most-favored-nation treaties with Member States of the Com""An appendix to this chapter examines the Europe an Free Trade Association
(E.F.T.A.) organized by these seven countries.
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munity. The decision of December 3 provided that, subject to the
reciprocal grant of like benefits, Community countries should increase quotas on industrial products from O.E.E.C. countries by an
amount equal to 20% of the total value of quotas of each of the
Six in favor of other O.E.E.C. countries. Within the framework of
this over-all increase, it was required that each quota should be
increased at least 10%. The second instalment of 10% was not
necessarily to be applied to each quota, but could be used for products of special interest to the country in question and in particular
for those products which are subject to insignificant quotas or in
regard to which no quotas have been opened.
These measures meant-as far as tariffs were concerned-that:
I) by decreasing duties on imports from non-Community countries by ro% (as they had in regard to Community goods), the
Member States avoided discrimination against non-Community
countries in implementing the E.E.C. Treaty;
2) by limiting this decrease to duties on those products which
were subject to a higher duty than that of the future common external tariff of the Community, they took the first step, as of January
r, I 9 59, towards the creation of a common external tariff (although
the Treaty provides only that the first decrease of external tariffs
should take place on December 3 I, I 96 I), thereby anticipating by
three years-and on their own initiative-the Treaty schedule, although nothing required them to do so; and
3) by restricting the decrease to duties which were higher than
the duties of the future common external tariff, the Member States
have nevertheless introduced differences of treatment of Community and non-Community countries since they also reduced by I o%
duties on Community goods which were inferior to the common
external tariff without extending this reduction to third-country
goods. It would, of course, have been foolish to extend this reduction to third-country goods since such a reduction would have affected duties which, on December JI, I96I, would have to be raised
again in order to progress towards the level of the future common
external tariff.
These tariff measures affecting third-country goods, having been
thus determined, were duly put into effect on January I, I959, at
the same time that the tariff reductions on Community goods were
effected. In fact, however, their implementation in some sectors has
been retarded, because the future external tariff of the Community
was not yet known. This forced the Member States to fix approxi-
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mate duties, choosing levels which seemed likely to be higher than
those of the future common external tariff. A special difference in
treatment resulted in certain cases from the fact that as to a few
products some of the Member States took as a base the duties applied on December 3 I, I 9 58, whereas these duties had been partially
or totally suspended on January I, I957, the determinative date of
basic duties under the Treaty. Since the duties to which the 10%
reduction was applied were different, the result was, of course, that
lower duties were put into effect on Community goods than on nonCommunity goods.
Country by country, the situation was this:
I) Germany had of her own accord reduced duties on a great
number of imports from the entire world. These reductions, effected after January I, I 9 57, were taken into account in applying the
provisions of the Treaty, and Germany had to make only a few
new tariff reductions on imports from Community, as well as from
non-Community, countries. These few were made and, as far as
industrial products were concerned, in a generally non-discriminatory manner.
2) Tariffs of the Benelux countries were, in general, lower than
the future common tariff of the Six. Benelux reduced its tariffs by
10% within the Community, but, of course, did not effect the same
reduction on all third-country goods. Where the then applicable
tariff was higher than the future external tariff of the Community,
however, the same 10% reduction applicable to Community goods
was put into effect.
3) Italy gave effect to the w% reduction on goods from third
countries, but made exceptions of a great number of products in
regard to which it was difficult to predict whether the external tariff of the Community would be higher or lower than the applicable
Italian tariff.
4) France's procedure was similar to Italy's. She had, in I957,
however, reduced or suspended duties on certain products (paper
pulp, kraft paper, boxes) but these reductions and suspensions were
later repealed. Under the terms of the Treaty, France was obligated
on January I, I9 59, to fix tariffs within the Community 10% lower
than those actually applied on January I, I957· As to non-Community goods she put into effect tariffs which were 10% lower than
those provided for by law on December 3I, I958. This difference
can be fairly important. For instance, on raw pulp the legal duty of
22% had been suspended on January I, I 9 57, and one of 6% was
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in fact applied. On January I, 19 59, the tariff to be applied to Community goods was therefore fixed at 5.4%, while the one applied to
third-country goods was fixed at 19.8%.
The decision of the Six of December 3 meant, as to quotas, that
these countries offered to other O.E.E.C. members bilateral negotiations concerning the application of the Treaty rules, with the
exception of the rule of 3% relating to small or nonexistent quotas.
This negotiation in fact fixed the over-all increase of quotas at 20%,
whereas the implementation of the 20% rule resulted in an increase
of much more than 20% of the quotas among the Six. No unanimous
decision of the Council of the O.E.E.C. could be reached concerning this offer to negotiate, and each country was left free to initiate
bilateral negotiations with one or another of the Six. Actually, such
negotiations took place only between France, and most of the
countries now constituting the E.F.T.A. Their result was a
substantial increase in the quotas opened by France to these countries subject to the grant of reciprocal benefits by them-an increase which in the French-British case, far surpassed the 20%
max1mum.

3·

THE REPORT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF
FEBRUARY

1959

ON FUTURE RELATIONS OF THE

SIX WITH OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Following the suspension of the negotiations concerning the free
trade area, the Council gave the Commission the task of preparing
a report concerning possible solutions of the problem of relations
between the Community and the other European countries. The report of the Commission was submitted in February 1959, and even
though it was not approved by the Council, it is highly interesting
in that it indicates what preoccupies the Commission.
The report states in particular that the relations of the Community with the other European countries should be viewed within
the framework of a general world-wide policy. From this point of
view, protectionism would be an inconceivable Community policy.
It is incumbent on the Community to pursue a liberal policy in regard
to Europe and the rest of the world and to translate its intentions
into actions. Noting that the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Community carry on almost one half of world trade, the
Commission stated that these great industrialized economic entities
have a particular responsibility in maintaining the economic equilibrium of the world. The major part of the world is, it continued,
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composed of countries which are still in the throes of development,
and it is doubtful whether they can, on their own, develop their national economies satisfactorily. Therefore, freer trade in the world
will only be possible if it goes hand in hand with active and coordinated development programs. Experience demonstrates that
free trade alone is not equal to the task of eliminating too-great
disparities. On the contrary, if other steps are not taken, free trade
may result in widening the gaps between rich and poor countries.
The Commission therefore proposed a common policy to be followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Community, with a view to lowering tariffs on a world-wide scale, to
furnishing technical and financial assistance to developing countries,
primarily by means of export credits, to stabilizing the prices of raw
materials, and to assuring world-wide coordination of policies designed to meet problems created by business cycles.
Having placed the problem of the relations of the Community
with the other countries of the O.E.E.C. in the more general framework of relations with the world as a whole, the Commission nevertheless reaffirmed the absolute political necessity of European solidarity. Although it rejected the concept of the free trade area as a
means of associating the Community with other European countries,
it nevertheless proposed some concrete tariff measures in order to
establish a modus vivendi among O.E.E.C. countries.
Primarily because the propositions of the Commission were inadequate at the European level, the Council could not approve the
Commission's report. In March 1959 it therefore appointed a
special committee to formulate suggestions for reviving negotiations
with other O.E.E.C. countries directed at the creation of a multilateral association between them and the Community. This special
Committee has not as yet completed its work, and in the meantime,
seven countries of the O.E.E.C. have decided to create among themselves a free trade area. 60
4·

THE PROBLEM OF THE HARMONIZATION OF
COMMERCIAL POLICIES IN REGARD TO
CERTAIN COUNTRIES

Even though the Community has often reaffirmed its intention of
pursuing liberal commercial policies in regard to non-Community
countries, the lack of a common commercial policy during the transitional period will create certain problems. Bt;cause one of the Six
00

See appendix at
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of this chapter,
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applies a more liberal tariff or quota to a given non-Community
product than another, a risk of trade diversions within the Community, which will provoke lively reactions on the part of the producers, will result. The highly-developed countries which make up
the Community are particularly afraid of the competition of three
groups of countries:
I) those which have abnormally low salaries and wages (that
is, the developing countries in Southeast Asia) ;
2) those where the state enjoys a commercial monopoly (the
countries behind the Iron Curtain) ;
3) those which use artificial methods of a kind which falsify the
price of exported products (for instance, countries with multiple
exchange rates).
The risks of trade diversion during the transitional period are
connected to the problem of fibre pratique within the Community,
and, in the cases of trade diversion, the countries may invoke the
safeguard clauses of Article I I 5. 61
Confronted with these problems, the institutions of the Community have assigned the Economic and Social Committee (a consultative organ which represents ec~nomic and professional interests) the task of dealing with them. In July of I959, this Committee submitted to the Commission an opinion representing the
viewpoint of economic and professional groups on these problems.
This opinion indicates that, if the agreement of the Six on a common commercial policy (which, according to the Treaty, is the ultimate goal for the distant future) cannot be reached immediately,
lack of coordinated action in regard to the three groups of countries mentioned above may well cause free trade in certain products 62 within the Community to fail. The reason for this is the
possibility of recourse to the measures contemplated by Article
I I 5 of the Treaty. The coordination of commercial policies of the
Member States, which the Treaty foresees for the transitional
period, should, in general, be effected without delay, according to
this opinion, and ought to be begun immediately in cases where the
above-mentioned danger threatens.
In this connection, the Economic and Social Committee has
formulated a certain number of proposals which, it seems, have
not as yet been seriously examined by the Community institutions.
61

See text at note 32 supra.
The products in question are both industrial and agricultural, for example,
natural or artificial textiles, optical goods, certain metal products, sewing machines,
ceramics, rubber footwear and toys.
62

159
It is interesting to note that the spirit of these recommendations
is to some extent protectionist in regard to the exports of the countries in question. Increased protection against exports of certain
countries-and notably of those whose economies are in the throes
of development-plainly seems to contradict the liberal declarations of principle of the Commission and to negate its professed desire to contribute to the development of these countries. No hasty
conclusions should be drawn, however, since these are special cases
which do, in fact, create problems of a certain gravity for the European industries affected.
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THE DILLON PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF THE
TARIFFS OF THE PARTIES TO G.A.T.T.

At the session of G.A.T.T. held late in 1958, Mr. Dillon, as head
of the United States delegation, submitted a proposal looking to
a new multilateral tariff conference (analogous to those held at
Annecy, Torquay, and Geneva during the last ten years) which
would permit the President of the United States to utilize the
powers, granted him by the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Extension
Act of 1958, to reduce existing U.S. duties 20% on all products
(with the exception of those duties which have reached the "peril
point.") These powers expire on June 30, 1962.
In accordance with this proposition, G.A.T.T., during the winter
of 1958-59, studied the possibility of organizing such a conference.
The interest of this proposition obviously lay in bringing about a
lowering of U.S. duties, as well as those of European countries,
and particularly, those of the Common Market, thereby making
new progress in the direction of liberalized world trade.
Realization of the Dillon proposal will create problems, however, from the point of view of the Community. The first of these is
whether the Member States should negotiate on the basis of their
present tariffs or on the basis of the future common external tariff.
The answer is, as it were, imposed by the future common external
tariff. In view of the fact that during the years to come the Treaty
requires Member States to raise their duties on some of their products, and to lower them on others in order to establish their future
common external tariff, it would be illusory to obtain concessions
from them with regard to duties which they will, in any case, have' to
lower or with regard to others which they must in any case increase
later.
A second question results from one of the rules of G.A.T.T. The
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countries of the Community will have to increase certain duties to
place them at the level of the common external tariff. A large number of these duties have been "bound" by each Member State visa-vis third countries. These commitments resulted from prior tariff negotiations-a given Member State agreeing, in exchange for
counter-concessions by other G.A.T.T. countries, to reduce and
"bind" certain of its duties, that is, not to increase them. It is clear
that if one of the Member States is to increase a "bound" duty
in order to carry out its obligations within the Community, then
it must either give up such counter-concessions or offer other compensation. This compensation may, of course, result from the fact
that another lVIember State must lower corresponding duties to
place them at the level of the future common external tariff, and
G.A.T.T. expressly provides that situations of this kind should be
taken into account.
The effect of these provisions is that the ultimate establishment
of the future common external tariff of the Community requires not
only that the Member States shall fix this tariff in accordance with
the complex rules already described, but that the "bound" tariff
headings which the Member States intend to increase to the level
of the future common external tariff should be re-negotiated with
the countries of G.A.T.T. which are not members of the Community. This tariff will, in effect, be modified following these renegotiations because the Member States of the Community will have
to offer compensation to their G.A.T.T. partners.
Consequently, if negotiations are undertaken pursuant to the Dillon proposal on the basis of the future common external tariff, it
will be necessary to carry out successively two separate negotiations
-one to re-negotiate the "bound" tariff headings of the Community members, and the other, on the basis of the external tariff
of the Community resulting from such re-negotiations, to lower the
common external tariff in exchange for counter-concessions by the
United States and other countries.
By a decision of May 5, 1959, the Council decided to accept the
offer of Mr. Dillon so that new tariff decreases can be effected in
the interest of developing world trade. The Council considered
that this objective is perfectly in accord with the intentions of the
Member States as expressed in the Treaty, according to which the
Common Market should contribute, in conformity with the public
interest, to the harmonious development of world commerce, and,
especially, to the reduction of customs barriers.
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At its I959 spring session, G.A.T.T. was able, therefore, to decide to hold a new world tariff conference. This is to begin on September I, I 960, at which time the "bound" duties which the
Member States of the Community intend to raise will be re-negotiated. The conference should end by Christmas I96o. In January
I 96 I, the negotiations of the Dillon proposal itself will begin. They
are to be terminated in time to make it possible for the President of
the United States to use his powers to lower U.S. tariffs.
This schedule plainly has meant that the Member States have
had to accelerate their decisions regarding the projected common
external tariff. This tariff had to be ascertained as soon as possible
in order that the countries of G.A.T.T. could know which tariff
headings were to be re-negotiated, and what concessions would be
asked of the Member States, either by virtue of an "unbinding" of
these headings or in order to obtain from the Six reductions of their
future common external tariff (within the framework of the Dillon
proposal) in exchange for appropriate counter-concessions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

A.

DIFFICULTY OF FoRMING JuDGMENTS

An examination of those provisions of the Treaty which relate
to the elimination of obstacles to trade among the Member States
and to the establishment of a common external tariff and commercial policy indicates that, although the Six were successful in establishing fairly precise rules concerning their relations with each other,
they were forced to leave vague the greater part of the rules affecting relations with third countries. This is understandable-among
themselves the Six could undertake firm mutual obligations, because
each was in a position to evaluate the benefits to be received in exchange for benefits granted, and to give effect to the benefits it promised. On the other hand, the establishing of a common external
policy raises complex problems in view of the very different initial
positions of the Member States, some traditionally liberal and
others traditionally protectionist. Moveover, this is a field in which
the countries in question have only partial control since they are
bound by other international obligations and since foreign policy
may only be defined in relation to constantly evolving situations at
home and abroad.
It is practically impossible to take stock now of the effect of the
internal rules of the Common Market. The goal is clearly enough
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defined-the establishment of a single economic unit grouping highly
industrialized countries whose population, economic power, and
technical capacities will make it the third-ranking economic power
in the world. But how will this be accomplished? Will the rules of
the Treaty governing the abolition of tariffs and quotas be strictly
applied? What scope will be given the safeguard clauses invoked?
In particular, will the clause relating to difficulties pertaining to a
particular sector be applied sparingly or will it be used to shield
large areas of economic life from the full force of the Treaty?
Doesn't the flexibility of the system for the abolition of tariffs in·
volve the risk of postponing the solution of the thorniest problems
until the end of the transitional period and, won't the consequence
be virtually insoluble difficulties? It must be remembered that some
Member States have long protected their industries extensively,
and exposure now to competition with those of other Member States
will create real problems.
It is also clearly difficult to estimate the effects of the rules governing the elimination of obstacles to trade among the Member
States without taking other rules into account. For example, the
rules concerning state competition and competition among enterprises must be considered. All state subsidies to industries are to be
abolished, but how is this principle to function and what will be its
consequences? Again, cartels and all forms of understanding between private enterprises are, as a matter of principle, prohibited.
But, in spite of this prohibition, isn't there a risk that enterprises of
the various countries may come to understandings dividing markets
among themselves in order to avoid competition which is too lively
for their tastes? What will be the impact of the ultimate answers to
these questions on the structure of enterprise-will the smallest disappear, victims of powerful combinations, or will small enterprises
be able to survive? What effects will this have on commerce? What
kinds of professional groups will be established?
Another and a related question-what will be the balance of
power between producers and consumers within the Common Market? For the time being, it seems that producers have more rapidly
recognized the importance of what lies ahead and that they are
organizing effectively at the Community level. No similar organization seems to exist among consumers. The unions are divided by
politics, and not yet ready to take advantage of the new situation
to increase international trade-union cooperation. However, things
may change-though how and when no one can tell.
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Even though the Treaty envisages some harmonization of the
fiscal policies of the Member States, it imposes no firm obligations.
It is therefore difficult to imagine what will happen in this area,
since these policies will obviously exert great influence on any
changes in the structure of enterprises, on their possibilities of investment, and on their respective competitive capabilities in the
various countries of the Community.
Under these conditions, although in theory it is possible to assert
that the creation of the European Economic Community will
strengthen the economic power of its Member States by increasing
the competitive capability of the whole and by raising the standard
of living of Community inhabitants, it is difficult to determine to
what extent and at what pace this will be accomplished, and also
what sacrifices will be necessary and what economic upheavals will
precede it. Will productivity rise faster or will wages-or will the
two be subject to a "see-sawing" effect? And to what extent will
balance-of-payments crises obstruct the course of events?
In this respect, it is obvious that the key to success in establishing
the Community is the maintenance of a high level of economic activity. Only within the framework of a continuous increase of production, productivity, and total consumption will th,e countries of
the Community be able to accept the necessary economic and social
changes. If marginal enterprises have to shut down, it is essential
that, through the continual progress of the economy as a whole, the
workers thus freed may immediately find other employment. The
Common Market could not survive a major unemployment crisis.
The resulting political and social reactions would immediately force
the governments to take protective measures, particularly with regard to imports, which would negate the very principles of the Community and would lead to its failure. But it is impossible for the
Six to study economic trends in isolation-they must consider those
in the rest of the world, and particularly those in the United States
and the sterling zone. The internal success of the Community therefore depends directly upon policies adopted beyond its boundaries.
This raises the problem of the external policy of the Community
itself. The provisions of the Treaty in this respect are vague. Moreover, the future common external tariff of the Community will give
rise to negotiations the over-all results of which cannot be foreseen-all the more reason why it is impossible to predict what tariff
will be applied to any particular product.
How will the external policy of the Community be determined?
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In the first place, the degree of success of the Community's internal
policy will be a factor. If, in the abolition of the obstacles to the
free flow of goods among themselves, the Member States encounter
great difficulty, a protectionist attitude towards the rest of the world
will automatically result. If they succeed in eliminating commercial
obstacles smoothly, however, there is every chance that their attitude towards the rest of the world will be more liberal. The Treaty
itself provides that, in establishing its external commercial policy,
the Community shall keep in mind the increase of competitive capacity which would normally be expected to result from the establishment of the Common Market.
The common external policy of the Community will also be influenced by its obligations towards its own overseas and associated
territories. In so far as it wants to give the latter preferential treatment, it will have to maintain barriers against third countries.
The policy will also depend on the policies of other countries, both
commercial and other. In this respect, initiatives such as the Dillon
proposal and the creation of the free trade area of the Outer Seven
will undoubtedly have an effect.
Finally, other international obligations of Community members
will also play an important part. The provisions of the Treaty relating to the abolition of quotas among the Six, as well as the problem of a common quota policy, appear today in an entirely different
light than they did at the time the Treaty was negotiated. There is
no excessive optimism in the statement that, within a relatively short
period, European countries in general, and those of the Community
in particular, will most likely give up the system of quotas as a systematic means of protection against imports. This movement will
be to the advantage of third countries, especially the United States.
It will also result in a more liberal orientation of the Community
than could have been expected only a short time ago. Another consequence, however, will be an increase in the importance of tariffs
which will remain the only means of protection for Community
products.
However, the freeing of imports and the durability of measures
of liberalization are in direct correlation with stability in balances of
payments and dependent upon financial, monetary, and economic
policies adopted both by the Member States and by the larger nonmember countries. In case of recession, general recourse by Community states to quotas will seem normal and is virtually certain.
Here again, a coordination of economic policies of Europe and the
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United States is imperative to avoid serious troubles and a retreat
from the liberalization of world commerce.
The countries of the Community are all large importers of basic
raw materials, and these imports should normally increase as the
economic strength of the Community increases. The role of the Six
in the commerce and economic development of the underdeveloped
countries will therefore be an essential one. The Community is well
aware of this role, 63 but to play it adequately, the Community must
pursue liberal import policies vis-a-vis these countries-a necessity
which creates conflicts. 64 For some Member States want to maintain
or even increase their production of some raw materials, but many
such enterprises could not survive third-country competition. The
Community also wishes to maintain preferences in regard to the
African territories with which it is associated. How these conflicts
will be resolved no one can guess.
To sum up, and granting the uncertainties remaining in regard
both to the internal development of the Community and to its relations with the rest of the world-and in spite of the setbacks which
it may suffer in the course of its evolution-one cannot doubt that
the formation of a new economic group as powerful as is the Community marks a major event in the history of the economic and commercial relations of the world.
Its formation will in all likelihood substantially strengthen the
competitive capacity of the enterprises of the Community. In addition, the products of each Member State will benefit from tariff
concessions of the others, for-in contrast to non-Community goods
-they will ultimately be free from import duties. Consequently,
the competition of Common Market producers will be more and
more active both in Community markets and those of third countries. This competition, however, should provoke a lively competitive reaction in third countries, and it is to be hoped that in the end
the main beneficiaries will be consumers in the Western world as a
whole. The spectacular rise in the standard of living in Europe that
occurred after the Marshall Plan was inaugurated ought logically to
continue, and it will entail a substantial increase in the needs of
European countries for basic raw materials as well as for machinery
and consumer goods. All in all, although the nature of trade currents
may change, it is unlikely that their volume will decrease.
These are the general conclusions usually drawn with respect to
63
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See the "Hallstein Report," discussed in Part III, Section E, Subsection 3·
See the discussion concerning List G in Part III, Section A, Subsection 4·
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the creation of the Community and, subject to the maintenance of
boom conditions in the world, there is reason to believe that these
conclusions will be verified by experience.
The existence of this new group will certainly involve some general problems for the United States concerning both the world's
political and its economic balance. It is difficult to say how the overall balance of payments of the United States will be affected. Some
American industries will encounter greater competition in Community markets as well as in third-country markets and even in those
of the United States. The demand for the products of other industries will increase. On the other hand, if the countries of the Com•
munity participate increasingly in financing investment in underdeveloped countries, the United States' share of the burden will,
perhaps, be relatively lightened.
The conduct of the United States will greatly influence the policies of the Community. A shift towards protectionism would produce a similar shift in the Community, and a resolutely liberal U.S.
policy will encourage liberal tendencies in the Community. Moreover, coordination of policies to control economic cycles will be an
essential element of the effort to free trade throughout the world.
Increased American investment in the Community alone will not
compensate for the potential harm to U.S. industries which the creation of the Community could cause. Above all the United States must
seek bases for active cooperation with the European countries directed at the maintenance of world prosperity, assistance to underdeveloped countries, and total freedom of trade. In this audit of the
uncertainties which weigh so heavily on the future of the Community these conclusions alone are certain.

B.

LESSONS DRAWN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE FIRST MONTHS OF THE COMMUNITY

Can one draw conclusions from the history of the first months
of the Community? Probably not, but it is certainly useful to isolate
outstanding factors, since they will dominate its evolution in the
months or years to come.
The first tariff reductions and quota increases within the Community were, generally speaking, carried out according to the rules
of the Treaty. They seem to have raised no difficult problems for
the Member States, nor of themselves to have had serious consequences for other countries.
These reductions and increases were, of course, fairly modest
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in terms of absolute values. A 10% reduction of tariffs reflects a
minimum effort at best. The increase of quotas was more impressive
-in fact, larger than the Treaty provided for, but it occurred in
circumstances which necessarily made its effect negligible. On the
other hand, these advantages have also been granted in a relatively
non-discriminatory manner to third countries.
The conditions under which this was done in regard to tariffs
have already been indicated. The efforts to be made by the Benelux
countries, Germany, and Italy in regard to quotas were of only
minor importance, but, particularly as a consequence of the convertibility of currencies (and in the case of Germany, under pressure
of G.A.T.T.), these countries have in general liberalized quotas on
third-country goods to the same extent as quotas on imports from
O.E.E.C. members.
France, who in 1958 applied a strict system of quotas on all imports, achieved 94% liberalization within the O.E.E.C. within a
few months, and 70% vis-a-vis the dollar area. As to products not
yet liberated, she increased quotas within the Community in accordance with the Treaty. She also increased quotas on imports from
various other European countries in keeping with bilateral agreements. Because of the devaluation of the French franc and the very
strict policy of financial orthodoxy since pursued, as well as by reason
of the renewal of confidence created by the government of General
de Gaulle, the rapid and extensive removal of restrictions on imports was not followed by a disturbing increase of purchasing
abroad.
In sum, then, the Treaty and the measures taken with regard to
third countries had no noticeable effect on the volume of imports or
on the direction or nature of the flow of trade either within or without the Community.
Indications of a tendency towards protectionism within the Community on the one hand, and a psychological climate favorable to
some deflection of the normal flow of trade on the other have already
been noted. Protectionism manifested itself in the difficulties which
arose in the calculation of the increase of quotas among the Six
in accordance with the rules of the Treaty, and especially in regard
to the so-called 3% rule. In other areas (particularly agriculture)
some states have manifested a tendency to replace tariff or quota
protection by consumer taxes on imported products. This development has had the incidental effect of drawing attention to the need of
a more immediate and thorough supervision by the Community of
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the fiscal policies of its Members than was contemplated at the time
the Treaty was negotiated.
Changes in the flow of trade have been accompanied by two
groups of contradictory phenomena. On the one hand, cartel agreements have been concluded between or among competing enterprises
within a particular country, as well as within the Community. Apparently these agreements are of a financial and technical nature and
it is often suggested-although to prove it is impossible-that these
firms are organizing to "rationalize" competition among them.
Whether these arrangements conceal clauses enjoining excessive
competition or providing for a division of markets is also impossible
to state.
On the other hand, preparations for an increased exchange of
products among the Six are going forward. Business firms of the
Six are setting up commercial networks of agents, distributors, and
concessionaires in the Community, which, if not yet active, are making preparations for future conquests of markets. The newspapers
in each of the Community countries are filled with publicity concerning products manufactured elsewhere in the Community. All of
this is new because exporting firms were never sure in the past
whether they were going to get import permits from neighboring
countries or not. Now they have an almost absolute guarantee that
the import policy of the other countries of the Six will become more
and more liberal as time goes on. Consequently, they are prospecting markets and organizing outlets to an extent which they would
never have considered a short while ago. Finally, because of the
preferential tariff system which will progressively take effect, Community agents, representatives, concessionaires, and old clients of
non-Community exporters seem tempted to abandon established
contacts in favor of new ones with Community exporters. This
tendency is obviously not easy to check on, but it is recurrently alluded to.
When the Treaty went into effect, a psychological shock to the
public opinion of the Member States doubtless occurred. Public
interest is indicated by the abundance of literature on the Common Market and also in the rapprochement of the Six, not only in
industrial and commercial areas but also in areas where it would
have been difficult, a priori, to imagine that there would be a need
for professional organization. It is certainly normal for producers
of chemical products, of industrial equipment, and the like, or for
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wholesale and retail merchants of the Six to form professional organizations to deal with their problems. It is somewhat astonishing,
however, that doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers of the Six are also
forming professional groups.
Facts of this kind are evidence of the existence and personality
of the Community. There is, indeed, a decided tendency within the
Community to assert the existence of this per'sonality by protectionist measures. Without going so far as to defend autarky as an ideal,
the partisans of the Community, during its first months, defended
relatively high tariffs, as well as the maintenance of quotas on nonCommunity goods on the basis of a need to set the Community off
from the rest of the world. The political objectives of the Community obviously serve to support such theories, which were expressed (especially in France) most forcefully at the time when
negotiations were in progress to unite Community and European
non-Community countries in a free trade area of the seventeen
O.E.E.C. countries. One of the arguments against this area was
that it would absorb the Community in larger entity and would
ultimately obliterate its distinctive characteristics.
It is all the more interesting to note that, in reaction against this
theory, the Member States have in fact extended to third countries
a very substantial part of the benefits of the tariff reductions which
they made available to each other on January 1, 1959, and that all
the members, and notably France, have made a great effort to apply
liberalized quotas on a far broader geographical basis than that
of the Community. According to the statements of its leaders, the
Community also intends to commit itself resolutely to a liberal commercial policy.
These declarations of the intentions of the Community are explained by several important factors:
I) The suspension of negotiations concerning the free trade
area among the seventeen countries of the O.E.E.C. caused a crisis
in Europe-the gravity of which is clear to all-and the Six wish
to resolve it. A few of them, and particularly Germany and the
Benelux countries, have very potent economic reasons for wanting
to maintain and develop close cooperation with the other countries
of the O.E.E.C. by lowering commercial barriers.
2) The convertibility of European currencies established in December I 9 58, as well as the considerable increase of dollar reserves
in the countries of the Community, did away with the justification
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for a quota system on imports, whatever their origin, and the Six
are bound by their other international obligations to make further
efforts to liberalize trade.
3) The increase of the competitive capacity of European business and its success in the export trade, especially in U.S. markets,
have eased the fears of European producers concerning foreign
competition, and have led them to look forward more optimistically
to a world-wide liberation of trade.
4) The reversal of the balance of payments of the United States
has weakened the conviction that Europe will eternally be a debtor
of the dollar area, and has also reminded the countries of Europe
of their obligations to the United States, which has contributed so
much to their prosperity, notably by means of the Marshall Plan.
This reversal should be considered in connection with the necessity,
ever more evident, that Europe share with the United States the
burden of aiding the under-developed countries by adopting, vis-a-vis
these countries, liberal commercial policies.
A progressively developing tendency towards commercial liberalism is evident in Europe, then, and particularly among Community
countries. At the same time specific demands for protection in various areas have been voiced. Nevertheless the tendency to liberalism
persists, and may well be intensified by rivalry between the Community and the free trade area of the Seven. Developments in these
two groups will be extremely interesting to watch-particularly the
measures which they adopt in regard to tariffs on July I, I 960.
Finally, the tariff concessions which European countries are prepared to consider within the framework of negotiations on the
Dillon proposal will be a very important element for the future of
European neo-liberalism.
C. THE UNITED STATES AND THE COMMON MARKET

The effects of the Common Market on the United States have
already been the subject of a great deal of discussion. Commercial
consequences as well as the consequences for the U.S. balance of
payments have been considered. The general opinion seems to be
that the United States accepted the Common Market for political
reasons, and that its effects will be harmful in the short run for
American exports to Europe and elsewhere. In the long run, however, it will slowly become advantageous as consumption in Europe
increases. To avoid the possible harmful effects of the Common
Market and to profit from the expected burgeoning of economic
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power and prosperity of the Six, many American firms are developing investments in the Common Market.
These views of the probable effect on the United States are perhaps realistic, but, for the reasons already indicated, a prediction
that they will prove to be well-founded is difficult to make. It is even
more difficult to indicate whether in any particular sector of the
economy, or in regard to any type of product, American exporters
and producers will show a profit or loss, whether long, short, or
medium term. Such a prediction would necessitate a structural study
of each sector as well as knowledge of the future fiscal, tariff, and
investment policies of the Member States.
If it is assumed that conditions will remain static, one can in
fact guess that some trade which presently flows in long-existing
commercial channels will be deflected, since consumers of one Community country will find it advantageous to buy in other Community countries, given the fact that imports therefrom will eventually
be duty free, whereas imports from third countries will be subject
to the common external tariff. Moreover, one may suppose that the
competitive capacity of Community enterprises will increase, that
marginal enterprises will disappear, and that the concentration of
enterprises and mass-production possibilities for a wide market will
make Community firms increasingly dangerous competitors for
American producers. Indeed, this is the declared aim of the Community. Finally, however, it might also be predicted that, as the
European standard of living approaches that of the United States,
an increased demand will cause a new surge forward of international commerce, from which American business may also benefit.
What is more important, however, is to know whether and how
the United States can influence the commercial policy of the Community, working in cooperation with it and with the other European
countries, in order to permit the Community to evolve without setbacks and to create a favorable climate in the Western world for
the development and maintenance of prosperity within a liberal
trade structure. Action of the United States will be decisive in two
spheres: in selecting policies to control the ebb and flow of economic
trends; and in freeing the movement of goods.
In this respect the Dillon Proposal for international tariff negotiations was a first step in the right direction. The maintenance of
a liberal import policy by the United States is a vital political and
psychological element in stimulating the development of liberal tendencies within the Community and in the other European countries.
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However, it will be necessary to go further and adopt plans to increase financial and monetary cooperation among the countries of
the free world, in order to avoid economic crises which would cause
an immediate return to protectionism. The forms of such cooperation are subject to discussion, but the need of it is beyond dispute.
Increased competition between the enterprises of the Community
and those of the United States will, then, clearly call for serious efforts by Americans if they intend to maintain and develop markets.
However, these are the "rules of the game" of private enterprise to which the United States is firmly committed. It depends very
much on the United States whether the creation of the Community
-which aroused serious misgivings among non-Community nations
because they sensed, and with some reason, protectionist sentiment
within it-will mark a trend towards the lasting creation of a liberal system of world trade and payments.

APPENDIX
THE EuRoPEAN FREE TRADE AssociATION (E.F.T.A.)

*

(THE LITTLE AREA OF THE "SEVEN")
As suggested earlier in this chapter, the possible association of
the six members of the Common Market and the eleven other members of the O.E.E.C. in a free trade area was under discussion within
the O.E.E.C. as early as July of 1956. Negotiations towards that
end were suspended in December 19 58.
In the spring of 1959 seven of the eleven members of the
O.E.E.C. who are not members of the European Economic Community (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain) began study of the possibility of forming
a free trade area among themselves. During a meeting of Ministers
convened in Stockholm on July 20 and 21, 1959, the seven governments decided that the objective of their free trade area negotiations should be a treaty which could be signed and ratified by their
respective parliaments in time to permit the area to begin functioning on January I, I96o. On November 20, I959, the Convention
establishing a European Free Trade Association was initialled by
the Ministers in Stockholm and it came into force in spring I 960
upon completion of the ratification process.
*The text of the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association
appears at the end of Volume II of this book.
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Now that this project has been realized, the countries of the
O.E.E.C. are divided into three groups:
1) those of the Common Market: Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Germany, France, Italy;
2) those of the "little free trade area" (the E.F.T.A.); and
3) the still-developing countries-Greece, Ireland, Iceland, and
Turkey to which Spain was added at the end of July, 1959, when it
became a member of the O.E.E.C.
In creating the Association, the Seven declared that their aim
was to facilitate future negotiations with the European Economic
Community as well as with other members of the O.E.E.C. (that is,
with the still-developing countries) which have particular problems.
The object of these negotiations would be the elimination of customs
barriers among all members of the O.E.E.C., and the establishment
of a multilateral association including all of them, which would make
it possible for O.E.E.C. members to increase their economic cooperation and at the same time to further the expansion of world
commerce.
The free trade area created corresponds to the general principles
of the G.A.T.T. definition of such an area. It contemplates the
elimination of the obstacles to trade among its members, who, nevertheless, retain their freedom in regard to questions of commercial
and customs policies towards third countries. In order to obviate
deflections of trade-which might result from disparities in the
commercial and tariff policies of the various participants towards
the rest of the world-a definition of origin has been introduced.
By virtue of this definition only those products, on passing from one
country of the Area into another, which are considered to have
originated in the former country will benefit from customs reductions or immunity.
To facilitate the negotiations which may bring together the
E.F.T.A. and the Common Market, the seven countries have agreed
to rules eliminating obstacles to trade among themselves which are
as nearly similar as possible to the corresponding rules of the Common Market. Given the fact that no attempt is made to create institutions of the kind involved in the European Economic Community, the Seven wanted the application of these rules to be as nearly
automatic as possible. They therefore made no provision for successive stages in the transitional period during which customs tariffs
are to be progressively abolished, thereby rendering unnecessary decisions of the Council of Ministers of the E.F.T.A. concerning the
termination of each stage.
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The following paragraphs will outline the rules of the E. F. T.A.
concernmg:
I) the abolition of tariffs,
2) the abolition of quantitative restrictions on imports,
3) the definition of origin, and
4) the safeguard clauses.
The rules relate only to industrial products. Special arrangements
govern agricultural products and fisheries.
A. ABOLITION OF TARIFFS

A "basic duty" is fixed. It is the duty which was in force on January I, I 960. In contrast, therefore, to what was done in the E. E. C.,
the date determining this duty was not made retroactive. Thus a
delay was provided for between the elaboration of the E.F.T.A.
Convention and January I, I96o, in the course of which the members
could, as far as their other international obligations permitted, raise
their customs duties or re-instate those which had been temporarily
suspended wholly or in part. The Seven considered the question,
however, whether the basic duty is to be the legal duty or the duty
actually applied (that is, one taking into account still existing temporary suspensions). They have adopted a solution which consists in
principle in retaining the duty in fact applied, conceding, however,
that for certain products individual countries might have legitimate
motives for departing from the general rule. A procedure before the
Council of the Association is to ensure collective examination of such
derogations.
The Seven contemplate a progressive abolition of customs as
among themselves, which will take place in the following manner:
I) a 20 percent reduction will be effected on July I, I960. In this
connection it may be noted that the Six reduced tariffs among themselves by ro percent on January I, 1959, and that the second over-all
reduction of I o percent (with a minimum of 5 percent on any single
customs duty) is to be effected on July I, I96o. In lowering their
tariffs by 20 percent on July 1, 1960, the Seven hope to catch up with
the Six and to fix the tariff reductions which they will at the same time
effect among themselves, at the same level as those of the Six ( although the plan of the Seven does not manifest the same flexibility as
that of the Six) .1
2) Later reductions will follow successively-Io percent reduc1
For the decision by the E.E.C. Council of Ministers to accelerate tariff reduction
see Chapter I supra.
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tions on January 1, 1962, July I, 1963, January I, I965, January I,
I966, January I, I967, January 1, I968, January I, I969, and January I, I 970.
This schedule and method mean that the rate of tariff elimination
is automatic, allowing no possibility of extension of the transitional
period or any part thereof. It means, that the transitional period is
much shorter for the Seven than for the Six. It means, finally, that
the process is also both automatic and rigid: all customs duties must
be reduced at the given dates by the same amount of 10 percent. The
Seven have not provided a flexible system of the sort established by
the Six. The advantage of the method of the Seven is that it is
simpler, avoiding the complex calculations of total customs revenue,
and from the outset both governments and businessmen know what
to expect. It also avoids the risk of pressure being brought to bear
on the governments by special interests. The disadvantage is that
recourse to the safeguard clauses in case of particular difficulties of
individual industries may be more frequent.
As does the E.E.C. Treaty, the E.F.T.A. Convention provides
that each member declares its willingness to lower its customs duties
as against the other members more rapidly than required by the
rules, if its economic and financial situation and that of the sector
concerned so permit. It also provides that the Council may at any
time decide that any import duties shall be reduced more rapidly or
eliminated earlier and that between July 1, 1960, and December 3I,
I 96 I, the Council will examine whether it is possible so to decide in
respect of duties applied on some or all goods by some or all of the
members.
The Seven have also provided for the progressive abolition of
drawbacks, that is, of rebates of duties levied by one member country on goods imported from outside the Area which are subsequently re-exported to another member of the Area after transformation or manufacture. This abolition should be completed by the
end of the transitional period.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION

B.

ABOLITION OF QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS

The Seven have, like the Six, provided for a standstill in regard to
import quotas. The members may not take steps which would mark
a retreat from the level of liberalization reached as of January 1,
I 960. Secondly, they contemplate, as do the Six, the complete aboli~
tion of all quantitative restrictions on imports within the Area at
the latest by the end of the transitional period. To this end they
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have agreed to suppress gradually during this period all quotas
as between themselves. They hope thereby to avoid neutralizing the
advantages obtained by the successive reductions of tariffs on imports and to avoid having to deal with difficult problems at the end
of the transitional period concerning quotas which might still be in
effect.
To attain these objectives, the Convention contains the following
rules:
1) Any quota opened by one of the Seven to another member of
the Association must be increased by at least 20 percent per annum;
2) Quotas opened not only in favor of other members but also
in favor of third countries must be increased each year by an amount
equal to at least 20 percent of the trade actually carried on, within
the framework of these quotas, with the other members of the Association;
3) If, for a particular category of goods, a member has provided
no quota, or a quota so small that an annual increase of 20 percent
would not suffice to achieve complete elimination of the quota by the
end of the transitional period, then that member must establish adequate quotas by July I, 1960. This rule corresponds to the so-called
"3 percent rule" for small or non-existent quotas of the E.E.C.
Treaty.
4) The increasing of quotas will begin on July I, 1960, and it
will be applied to the quotas in force on December 3 I, I 9 59·
In addition, the Seven foresaw two particular quota problems.
They recognized that in exceptional cases serious difficulties resulting from the obligation to increase quotas are conceivable within
the Area. They are concerned particularly with the case of developing industries, for which a substantial degree of continuing protection may be justified, and with cases where a country applies a very
low tariff or none at all, depending solely on quotas as a means of
protection. In these cases, the Seven foresaw special arrangements
to be authorized by the Council which would permit the complete
abolition of quotas by the end of the transitional period and which
would not hinder the progressive lowering of tariffs from generating
a reasonable rate of trade expansion and which would not create
difficult problems towards the end of the transitional period.
The second problem is that of the application of other international obligations, in particular those of the G.A.T.T. and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). The Seven have paid more
attention to these obligations than have the Six. Of course, their
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Convention was negotiated at a time when the problem of a worldwide elimination of quotas was being seriously discussed in quite
concrete terms whereas when the E.E.C. Treaty was negotiated, the
prospects for a world-wide liberalization of trade (made possible in
December I 9 58 when the European currencies became convertible)
were still remote.
The Seven declare that they have international obligations concerning the use of quantitative restrictions and that, in establishing the
free trade area, they have no intention of modifying those obligations. In particular, they do not propose to use quantitative restrictions in any way to create a preferential regime among themselves.
This apparently is the reason for the provision in the Convention
according to which quotas opened both to countries of the Area and
to third countries will be increased by 20 percent; in fact, although
the 20 percent increase is calculated only by reference to that part
of the quota used by the other countries of the Area, the quota as
calculated will apparently be open to goods from third countries as
well as from other members. Moreover, the Seven envisage that
during the next ten years the majority of the members of the
G.A.T.T. may proceed, in accordance with their international obligations, to abolish quantitative restrictions on a large part of their
imports. Accordingly the Council will, by December 3 I, I 9 6 I, and
periodically thereafter, examine whether the rules concerning the
progressive elimination of quotas continue to be appropriate, and
whether, taking account of events occurring after the effective date
of the Convention, these rules will effectively lead to the abolition
of all quantitative restrictions by the end of the transitional period.
· The problem of the relationship of the rules adopted by the Seven
concerning the abolition of quotas with the rules of the G.A.T.T. is
also raised by the safeguard clause concerning balance-of-payments
difficulties.

C.

DEFINITION OF ORIGIN

The most difficult technical problem in a free trade area is the
definition of the origin of goods. The only goods which are free of
customs duties on passing from one country in the area to another
are goods which originate within the area. Goods coming from one
member which did not originate within the area continue to be subject to customs duties on entering the territory of another member,
just as if they came from a third country. It must therefore be possible to distinguish products which originate within the area from
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those which do not, otherwise so-called deflections of trade would
result. In distinguishing goods which originate within the area from
those that do not, there are, in the first place, two simple cases:
1) goods coming from outside passing from one to another country in the area unchanged. There is no doubt here: these goods do
not originate within the area;
2) goods completely manufactured within the area from raw
materials produced within the area. There is equally no doubt here:
they originate within the area.
The more difficult, and more frequent, case is where the goods
are manufactured within the area from raw materials or parts which
originate outside the area, or which contain certain elements which
originate outside the area. In these cases the problem of the definition of origin is particularly acute. The principle adopted by the
Seven is that a product of this sort is to be considered as originating
within the Area when the value added within the Area to the raw
materials or parts imported from outside is at least equal to a given
percentage of the total value of the product concerned. This is the
"added-value criterion."
The fixing of a minimum percentage of added value constitutes
in a sense an acceptance of the idea that the effect on the value of
the finished product of the differences between the duties levied on
its constituent raw materials-because they entered the area through
a member country with a high tariff rather than a low one or vice
versa-gradually decreases as the amount of transformation within
the area increases. If the minimum added value required to qualify
a product as of area origin were too low, some diversion of commercial activity could result. In fact, it would be profitable to establish transformation industries in those countries which apply the
lowest tariffs on raw materials and assembly parts. If this happened,
such industries would be competing with their counterparts in countries which apply higher tariffs on raw materials and parts under
artificially created economic conditions.
Because this is true, the minimum added value required to combat
disparities between the tariffs of the members on raw materials and
parts coming from outside should be calculated in each case on the
basis of the amount of tariff disparity and the degree of work done
within the area. The higher the tariff disparity, the greater amount
of work would have to be done within the area in order that a finished product could be considered as originating within it. Con-
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versely, the smaller the disparity, the smaller the amount of work
which should be required.
With a view to simplification, the Seven adopted as a general rule
the criterion whereby a product is considered as originating within
the Area when so percent of its final value (on the basis of the
f.o.b., or the free-at-frontier, price) results from transformation
operations carried out within the Area.
The smaller the disparity between the national tariffs of the members on a particular raw material, the smaller should be the amount
of work required to qualify the product as of area origin. If tariffs
of the various countries on a given raw material are the same, a customs union rather than a free trade area exists and a very slight
transformation, adding only a very low percentage to the product's
value, would be enough to qualify the product as of area origin. The
same result may be reached if it is agreed that, whether their true
origin be internal or external, raw materials to which the members of
the area apply an identical or a very similar external tariff are to be
considered as originating within the area when they are incorporated
in a product manufactured within the area. For this reason the Seven
also established a list of basic materials which, whatever their true
origin, would be considered as originating within the area for purposes of determining whether finished goods, of which such basic
materials are constituent parts, qualify for customs exemptions in
passing from one E.F.T.A. country to another. In addition, certain
transformation processes effected within the Area are considered to
add sufficiently to the value of the material imported so that the resulting product may automatically qualify as of Area origin. For
example, the spinning and weaving of wool imported from outside
the Area will confer Ar-ea origin, since spinning and weaving produce cloth with a value which is more than double the price of the
imported wool which it comprises.
The Seven consider that these rules concerning added value should
be as liberal as possible. With this in mind, they decided to review
periodically these rules in a liberal spirit, and that in any case a
member of the Area may on its own initiative apply more liberal
rules than those agreed to in regard to imports from the other countries of the Area.
Clearly, the more liberal the rules, the greater the number of
products which may circulate freely within the Area. For European
countries which are comparatively poor in raw materials, the liberalTHE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
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ity of the rules and the establishment of as broad a list of basic materials as possible are particularly important.
Once rules of origin have been established, the problem of supervising their application arises. Such supervision requires a certain
number of formalities-for example, showing customs officials
documents of origin-but to avoid hindering commerce within the
area these formalities must be kept at a minimum. The Seven have
decided that it is up to the exporter to prove that the product originates within the Area and he may do so by means of any of the above
criteria.
Despite all precautions, deflections of trade or commercial activity caused by disparities between the external tariffs of the countries
of the Area are still possible. To control these the Seven have further
provided:
I) A "code of good conduct," by the terms of which members
promise to abstain from any step which might have as a principal
effect a deflection of trade. For example, they may not deliberately
undertake a systematic lowering of their tariffs as against the rest of
the world in order to put their industries in a more favorable competitive position than those of the other members.
2) An appeal procedure whereby a country suffering from serious deflections of trade because of tariff disparities may submit its
case to the E.F.T.A. Council. The latter may make recommendations to the other members with a view to remedying the causes of
such deflections. In such cases, the rules of origin could be modified
and made less liberal, but other remedies could be adapted.

D.

SAFEGUARD CLAUSES

As did the Six, the Seven have created "two categories of safeguard clauses, one relating to difficulties in balance of payments, and
the other relating to difficulties arising in particular sectors of the
economy.
I. DIFFICULTIES IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Recourse to the E.E.C. safeguard clause is subject to a complex
procedure designed to permit strict supervision of such action of a
country in difficulty (in theory, except in urgent cases such recourse
must first be authorized by Community institutions), to render such
recourse as rare as possible and to stress the solidarity of the Six
by making "mutual assistance" available. The corresponding clause
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adopted by the Seven is infinitely more flexible. Indeed the Convention provides :
r . . . . any Member State may, consistently with its
other international obligations, introduce quantitative restrictions on imports for the purpose of safeguarding its
balance of payments. [Emphasis added.]
2. Any Member State taking measures in accordance
with paragraph I of this Article shall notify them to the
Council, if possible before they come into force. The
Council shall examine the situation and keep it under review and may at any time by majority vote, make recommendations designed to moderate any damaging effect
of these restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned to overcome its difficulties. If the balance of payments difficulties persist for more than I 8 months and the
measures applied seriously disturb the operation of the
Association, the Council shall examine the situation and
may, taking into account the interests of all Member
States, by majority decision, devise special procedures to
attenuate or compensate for the effect of such measures.
J. A Member State which has taken measures in accordance with paragraph I of this Article shall have regard to
its obligation to resume the full application of Article IO
[i.e., the Article requiring the elimination of quantitative
import restrictions J and shall, as soon as its balance of
payments situation improves, make proposals to the
Council on the way in which this should be done. The
Council, if it is not satisfied that these proposals are adequate, may, by majority vote, recommend to the Member
State alternative arrangements to the same end.
Admittedly these provisions incorporate notions identical with
those in the Rome Treaty; for example, aid of the members to a
partner in difficulties. But they are presented in a less systematic and
less obligatory form than in the E.E.C. Treaty. Moreover, and
this is important, in the Association recourse to the safeguard clause
is unilateral, the member in difficulties being obliged only to give
prior warning to the others if possible. Finally, whereas in the Rome
Treaty the Community institutions determine the measures that the
country having difficulties may take to protect itself, methods of application, and the like, in the Association each country has complete
freedom of choice, subject only to its other international obligations.
The reference to other international obligations is important.
The other international organizations concerned are, of course, the
I.M.F., the G.A.T.T. and the O.E.E.C. They maintain relatively
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strict control over the measures taken by a country in balance-ofpayments difficulties, such measures consisting of the imposition of
quantitative restrictions which are to be administered in a non-discriminatory manner. Two of these organizations, the I.M.F. and
the O.E.E.C., also practice what the Six in their Treaty call "mutual assistance"; the I.M.F. may grant credits and the O.E.E.C.
can also appropriate credits (through the intermediary of the European Fund of the European Monetary Agreement), as well as recommend to its members measures for facilitating the import by them
of the exports of the country having difficulties. In addition, both
the I.M.F. and the O.E.E.C. may recommend to the country in difficulties internal financial measures (cutting back public expenditures, restriction of credit, modification of discount rates, and the
like) which will enable it to regain equilibrium in its economy. They
may condition the granting of credits on the institution of a plan
to stabilize the country's economy. Finally, the O.E.E.C. may even
go so far as to fix the time limits within which the country, which has
had to re-establish quantitative restrictions on its imports because of
its balance-of-payments difficulties, is again to liberate imports.
In view of this existing framework the Seven thought it useless to
make special arrangements for the Association. In so deciding they
had certain things in mind.
1) They wanted to manifest their desires to respect their other
international obligations, and in no way to use quantitative restrictions to create a preferential regime amongst themselves.
2) The Seven wanted further to show their desire to continue to
cooperate with the Six, within the framework ~f the other international organizations, and in particular of that of the O.E.E.C.
In fact, it is this organization which has worked out the most detailed rules concerning safeguard clauses for balance-of-payments
difficulties. Since I 948 these rules have functioned well, thanks to
constantly strengthened examination and control procedures, to procedures permitting systematic review of the interrelationship of the
economic and financial policies of its members which in turn permit
preventive examination of possible balance-of-payments difficulties,
and appropriate measures of cooperation to be recommended; and
thanks finally to the existence, first of all, of the European Payments
Union and later of the European Fund, which on several occasions
permitted the appropriation of substantial credits to countries in
difficulties. Since the Association of the Seven has as its aim the establishment of a broad association uniting, within the O.E.E.C.,
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the Seven, the Six, and the underdeveloped countries of the
O.E.E.C., the Seven thought it natural to base themselves, as concerns balance-of-payments difficulties, on the system of cooperation
already tested in the O.E.E.C.;
3) Finally the Seven wanted to avoid the need for new international arrangements, since, in their opinion, those of the O.E.E.C.
will normally suffice to cover both their own needs and those of the
larger association of the eighteen countries of the O.E.E.C. which
they hope to see formed.
Although their answer to the problem of restrictions imposed to
counter balance-of-payments difficulties relies essentially on the
other international institutions, the Seven were nonetheless forced
to consider the possibility that protective measures of one of them
might be maintained, despite the rules of the other institutions, over
a long period of time. Such measures, if long maintained, could seriously disturb the functioning of the Association, and the Seven therefore concluded that E.F.T.A. institutions should supervise their application. They concede that it may become necessary, in the light of
experience, to work out special procedures to attenuate or counteract
the effect of these protective measures, although it is clearly impossible to foresee at present what such procedures might be. Nonetheless the gradual development of the Association of the Seven
will obviously bring about an ever closer solidarity and interdependence among the members and their economies.
2. DIFFICULTIES ARISING IN A PARTICULAR SECTOR

Although the clause concerning balance-of-payments difficulties
in the E.F.T.A. is more flexible than the comparable clause in the
E.E.C. Treaty, the E.F.T.A. Convention clause concerning difficulties of a particular economic sector is both more complete and
more rigid than its E.E.C. counterpart. This is largely because the
Six decided to leave to the institutions of the Community-and in
particular to the Commission-a very large measure of discretion in
this field; since the E. F. T.A. will be institutionally much less centralized and less supranational, the Seven, on the other hand, wanted
to establish precise rules at the outset in order to avoid giving their
institutions too much discretionary power. They found, however,
that there are limitations on the precision with which such rules can
be defined.
In the first place a definition of this kind of difficulty was necessary. The Six refer simply to "serious difficulties which are likely to

I 84

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

persist in any sector of economic activity or difficulties which may
seriously impair the economic situation in any region." The Seven
were more precise, the relevant clause providing:

If, in the territory of a Member State,
(a) an appreciable rise in unemployment in a particu·
lar sector of industry or region is caused by a substantial decrease in internal demand for a domestic product, and
(b) this decrease in demand is due to an increase in
imports from the territory of other Member
States as a result of the progressive elimination
of duties, charges and quantitative restrictions . . . ,
that Member State may, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Convention,
( i) limit those imports by means of quantitative
restrictions to a rate not less than the rate of
such imports during any period of twelve
months which ended within twelve months of
the date on which the restrictions come into
force; the restrictions shall not be continued
for a period longer than eighteen months, unless the Council, by majority decision, authorises their continuance for such further period
and on such conditions as the Council considers
appropriate; and
(ii) take such measures, either instead of or in addition to restriction of imports in accordance
with sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph, as
~he Council may, by majority decision, author1.

Ise.
In applying measures in accordance with paragraph
I of this Article, a Member State shall give like treatment to imports from the territory of all Member States.
2.

If the country concerned is to take protective measures, the harm
caused must take the form of substantial unemployment, and a
spectacular fall in domestic demand, resulting from an increase in
imports from the other member countries, must be the proven cause
of such employment.
The Seven, it should be noted, defined the kind of protective measures that a member country may apply, and the duration of their
application. The Six, on the other hand, gave the Commission full
discretion.
It is interesting to observe here that recourse to the clause, in the
Association of the Seven, is unilateral, whereas in the Community
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it is subject to prior authorization by the institutions. Nevertheless,
to limit possible abuses, the Seven were forced to limit the duration
of protective measures. They also provided that, beyond the I 8month period, protective measures may be continued only with the
approval of the Council. This point is important, for it implies the
possibility of active intervention by the institutions of the Association. In effect, the other countries of the group, or a majority of
them, must consent to continued protection by the country concerned
of the sector or the region in difficulties. Thus even the Seven, who
are hostile in principle to supranationality and excessive institutional
intervention, were forced to envisage fairly strict institutional control in this area.
In the same vein, the Seven provided that:
3· A Member State applying restrictions . . . shall notify them to the Council, if possible before they come into
force. The Council may at any time consider those restrictions and may, by majority vote, make recommendations
designed to moderate any damaging effect of those restrictions or to assist the Member State concerned to overcome
its difficulties.
4· If at any time after Ist July, I96o, a Member State
considers that the application of sub-paragraph (a) of
paragraph 2 of Article 3 [i.e., the prescribed reduction
in tariffs] and paragraph 3 of Article 6 [i.e., the prescribed elimination of protective elements in internal
charges and revenue duties] to any product would lead to
the situation described in paragraph I of this Article, it
may propose to the Council an alternative rate of reduction of the import duty or protective element concerned.
If the Council finds that the proposal is justified, it may,
by majority decision, authorise that Member State to apply an alternative rate of reduction, provided that the obligations relating to the final elimination of the import
duty or protective element . . . are fulfilled.
At the same time that they make unilateral action by the country
concerned possible, these measures indicate the Seven's intention
that the institutions should, wherever possible, intervene before such
action is taken, and the further intention that the countries of the
Association should grant aid to one another to overcome difficulties.
But the institutions of the Association will also be able to authorize
measures other than quotas to protect a sector or a region in difficulties, or to permit it to adapt itself to external competition-for
example, by subsidizing production.
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In the Seven as in the Six, the safeguard clause concerning balance-of-payments difficulties is valid after the end of the transitional
period as well as during that period. Moreover, and again like the
:Six, the Seven provided that the safeguard clause concerning particular difficulties would only be applicable during the transitional
period. The Seven did, however, provide that before the end of this
period the Council will consider whether similar arrangements may
be thereafter necessary.
E.

CONCLUSIONS

As things stand it is difficult to guess at the consequences of the
creation of the E.F.T.A. The rules determining origin will not be
finally defined for some time to come, and it is quite probable that
they will be in a constant state of evolution during the transitional
period and even, no doubt, thereafter. That definition is, of course,
fundamental, for it will determine the real substance of the Area,
that is to say, the volume of products, in relation to total trade between the member countries, which is to benefit from customs exemptions when passing from one country in the Area to another.
In the view of its promoters the E.F.T.A. is not, moreover, an
end in itself. It is essentially a means of "thawing" the situation
created by the suspension of negotiations for the establishment of a
large area including the European Economic Community and the
other countries of the O.E.E.C. No one can guess whether the desire of the Seven to resume talks with the Six will be realized or not.
But the future of the E.F.T.A. obviously depends on whether or
not the eighteen countries establish this larger association.
This being said, the most interesting question is obviously whether
a free trade area is, as such, a viable concept. In the course of the
negotiations in the O.E.E.C. for the establishment of a larger area,
the viability of such an enterprise was fiercely attacked, particularly
by France. Later, the then Finance Minister of France, M. Pinay,
declared that in his opinion the free trade area was an artificial con·cept, illogical and completely incapable of working. It will be interesting to see whether the Seven can show that it is technically
·possible to make a free trade area work. Verification of origin, and
the formalities this necessitates, will make commerce among the
members of the Association even more difficult than at present, despite the removal of quotas and customs duties. Clearly the major
preoccupation of the Seven must now be to reduce these formalities
as much as possible.
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The experience of the Seven in regard to deflections of activities
will be equally interesting. In its present form the E.F.T.A. groups
together the United Kingdom, a world commercial power which produces about everything that modern techniques make possible and
which applies, in general, quite high tariffs, and six small countries,
mostly with low tariffs, each of which has attained an extremely high
degree of productivity. On the one hand, there is a risk that the
United Kingdom will have a quasi-monopolistic position within the
Area for certain products since she will enjoy customs immunity in
the other six, whereas her great world competitors (the United
States, Germany) will continue to pay customs duties however low.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom will suffer both from her
high customs duties towards the rest of the world and, in certain
sectors, from the extremely active competition of her partners in the
Area; and she will no longer be able to protect herself by customs
duties on products in relation to which the competitive strength of her
partners is greatest-for example, on aluminum, special steels, clocks
and paper. Will deflections of activity within the area occur to the
detriment of the United Kingdom? Or will the latter gradually
achieve pre-eminence over her partners, thereby creating an ever
more monopolistic situation? It is impossible to foresee what will
happen without making detailed studies, sector by sector; and such
studies will be made more difficult by the uncertainty, which will
persist for a long time, concerning the development of the commercial policy of the countries of the Area towards the rest of the world.
Whereas it was possible to give extensive consideration to the external commercial policy of the European Economic Community,
the problem of the external commercial policy of the E.F.T.A. must
be passed over in silence, since, by definition, it has none, each country reserving the liberty to determine as it sees fit its commercial,
tariff and quota policy, subject to its other international obligations.
The E.F.T.A. undoubtedly involves preferences among its members as to tariffs, but these are acceptable to the G.A.T.T. Third
countries are nonetheless protected to a certain extent against the
consequences of the creation of the Association:
I) by the fact that no member of the Association if it wants to
achieve increased protection vis-a-vis the rest of the world, can do
so except within the framework of its international obligations
(G.A.T.T., O.E.E.C.);
2) by the declared intention of the Seven not to use quotas as a
means of establishing a preferential regime among themselves. The
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CUSTOMS UNION
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manner in which they have handled the problem of the safeguard
clause in the case of balance-of-payments difficulties is interesting
and reassuring;
3) by the underlying possibility of competition in the progressive
lowering of customs tariffs that the Seven may well provoke among
themselves to avoid deflections of trade or industrial activity. The
fact that a country like the United Kingdom is going to find itself,
without any tariff protection, in competition with the very specialized industries of low-tariff countries like Sweden, Norway or Switzerland, will naturally compel it to increase its competitive strength
so that it may lower its own tariff vis-a-vis the rest of the world.
Above all, like the European Economic Community, the E.F.T.A.
aims at stimulating competition among its members, eliminating
marginal activities, increasing productivity and production, raising
the standard of living of its population and increasing consumption.
The more the competitive power of its members increases, the less
they will have to use administrative measures to protect their industries. They will also no doubt be motivated to reduce tariffs
slowly as the E.E.C. is to do. In this sense, without being accused
of undue optimism, one might say that the movement set off in Europe within the framework of the E.E.C. and within that of the
E.F.T.A. may stimulate a new movement along the road towards
freedom of world trade. During the transitional periods, third
countries may well believe that their interests are being harmed.
It is almost certain, however, that, given a state of reasonable
financial stability in which cooperation between the great powers
is an essential factor, a new era of increased prosperity will open
to the countries of the Western world. Their responsibilities
towards the underdeveloped countries will increase correspondingly.
These general observations may now appear somewhat arbitrary.
And it will only be possible to verify their validity by experience. In
this respect, the measures which the Six, and the Seven adopt in regard to tariff matters and the manner in which these measures are
applied towards third countries are and will be instructive, as will
be the extent of cooperation in the G.A.T.T. negotiations concerning the Dillon proposal.

Chapter IV
Exchange Control Regulations In France*
Fernand Charles leantet t
Although it is more than twenty years since the beginning of
W 9rld War II many countries of the world still exercise some control over the international payments of private citizens and over
international private investments. This is true of nearly all the
European countries west of East Germany, including Great Britain,
France, and West Germany, of most of the Middle Eastern countries and of many countries in the Western Hemisphere. Even such
traditionally liberal countries as Switzerland have, although less
conspicuously, exercised control over their international payments
to and from countries with exchange controls by means of bilateral
payments agreements.
Exchange control regulations have become a part of a general
regulatory system aimed at close supervision of national economies
-which in practice means control of its industrial and commercial
activity, a certain amount of control of its agricultural production,
plus credit, price, and employment controls. A new field of law,
known on the Continent as economic law, has come into existence.
For a long time only practitioners paid any attention to this law, and
even they were concerned only with those laws, statutes, and regula-

* When this book was originally conceived, a survey of exchange controls in the
Six against the background of the E.E.C. Treaty seemed an obvious need. By the time
plans became concrete the need had become questionable-exchange controls had been
dramatically relaxed almost everywhere. Nonetheless no one felt that a subject which
had been of overriding importance to American investors in Western Europe and
which is the focus of important provisions of the Treaty could be ignored. The compromise finally adopted defines the scope of Professor J eantet's chapter as a description
of exchange controls in one of the Six providing an example of what the problem
of exchange controls has been in a Community country, an indication of how that
problem has been affected by the Treaty, and a suggestion of what it may be should
future balance-of-payments difficulties occur under the Treaty. Some of the most recent
developments which took place after the completion of this chapter are mentioned in
the footnotes.-THE EDITORS,
t A vocat a Ia Cour d' Appel; Charge de Cours de Droit Economique a l'lnstitut des
Sciences Juridiques et Financieres Appliquees aux Affaires de l'Universite de Paris.
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tions which directly affected their fields of activity. It was believed
that these laws would all disappear soon after the end of the war.
But that expectation was frustrated; a certain amount of control
is still a necessity and probably will be for a long time, either because political evolution is increasingly favorable to governmental
intervention in the economic life of nations, or because active hostilities have been succeeded by the "cold" war, or for both reasons.
Steps have been taken, however, if not to abolish controls, at least
to make them more flexible. The organization of the European
Economic Community represents a very important step.
This chapter deals with only one part of the whole body of economic laws whose interdependence makes exchange control regulations, when viewed separately, seem both complex and abstract. It
will be limited to a description of the exchange control laws and
regulations in France, and will be divided into the following sections:

f

A General Survey of Exchange Control Laws and Regulations;
II. International Payments;
III. International Trade;
IV. French Investments Abroad;
V.
Foreign Investments in France;
VI. Sanctions ;
VII. Probable Evolution Under the European Economic Community Treaty.
I. A GENERAL SURVEY OF EXCHANGE CONTROL

LAWS AND REGULATIONS
War was responsible for the introduction in France of the first
exchange control regulations. Such regulation had been in effect in
Germany for many years prior thereto. The Law of July I I, 1 9 3 8,
concerning the general organization of the country during wartime
provides in Article 46 that, in case of a state of war, decrees issued
by the President of the Republic may regulate or suspend the import, export, transfer, use, or sale of certain resources, that is, all
goods and services, including money. 1
1

Journal Officiel de Ia Republique Fram;aise (hereinafter cited as J.O.) July 13,
1938. The Decree of July 3, 1915 prohibited the export of gold, the Law of Aug. x,
1917 created controls on exchange operations and was completed by the Law of Jan.
7, 1918. All of these were abrogated, however, by the Law of Mar. 30, 1929. Art. 46
of the Law of July II, 1938 has been completed by Art. 5 of the Order of Jan. 7,
1959, (Jan. IO, 1959] J.O.
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Soon after the declaration of war, a decree dated September 9,
1939, 2 prohibited or regulated for the duration of the war the
export of capital (currency or other assets), exchange transactions
and transactions in gold. A decree dated the same day required
French citizens to declare their assets abroad to the newly created
Exchange Control Office. The first of these decrees 3 was ratified
by the National Assembly and has the same force as a statute. It
has remained in force in spite of the end of the state of war
(May 10, 1946) ,4 and other texts have been added to it-namely,
seven orders 5 and two statutes. 6 Application of these basic texts
is effected by thirty-one decrees of the Head of the Government,
thirty-two ministerial decisions of the Finance Department, more
than seven hundred regulations of the Exchange Control Office,
nearly nine hundred instructions and five hundred notes of the same
office. The rules which are presently in force represent about a
thousand pages of printed matter.
In itself this calls for explanation and comment.
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE

A.

THE HIERARCHY OF TEXTS

It should be understood that such statutes, orders and the Decrees
of September 9, 1939, are "laws" in the technical sense of the word.
The main consequence of that fact is that they are not subject to
judicial review, and they alone provide for penalties (although the
definition of the offense is given by administrative rules).
Decrees, ministerial decisions and regulations are as binding
as statutes, but only to the extent that regulations are in conformity
with ministerial decisions, ministerial decisions with decrees and
decrees with the statutes. They represent a hierarchy of rules
and, unlike statutes, if they violate requirements of form, involve
an abuse of power, or are contrary to law, a private claimant can
2

(Sept. 10, 1939] J.O.
Modified by several
Law of Apr. 15, 1942,
1948] J.O.
• Law No. 46-2154 of
tion, (Ch. cr.), July 9,
3

553·

decrees or laws: Decree of Apr. 24, 1940, [May 2, 1940] J.O.,
(Apr. 16, 1942] J.O., Law of Feb. 2, 1948 arts. I, 3· [Feb. 3,
Oct. 7, 1946, art. 178 [Oct. 8, 1946] J.O.; see Cour de Cassa1953, [1953] Dalloz 2 Jurisprudence (hereinafter cited as D.)

0
An "order" ["ordonnance"] is, under French constitutional law, a law made by
an individual to whom legislative power has been delegated, normally by Parliament.
Such delegations were made to General de Gaulle as head of the French Government. These were the Orders of Oct. 7, 1944, [Oct. 9, 1944] J.O.; Jan. 15, 1945, Jan. 16,
1945 and Jan. 17, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O.; May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945] J.O.;
Nov. 2, 1945, [Nov. 4, 1945] J.O.; and June 24, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O.
• Of Dec. 26, 1945, [Dec. 27, 1945] J.O. and of Feb. z, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O.
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seek recourse in the competent court, the Conseil d'Etat. 7 Illegality
of a regulation could also be urged before the Criminal Court and
Criminal Court of Appeals in case of criminal prosecution under
such a regulation.
Instructions and notes are comments of the competent governmental department and are not binding, except on the department
itself. Accordingly, no claim in court is normally possible. Because some of these instructions appear in fact to be as important
as regulations themselves, there is a tendency, however, in the
decisions of the Conseil d'Etat to admit appeals based on illegality
or abuse of power against instructions. 8
Individual decisions of the competent department may also be
attacked on the ground they are illegal or constitute an abuse of
power. 9

B.

THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THESE RuLEs

The existence of this hierarchy of rules is suggestive of the technique of regulation. The law provides very broad definitions and
applicable penalties and gives the government broad powers to
prohibit or regulate certain operations. The government provides
more precise (but still broad) definitions. Generally it forbids almost any operation which comes within the scope of its powers but
delegates to the Ministry of Finance, who subdelegates to the Exchange Control Office, power to grant general (by regulations) or
special (by individual decisions) exceptions. The result is the converse of the normal rule-instead of "all which is not prohibited
is permitted," the rule is virtually "all which is not expressly permitted is forbidden." Such a formulation is inelegant and burdensome for private persons but places the governmental agency on
the safe side in cases of omission.
This formulation also affords the agency concerned another advantage: it allows adaptation to special circumstances and to frequent changes in the economic situation. It is, indeed, one of the
prominent features of economic laws that they give broad powers to
1
See Conseil d'Etat (hereinafter cited as C.E.) Feb. 28, 1951, [1952] D. 454; C.E.
Mar. 28, 1952, [1952] D. 455; C.E. Apr. 17, 1953, [1953] Gazette du Palais {hereinafter cited as G.P.) II. 9·
8
C.E. Mar. 28, 1952, [1952] Jurisclasseur Pratique {hereinafter cited as J.C.P.)
II. 7132.
• C.E. May 16, 1951, [1951] Recueil Lebon (hereinafter cited as Rec. Leb.) 268;
C.E. Nov. 12, 1954, [1954] G.P. II. 414; C.E. Feb. 11, 1955, [1955] Rec. Leb. 82; C.E.
Feb. 20, 1956, [1956] Rec. Leb. 513.
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the competent agencies and that the agencies constantly modify the
rules. Private citizens must, therefore, constantly re-check what is
permitted and what forbidden, and uncertainty about the future
necessarily results.
A distinction must be made, however, between basic principles
and current rules-the former being fairly stable and the latter
changing frequently. Because a study of exchange control regulations might otherwise promptly become obsolete, this chapter contains statements of basic principles as distinguished from current
rules. 10
The regulations now in force greatly increase the rights of private investors granted by the legislative and administrative texts
establishing the basic principles. The policy of the Fifth Republic
is to follow sounder finance practices, strengthen national exchange
rates, and promote private trade and investment. Two important
sets of regulations have been promulgated to these ends: the first
included Regulation 669 on foreign investments in France, issued
at the beginning of 1959, and the second, published in the Journal
Officiel of July 26, 1959, included four regulations which greatly
facilitate monetary payments to and from the franc area.
EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE

C. THE AUTHORIZATIONS DELIVERED BY
THE EXCHANGE CONTROL OFFICE

One consequence of the above-described system is the need for
practitioners to have an accurate knowledge of the essential exchange regulations in order that they may know what kind of
authorizations are necessary and how they may be obtained. These
are of three kinds. The principal kind of authorization covers transfers of funds to and from the franc area. Indeed, one could imagine
exchange control regulations which would apply only to such transfers, since the main purpose of such regulations is to maintain a
satisfactory balance between the general debit and credit account
of France in relation to the rest of the world. The transactions
primarily affected are the conversion of francs into other currencies
and vice versa, and the actual transfer of funds back and forth
10

The more important principles are contained in the following texts: the Decree of
Sept. 9, 1939, [Sept. 10, 1939] J.O.; the Order of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O.
concerning foreign investments in France; the Order of May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945]
J.O. concerning penalties; the Law of Feb. 2, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O.; the Order of
June 6, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O. concerning French investments abroad; and, most
important of all, Decree 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, [July 20, 1947] J.O., amended by
decree 59-1440 of Dec. 21, 1959, which contains a statement of most of the basic rules
along with the Ministerial Decision of the same date, [July 20, 1947] J.O.
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between the franc area and other monetary areas of the world.
Crediting and debiting foreign accounts is part of such transfer.
But it is difficult to exercise effective control over transfers, which
for the most part represent payments, if obligations between one
area and another may be freely assumed. This is why international
trade itself is controlled-that is, why the second kind of authorization, licenses to import and export goods are required.
In the third place foreign investments in the franc area are also
controlled, not to implement old-fashioned notions of protectionism,
but because foreign investments mean debts for the future which
might one day upset the national balance of payments.
During periods of emergency, special measures have been applied to French citizens residing in France. Thus foreign investments could be requisitioned in order to supply the state with the
necessary foreign currency. No requisition orders are presently in
force, but French citizens residing in France must still declare their
assets abroad 11 and all residents must repatriate their income.

D.

THE VARIOUS AGENCIES

Authorizations are issued by the Exchange Control Office, which
is the principal competent agency, the Department of Finance,
through its Section for Exterior Finance (Direction des Finances
Exterieures) being another. The Exchange Control Office, which
is a separate and autonomous agency of the state/2 is supervised by
the Department of Finance but has been given authority to issue the
necessary regulations and make individual decisions. Decisions are
very often made upon the advice of the competent ministries
(mainly the Department of Commerce and Industry and the Department of the National Economy). Each of these departments
has to appoint representatives to a special Investment Committee, which is consulted by the Minister of Finance when large
investments are in question.
Aspects of the mission of the Exchange Control Office are delegated to several other administrative bodies. One of the most important is the customs administration which controls all physical
transfers, be they imports or exports. Monetary transactions are
11
Since this chapter was written, exceptions to this rule have been created.
,. Created by a statute dated Oct. 18, 1940, [Nov. I, 1940] J.O. Since this chapter
was written, however, the Exchange Control Office has been eliminated as an autonomous agency and legal entity by Decree 59-1438 of Dec. 21, 1959. Prior functions of
that Office are now exercised by the Bank of France, under the supervision of the
Department of Finance, or directly by the Department itself. Whenever the Exchange
Control Office is referred to, it must be deemed to mean, therefore, either the Bank
of France or the Department of Finance.
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effected by the Office itself and for it and for the Exchange Stabilization Fund by the Bank of France, which is wholly state controlled.
Applications have to be filed with the Exchange Control Office by
interested parties or by their duly appointed agents or attorneys.
But only French or foreign banks which have been designated as
"Authorized Intermediaries" (practically all the major ones) are
permitted to carry out the actual transactionsY These Authorized
Intermediaries receive a special delegation of authority from the
Exchange Control Office to receive deposits of foreign currencies
and negotiable instruments, to buy them, to open and keep the accounts in francs of non-residents, to receive and make international
payments for the accounts of clients, to buy foreign currencies on
the currency market for clients' accounts, to handle export and import licenses, and to keep, for the Exchange Control Office, appropriate records of their transactions. They very often receive
authorization from the Office to carry out transactions subject to
their acceptance of a duty of supervision and responsibility therefor.
As such, "Authorized Intermediaries" have mixed status, part private part public, and consequently they assume special responsibilities.14
Since exchange control regulations apply to the whole franc area
and not to France only, 15 a definition of the franc area and of certain basic notions is at this point necessary.

E.

THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "FRANC AREA"

Pursuant to the new Constitution of the Fifth Republic, the Executive Council of the French Community of States (La Communaute) was created on December 19, 1958. 16 The Executive
Council on June 12, 1959, issued the following Decision:
Exchange control regulations shall be common to all
Member States of the Community. Treaties concerning
payments shall include all such States.
The Decision provides further:
all public and private resources in foreign currencies shall
be put at the disposal of the Community. They shall be
assigned to each State by the department in charge of the
13
Decree 59-1440 of Dec. zx, 1959. This decree replaces title VIII of the Decree of
July 15, 1947, [July zo, 1947] J.O.
"See Cour d'Appel, Toulouse, July x, 1957, [1957] J.C.P. II. xozo6.
""Because local offices have been created. The "Caisse Centrale de Cooperation
:Economique," formerly known as the "Caisse Centrale de Ia France d'Outre-Mer," is
their central office.
16
See Order 58-1254 of that date.
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economy and finance of the Community, with a view to
an appropriate satisfaction of the needs of each. Such department issues the appropriate regulations. Import and
export programs shall be determined by each State which
shall also issue the appropriate authorizations.
The Executive Council of the French Community decided on the
same date that the franc was the common monetary unit of all
members of the Community, it being understood that each may have
a separate currency with a parity base in relation to the French
franc. This parity may only be modified by a decision of the President of the Executive Council. Currencies of the members of the
French Community are freely convertible among themselves, and
funds are freely transferable.
The franc area thus includes the territory of the French Republic-that is Metropolitan France-the Overseas Departments
such as Guiana and the Departments of Algeria, and all Member
States of the French Community. But it also covers a larger area,
which includes countries which either use the franc as a monetary unit
or currencies of their own (Morocco, Tunisia, 17 Guinea, Cambodia,
Laos, and Viet N am). The parity base is not the same for all
"francs." For example, the C.F.A. francs which are used by African
Member States of the Community are worth two Metropolitan
Francs.
A complete study of the problems raised by the definition of the
franc area (contained in a regulation 18 ) would go far beyond the
scope of this work. All rules mentioned in this chapter normally
apply to the whole franc area. There are occasionally minor differences, which however, it will not be possible to explain. As used
in this chapter the term designating all the world outside the franc
area is "abroad," franc means the French franc, and France means
the territory of the French Republic and Monaco. 19

F.

THE DEFINITION OF "RESIDENCE"

Exchange control regulations attach little importance to nationality, except in regard to compulsory declaration and requisition of
assets abroad. Instead they are concerned with the usual place of
17
Countries like Tunisia and Morocco are developing exchange control regulations
of their own, but they-and this is even true of Guinea-continue to be parts of the
franc area. In sum the situation is in transition. See Regulation (hereinafter cited
as Reg.) 497, [May 17, 1951] ].0.; Reg. 579, [Oct. 31, 1954] ].0.; Reg. 673, [May 21,
1959] ].0.; Reg. 678, [July 5, 1959] ].0.
18
Reg. 644, [Feb. 22, 1958] ].0.
19
Decree of July 15, 1947, art. 73, [July 20, 1947] ].0.
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residence (residence habituelle)' since an individual's residence
is considered a more realistic indication of the location of his main
interests and of the likelihood that he will withdraw income or the
proceeds of assets situated elsewhere. Normally, payments between
residents do not involve an international transfer of funds, whereas
a payment between a resident and a non-resident sooner or later
will.
A resident is a person who habitually resides in the franc area;
a non-resident is a person who habitually resides abroad. But there
is no definition of residence in the exchange control laws and regulations. The Exchange Control Office stubbornly refuses to give such
a definition. Where French nationals are concerned, the Office virtually never considers a change of residence subsequent to September I, 1939 as bona fide.
French non-residents who establish a residence in France must
declare their foreign assets within six months after doing so. Recently, in giving instructions concerning the purchase and sale of
real estate in France by non-residents 20 the Exchange Control Office decided that a four-year effective residence or non-residence
could be considered, but it took great pains to explain that this was
not a general definition of residence. It has even gone so far as to
create a special franc account, the "Interior Non-residents Account,"
which must be used by French citizens who have a temporary residence abroad 21 and by foreigners who have a "temporary"
residence in France. Since the words "resident" and "habitual residence" are used by the law itself, only courts can finally decide, in
each case, who is or is not a resident under exchange control regulations. For all practical purposes, however, residence coincides
with the location of one's main center of activity, provided that his
physical presence there is in the aggregate of sufficient duration.
Strangely there has been no litigation on the question, parties preferring, because of the uncertainty, to settle disputes. 22 Establishments of foreign companies or corporations in France are also
considered to be residents, whereas the foreign establishments of
French companies or corporations are deemed to be non-residents.
This treatment of establishments, like the notion of "residence"
20

See Part V, Section B, infra.
Since this chapter was written, Reg. 700 of Jan. 23, 1960 has authorized French
citizens who have resided four years abroad to open "foreign accounts" in France
with the authorization of the Bank of France. Four years' residence abroad thus appears as the decisive criterion of non-residence-at least for the purpose of Reg. 700,
[Jan. 23, 1960] J.O.
· ,
""See Part VI, infra.
21
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itself, is familiar to specialists in tax law, and they know its difficulties. It means in practice that for financial purposes, as for tax
purposes, such an establishment must be considered autonomous,
with separate assets and books, as if it were a separate legal entity
-indeed, as if it were a subsidiary. 23

G.

THE MEANING OF SoME FREQUENTLY UsED
EXPRESSIONS

a

1. French assets abroad ( avoir franr;ais
l' etranger) mean
all kinds of property, real or personal, all goods, all rights of a
pecuniary nature which are located abroad and owned by a resident
of French nationality or a French branch of a foreign corporation or
company.
2. The corresponding expression is "foreign assets in France"
( avoir etranger en France).
3· Currency assets ( avoir en devises) mean foreign currencies
and short-term negotiable instruments which represent foreign cur~
rencies. 24

II. INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS
By "international payments" is meant monetary payments which
involve a transfer of funds across the frontiers of the franc area,
but they may also include payments by a private debtor who is
deemed to be a "resident" of the franc area to a non-resident private creditor or vice versa.
Since international transactions nearly always involve international payments, knowledge of the proper channels and procedures
for making such payments under exchange control regulations is
vitally important. Only the most general rules will be considered in
this section. More specific rules will be examined in the sections
concerning international trade, French investments abroad and
foreign investments in France. Special rules resulting from the
23

For the use of the words "residents," "non-residents," "habitual residence," see
Decree of Sept. 9, I939 1 [Sept. IO, I939] J.O. concerning assets abroad, art. I; Order
of Oct. 7, I9441 [Oct. 9, I944] J.O., art. 3; Order of Jan. IS, I94S (foreign investments), art. 2; and Order of Jan. I6, I94S (assets abroad), arts. 7, 9, IO (art. IO concerning the transfer of residence), [Jan. I9, I94S] J.O.; Order of Nov. 2, I94S. [Nov. 3,
I94S] J.O. art. I; Decree of Feb. I3 1 I946, [Feb. I4, I946] J.O.; Decree of June 4,
I946, [June s, I946] J.O.; and Decree of July 26, I946, [July 28, I946] J.O. art. I
(all three on requisitions); Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I947 (codification) arts. 24, 28,
32, 48, s2, 59; Ministerial Order of July IS, I947 1 art. I, 3° and 4•, [July 20, I947] J.O.
"'Other or more complete definitions appear in the following sections of the text.
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existence of bilateral monetary or payments treaties or international clearing agreements are not included.
The franc area could be thought of as a monetarily closed unit.
Payments to and from it must be made through appropriate channels, closely supervised by the Exchange Control Office. It not only
supervises payments but authorizes them (when they are made
from the franc area to a creditor abroad). It also authorizes resi~
dents to buy the necessary foreign currencies.

A. BAsic RuLEs
The basic rules are set forth in the following hierarchy of texts :
The Decree of September 9, I 939, 25 prohibits or regulates the exportation of capital and all transactions involving the exchange of
money and gold, but the definition of capital exportation is left to
decrees.
Article 27 of the Decree of July IS, I947, now in force 26 specifies
that "All payments addressed abroad are subject to the authorization of the Exchange Control Office." Article 2 of the same Decree
also prohibits all physical exportation or importation of money,
gold, negotiable instruments, or titles of debt, except as authorized.
Thus, transfers of funds to and from the franc area are controlled
in their entirety. To make such control still more effective, Article
I 5 requires all foreign currencies or "instruments which represent
foreign currencies" to be deposited with an Authorized Intermediary. Article 30 provides, however, that whenever transfers of funds
are allowed (which they automatically are in the case of payments
to be received from abroad, while payments to be made abroad
must be specifically authorized), such transfers must be made
through an Authorized Intermediary.
The Ministerial Decision dated July IS, I947, which specifies
the scope of application of this Decree, provides for certain exemptions, for example, in regard to travellers and tourists. It also
regulates such matters as the opening of accounts to non-residents,
the functions of Authorized Intermediaries, and the like, which are
discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
These basic rules expressly refer to transfers of funds (or of
legal instruments which, for this purpose, are treated as funds) to
and from (mainly from) the franc area. They also concern payments in foreign currencies within the franc area which are directly
""Modified by a Law of Apr. 15, 194z, [Apr. 16, 194z] J.O.
26
Decree 47-1337, [July zo, 1947] J.O.
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prohibited 27 or prohibited by virtue of other provisions, such as
the obligation to deposit foreign currencies.
But no mention is made of payments in francs, within the franc
area, between a resident and a non-resident. And indeed, such payment should not be considered as a contemporaneous exportation
(or importation) of funds, although a payment in francs made to a
non-resident may necessarily involve a future exportation of funds.
A regulation of July I I, I9S4, 28 was the first to provide that payments in francs between residents and non-residents (tourists excepted) should be made through the Authorized Intermediaries,
thus identifying such payment with the exportation or importation
of funds.
The validity of this provision is questionable. Whether it is still
in force is still more questionable in the light of a new regulation, 29
which applies to transfers of funds between the franc area and foreign countries. The new regulation does not say that any specific
part of the earlier one is abrogated, but it provides that parts of
the earlier one 30 (which concern payments "between residents and
non-residents") shall be replaced by more favorable provisions in
the new regulation. 31 The earlier regulation remains in force, however. The substituted provisions do not refer to payments between
residents and non-residents, but only to transfers of funds to and
from the franc area. Accordingly it can be concluded that payments
in francs within the franc area, between residents and non-residents,
are free of regulation. But considering that penalties are very heavy
in case of infringement of the exchange control regulations and
since it is easy to obtain the {perhaps) necessary authorization, payments between residents and non-residents without authorization
would be ill-advised.
Non-resident tourists are authorized to bring into France any
amount of any kind of currency, including francs. They may not
use foreign currencies directly for payment, but must first sell their
currencies through an Authorized Intermediary, except when goods
are delivered outside customs limits ( hors douane). In such cases
the rate of exchange is also more favorable because of tax differences. They may freely use the proceeds of such sale, or imported
francs, for their own personal needs. They may sell foreign cur27

Decree 47-1337, art. 59·
Reg. 574, (July 11, 1954] ].0.
29
Reg. 682, (July 26, 1959] ].0.
30
Title I, chapter 1, paragraphs I and II of Reg. 57431 Title I, chapter I of Reg. 682.
28
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rency of one kind against foreign currency of another kind, provided
they operate through an Authorized Intermediary. They may physically re-export such currencies, but it is safer for them to obtain the
necessary documents in order to be able to prove that they are exporting currencies actually brought in by them.
Recent regulations make it possible for residents to import freely
any amount of any type of currency and to keep it. But since they
can neither re-export foreign currencies nor use them for payments,
the sole possible use is for sale through Authorized Intermediaries. 32
As far as transfers of funds are concerned, the rules in force may
be summarized as follows: Except for tourists and the importation
of currencies, all payments which involve a transfer of funds, or
legal instruments which represent funds, must be authorized and
made through designated channels, that is, through Authorized Intermediaries. Authorization is, however, not necessary for payments
received from abroad. Any resident to whom a payment is made is
obliged to repatriate it, through appropriate channels, within one
month, and to sell the foreign currency to the Exchange Stabilization
Fund.
There is one other important rule. Payments made to and from
a foreign account in francs are considered as a transfer of funds
from or to the franc area, but general authorizations are provided
for, which greatly facilitate such payments. 33
The corollary to these rules is the prohibition of compensation between payments to be made to and from the franc area. 34 "Private"
or unauthorized compensation is a major offense.

B.

THE CuRRENCY MARKET

Because residents do not have the necessary foreign currencies to
pay their foreign debts, because they must sell their foreign currencies to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, and because nonresidents who invest in France must normally sell foreign currencies
and buy francs in order to invest in France, it has been necessary to
create an official currency exchange which is supervised by the Bank
of France. But an increase in demand and in offers resulting from
the increase in the volume of private international trade has made
32

For details see Reg. 697, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O.
Foreign accounts and general authorizations are explained more fully in the following discussion.
34
E.g., a resident of France collects money due in France to an American and the
American in turn collects money due the resident of France in the United States. The
two collections compensate for each other in an amount equal to the lower of the two.
33
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possible the creation of a "Free Currency Market" to which, however, only Authorized Intermediaries have access. Under the relevant regulation 35 the Free Currency Market is now the sole
currency market in France.
This market is closely supervised for a number of reasons. The
first is to maintain rates of exchange between the franc and other
currencies at a level which is fairly close to official rates. Since the
market is "free," its rates are determined by buy and sell offers, and,
whenever necessary, offers to buy or sell are made by the Bank of
France for the account of the Exchange Stabilization Fund itsel£. 36
This system presupposes that the Bank has the necessary monetary
reserves in the currencies quoted on the market. If its reserves are
exhausted, a devaluation may eventually become necessary.
Another purpose of the close supervision of the Free Currency
Market is to keep a check on the legality of sales and purchases in
order to make certain that the appropriate authorizations have been
issued, and that funds are used in accordance with such authorizations. Unused foreign currencies must in due course be resold on
the Market, and when they are, the profits, if any, must be refunded
to the Exchange Stabilization Fund. No one is allowed to buy foreign currencies merely for speculative purposes. However, Authorized Intemediaries may set off their gains against their losses, and
profits are only refunded when they are in excess of a certain percentage ( 2% at the present time).
Sales and purchases on the Free Currency Market may be made
for cash or on account, according to the authorizations granted.
The number of foreign currencies quoted on the Market is, however, restricted.
They are presently divided into two main categories: (I) Foreign
currencies from the so-called "convertibility zone" and ( 2) those of
countries with which France has reached a bilateral payments agreement. The first group includes U.S. and Canadian dollars, the pound
sterling, the Swiss and Belgian francs, the Deutsche Mark, the Portuguese escudo, the Mexican peso, the Italian lira, the Austrian Schilling, the Dutch florin and the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian
crowns. Recent regulations (of July 26, 1959) have put all of
these currencies in a single category, which means that authorizations to buy such currencies are equally available and that conversion
from one to the other is easy.
The so-called "bilateral group" includes only Czechoslovakia and
36
88

Reg. 657, [June 21, 1958] J.O., as modified by Reg. 665, [Dec. 28, 1958] J.O.
For details see Reg. 697, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O.
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Yugoslavia. Payments between France on the one hand and Chile,
Ecuador, or Uruguay on the other, are made in U.S. dollars.

C. FOREIGN AccOUNTS IN FRANCS
Payments abroad do not always involve a purchase of foreign
currencies on the market and their transfer to a creditor's account
outside the franc area. They may also be made to a franc account of
the creditor held in France by an Authorized Intermediary.
The basic rules governing this transaction are set forth in a
Ministerial Decision 37 concerning the application of Decree 4738 The present reach of the rules is defined by a recent reguI 337.
lation.39
The matter has been considerably simplified by these rules. Four
types of "foreign" accounts (accounts of a non-resident), still exist,
but only one type is common, the "Foreign Account in Francs." The
three others are: "the Foreign Account in Foreign Currency," which
an Authorized Intermediary may hold for a non-resident, under special authorization of the Exchange Control Office; the "Temporary
Account" held for non-residents to which payments in francs may
always be made; 40 and the "Interior Non-Resident Account"
( I.N.R.) created to meet the special situation of foreigners who
have a temporary residence in France or French citizens who have
a temporary residence abroad.
The normal foreign account in francs is now called either "foreign
account in convertible francs" or "foreign account in bilateral
francs" (hereinafter "convertible account" and "bilateral account").
A basic rule must be kept in mind concerning such accounts: a payment made from such an account to a resident or by a resident to
such an account is an international payment as defined under exchange control regulations. Accordingly, the same kind of general
or special authorizations must be obtained for such payments as
for international payments.
Three situations must be considered in regard to each type of
foreign account: the opening of the account, transactions resulting
in a credit to the account, and transactions resulting in a debiting of
the account.
87
Arts. 19-30, Ministerial Decision (hereinafter cited as Min. Dec.) of July 15,
1947, concerning the application of Decree 47-1337.
88
See note 10, supra.
•• Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] J.O.

•• Such accounts are said to be blocked because they may only be used in cases of
emergency when an international payment is not authorized. A special authorization
of the Exchange Control Office is necessary to withdraw money from such accounts.
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I. CONVERTIBLE ACCOUNTS

a. The opening of an account by an Authorized Intermediary for a non-resident who has his residence in the "convertible
zone" is permittedY A special authorization must be obtained, however, if the account is opened by a non-resident French citizen or by
residents of certain countries which have special payment agreements with France.
b. Such an account may be freely credited with the proceeds
of sales of foreign currencies of the "convertible zone" on the Free
Currency Market, or by debiting another convertible account.
c. Such an account may be freely debited: to pay for the purchase of currencies of the "convertible zone" where currencies obtained on the Free Currency Market are used, or to credit another
convertible account, or to make a payment in the franc area.
Convertible accounts are, then, free from governmental intervention in the sense that deposits are readily convertible and withdrawn. These accounts serve as a kind of anteroom to the franc
area and general authorizations 42 indicate how far the door of this
anteroom is open into it.
Another important feature of these accounts is that they have no
nationality. Such an account may be opened in the name of anyone,
provided he is a foreigner residing in the convertible zone, and
provided he does not belong to a country which has special exchange
regulations preventing him from doing so.
Overdrafts on such accounts must be specially authorized by the
Exchange Control Office. 43 Such authorization is freely given whenever the overdraft is connected with exports. Conversion between
currencies of the convertible zone is free, and it is also possible to
buy Czech or Yugoslavian currencies with assets in these accounts.
2. BILATERAL ACCOUNTS

a. Accounts of this type may be opened freely in the name
of non-residents residing in one of the countries of the so-called
"Bilateral Group": Albania, the East Zone of Germany, Bulgaria,
Chile, Ecuador, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Rumania,
Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R., Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. Special rules
apply for Chile, Ecuador, and Uruguay, payments being made to
and from these countries in U.S. dollars.
n By the general authorization given in Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] }.0.
'"Reg. 700, [Jan. 23, r96o] }.0. See the section concerning foreign investments in
France, infra.
'"Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] }.0.
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b. Bilateral accounts may be freely credited: with the proceeds of sale on the Free Currency Market of any currency of the
convertible zone, or of the currency of the country where the owner
of the account has his residence, or by debiting an account of the same
nationality.
c. Bilateral accounts may be freely debited in order to buy on
the Free Currency Market the currency of the country in which the
owner of the account has his residence or to credit an account of the
same nationality, or to make a payment in the franc area, provided
the true debtor is a resident of the country in which the owner of
the account has his residence and the true creditor is a resident in the
franc area.
The difference between the two types of accounts, convertible on
the one hand, and bilateral on the other hand, and the reasons
therefor are obvious. 44 ,

III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The above-described rules are applied to international payments
involved in international trade, and the necessary authorization to
make such payments is linked with the authorization to import or
to export goods, both of which are generally prohibited.

A.

ORIGINS OF THE PROHIBITION

A basic Decree of November I I, I 944, prohibits both the exportation and importation of goods.
This prohibition was made necessary by the state of war then
prevailing. It has since been used to control the economy of France.
During the post-war recovery period authorizations to import goods
were reserved for basic raw materials, equipment and supplies such
as coal, oil products, heavy equipment and certain food products.
Imports were to be made in accordance with the Plan for Reconstruction, popularly known as the "Monnet Plan," and the hierarchy
of needs established by that Plan. Even now there is a priority for
imports which are in keeping with the present five-year plan.
There has been a tendency, moreover, to use that control as a
means of protecting national industry, although there is also a counter movement towards free international trade. The Organization
for European Economic Cooperation ( O.E.E.C.) has worked un"It is also obvious that all countries of the world are not mentioned in the above
rules (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Egypt). Special rules apply to
those countries as a result of special payments agreements with France.
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ceasingly to get its members to accept a progressive liberalization
of trade among themselves. 45 The Coal-Steel Treaty and the Treaty
establishing the European Common Market have made, and will
make, important contributions to the liberalization of trade 46 and
international payments.

B.

THE ROME TREATY AND THE TREND TOWARDS
LIBERALIZATION

Under the Treaty trade among the Member States is to be completely freed during the transitional period. Each year, basic quotas
must be increased, and restrictions on exports are prohibited.47
Other obstacles to trade among Member States such as customs
duties, currency restrictions and the like must also be removed and
a uniform tariff is to be applied to trade with non-member states.
Article 67 of the Treaty provides that members of the Community
must gradually remove restrictions concerning transfers of funds
among residents of the Community, to the extent necessary for the
proper functioning of the Common Market, and that, during the
first four-year stage, current payments among Member States must
be entirely freed. In case of disturbance of the financial market of
one of the Member States or in case of financial difficulties, emergency measures may be authorized, however. 48
These rules have been given effect in all Community countries
and liberalization in France in fact goes beyond the requirements
of the Treaty and has accrued to the benefit of non-European as well
as Community countries. 49 Indeed, liberalization has now reached
the point where quotas constitute the exception rather than the rule.
Exports, upon which there are no restrictions, have increased
steadily. Two devaluations have boosted them by reducing French
prices in relation to world prices, and will probably permit increased
imports without damage to France's balance of payments. These
rules relate, nonetheless, to a transitional period, and they therefore
provide for emergency measures and do not require that all currency controls be supressed. They require only that all necessary
authorizations shall be granted.
In sum liberalization of currency control has made the regulations more flexible and made available more liberal allowances of
•• See Chapter III supra.
•• Ibid.
7
' Chapter III, Part II, supra.
•• Treaty art. 73· See Section VII, infra.
•• See Chapter III supra.
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foreign currencies to those applying for authorizations. But exchange control laws and regulations remain for a number of reasons.
International trade is considerably freer, but it is not yet wholly
free. Supervision and control of international transactions helps
to keep a check on them. It also provides a check rein, if necessary,
on the economic development of the country, and helps to acquire
the statistical data which forms the basis of the five-year economic
plans. 50 Last, but not least, it gives the government a means of effective and immediate action in case of emergency. The system of
exchange control laws and regulations in France makes it easy to
make the necessary changes. Regulations can be promptly modified,
and departmental instructions, pursuant to a change of administrative policy, may introduce virtual freedom by making the granting of authorizations almost automatic.
Such flexibility is considered necessary, but it also makes-and
probably unavoidably-import and export transactions somewhat
complex.

C.

IMPORTATION

1. As a rule, an authorization ("license") must be obtained
from the Exchange Control Office and detailed rules are set forth in
the relevant regulation 51 for doing so. Special forms must be filed.
Then the competent department, usually the Department of Commerce and Industry, passes on the application. The granting or refusal of an import license is discretionary, but if discretion is abused,
or if the principle of equality among applicants is violated, appeal
to the administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat is possible. 52
The import license is a non-transferable administrative document. Its validity is limited to a maximum of six months, which
means that the goods must have been shipped to France before the
six months have elapsed. The license must be checked by customs
authorities at the time the goods enter French territory.
When a license is granted, it automatically gives the beneficiary
the right to buy, through an Authorized Intermediary, the amount
of foreign currency corresponding to the price mentioned on the
50
These plans are not state imposed, but are, rather, detailed forecasts which guide
the action of the competent departments and nationalized enterprises.
51
Reg. 483, [Jan. 4, 1951] J.O., modified by Reg. 685, [July 26, 1959] J.O.
52
C.E. Mar. z8, 1952, [1952] J.C.P. II. 7132; C.E. May 16, 1951, [1951] Rec. Leb.
z68 and C.E. Feb. 20, 1956, [1956] Rec. Leb. 513; C.E. Feb. II, 1955, [1955] Rec. Leb.
82. When imports have been freed by a regulation, as is now usual, the granting of
a license is no longer discretionary but automatic.
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license. There are strict rules, however, to avoid an illegitimate use
of the foreign currency thus acquired.
The purchase of foreign currency may be made for cash or on
account. But it can only be made on account until a credit on documents has been obtained. If the license is not utilized in due time,
the foreign currency must be resold and the profit, if any, resulting
from differences in the rate of exchange, credited to the Exchange
Stabilization Fund. When goods have been shipped directly to
France (or, in certain cases, through Antwerp, Amsterdam, or
Rotterdam), payment becomes effective by transfer of the funds
to the account of the sender of the goods. This rule has no exceptions. Alternatively a transfer of francs to an account in France
of the sender is possible. The amount of money so transferred must
never exceed the C.I.F. price of the goods.
2. In certain cases, the maximum six-months' validity of import licenses is inadequate-for example, when the goods to be imported consist of heavy machinery the manufacture of which cannot be completed within six months' time. In such cases, moreover,
the foreign manufacturer often requires a payment by installments,
beginning before the goods are delivered or even shipped.
A special procedure has been adopted for such cases, that of
"Prior Authorizations." They are granted only when the importer
can support his application by producing a written agreement between himself and his seller. The authorization makes possible the
purchase of foreign currency, on account, within six months prior
to the time the installment to be paid is due. The grant and use of
such authorizations are very closely supervised.
3· When imports of certain goods have been freed, the same
procedure must still be followed, but another regulation 53 declares
that the necessary licenses for such goods are to be automatically
issued. Whether "Prior Authorizations" are also to be automatically issued is not quite clear, but experience indicates that they are
easily and promptly obtainable.
Goods bought for cash with a value inferior to 350,000 francs 54
or those which are paid for on an E.F.A.C. account 55 are handled
more rapidly. In such cases it is sufficient to produce the invoice at
the Customs Office and at the offices of an Authorized Intermediary
53
Reg. 68o, [July 21, 1959] ].0. See also Reg. 698, [Jan. 23, 1960] ].0. in regard
to procedures concerning "import certificates."
04
This amount has been raised to 5,ooo new francs (equivalent to soo,ooo old francs)
by Reg. 696, [Jan. 23, 1960] ].0. unless otherwise stated, "francs'' means "old francs."
One "new franc" equals 100 "old francs."
"" See text at note 64, infra.
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in order to import and pay for such goods. A similar procedure is
applicable in importing spare parts which have a value less than
so,ooo francs.
4· Another special procedure applies to goods not subject to
quotas. This is the case for goods which are temporarily imported
into France and are to be re-exported with or without modification,
for those which technically are not considered as imported goods
(for example goods in transit), and for certain privileged goods
(furniture in case of a change of domicile, goods with diplomatic
status, small postage parcels, and the like). The same procedure
also applies to goods which have been freed pursuant to rules of
the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and to coal
and steel products subject to the Coal-Steel Treaty. In such cases an
import certificate is automatically granted by the Exchange Controls Office. A certificate is a much simpler document than a license.
Like licenses, certificates authorize the entry of goods into France
and the purchase of the necessary amount of foreign currencies. The
rules applicable to such purchases are very similar to those already
described above, 56 with minor modifications-for example, the certificate is valid for three months only.
5. One apparently simple case of importation is specially
treated by the Exchange Control Office-importation without payment. A special authorization is required since imports of this kind
are not considered normal. They may involve illegitimate payments,
made out of assets which have not been declared, or unlawful private compensation. When imports are linked to exports, the transactions are submitted to special scrutiny, to make sure that both are
legal. Sometimes the Exchange Control Office grants import licenses
with the proviso that the raw materials or parts so imported shall
be re-exported within a specified time in the form of manufactured
products. When equipment or finished products are imported in
connection with foreign investment in France, payment authorization becomes part of the authorization to investY
6. The above procedures apply to goods which may be physically imported, but intangible goods may also be imported. The
most important example is that of industrial property rightspatents, trademarks, technical data, and such services as are linked
with the communication of know-how. 58 In such cases, only the payment of the price, royalties, or fees must be authorized. But the
56

See section C, subsection
See Part V, infra.
•• See Chapter V infra.

57

I,

supra. See also Reg. 698 of Jan. 23, 1960.
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usual practice, greatly favored by the Exchange Control Office, is
to submit a written contract for approval. The approval given to
such a contract, which is very closely examined by the competent
authorities, means that when application is made for authorization
to make payment it will be granted upon a showing that the payment is in conformity with the approved contract. There is no known
instance of the refusal of such an authorization. Considering the
wording of such approvals, it is questionable, however, whether
they commit the Exchange Control Office legally.
Special rules also apply to insurance premiums, 59 transportation
costs, and the like. For example, residents are not allowed to export from France more than 25,000 francs at one time nor more
than the equivalent of so,ooo francs 59a in foreign currency per year
for purposes of travel.

D.

ExPORTATION

The only reason why exports still require licenses or some kind
of similar authorization is that the Exchange Control Office wants
to make certain that the total counter value of exported goods is
repatriated into France, and that the foreign currencies thus obtained are introduced into the exchange market and put at the disposal of the Exchange Stabilization Fund. Moreover, exports are
normally made against payment in the currency of the buyer. When
that currency is "convertible," whether it or another currency is
in fact used is not very important. But in certain cases, and due to
special international agreements, the buyer must pay in United
States dollars, although he does not reside in the dollar zone. Special supervision is also exercised over exports made to countries
of the bilateral group, and to countries whose currency is weak, in
order, as far as possible, to balance exports to, against imports from,
such countries.
For this reason, the exporter must as a rule commit himself to
repatriate the price of the exported goods and such repatriation
must be made through an Authorized Intermediary within a month
from the date payment is received. The normal duration of the export license is three months, and payment must usually be obtained
within six months after the delivery of the goods to the purchaser.
Special authorizations may be obtained for consignments abroad, 60
•• Instruction No. 823, [Nov. 2, 1959] J.O.; Reg. 692, [Dec. 19, 1959] ].0.
•••This amount has now been raised to r,5oo new francs (r5o,ooo old francs).
00
Reg. 686, [July 26, 1959] J.O.
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and special procedures have also been devised for exports which
require a longer lapse of time before payment. As is true of imports, moreover, simplified procedures have been established for
certain exports of small value.
The French Government makes every effort to promote exports.
For example, applicable industrial and commercial credit restrictions are not applied to export activities. 61 Moreover, credit insurance and export insurance can be obtained from special organizations controlled and financed by the government 62 and depreciation rates are accelerated when applied to equipment for the
manufacture of products for export. (One of the most important
incentives for exporting is the fact that exported products are not
subject to the turnover tax, the tax on added value, the nite of which
is zo%.) 63
Exchange control regulations also grant a special right to exporters: they may retain, in a special account called an E.F.A.C.
Account, 64 a percentage of the foreign currencies earned by their
exports. The percentage is 12% in the case of exports to the United
States. The foreign currencies obtained by an exporter can be used
to pay, without going through a complex procedure, the commissions of agents abroad (which otherwise could only be paid on
special authorization), business travel expenses, and advertising.
They may be used, upon special but easily obtainable authorization,
to purchase equipment for the enterprise of the exporter, and they
can be converted into other currencies. But the currencies of
E.F.A.C. Accounts cannot be transferred to a third party and such
accounts are kept, under strict rules, by an Authorized Intermediary.
Every three months the exporter must sell on the exchange market
at least 10% of the unused balance of his E.F.A.C. Account.
The legal theory of E.F.A.C. Accounts, as well as that of accounts in which an importer or exporter holds foreign currencies for
certain purposes, has yet to be articulated. 65 He certainly is the
61
The National Credit Council ("Counseil National du Credit") fixes credit termsduration, interest and maximum amounts-which banks grant to private enterprises,
and it has facilitated export credits, e.g. by the Decision of Feb. 5, 1959 fixing the
Bank of France interest rate for export transactions at 3% instead of 4.25% and
permitting longer term bills of exchange.
•• French Insurance Company for Foreign Commerce ("Compagnie Fran~aise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur" or "Coface") created by Decree of June 17,
1946. See also Law of July 21, 1950.
63
Min. Dec. of Dept. of Finance of Oct. 25, 1957.
64
Export and Accessory Expenses Account ("Exportation-Frais Accessoires
Compte").
65
See Cour de Pontoise, Oct. 22, 1957, [1957] G.P. II. 389.
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owner of the assets, but an owner who must use them for designated
purposes. His right of ownership does not have the same content
as in private law. It is restricted by state controls, and is exercised as
if it were a social function; fortunately the restrictions are only
temporary in the sense that the proceeds, in francs, may be freely
disposed of.
IV. FRENCH INVESTMENTS ABROAD

"French investments" are investments which are or have been
made by physical persons of French nationality who habitually reside in the franc area, or by companies, and other such entities, on
behalf of their establishments located in the franc area.

A.

EvoLUTION SINCE WoRLD WAR

II

The general policy of the various laws and regulations applica
ble 66 is quite simple:
All assets abroad owned by French residents must be declared to
the Exchange Control Office. 67
Certain assets which are physically in France such as foreign
currencies, letters of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, and stock
insured abroad are considered as "assets abroad."
Whenever possible or, in other words, whenever the assets consist in negotiable instruments, such assets must be deposited with an
Authorized Intermediary in France or in an establishment abroad
of an Authorized Intermediary.
All income having its source abroad, including proceeds of exports, must be repatriated and the corresponding foreign currency
sold to the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This rule applies to all
residents, French or non-French.
Assets abroad may be subject to requisition against due payment.
Acquisition and transfer of assets abroad are subject to prior
authorization. Transfer and all other transactions must be made
through an Authorized Intermediary. However, current transactions for purposes of exploitation and maintenance are authorized.
When exchange control regulations were first introduced in
France, their purpose was merely to prevent the flight of .French
66

A policy which has been summarized in Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I9471 (July
I947] J.O.
61
Decree 47-I337 of July IS, I947· But important exceptions to this rule have been
created by Reg. 702, [Jan. 23, I96o] J.O.
20,
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capital, but at the end of World War II a different problem arose.
At that time-the French economy was ruined-stores and factories were either physically destroyed or obsolete; there was a considerable shortage of foreign currency; the level of exports was at
the lowest point it had been for a long time whereas imports in substantial quantities were sorely needed. Accordingly, the government
wanted to be able to use French assets abroad to aid recovery.
Requisition was considered both necessary and legitimate, the more
legitimate since those who had invested abroad had suffered less
from the consequences of the war. As time went on, requisition no
longer appeared necessary, but the French economy still fluctuates
seriously as the number of devaluations indicates. It is therefore
still imperative to prevent substantial flights of capital, and the
continued existence of a permanent canvass of French investments
and assets abroad is thought necessary to help to keep track of
transfers abroad from France. It also aids supervision by the tax
authorities, and, since French payments to other countries have
only in the last few months been fully balanced by export trade
receipts, such a canvass is still necessary to make effective the obligation to repatriate the income of French investments abroad. But
exchange control authorities are quite aware of the necessity to
develop French enterprises and investments abroad to further national prosperity and security. Thus general prohibitions have been
maintained in principle, but exceptions have become more and more
frequent.

B.

THE PRESENT SITUATION

The result of the above-described evolution is that reqms1t10n
of assets abroad has since 1950 been practically eliminated. It has
never been applied to residents other than those of French nationality, and its practical scope has always been limited to cash (of
the so-called "hard" currencies) or such assets as could be easily
transformed into cash. Residents have never been obliged to sell
real property nor to dismantle their enterprises abroad. N onetheless, compensation for requisitions was at the official rate of exchange, at a time when that rate was much lower than the rate of
exchange prevailing outside France and, for that reason, requisition
was deeply resented.
The three effectuating 68 decrees were those relating to the requisition of foreign currencies in cash, 69 the requisition of assets in
.. Under Law 45-0140 of Dec. 26, 1945, [Dec. 27, 1945] J.O.
•• Decree 46-177 of Feb. 13, 1946, [Feb. 14, 1946] J.O.
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gold kept abroad, 70 and the requisition of certain foreign stock and
bonds. 71 These have not been abolished, but their application depends on regulations of the Exchange Control Office. 72 Ownership
and transfer of gold inside France is unregulated; but gold cannot
be freely acquired or transferred abroad; nor transferred abroad, or
from abroad, from or to the franc area.
The obligation to repatriate income-which as a matter of practice is an obligation only of residents of French nationality, although
theoretically all residents are subject to it-is less resented now than
it was for the simple reason that the free rate of exchange has ceased
to be higher than the official rate.
The obligation to declare assets abroad, which does not apply
to non-French residents of France, 73 is still in effect. Such assets
must be declared within six months of their acquisition (in some
cases they can be acquired without authorization) or within six
months of the establishment of residence in France, for French persons who resided outside the franc area prior thereto.
Despite very heavy penalties, which may include five years imprisonment, confiscation of assets and a fine many times their value,
the enforcement of the obligation to declare assets abroad has been
very difficult. Declaration has been looked upon as the first step to
present or at least future requisition, and French owners of such
assets have therefore been reluctant to declare them. Very often
the result of such legislation has been to prevent them from being
repatriated.
From time to time therefore Finance Ministers have taken a
realistic view of the situation, and a law has been adopted granting
amnesty to non-declared assets in order to encourage their repatriation. Such is the case of the "permanent" amnesty resulting from a
1948 law. 74 Under this law as modified assets which are illegally
abroad-that is, those which were not declared in due time or which
were acquired without due authorization-can be repatriated without other consequences than a 2 5% fine, which it is in most cases
advantageous to pay because the fine also covers all taxes, including heavy inheritance taxes, which were due. A special procedure
70

Decree 46-1293 of June 4, 1946, [June 5, 1946] J.O.
Decree 46-1698 of July 26, 1946, [July 28, 1946] J.O .
.,.Reg. 440, [Jan. 25, 1950] J.O.; Reg. 451, [Mar. 21, 1950] J.O.; Reg. 471 and
Reg. 472, [Sept. 21, 1950] J.O. have stopped requisitions except for gold.
13
Order 45-86 of Jan. z6, 1945; Order 45-87 of Jan. 17, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O.
See also Reg. 702 of Jan. 23, 1960.
"'Law 48-178 of Feb. 2, 1948, [Feb. 3, 1948] J.O., modified by Law of July 5, 1949,
art. 25.
11
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has been devised to permit anonymous repatriation. A new order 75
has extended in two ways the benefit of the amnesty: (I) it applies
to assets which were not declared prior to June 24, I 9 58, and ( 2)
the 25% fine is eliminated. Repatriation must, however, be made
through appropriate channels to enjoy the benefits of the amnesty.

C.

A NEw FLEXIBLE PoLICY CoNCERNING AssETS
ABROAD

Some flexibility has been introduced into the regulations applying
to the management of assets abroad:
Foreign currencies can be freely introduced into France by residents (introduction by non-residents is a fortiori free) and they do
not have to be deposited. 76
Foreign stocks and bonds quoted on the Paris Stock Exchange
(they are more and more numerous) can be freely acquired, but
the negotiable instruments themselves are not physically delivered
to the buyer.
Authorizations for the purpose of subscribing for increases in capital stock are more and more freely granted, through general or
special authorizations, to shareholders of foreign companies, although the shares must be deposited. Whenever such stock is quoted
on a foreign stock exchange, it is easy to sell it, provided the sale is
made under the supervision of an Authorized Intermediary and
provided the proceeds are either invested in similarly quoted stock
or repatriated.
Real property abroad may be freely sold to a non-resident or even
to a non-French resident, provided there is a deed of sale, provided
the sale is made for cash in convertible currency or in currency of the
country where the property is located, and provided the proceeds are
duly repatriated. 77 Income from real property may, without authorization, be used to meet expenses or taxes, insurance premiums and
repair costs of real estate (but not improvement and management
costs).
These rules make clear that exchange controls are at present
slight. All purchases, sales, encumbrances, payments and gifts are
normally subject to authorization. In case of death the appropriate
76

Order No. 58-544 of June 24, 1958, [June 25, 1958] J.O. See also Reg. 506, [Sept.
1951] J.O.
76
Reg. 652, [Mar. 22, 1958] J.O.; Reg. 699, [Jan. 23, 1960] J.O. specifies the conditions under which it may be introduced and makes explicit that this freedom is not
a right but at the sufferance of the government. When money introduced represents
income, it must be sold on the Free Currency Market.
77
Reg. 584, [Feb. 19, 1955] J.O. See also Reg. 701 of Jan. 23, 1960.
2,
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inheritance laws are applied and legacies are unregulated. The
drafters of the exchange control laws and regulations have indicated
embarrassment in connection with transfers by inheritance of assets
abroad. Authorization is required of "any act the aim of which is
to dispose of" or modify the substance of assets abroad or to reduce
"the rights in such assets." 78 Application of the appropriate law of
inheritance does not, accordingly, result in the application of exchange regulations. But the creation of a legacy is an "act," and although there is no known example of difficulty in such cases, there is
no doubt that difficult problems could be raised by certain dispositions of the will of a resident-for example, certain types of trusts
which would prevent normal repatriation of income by resident
beneficiaries. The Ministerial Decision of July I 5, 194 7, authorizes
"the taking over of assets abroad acquired by inheritance." This is
a clear acknowledgement that, at least in so far as the acquisition of
assets by inheritance is concerned, exchange control regulations do
not affect substantive rights.
But a deed of partition of an estate among heirs must be submitted to the Exchange Control Office if resident heirs, under the applicable law, must agree to accept a reduction or merely a modification of their rights.
The above rules permit strict control of new investments abroad.
As a matter of practice new investment consists in the opening of a
branch, the creation of an independent or subsidiary company or the
increase of funds invested in such branch or subsidiary. In such cases
special authorization must be obtained, and to obtain it, sufficient
evidence of the commercial interest of the new enterprise or of its
enlargement must be supplied. Normally the Exchange Control
Office gives the authorization on the condition that a report shall
be made each year on the development of the project, including a
balance sheet and an income statement, and that normal dividends
shall be repatriated and distributed.
When all provisions of the Rome Treaty have been given full
effect, it is to be expected that all restrictions to French investments
in the states of the Community will disappear, but, prior thereto,
only "progressive steps" towards liberalization are to be anticipated.79
'"Decree 47-1337, art. 58, [July
"' See Section II, supra.
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Under the French Civil Code, as applied by a long line of decisions, foreigners may freely acquire assets of any kind in France,
as well as any private rights that are recognized by French law, and
they may exercise any trade or profession, except where expressly
prohibited by statute. Such prohibitions are rare in the commercial
trades and exceptions to these are often permitted. Special rules do
apply, however, to such occupations as banking, mining, the manufacture of pharmaceutical products, and the publishing of magazines or newspapers. No law requires that the president or the general manager or the majority of the directors of a company be
French, except in a very few cases such as companies which operate
public utilities or companies which enjoy long-term licenses for the
importation of crude oil and oil products, and practically no law
requires a majority or even a minority of shareholders of a company organized in France to be French. A foreigner who wants personally to exercise a trade in France, or who wants to become chief
executive (president, or manager, or head of a branch) of a company which does business in France, must obtain a "commercial
permit," from police authorities. He must also obtain a "labor
permit" if he wants to work in France as an employee. But commercial and labor permits are normally granted and abusive refusals
are scarce.
Under exchange control laws and regulations, however, non-residents, whether foreign or of French nationality, cannot always
freely acquire assets in France. This section deals with the problem
of acquiring assets in France, with investments, and also with the
management rights of inventors under exchange control regulations.

A.

BAsic RULES

81

An order 82 attempts to give a definition of the "foreign assets
in France" to which it applies. According to it, those words mean
all movable or immovable, all tangible or intangible assets which
are "located in France, including negotiable instruments," and also
"all rights which can be exercised in France," provided the owner
80

"Foreign investments" here means investments in France by non-residents.
The basic rules are set forth in Order 45-85 of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945]
J.O. concerning "foreign assets in France," Decree 47-1337 of July 15, 1947, arts. 48-51
and Min. Dec. of July 15, 1947, arts. 19-36. The main Regulation presently applicable
to foreign investments in France is Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959] J.O.
82
Order 45-85 of Jan. 15, 1945, [Jan. 19, 1945] J.O.
81
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of such assets or rights is a non-resident. 83 Difficult questions may
arise in connection with the location of intangible assets. They (for
example, bearer shares of stock) are located in France when they
are physically there, or when they (for example, the rights of a
partner in a partnership) are rights to an asset located in France.
The trend of exchange control regulations as far as stocks, bonds
and debentures are concerned is to take into account those which are
issued in France and payable in francs.
One order 84 went so far as to authorize the Minister of Finance
not only to regulate the acquisition and transfer of such assets 85
but also to impose compulsory declaration of assets in France held
by non-residents and even to regulate the acquisition and transfers
of assets held by companies organized in France, whenever nonresidents participated in the management of such companies. 86 But
the decrees and ministerial orders which put these provisions into
effect have been abolished. 87
In I 94 7 88 authorization of the acquisition or assignment of the
following kinds of assets was made compulsory:
a) Real property: land, buildings and rights in land and buildings considered in France as "immovables." Leases were not included.
b) Assets of a going concern: this phrase normally includes commercial premises (fully owned or under commercial lease), commercial name, installation, tools or equipment, goods, trade-marks and
the like, each single element being considered as a means of building
the assets of a going concern.
c) Stocks, bonds or debentures, issued by a French company or
issued by a company organized abroad when such shares or stock
are physically located in France. Subscription is, naturally, considered as an acquisition. These regulations also require the opening
of accounts for non-residents to be authorized.
When the requirements for opening a convertible or bilateral account 89 or for paying francs into such accounts are not met, a "temporary" account may be opened, but such an account is blocked, and
special authorization is necessary to withdraw money from it. The
sole use which may be made of such funds is the purchase of stock
/d., art. z .
.. Order 45-Ss of Jan. 15, I94S·
85
!d., art. 3·
86
/d., art. 487 Decree of July IS, 1947, art. 70, 3°, [July
88
/d., art. 51 and Min. Dec. of July IS, 1947.
89
See Section II, supra.
83

20,

1947] ].0.

EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE

219

on the Paris Stock Exchange, provided the stock purchased is itself placed in a temporary blocked account. Transfers from a
blocked account to another blocked account of the same nationality
is possible.
Since it has become possible 90 for non-residents in all cases to
open convertible accounts to which the proceeds of the sale of convertible currency on the French currency market is credited, and
since such accounts may be used to make any kind of payment in
France, 91 a non-resident may freely acquire in France all assets
other than those mentioned in the above list, provided, of course,
that the assets so acquired are not exported from France. Furthermore, non-residents may acquire assets in France by operation of
law: for example, by virtue of laws of inheritance, or tort law.
The freedom to acquire is linked with the freedom to assign the
asset, thus assignment of the assets listed above must be authorized.
Normal exploitation and acquisition of the income of an asset
are unregulated, but problems arise in regard to the utilization of
such income in France and its withdrawal from France and in regard
to utilization and withdrawal of the proceeds of the sale or assignment of legitimately acquired assets.
Withdrawal is subject to authorization. Credits to Foreign Accounts of Francs which have a source other than the sale of foreign
currencies or another foreign account are not permitted.92 It is not
certain that even if income or the payment for an asset sold is in
francs that these may be used without authorization for other payments in France. If one considers that the provisions of Regulation 574 93 are still in force, such a payment must be made to an
account of the non-resident, and an authorization is therefore required. The alternative would be to pay the funds into a temporary
blocked account. But if those provisions have been abrogated, then
a payment may be made in cash and such cash may be used freely
(except for transactions of the kind listed above) .
General authorizations have become more and more frequent,
and even where authorization is still necessary-and this is true in
regard to withdrawal from France of income or the proceeds of the
liquidation of an investment-it is easily obtained. The basic rules
remain, then, but recent regulations and instructions have increasingly reduced their effect.
90

Reg. 683, [July 26, 1959] J.O.
Similar rules apply to "bilateral accounts."
Reg. 683, supra note 90.
93
Title I, chapter I, paragraphs I and II. See text at note 29, supra.
91
92
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Among the liberalizing rules are those which encourage investment in France. 94 An examination of the status of the principal kinds
of foreign investments in France under presently applicable rules
is at this point necessary.
B. REAL PROPERTY

Real property in France may be acquired freely by a non-resident
provided the acquisition is paid for in cash from a convertible account or from a bilateral account (in the latter case the account
must be of the same nationality as that of the residence of the
buyer) and provided the acquisition is made through a notary. Notaries in France have a special status which makes them officers of
the state in certain respects. If the property is acquired from another non-resident, the necessary amount of foreign currency of the
buyer must be transferred in France through appropriate channels
to pay transfer taxes and other legitimate costs of the deed of sale.
Real property legitimately owned by a non-resident may be sold
to a resident for francs, and such francs may be credited to a Foreign
Account of the vendor (if the vendor resides in the convertible
zone, a convertible account must be opened; if in the bilateral zone,
a bilateral account of the same nationality as that of the residence of
the vendor). The sale must be made through a notary. In short,
"disinvestment" may be freely effectuated. 95
Leases are unregulated, whether the non-resident is the lessor or
the tenant, but transfer of commercial leases may be considered a
transfer of assets of a going concern.

C.

STocK, BoNDs, AND DEBENTURES QuoTED
ON THE PARIS STOCK EXCHANGE OR ON
THE PARIS BROKERs' ExcHANGE

96

Provided it is paid for from a Foreign Account (even a blocked
temporary account) and through an Authorized Intermediary, the
stock, bonds, or debentures issued by a French company may be
freely bought. The corresponding certificates are placed in a convertible account or a bilateral account, or a blocked account, ac•• Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959] J.O.
""/d.; Instruction to Notaries, Jan. 21, 1959.
•• "Paris Brokers' Exchange" is a free rendering of "Marche des Courtiers en
Valeurs." "Paris Stock Exchange" renders "Marche Ofliciel." Brokers on the "Marche
Ofliciel" are called "Agents de Changes" and their status dates back to 1810 (but is
now principally regulated by the Decree of Oct. 7, 1890). Both "Agents" and "Courtiers" are brokers but the "Agents" have special privileges and more restricted duties,
although both are under supervision of the same committee, the "Comite des Bourses."
The reasons for the difference in status of the two is mainly historical.
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cording to the origin of the funds. All dividends are automatically
paid into the same kind of foreign account as the one in which
certificates are kept, as are proceeds of sales made through appropriate channels. An authorization is necessary when such assets are
not sold through official channels. Subscription to the increase of
capital of French companies is equally free when the shares are
quoted on the Stock Exchange or the Brokers' Exchange and when
subscription is made through appropriate channels. Non-residents
are authorized to buy French stock on the Stock Exchange or
Brokers' Exchange, not only for cash but also on margin. 97 If stock
is bought on margin, the usual guaranty must be deposited and may
be composed of funds originating from a Foreign Account or stock
on the Exchange which is itself in a Foreign Account. 98 As the result of a general authorization, 99 various convertible currencies
amounting in value to hundreds of millions of dollars were invested
on the Paris Stock Exchange in a recent six months' period.
Non-residents are authorized to withdraw from France legitimately acquired stock, debentures, and bonds issued there in franc
denominations. In case of withdrawal, dividends are freely transferred through an Authorized Intermediary. Physical transfer of
certificates and coupons must always be made through banks and
Authorized lntermediaries. 100 Owners must keep in mind that any
assignment of the stock, bonds, and debentures which they have thus
taken out of France must be authorized.

D.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN COMPANIES
ORGANIZED IN FRANCE

Stock of or interests in French companies may also be purchased
directly and increases of their capital subscribed to. By "interests" is
meant the rights of members of partnerships ( socihes en nom collectif, sociites en commandite) or in limited liability companies
( sociites
responsabilite limitee). Such interests may not be issued in the form of certificates or negotiable instruments and, of
course, cannot be quoted on exchanges. Shares of stock, on the other
hand, are issued by stock companies ( socihes anonymes) in bearer
or registered form, are negotiable instruments and may or may not
be quoted on the exchanges.
While purchases on the Stock Exchange normally involve portfolio investments only, the purchase of interests in companies or

a

"Marche a terme."
Reg. 669, [Jan. 21, 1959]; Instructions 773 of Jan. 21, 1959 and 785 of Feb. 25, 1959.
99
Ibid.
100
Instructions 772 and 773 of Jan. :n, 1959.
97

98
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non-quoted shares generally represent decisions to participate ac"
tively in business ventures. Such investments, which create new
enterprises or enlarge existing ones, are very much encouraged by
France, since they increase employment and contribute generally to
the country's prosperity. They are especially encouraged outside
the Parisian industrial zone, and when the enterprises to be created
are to be located in areas where employment opportunities are
scarce. Tax reductions, extensive credit, and even subsidies may
often be obtained in such cases. Large foreign companies are thus
motivated to make France their base of operations within the European Common Market.
These investments are subject to the authorization of the Exchange Control Office. This authorization is required by law for
the purchase of or subscription to shares not quoted on the Stock
Exchange or Brokers' Exchange. Control in this area is in fact
exercised by the competent technical ministries, through an Investment Committee, however. Application for authorization involves a description of the venture, special emphasis being given
to the .amount of the contemplated investment, its technical contribution (for example, know-how, industrial experience) to
France, the need for French-manufactured equipment and supplies,
the location of the plant, the expected size of the labor force, the
expected sales volumes and the contribution which the venture will
make to the reduction of imports and the increase of exports. Such
ventures often involve not only an application to buy or subscribe
to shares, but also to import heavy or highly technical equipment.
The applicant must also give information on the expected means
of financing, and particularly on the amount of bank or other credit
which may be needed, and whether the investment is to be made under a guaranty of the United States International Cooperation Administration. It must also be indicated whether the investment is
purely foreign or involves French capital-which may help in
achieving acceptance but is not a necessity. The application submitted does not, except in extreme cases, constitute a commitment,
but the future attitude of French authorities towards the new enterprise will naturally be affected by the bona fides with which the project submitted to them is carried out.
When authorization is obtained, the interests or stock may be
acquired, and the rules already described for their acquisition then
apply. Newly-acquired stock may be transferred abroad, or deposited in a bank in France, or held by the company itself. Divi-
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dends and other proceeds are transferable and convertible provided
the owner of the stock is a resident in the convertible zone. If the
stock is not deposited with an Authorized Intermediary, a certificate of residence must be produced for transfers, which must always
be effected through an Authorized Intermediary. Transfer of stock
dividends remains subject to authorization-which is easily obtainable if the relationship of stock to dividends is reasonable.
Assignment of such interests and stock is also subject to authorization of the Exchange Control Office, as is the withdrawal of the
proceeds in case of "disinvestment." The requirement of authorization is retained to make certain that transactions resulting in withdrawal are legitimate. 101
E. OPENING OF A BRANCH IN FRANCE

The opening of a branch does not, of itself, require authorization
since no new company is organized. In fact, however, authorization
may be necessary-for example, because the assets of a going concern are acquired.
The transfer of profits is subject to authorization, but the initial
authorization normally provides that further authorization shall
be automatic. The sale of a branch is also subject to authorization
since it involves the sale of the assets of a going concern.
F. LOANS

Loans in francs up to roo,ooo,ooo francs need not be authorized
if made from convertible accounts, 102 if for a term of not more than
five years and if the interest rate is not higher than the lower of:
s%, and d-f times the rate of interest applied by the Banque de
France for loans against securities.
Mortgages may be obtained through a notary. Interest and principal payments are transferable and convertible through the original
convertible account out of which the loan was made. Assignments
of loans are subject to authorization, and authorization is also necessary for loans which do not meet the above requirements.

G.

EFFECT OF THE E.E.C. TREATY

The above rules apply to non-residents in general. When nonresidents are resident~ of a Community country, the provisions of
101
But Reg. 419, which applied to dollar investments and has been superseded by
Reg. 669 of Jan. 21, 1959, was more precise as to the purely technical character of the
supervision to be exercised at the time of "disinvestment."
102
See Part II, supra.
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the Rome Treaty apply. Under Article 52 "restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be progressively abolished in
the course of the transition period." Article 58 provides that companies organized in accordance with the law of "a Member State
and having their registered office, central management or main
establishment within the Community" enjoy the benefit of, inter alia,
Article 52. Progressive elimination of restrictions includes the elimination of all restrictions to the creation of agencies, branches, or
subsidiaries.
Since these provisions require no immediate action on the part of
the Member States, special rules have not yet been established for
investments in France of nationals of the other five Member States.
A problem might arise, however, if, contrary to the prohibition
against new restrictions to establishment (Article 53) or to a program established by the Council (pursuant to Article 54) authorizations were refused, since, under the French Constitution, the Treaty,
and, therefore action of the Council pursuant thereto, supersedes
regulations and even laws. 103 In any case Regulation 669 104 may be
considered a step in the direction of the progressive abolition of
restrictions to establishment envisaged by the Treaty.
VI. SANCTIONS

Penalties for infringement of exchange control laws and regulations may be heavy, but the Ministry of Finance has the right to
settle for a conventional fine, so that court decisions concerning
penalties are not frequent. Infringement may also affect the validity
of a contract or prevent or invalidate its performance. Here again
court decisions are rare-obviously because parties do not like to
become involved in court cases which may have penal consequences.

A.

PENAL SANCTIONS

Two texts are here relevant. One, 105 of very general effect, concerns the prevention of infringements of exchange control regulations. The other one 106 applies only to infringements of regulations
applicable to French assets abroad.
108

French Constitution (hereinafter cited as Fr. Const.) 1958 art. 55· See text, infra
at note 123.
10
' See note 8r supra.
105
Order 45-1088 of May 30, 1945, [May 31, 1945] J.O.
106
Decree of Sept. 9, 1939, [Sept. ro, 1939] J.O. art. 4, as modified by Law of Apr.
IS, 1942.
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Penalties consist in fines of a minimum of I so francs and of a
maximum of 3oo,ooo,ooo francs and imprisonment of from one
month to five years (or up to ten years for repeating offenders).
The court must, moreover, confiscate the corpus delicti or, upon request of customs officials, it may impose fines of an amount equal
to the value of the corpus delicti.
Fines are somewhat smaller in cases involving French assets
abroad 107 and in such cases the criminal court is not bound to confiscate the corpus delicti. Attempted violations, when so characterized by a court, may be prosecuted and accomplices may also be
charged. 108
The general principles of the French Penal Code apply to these
sanctions, but derogations from the Code make them more stringent. A complete review of the derogations is beyond the scope of
this work. Nonetheless it can be generally stated that the sanctions
of economic laws and regulations are severe, and that the defendant
has less protection against a rigorous application of the rules than
he does in regard to other offenses. The reason is widely accepted.
Violations of economic rules and regulations do not seem, prima
facie, as unethical as other offenses, and it requires a very strong
deterrent to frighten people into abstaining from actions which
formerly were considered legitimate, and which are so directly to
their advantage.
One of the most striking features of the penal provisions of this
legislation is that proof of an intention to commit the forbidden
action (dolus penalis) is not a necessary element of a conviction.
Naturally an insane person or anyone deprived of will may not be
considered responsible; but for all others these laws are applied in
the same way as traffic regulations-violations are, so to speak, automatically punished. Needless to add, the old principle nemo censetur ignorare legem (no one is deemed to be ignorant of the law)
is strictly applied.
The other prominent feature of these statutes is that their enforcement is intended to be a weapon in the hands of the competent
government agencies. This explains most of their special provisions.
In the first place, infringement itself is not defined in a statute
enacted by the French Assembly, but by an administrative body. It
is provided that "Infringements of exchange control regulations
are punished as provided in the present order." 109 Thus, the normal
107

Cases in which the Decree of Sept. 9, 1939 is applicable.
'''Order 45-1008 arts. 20, 21, [May 31, 1945] J.O.
'"'Order 45-1088 art. 2.
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French principle Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (no crime,
no penalty, absent a law) is only in part respected. The "crime"
is defined in a regulation, and in consequence of its official publication 110 everyone is presumed to know all of the subleties of complex and changing rules.
Secondly, broad powers are granted to certain administrative
officials to discover and make an official record of infractions. These
are not only the normally competent police officers, but also the
customs officers and officials of the Ministry of Finance and Exchange Control Office. Such officials have power to investigate, obtain information from other governmental agencies (with respect
to suspected offenses) and to go through postage parcels addressed
abroad or sent from abroad. 111
Thirdly-and this is probably the best proof of the true aim of the
statutes in question-prosecution depends on the decision of the
Minister of Finance (or his representative) and the Ministry may
choose to settle for a conventional fine, even after a judicial sentence has been handed down, 112 unless the accused has been sentenced
to a term of imprisonment in which case the court's decision is final.
Settlements occur very often, not only because there are doubtful
cases, but also because the government agency itself considers that
its proper function is not to obtain heavy judicial penalties, but to
recover assets which would otherwise be lost to the French economy.
The policy of the exchange control administration is the same as
that of a bureau of taxation. This is why, in case of death of a defendant, the possibility for prosecution does not disappear: confiscation of assets in the estate of the deceased person may be possible.U 3
Moreover, companies are jointly liable for fines to which their officers have been sentenced, when the infraction was committed in
the interest of the company. 114 It is only in the more extreme cases
that judicial intervention is sought.

B.

CIVIL LAw CoNSEQUENCES

Contracts which violate certain prohibitions are void (under
French law). In other cases, for example where payment in a
foreign currency must be authorized, the law may make performance
impossible, although the contract may not be void.
110

In the Journal Officiel.
See Order 45-1088 arts. 3-7.
!d., arts. 8-xo.
113
/d., art. 11.
mId., art. 12.
111

112
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The first category includes provisions 115 which subject all assignments of real property rights, all acquisitions of goodwill, stock,
debentures and bonds issued in France or located in France, and all
subscriptions to such stock, debentures, or bonds to prior authorization when a non-resident is a party to the operation. It also probably includes the provisions, 116 under which all acquisitions and all
acts, of which the purpose is the assignment or substantial modification of assets abroad, are subject to authorization when a French
resident is a party to such act. Indeed, as a rule French courts will
hold void transactions in violation of law, at least when a penal
sanction is attached to the prohibition violated. 117 In one case, 118
for example, the court declared that a subscription to the shares of
a company made by a resident acting as a straw-man for a non-resident was void because the necessary authorization had not been obtained. Under French law such a result is not subject to question,
and, since the nullity is the result of a criminal offense, any interested
party may bring an action to have the transaction voided.
Such consequences are harsh, and it has been argued that, since
the nullity depends upon the lack of the necessary authorization of
the Exchange Control Office, and since prosecution depends upon a
decision of the Ministry of Finance, such a transaction should not
be voided until that office has definitely refused its authorization. No
court decision supports this theory, but it can, at least, be argued
that if the Exchange Control Office grants its authorization a posteriori, but before a final court decision has been reached concerning the validity of a contract, the contract could not be declared
void. Since the criminal offense has been purged, it can no longer be
said that the contract involves a breach of law.
The nature of the nullity is important. It does not result from an
incapacity to act, but from a violation of French public policy
(i.e., l' ordre public). For that reason unauthorized transactions by
French residents abroad should not be void, at least when, according to the relevant choice-of-law rules, such transactions are not
subject to French law. 119 Many regulations of the Exchange Control Office specify that transactions which are subject to the ex115 Decree 47-133 7, art. 51, [July 20, 1947] J.O.
u• I d., art. 58.
117
This rule has been applied in many instances of violation of the exchange control regulations. Cour de Ia Seine [Ch. Civ.] Mar. 14, 1949, [1949] J.C.P. II. 5038.
Court de Belfort [Ch. Civ.] Feb. 6, 1952, [1952] G.P. II, Table analytique 166.
us Commercial Court of the Seine, Jan. 3, 1951, [1952] J.C.P. II. 6846.
119
Unless they are subject to Article VIII, section 2 (b) of the Bretton Woods Agreement concerning the International Monetary Fund which provides for the unenforceability of exchange contracts prohibited by regulations of the signatory states.
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change control regulations of another state must also conform with
such regulations.
When exchange control regulations affect only the performance
of certain obligations, the consequences may be very difficult to
foresee. The most frequent and interesting case is the one concerning
the prohibition of unauthorized payments. If, for example, a license
contract, which provides for royalties to be paid by the French licensee to his foreign licensor, has not been submitted to the Exchange Control Office before it is executed, difficulties may be expected at the time an authorization for transfer of the first royalties
is applied for. If the contract is under French law, and if it does not
clearly provide that payment must be made in foreign currency,
the French debtor will have performed its obligations under French
law by a payment of the corresponding amount of royalties into a
"temporary" account, which is blocked. On the other hand, if it is
clear that payment must be made in foreign currency, non-performance may lead to a cancellation of the contract. Since, however, the
contract will have been in force for a period of time, royalties will
have accrued, or in certain circumstances damages will be payable.
A French court would certainly grant such damages, but they could
not be transferred without authorization.
Another dispute between the parties is possible. A non-resident
may argue that it was the resident's duty to apply for the necessary
authorization in due time. The resident may answer that the existence of exchange control regulations in France is well known, and it
was up to the non-resident to stipulate such terms and conditions as
he deemed necessary. There has been a great deal of theoretical discussion of this question, but each case requires its own solutions.
Precedents are, for example, of little help in regard to the most
frequent cause of litigation in this area-losses due to a sudden
change in the rate of exchange between the currency of the debtor
and that of the creditor. One case is, however, clear: if a loss is
suffered because of the negligence of the debtor, he must make such
loss good. 120
VII. PROBABLE EVOLUTION UNDER THE E.E.C.
TREATY
New exchange control regulations in France which have created
more freedom in international trade, payments, and investments
120
Court of Appeal of Colmar May 28, 1952, Revue Critique de Droit International
Prive 1952, p. 723.
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since the end of the year I 9 58, were not introduced solely to comply with the Rome Treaty. Their scope is, in fact, broader than that
of France's Treaty obligations-to which the regulations make no
reference.
Consideration of the effect of the Treaty on those regulations
is therefore indicated. Three points should be stressed: I) The
provisions of that Treaty are mandatory, and, at least to the extent
that they are self-executing, must now be considered part of French
exchange control laws; 2) The implementation of the Treaty is progressive; 3) The effect of the Treaty is to shift from national
authorities to Community authorities the bulk of the power to regulate international trade, payments, and investments, both among
Member States and, to a large extent, between the Community and
third countries.

A.

FRENCH LAw AND CoMMUNITY LAw

It is important to realize that the hierarchy of French texts applicable to exchange control 121 is now affected by the provisions of
the Treaty which have become a part of internal French law. It
is a clear principle of French constitutional law that when a Treaty
has been duly ratified, its provisions prevail over any contrary
provision of a prior or subsequent law. Accordingly the self-executing provisions of the Treaty are binding on French citizens and
must be applied by courts whenever appropriate. That principle was
expressly stated in the Constitution of 1946, Article 26: "Diplomatic treaties duly ratified and published have the same force as a
law even though they be contradictory of internal French law, and
no legislative act is necessary to their enforcement beyond that required for ratification." 122
The new I 9 58 Constitution is different but no less precise. Article
55 under the Title "Treaties and International Agreements" reads:
"Treaties or agreements duly ratified and published have, as soon
as they are published, an authority superior to laws, provided, for
each treaty and agreement, that it shall be so applied by the other
party thereto." 123
Accordingly, articles of the Treaty which concern foreign exchange control are part of French law and a person to whom the
benefit of these provisions accrues may have recourse to the competent court to vindicate his rights.
Ht

122
123

See text at note 7·
Fr. Const. 1946.
Fr. Const. 1958, art. 55·
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TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

During the transitional period powers of exchange regulation
are to be progressively shifted from the Member States to Community institutions. Since the purpose of the Treaty is to establish
an economic community, a single market common to the Six, it is
to be expected that the power over economic decisions, which determine the need and form of exchange control regulations, would
also be shifted to the Community. Indeed, the powers given to the
Community institutions to make economic policy are great, while
those which directly concern exchange control regulations, curiously
enough, appear weaker. Exchange control measures are plainly subordinate, however, to questions of economic policy.
A thoroughgoing study of the Treaty would accordingly be necessary to indicate the probable effect of the Treaty on exchange control regulations. Some examples of the Treaty provisions concerning international trade, investments, and transfers of funds will,
failing that, suggest the kinds of progressive changes which can be
expected to influence exchange control regulations.
Increases of quotas and reductions of tariffs pursuant to the
Treaty began on January I, I959, and bilateral quotas were merged
by each Member State vis-a-vis the five other Member States, into
global quotas which were increased by zo% ( 10% for each product). A similar increase must be effected at the beginning of each
succeeding year. 124 All quotas must disappear by the end of the
transitional period. State monopolies of a commercial character
must be organized in such a way that they do not constitute an
obstacle to progressive liberalization. 125 Services rendered across
national boundaries are also to be freed of restrictions/ 26 but since
modification of national laws may be necessary in certain cases (for
example, as to pharmacology) the Council will establish a program
to facilitate the exchange of services from country to country. 127
Tariffs and charges of similar effect were first subjected to a general reduction of 10%. At the beginning of the two I8-month periods subsequent to January I, I959, and one year after the beginning of the last of these periods a new 10% general reduction must
be made (of at least 5% as to each product, or I o% if the rate is
higher than 30%). The reduction on each product should reach
zs% at the end of the first stage and so% at the end of the second
12
'
125

Treaty arts. 31-33.
Treaty art. 37·
"
Treaty art. 59·
""Treaty arts. 6o-63.
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four-year stage (the timing of the reductions in the second stage
again to be I8 months, 36 months, and 4 years after its beginning).
In calculating those percentages duties which are not designed to
protect national industry (i.e., duties of a fiscal nature) may not be
taken into account. 128 Import duties are to be completely abolished
by the end of the transitional period.
Investments are similarly to be freed of restrictions. 129 Existing
restrictions may not, moreover, be made more restrictive after
January I, 1958. But the freedom of establishment, which is accorded powerful protection by the Treaty both in regard to physical
persons and to companies, may raise technical problems. For this
reason the Treaty provides, as it does as to services, that the Council shall, before the end of the first stage, lay down a program for
the progressive implementation of the freedom of establishment.
Since this program must be adopted by a unanimous decision of the
Council, the Treaty also provides for a way to establish a program
during the second period if unanimity has not been achieved prior
thereto. 130
It is clear, then, that at least as of the second stage, transfers of
funds among the Six will be facilitated.
Article 67 of the Treaty provides, moreover, that restrictions
on monetary transfers within the Community by residents of a Community country must progressively disappear, but the implementation of this provision is to be very cautious. Article 67 itself specifies
that restrictions must be abolished "to the extent necessary for the
proper functioning of the Common Market." What is asked from
Member States is not, at least during the transitional period, to
abolish restrictive regulation but to apply it in such a way that it
does not result in an obstacle to free trade and investment within
the Common Market: exchange authorizations are to be granted
"in the most liberal manner possible." 131 In the same way Article
67 provides that total freedom shall be granted current payments no
later than the end of the first stage-this rule to be implemented
pursuant to Article 106 according to which each Member State
pledges itself to authorize payments in the currency of the country
in which the creditor has his residence. Article 71 provides, moreover, that "Member States shall endeavor to avoid introducing
within the Community any new restrictions."
The caution here manifest is explained by the evident fear of
128

Treaty art. 17.
'"' Treaty art. 52.
0
'" Treaty art. 56.
181
Treaty art. 68.
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further monetary troubles. The Treaty contains many safeguard
clauses which may be invoked to deal with emergencies,m and
principally with balance-of-payments difficulties, which France insisted upon. 133
C.

PROBABLE EFFECT OF

A

TRANSFER OF POWERS

It is accordingly probable that present national exchange control laws and regulations will not be immediately abolished, at least
not by reason of the Treaty provisions. As has been indicated, the
effect on French exchange control regulations has been to make
them more flexible, but not to abolish basic laws. This could also be
said of the exchange control regulations of the other Member
States. Nevertheless, implementation of the Treaty will sooner or
later result in virtually complete freedom of international payments
and of the transfer of funds within the Community (absent emergencies, and the Community institutions are to decide, subject to
decision by the Community Court, whether emergencies exist) .134
A further result will also be achieved. In order to create a COTQmon market it is not only necessary to abolish internal obstacles, it
is also necessary to establish a common economic policy. Many steps
must be taken to this end pursuant to the Treaty. One of the most
striking is the progressive establishment of a common external
tariff. 135 An economic community, however, far exceeds the bounds
of a customs union. The Treaty therefore envisages decisions by
the Council concerning economic trends (the politique de conjoncture) 136 and negotiations by the Community (through its Commission) not only of customs but of commercial treaties with third
states. 137
A special body, the Economic and Social Committee, 138 has been
established to assist the Council and the Commission in their economic functions, and special means to implement Community
economic policy are provided for. Foremost among these aids are
the European Investment Bank 139 and certain funds. 140 Little by
little the Member States are either divested of their economic
132

Treaty arts. 26, 73, 93, 108, 109, 226.
See Protocol Concerning France annexed to t'· e Treaty.
See, e.g., Treaty arts. 73, 109 and 226.
"'"See Treaty arts. 18, 19 and 23.
136
Treaty arts. 103 ( 3).
131
Treaty art. II 3·
138
Treaty art. 193·
139
Treaty art. 129.
''"Treaty arts. 199 and 132(3).
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1
"'

EXCHANGE CONTROL REGULATIONS IN FRANCE

233

powers or must exercise them under the direction, or at least under
the supervision, of the Commission or of the Council. The second
yearly Report on the Activities of the Community by the Commission
lays special emphasis on this aspect of its functions and stresses the
important role of the Community in discussions with the O.E.E.C.
and with G.A.T.T.
Under these conditions, it will be difficult for any of the Member
States to maintain an independent set of exchange control rules and
regulations, even in regard to relations with third countries. For
example, the Treaty provides that after December 31, 1960, nationals of any one of the Six shall be accorded national treatment in
any of the other five Member States in regard to financial participation in companies of the latter.H 1 The words used to designate
"nationals" (in French, ressortissants) may apply as well to companies as to physical persons, 142 and if that construction is accepted
by the court, a company formed in France would be free to subscribe
to the capital of a company formed in Italy, even though the
"French" company's stock was wholly owned by U.S. investors. It
would accordingly be meaningless for Italy to apply to investors
from outside the Common Market prohibitions which would be
stricter than those of France and correspondingly it would be meaningless for France to maintain stricter rules of investment than
those of any of the other Six. The consequence of this logic has in
fact already made itself felt even if the regulations do not yet reflect it. It is accordingly probable that, during the transitional period
which ends in 1970 or at least no later than 1973, French exchange
control laws and regulations will either be profoundly modified or
abolished.
m Treaty art. 221.
Some doubt might be expressed as to the accuracy of the opinion expressed in
the text, given the usual translation of the word "ressortissants" as "nationals" and
given the wording of Article 58 of the Treaty, to which Article 221 expressly refers.
Article 58 states that "for the purpose of this chapter," which differs from that of
Article 221, companies which are described in the first paragraph of Article 58 are
assimilated to "natural persons being nationals of Member States" which seems a
contrario to exclude such assimilation in other chapters. But ( r) at least in French,
"ressortissants" does not denote physical persons only; (2) the very wording of Article
58 indicates that when physical persons are meant it must be specified that the "ressortissants" concerned are physical persons; and (3) there would be no point in preventing a French company formed by U.S. citizens from subscribing to the capital of
an Italian company, since practically the same results could, thanks to Article 58,
be reached by forming in Italy a branch of the "French" company.
142

Chapter V

Industrial Property
Stephen P. Ladas*
I. PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

A.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The establishment of the European Common Market has raised
many questions in the United States with respect to its effects on
patent, design, trademark, and other industrial property rights.
This is particularly so because the six members of the Common
Market Community are, with Great Britain, the foreign countries
in which ownership and exploitation of industrial property rights
by American firms and their foreign subsidiaries are most extensive.
Patents are sought in these countries not only with licensing or
the establishment of manufacturing facilities in mind, but also because manufacturers in Western Europe enjoy strong competitive
positions in world markets in part by means of foreign patents, and it
is therefore vitally important for Americans to seek patent protection in this source of exports. Similarly, the acquisition of trademark
rights through registration in the six countries prevents misappropriation and eliminates a source of dissemination of infringing
marks to the rest of the world.
The acquisition and maintenance of industrial property rights in
these six countries have assumed an even greater importance in the
period following World War II because of the very significant shift
in American business methods in this part of the world. Instead of
exporting goods manufactured in the United States, American enterprises are in increasing numbers licensing manufacturing subsidiaries or independent manufacturers located in Europe. It is a
*Member of the New York Bar; LL.D. Athens University; A.M. School of Political
Science, Paris, 1923; LL.B. Harvard, 1926, S.J.D., 1927; member of Langner, Parry,
Card & Langner, New York City; chairman, Commission for Protection of Industrial
Property, U.S. Council of International Chamber of Commerce; secretary of International Patent and Trademark Association; author of a number of publications on
industrial property law.
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matter of personal knowledge that licensing agreements in this
period have increased by more than IOoo% as compared with the
pre-war period.
The acquisition and maintenance of industrial property rights in
the Six present many difficulties. Some are caused by the fact that
each of the Six is an industrial country competing with other industrial countries. All are technologically advanced; their populations
are highly inventive; and each has large industrial concerns which
file many patent applications and use or register a large number of
trademarks.
Other difficulties stem from the fact that their laws and procedures are not uniform, so that the American inventor, designer or
trademark owner encounters different problems in each of the Six.
Further, their laws are based on economic and political philosophies
or applied in keeping with judicial traditions and administrative
procedures which differ from ours. For instance, a patent specification as filed in any of these countries may differ considerably from
one which would be acceptable in an American patent application.
The United States patent system permits independent product
claims not limited to the process of manufacture. In most of the
European countries such independent claims are not permitted. The
American system imposes neither penalties for failure to work
patents, nor annual taxes during the term of the patent in order to
maintain it. The Common Market countries impose both. A symbol,
device, or word which may be registered as a trademark in the U.S.
Patent Office may not be admitted to registration or validly registered in some Common Market countries and the laws governing
licensing and assignment of trademarks differ from American law.
What bearing will the creation of the Common Market have on
these and other problems? Will the European Community adopt uniform patent, design, or trademark laws or will it seek only "harmonization" of the laws of its individual members? If "harmonization" is attempted, how will the attempt be made? Will the Common Market countries adopt special arrangements for the benefit of
Community nationals, and will American nationals also enjoy the
benefits of such arrangements?
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to give some answers to
these questions.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

B.
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ROME TREATY PROVISIONS

The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community
seeks to abolish economic boundaries between Member Countries.
To this end, Article 3 foresees as one goal of the Community the
"approximation of national legislation to the extent necessary for
the functioning of the Common Market." The Treaty, in addition
to providing for the removal of barriers to the free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital in the Common Market countries, contains a number of specific provisions envisaging coordination of national legislation to facilitate free movement. The Treaty
does not provide specifically for harmonization or unification of
industrial property law. Any development of this kind will only be
effected by action of the institutions pursuant to the general provisions of Articles 100 and 235·
Article 100 provides that the Council of the Community, voting
unanimously on a proposal of the Commission,
shall issue directives for the approximation of such legislative and administrative provisions of the Member
States as have a direct incidence on the establishment or
functioning of the Common Market.
In addition Article 235 provides:

If any action by the Community appears necessary to
achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one
of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty
has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the
Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been
consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions.
Action by the Council in the field of industrial property may indeed be necessary if the disparities among the laws of the Six create
substantial obstacles to the proper functioning of the Common
Market, or if the harmful effect of such laws on the free movement
of goods in the Common Market is to be reduced to a minimum. It
would seem illogical to abolish national economic boundaries by
means of the Treaty and yet permit the barriers created by private
industrial property rights to continue to exist.
Pending such action by the Council, the only important limitation
to which industrial property legislation is subjected by the Treaty
(with the possible exception of that imposed by Articles 8 5 ff.
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which are discussed later in this chapter) is that imposed by the last
sentence of Article 36. The drafters intended that otherwise the
regulation and protection of industrial property should be left to the
Member States, as Article 36 makes clear.
Following provisions prohibiting quantitative restrictions on the
importation or exportation of goods (Articles 30-34), Article 36
provides:
The provisions of Articles 30-34 inclusive shall not be
an obstacle to prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit which are justified on
grounds of public morality, public order, public safety, the
protection of human or animal life or health, the preservation of plant life, the protection of national treasures of
artistic, historical or archeological value or the protection
of industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions
or restrictions shall not, however, constitute either a means
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States. (Italics added).
Article 36, it will be noted, is stated in negative terms. It does not
say that Member States retain under the Treaty full and virtually
unrestricted power to maintain and create legislation concerning
industrial property, but the effect is the same as if it so provided.
This is clear since the bulk of the Treaty's provisions is directed at
the removal of prohibitions and restrictions in respect of imports,
exports, and transit and Article 36 places such prohibitions andrestrictions, which are aimed at the protection of industrial or commercial property, beyond their reach. Ultimate definition of the
limitation on this legislative freedom imposed by the last sentence
of Article 36 is left to the Community Court by Article 177.
Article 36 is probably derived from, and corresponds to, Article
XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.).
Article XX provides that the Agreement shall not be construed to
prevent the adoption or application by the contracting countries of
measures necessary for the protection of public morals, of health,
and of life; or of laws or regulations relating to "the protection of
patents, trademarks and copyrights"; or of measures "proper to
prevent practices of a nature to induce to error."
Article 36 refers to "the protection of industrial and commercial
property." "Industrial property" is an expression which has an accepted meaning. "Commercial property" is not. Although the meaning of "prohibitions or restrictions . . . justified on grounds of
'1 property . . ." seems
.
. . . t he protectiOn
o f . . . commercra
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broader, this clause is probably a restatement of what Article XX
of G.A.T.T. expresses by the terms "measures proper to prevent
practices of a nature to induce to error"; that is, it is probably directed at protection against unfair competition.
Reference also must be made to Article 234 of the Treaty, the
first paragraph of which provides:
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

The rights and obligations resulting from conventions concluded prior to the entry into force of this Treaty between
one or more Member States, on the one hand, and one or
more third countries, on the other hand, shall not be affected by the provisions of this Treaty.
One of the Conventions to which this Article may be deemed to
refer is certainly the International Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property, commonly known as the Paris Union Convention, originally adopted in 18 83, and periodically revised in the
ensuing years. The revision which last went into effect prior to the
signing of the Rome Treaty was that of London in 1934. A more
recent revision of the Paris Union Convention was made at Lisbon
on October 3 r, 1958. Member States of the Common Market are
required, by virtue of the second paragraph of Article 234, to take
all necessary steps to remove any incompatibility between the Paris
Union Convention and the Treaty.
In view of this provision and also of the provision of Article roo
which contemplates action by the Council to harmonize those laws,
regulations and administrative rules of the Member States which
directly affect the operation of the Common Market, and therefore
to harmonize their industrial property laws, it is necessary to review
the systems of industrial and commercial property in the Six resulting from municipal legislation and regulation and from international
treaties. This review will not examine the systems of the Six in their
entirety but only those aspects which may involve prohibitions or
restrictions capable of frustrating the purposes of the Common
Market.

C.

PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
BASED ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES

National industrial property laws are territorial in character,
that is, the territorial scope of the rights they grant and the obligations they create is limited to the areas in which those laws obtain.
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The validity of a patent granted in Germany cannot extend beyond
Germany's boundaries. A trademark right acquired in France is
effective only in France.
The national law applicable in the territory of a state determines
the subject matter of protection, the formalities and conditions of
protection, the administrative procedure governing the acquisition
of various rights, the scope of protection, the means of enforcement,
and the duration of the right. All of these are determined by each
state in the light of its political structure, its legislative, judicial
and administrative traditions and policies, and its internal economy.
In the history of law industrial property legislation is comparatively recent. Generally such legislation was first introduced during the latter half of the last century 1 as new conditions of industrial and commercial life developed which demanded recognition
of new claims and the satisfaction of new interests. Because these
claims and interests were generally similar, it was possible for countries to model their industrial property laws on those of other
countries whose general laws and legal phraseology were akin to
their own. Certain type-groups of industrial property legislation are
therefore found throughout the world, the countries of each group
having enacted legislation based on common principles which produced similar administrative regulations.
But law consists not only of legislative texts or formal regulations. It includes administrative practice, techniques in handling
legal materials, and political and social ideas and ideals which nourish and give life to legal materials and their administration. This
makes industrial property laws, which are much alike in legislative
texts-for example, those of France and Belgium-quite different
in application.
By the beginning of the last quarter of the last century, it was
already clear that the strict territorial theory of industrial property
law and the disparities among legal regulations resulting from varying legislative and administrative practice were not in harmony with
the nature of industrial property which should not be restricted irrelevantly by national boundaries; that the great multiplication and
development of means of communication were creating a unified
world; and that no country could expect to satisfy the claims and
protect the interests of its own people in this sphere without securing for them protection on an international level.
This led to the adoption of the International Convention for the
1

Switzerland passed its first patent law in 1888 and the Netherlands, not until 1910.

INDUSTRil\L PROPERTY

241

Protection of Industrial Property at Paris in I883. The international regime of industrial property established by this Convention
has been periodically revised in the three-quarters of a century that
the Convention has been in existence, and it now constitutes an international charter which is of extraordinary importance in international trade and international investment.
This Convention has established two fundamental principles:
(I) the principle of national treatment according to which nationals of each contracting country enjoy in the other contracting
countries the same protection and the same rights which those countries accord to their own nationals; and
( 2) the principle that each country is required to extend specified special rights or advantages to the nationals of the other contracting countries, the object of which is to establish either certain
uniform standards or certain kinds of protection, both of which are
made necessary by the fact that the contracting countries have di ffering laws, and that adequate protection of industrial property
must transcend the boundaries of individual countries.
The most important special rights and advantages for which the
Paris Union Convention provides are:
(I) the right of priority under which a foreign applicant for
a patent, design or trademark may first file in one contracting country and claim the priority date of this first filing in another contracting country upon the filing of a second application there, provided his subsequent application is filed within a certain term (twelve
months for patents and six months for designs and trademarks, from
the date of the first filing) ;
( 2) the abolition of the forfeiture of a patent because of importation of articles made by the patentee in another country and
restriction of the sanctions for non-working of his invention in the
country in which he has obtained a patent;
(3) a period of grace for the payment of fees and annuities;
(4) the abolition of penalties for failure to work a design and
for importation of articles bearing the design;
( 5) the abolition of the requirement of prior home registration
as a condition of registration of a trademark in Member Countries;
( 6) the validation of trademarks registered abroad, subject to
certain exceptions;
( 7) the protection of the owner of a well-known trademark
against misappropriation even though the owner has no registration
in the foreign contracting country;
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( 8) the protection of trade names without the obligation of
registration;
( 9) protection against acts of unfair competition.2
This remarkable list of rights and advantages was designed to
establish a far-reaching uniformity of legislative treatment of industrial property rights throughout the 4 7 countries which are parties to the Convention. The provisions of the Convention are given
effect either on the theory that certain of them are self-executing
or by legislation or administrative regulation. A number of signatory countries have been lax in bringing their laws into conformity
with the Convention, but where implementing legislation was necessary, it has generally been enacted in each of the Six. Indeed, on
the whole and in the long run, the growth of national law and practice which conforms to the Convention has been marked.
Each of the Six has long been a party to the Paris Union Convention of I 883, and each has ratified the revised London Text of
I 934· All are therefore bound by it not only in their relations to
each other but also to the other 41 countries of the Paris Union
(including, therefore, the United States). The obligations created
by the Convention are therefore of great significance in considering
future industrial property developments in the Common Market.
Fulfilment of these obligations will not, however, resolve the
problem for the Common Market of economic barriers created by
industrial property rights. On the other hand a logical and complete
2
The following additional special rights and advantages are provided for in the
Convention:
(a) the independence of patents obtained in the various countries, so that refusal,
forfeiture or cancellation of the patent in one contracting country does not
affect patents obtained in other contracting countries;
(b) the elimination of refusals to a patent and of the invalidation of patents on
the ground that the sale of the patented product is subject to restrictions or
limitations resulting from the domestic law;
(c) the exemption from patent-mfringement rules of the use of a patented device
on board vessels or aircraft temporarily entering the territory of a country;
(d) the protection of process patents against the importation of products made
in another country on the basis of such process patents;
(e) the creation of an obligation of contracting countries to protect industrial
designs;
(f) the protection of armorial bearings, flags, state emblems, and official signs or
hall marks against appropriation as trademarks;
(g) the protection of service marks;
(h) the permission to assign foreign trademarks with the local goodwill only;
(i) the permission to license trademarks (although of very inadequate effect);
(j} the protection of the trademark owner against misappropriation of his mark
by a foreign representative or agent;
(k) the protection of association or collective marks;
(I) protection against false indications of origin.
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answer to this problem would be the adoption of single patent and
trademark laws, and a general unification of other industrial property laws throughout the Common Market. It is unlikely that the
Six will go so far in the foreseeable future. Industrial property law
is intimately connected with civil, procedural, commercial and criminal laws of the countries in question. It cannot be fully unified unless
large segments of those laws are also effectively unified.
The question, then, is how far the Six may be willing to go in
harmonizing their industrial property laws, and in considering this
question two fundamental observations should be kept in mind.
First, development in this field depends on choices among several
vital alternatives of policy. Is the European Community to seek
extensive or limited economic integration of the Member States,
and in either case is it: to pursue a policy of free trade or one directed at a controlled economy; to impose specialization of industry
or encourage competition; to seek an economy of large or of small
units? These general problems of policy will determine to a large
extent the answers to the questions posed.
Secondly, we must distinguish between unification or harmonization of the law of industrial property directed at simplifying the
obtaining, maintenance and enforcement of industrial property
rights-goals which are plainly desirable whether or not a Common Market exists-and that which is specifically necessary or desirable in order to increase freedom of movement of goods or to remove obstacles to such movement in the Common Market
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

II. PATENTS

A.

PATENT LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

A patent is a statutory monopoly granted to an inventor in exchange for the disclosure of his invention to the public in his application for a patent. Ownership of a patent for a particular product or
process in one country of the Common Market enables the patentee
to stop at the borders of that country the importation of the subject matter of the patent from any of the other five. Differences in
the patent laws of the Six are important from the point of view of
administrative procedure for the grant of patents, patentability of
inventions, subject-matter restrictions, annuities, working requirements and duration of patents.

244

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
I. ADMINISTRATION PROCEDURE

The administrative procedures prescribed by the laws of the Six
for grants of patents differ in important respects and the consequences of these differences are significant.
In two of the countries of the Common Market, Belgium and
Luxembourg, there is no examination of an application, except with
respect to formal matters. Administrative officials do not undertake
to examine whether the invention is adequate or whether the claims 3
are proper. The patent will be issued immediately, and determination of its validity is left to the courts. In France and Italy, examination is confined to subject matter, 4 form, and unity of invention. 5 In
France, subject matter is considered only in the case of pharmaceuticals, and in Italy only in the case of pharmaceuticals and foods and
beverages. Prior art 6 is not cited in any of these four countries. In
Germany and the Nether lands, on the other hand, examination is
extremely strict as regards form, unity of invention, subject matter,
and novelty; and domestic and foreign prior art may be cited. Oppositions may be filed after publication of acceptance
2. PATENTABLE INVENTIONS

Whether or not the patent office examines an application in detail prior to grant of the patent, the question of patentability of the
invention may be litigated after the grant in each of the Six. A basic
requirement in each country is novelty of the invention, but the definition of novelty varies.
The existence of an issued prior patent or any other printed publication anywhere covering the same subject matter is a bar to validity
in all six countries, except that in Belgium an importation patent
may be granted, although a corresponding foreign patent has been
issued, provided there has been no public use in Belgium prior to
3

"Claims" in a patent application define the monopoly granted to the patentee. They
tell the public the prohibited ground that the inventor claims for himself. If, for instance, the specification describes machinery in its entirety, and does not state which
parts the inventor claims as new, the patent will be void if any particular part turns
out to be old.
'"Subject matter" in a patent application means the field to which the invention
relates, for instance, a new process for the manufacture of food products or new foodstuffs or an invention in the chemical field or in the electronic field.
5
"Unity of invention" means that the application does not purport to claim separate
and distinct inventions. If more than one invention is covered, a separate application
must be filed for each.
• "Prior art" means the prior knowledge in the particular industry or technology.
Such knowledge may be embodied in scientific or technical publications, patent specifications, issued patents, etc
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filing there. In France, Italy, and the Netherlands, moreover, prior
publicity of the invention anywhere sufficient to enable it to be
worked is a bar. This is absolute in the sense that any publication,
whether printed or not, and any public use is fataP In Belgium and
Germany printed prior publication anywhere is a bar, while public
use of the invention in other countries is not. In Germany, moreover,
public use or any printed disclosure by the inventor during the six
months preceding the filing date is not a bar and printed publications
more than one hundred years old are not considered as affecting the
novelty of the invention claimed.
The standard of invention which will justify the issue of a patent
in the strict-examination countries, Germany and the Netherlands,
is of the highest. The patent office examiners in these countries must
be convinced not only of the novelty of the invention but also that
a requisite level of inventiveness is disclosed 8 and that the invention represents an advance in the art. The applicant is usually called
upon to establish a "new technical effect" and must prove that the
invention at the time of the application was not obvious to a person
skilled in the particular art.
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

3·

SUBJECT MATTER RESTRICTIONS

Restrictions relating to immoral inventions, financial schemes,
and the like aside, significant differences in the laws of the Six relate,
first of all, to the problem of process and product patents and, secondly, to exclusion of certain fields of invention from patent protection.
Belgium is the only one of the Six which grants patents for new
processes as well as new products, in the pharmaceutical field. On
the other hand in Italy no patents may be obtained either for products or for processes in the pharmaceutical field. In Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Germany inventions relating to chemical or
pharmaceutical products and foodstuffs can only be protected by
7
This is not true in the Netherlands. Its courts have held that a publication (or
public use) is only fatal with respect to novelty if a Dutch expert could discover it,
and the Patent Office takes the view that this may be prevented by factors of language or place of publication.
8
An invention necessarily involves an addition to the stock of knowledge, i.e., the
public must be told something which it did not know before. No invention is involved
in merely doing what has not been done before if it could have been achieved by a
skilled workman as a matter of shop routine. Mere application of ordinary knowledge or of obvious matter is not invention. There is no invention in the adaptation,
without ingenuity, of a well-known idea in a well-known manner for a well-known
purpose. There must be an exercise of inventive faculty and a display of thought,
skill and design in working it out. But the quantum of such exercise or display required is not the same in all countries.
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process claims. This was also true in France for pharmaceutical
compositions and remedies, but a recent law passed on February 4,
1959, authorizes special patents for pharmaceutical products. In
the Netherlands, products and compositions in bulk form, so-called
Stof, can only be protected by process patents.
But while independent claims for products, as distinct from processes, are not allowed, claims covering the manufacture of given
products are in effect permitted in Germany, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, in the sense that these products are an inherent part
of the process claims. If an infringer is sued on the ground that he
is using or selling a product made by the patented process, the burden
of proving that it was made by the protected process is usually on
the patentees if the product is old, but this burden is shifted to the
defendant if the product was new on the date of the process patent. 9
4· ANNUITIES

All six countries impose annual taxes on the patentee during the
life of the patent. In Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Italy, these
are payable annually from the filing date; in the Nether lands annually from the date of grant (which may be two or three years
after filing) ; and in Germany, annually beginning with the third
year after the filing date.

5.

WORKING REQUIREMENTS

In each of the Six the patentee has an obligation to work his invention. The sanction for failure to do so is a restriction of his exclusive right. This obligation and the sanction therefor are basically
affected by Article 5 of the Paris Union Convention. Article 5 provides that each country has the right to enact legislation providing
for the grant of compulsory licenses to prevent abuses-notably
failure to work-of the exclusive rights conferred by patents. Under
the text as revised at Lisbon, an application for a compulsory license
may not be made, on the ground of failure to work or insufficent
working, until four years have expired since the date of filing of
the patent application or three years since the date of the grant of
the patent, whichever period last expires. An application for a compulsory license is in any case refused if the patentee justifies his inaction. Revocation of a patent is not permitted except in cases where
9

Such date being the date of the filing of the application or priority date of the
process patent.
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the granting of compulsory licenses is not sufficient to prevent abuses
resulting from non-working. Even in such cases, however, a proceeding for revocation may not be instituted until two years have expired since the granting of the first compulsory license.
Although the domestic law has not been revised in Belgium and
Luxembourg in accordance with Article 5, the courts have held
that its provisions are self-executing and must therefore be given
effect. In France since 1953 and in the Netherlands since 1957 the
law has conformed to the London text of the Convention. The German law also reflects the provisions of the Convention. In Italy,
however, the law governing working requirements is not conformmg.
Italian law requires that a patent must be worked in Italy within
three years from the date of grant. Failure to work within such
term entails forfeiture of the patent. Patentees may void this result
only by exhibiting the patented invention at one of the official Italian
Fairs within the period fixed for working. The theory is that such
an exhibition is in effect a working of the patent for the duration of
the exhibition. Exhibition may be effective, however, only once.

6.

DVRATION OF PATENTS

In Belgium, France and Luxembourg patents are granted for a
term of twenty years from the filing date. Importation patents are
granted in Belgium for the remainder of the term of the corresponding foreign patent, if the term remaining does not exceed twenty
years. In the Netherlands the term is eighteen years from the date
of grant, and in Germany eighteen years from the day after the filing
date. In Italy the term is fifteen years from the filing date. Patents
of addition in all six countries are granted for the remainder of the
term of the parent patent.

B.

PossiBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR
HARMONIZATION OF PATENT LAws
IN THE CoMMON MARKET

Patents create lawful monopolies by granting the patentee the
exclusive right to control the subject matter of the patent throughout the territory of the granting state. By the same token, patents
restrain the liberty of others either to make and sell the same product, in the case of product patents, or to utilize the process, in the
case of process patents. Article 36 of the Treaty reserves to each
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of the Six the power to enforce all prohibitions and restrictions to
the free movement of goods required by the protection of patent
rights.
Is it possible, however, that no attempt will be made to unify or
harmonize the six distinct patent systems of the Common Market?
Such inaction seems unlikely, because the merging economic life of
the Six must certainly create pressure to eliminate obstacles to the
free flow of trade in the Community.
Indeed, efforts at harmonizing patent law had already been initiated before the conclusion of the Treaty, beginning in 1951 within
the Council of Europe. 10 A Committee of Experts on Patents was
appointed by this Council to study unification, and on October 7,
I 9 55 adopted the following resolutions:
The Committee believes that the unification on certain
points of the substantive law concerning patents is one
of the conditions for the creation of a European patent
to be issued either by a European Patent Office or by national Patent Offices.
Unification, at least in the first stage, shall bear on:
(a) the general conditions of patentability (industrial
character, novelty, technical progress, inventive effort,
effect of prior patents and patent applications) ;
(b) the effect to be given to the specification and claimsY
Before this resolution was adopted, various plans had been submitted by Longchambon (1949), Reimer (I953, I954), de Haan
( r 9 54) and Was (I 9 54) ,12 These did not meet with approval.
Then Dr. W. Lampert of Stuttgart suggested a project of unificationY This project contemplates the conclusion of a treaty permitting an applicant to file a patent application in one of the contracting
countries practicing prior examination, the filing to be effective in
all contracting countries. The applicant would have the right to
require that his application be communicated to the other contracting countries so that they might examine it in accordance with their
laws. The countries whose patent offices do not practice examination
with regard to novelty could only advise the applicant that they
10

67 LA PROPRIET!l lNDUSTRIELLE 19, 68 (1951) j 70 id. 59, 60 (1954).
71 id. 236 (1955).
'"Longchambon, Rapporteur of the Committee for Economic Questions of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; Reimer, President of the German Patent
Office; De Haan, President of the Dutch Patent Office; Was, Dutch Patent Attorney.
13
See Report of Coordinatin{! Committee on Industrial Property Ri{!hts, [1957] AN11
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33-39 (1958).
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would deal with the copy of the application as if it were a national
application, and the applicant would be granted a national patent
after fulfilling the usual requirements. Any country which practices
examination would have the choice of adopting as its own the examination made in the first country or of submitting the application
to an examination of its own as soon as it was advised that the first
country was ready to publish the invention.
The Patent Commissioners of countries practicing examination
have had a number of meetings. Among those present at the first
of these, which was held at The Hague in April 1956, were the Commissioners of Germany and the Netherlands (as well as those of
Britain, Austria, Norway, and Sweden). The following resolution
was adopted :
This meeting, taking notice that nearly all the European
Patent Offices which undertake a search for novelty have
difficulty in disposing of the present very large number of
applications for patents because of the general shortage
of technically-trained staff, and the increasing volume of
search material and complexity of inventions, observing
that when applications in respect of the same invention are
lodged in more than one of these Offices the search for
novelty has to be made in each of them, thus leading to a
considerable repetition of work, and being of the opinion
that this repetition of work might be avoided to some extent if the result of a search in one Office could be available
to other Offices in which an application in respect of the
same invention has been made,
1. Recommends that these Offices should examine with
interested parties in their countries whether powers,
(a) to require an applicant for a patent to disclose
the result of the search made in or on behalf of
any other Office, and/ or
(b) to enable Offices themselves to exchanQ"e search
results would be of advantage to the Offices and
would be acceptable in their countries.
2. Requests the Government of the Netherlands to bring
the resolution to the notice of the Secretary-General of
the Council of Europe with the explanation that the measures proposed are of an exploratory nature.
At a second meeting in Munich in April 1957, 14 the Commissioners accepted the Lampert project as the basis of a proposed first
stage of unification. They appointed a sub-committee to prepare a
11

73 LA PROPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 123 (1957).
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draft Convention for Applications for a European Patent. The subcommittee discussed the subject and submitted its conclusions to a
third meeting of the Commissioners in Vienna in April 1958.
The sub-committee agreed that a convention should be concluded
providing for the filing of a joint patent application by any person
entitled to file a national patent application. The joint application
should be filed in the country of which the applicant is a national or
in which he resides. He should indicate, on filing, the countries to
which his patent application is to extend, and the application should
contain a specification and claims. The fees to be paid would be the
sum total of the fees payable to each of the countries covered by
the joint application, and examination would be made by the patent
office of the country in which the application was filed or by the
International Institute of Patents at The Hague, the results to be
communicated to the patent offices of the countries concerned. No
patent office would be bound to accept these results, each therefore
remaining free to make its own examination. A subsequent meeting
was held in October 1959 in Vienna. This meeting discussed a modification of the previous plan under which a joint application is presented to the Patent Office of one country with a list of the countries
in which protection is desired. A copy of the specification and full
filing fees for each such country are remitted. The Patent Office
receiving the joint patent application distributes the documents to
the other countries and keeps them advised of the prosecution of
the original application. The other countries may start their examination at any time or may await the results of the search in the
original country. The meeting in Vienna decided to entrust a subcommittee consisting of representatives of the Patent Offices of
Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland with the preparation of a draft Convention.
In the meantime, an organization known as The Committee of
the National Institute of Patent Agents ( C.N.I.P.A.) has produced its own plan, known as the "C.N.I.P.A. Plan." Its general
outline is that an applicant filing application in one country shall be
entitled to file in other countries, within the Paris Convention priority of twelve months, an inexpensive preparatory application to
be completed within a prescribed period which will be long enough
to allow him to receive the result of the official novelty search upon
his first application. It is proposed that this period be six months.
The preparatory application will include a copy of the specification
on file in the originating application in the same language. After the
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preparatory application is completed, a certified copy of the novelty
search in respect of the first should be filed. This search may be
undertaken by the Institute of The Hague. The usual documents
and the regular fees must also be filed with the complete application
which will then be examined, in accordance with the law of the
country. The advantages of this plan are: original payment of small
fees and saving of expenses of translation of specification which are
generally quite high; a term of I 8 months for filing a complete
specification in other countries. Ha
The directors of the patent offices of the countries which do not
practice examination also had a meeting in Paris in June I957. 15
They favored a simpler procedure, which would leave untouched the
existing laws in each country and would provide only for a common
novelty examination. Applicants would be entitled to file an international application meeting certain requirements: unity of invention, specification and claims, and the like. The national offices would
then refer the application to the International Institute of Patents
of the Hague for novelty examination. The findings would be communicated to the applicant who would then indicate in what countries he wished to obtain patent protection. Each country would
then be free to proceed with the application and grant or refuse the
patent.
The directors of the patent offices of the Six have also decided to
meet regularly to examine problems raised by the Common Market.
Such meetings were held in Paris, Rome, Munich, The Hague, and
Nice during the year I 9 58. At these meetings the directors discussed
the conditions necessary for the harmonization of national laws, and
particularly of the laws pertaining to working requirements within
the Community; the possibility of common adoption of certain provisions of given national laws; and a common procedure which
would permit inventors to obtain protection more simply.
Harmonization of patent law is, then, actively being sought. Under the aegis of the Council of Europe, two Conventions have already been concluded: a Convention for Uniform Formalities of
Patent Applications signed December I I, I953/6 and a Convention
for the International Classification of Patents, signed December I 9,
I954Y The first has been ratified by four of the Common Market
ua 1960

ANNUAIRE DE L'ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LA PROTECTION DE LA PRO-
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(n.s. No.9) 14-15.

"'I d. at 205-206.
16
70 id. 21-28 ( 195+).
17
71 id. 3-5 (1955).

252

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

countries: Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and
the second by :five: Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, and the
Netherlands.
A common search for novelty of claims for inventions is already
operative in an informal way through the International Institute
of Patents at The Hague, which was established by a Treaty of
June 6, 1957. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands
are parties to this Treaty. The Institute is an international nonprofit organization set up to carry out documentary research for the
benefit of the governments of the member countries, of inventors,
and of industry in general. The Institute functions independently of
any government or state, and is staffed by qualified engineers and
scientists of various nationalities who are engaged for specialized
research in each of the different technical fields. Staff members are
not permitted to perform any technical work other than that of the
Institute.
The Institute has access to the documentation system used by
the Netherlands Patent Office which covers patent specifications of
Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United States. Requests for searches
may be made by the appropriate national patent offices or private
persons and organizations of the countries which are parties to the
Hague Agreement and also by persons of any nationality of a country which is party to the Paris Union Convention.
Other attempts to simplify procedure, limited to the Common
Market countries, are foreseeable. It is not unreasonable to expect that a plan may be worked out which will permit a Common
Market inventor to make, at his option, a single filing in one country which will give him a filing date for all six countries, provided
that the application satisfies requirements of form, content (proper
description, claims, drawings, etc.) and certain other agreed requirements of the Six. It will probably be required, as in the Lampert
plan, that copies of applications be transmitted by the patent office
in which the application is first filed to the patent offices of the other
Common Market countries.
It will probably be agreed that applications for novelty examination may be submitted to the International Institute of Patents at
The Hague and that it shall communicate its findings to the patent
office in which the first application was filed, and, in accordance with
the applicant's request, to other of the Common Market countries.
Under such a plan the applicant would have to do nothing further,
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in connection with his application, in France, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Italy and his application would require only further examination in the Nether lands and Germany.
Such simplification of procedure is plainly desirable. The greater
the difficulties in filing applications and obtaining patents in the Six
-whether due to language differences, methods of drawing up
applications, requirements concerning the enumeration of claims, or
other causes-the greater the advantage which large and financially
strong corporations have over smaller firms and individual inventors. If legal protection of inventions is justified, however, clearly
it should be effected by the most efficient and equitable system possible, that is, one which enables everyone to obtain protection, and
with a minimum of expense, trouble, and legal red tape.
With regard to procedure the greatest difficulty lies in obtaining
from Germany and the Nether lands agreement to adopt the procedural system of the other four countries, or vice versa. It is difficult
to believe that Germany and the Netherlands will agree to abandon
their systems of examination. Nor would these two countries be
willing to abolish their procedures for publication of inventions
(the purpose of which is to make opposition by interested parties
possible), even though the other four might be willing to subject
applications to examination as to novelty, probably through the Institute of The Hague.
An agreement making it possible to obtain a single patent for
the whole of the Common Market would increase freedom of movement of goods since it would eliminate the barriers created by the
acquisition of patents in some only of the Six or by the acquisition of
patents for the same invention in the various countries of the Common Market by different persons. But such an agreement presupposes agreement among the Six on a single procedure for the examination of inventions with respect to novelty and patentability,
and uniform definitions of novelty, patentability and subject matter.
An agreement on uniform definitions will be even more difficult to
obtain than agreement on procedure.
If separate patents continue to be granted by each of the Six,
harmonization of the law on these substantive points is highly desirable to avoid the possibility that a patent right and its inherent
statutory monopoly may be available in one or some of the countries of the Common Market but unavailable in others. If harmonization is not achieved, products freely made in a Member Country
in which no patent may issue will not be able freely to cross the
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boundaries of Member Countries which have granted patents on
the particular subject matter-a negation of the Common Market's
aims. Moreover, conditions to which enterprises in the various countries of the Six will be subject will thereby be made less equal and
intra-Common-Market division of labor discouraged. If small technical improvements may be patented in France but not in Germany,
technical improvements in France may be unduly restricted. If
pharmaceutical products may be patented in France but not in Italy,
economic inequality between the two countries may result. Moreover, the movement from Italy into France of such products, freely
made in Italy, can be blocked.
It would obviously be undesirable to lower standards by compromising the best laws with the worst. But any attempt to reach
agreement as to what is the "best" law would encounter basic differences of opinion, strongly entrenched habits of mind and reluctance to change.
One revision of the laws of the Six which suggests itself, however,
is the adoption of certain uniform requirements as to patentability
coupled with a provision in each of the laws of the Six that anything
which is not patentable in one of them, because it is not considered
novel, should be so regarded in the others. Patent protection as a
means of encouraging invention in the Common Market territory
as a whole would seem to be economic justification of such a revision.
Uniformity of requirements of patentability may also be aided by
resolving the problem of invention definition. In France, Belgium
and Luxembourg the inventor describes the general operation or
function of his invention and need not refer to all the features and
advantages of the machine or device or product or to every new idea
which is implied in every part of his invention or in the combination
of different parts or details. No broad or detailed claims need be
specified. A general resume, however, must end the description.
More specific delimitation of inventions is left to judicial determination which will decide in a case involving the validity or scope of a
patent whether a special function, operation, feature or idea is
covered by it, taking into consideration the whole of the description
and drawings. This is also true to a certain extent in Italy.
In Germany and the Netherlands on the other hand, the inventor
must make an enumeration of distinct claims, though these need not
be too specific and detailed. The ambit of the claims depends on the
nature of the result to be obtained by the device described in the
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light of the common knowledge of the art at the date of the patent.
A compromise between the two systems would not be impossible.
Harmonization of other aspects of patent law is less difficult.
Certainly a uniform term for patents may be adopted, particularly if
a common examination system is agreed upon so that the term may
be computed in all countries from the date of the grant of the patent.
Such uniformity is desirable because it will mean that statutory
monopolies of patents on the same invention will come to an end at
the same time in all six countries, and freedom of manufacture and
of movement of goods throughout the Common Market will thereby
be simultaneously ensured in all.
The necessity of paying annuities in each of the Member Countries for the maintenance of patents should be eliminated, moreover.
Failure to pay the annuity in one Member Country may otherwise
result in forfeiture of a patent there which continues in force in
other Member Countries, again creating an obstacle to the free
movement of goods. This problem could be effectively solved by
providing for a single payment of annuities at a central office which
would apportion it among the Six in accordance with an acceptable
formula.
Finally, the problems created by working requirements for patents in the Six require a solution. Under the Paris Union Convention and the present law in the Member Countries, outside Italy,
the ordinary sanction for non-working is the grant of a compulsory
license. The pressure will, therefore, be great on Italy to change its
law by introducing compulsory licensing as the first sanction for
non-working.
Forfeiture of the patent will always threaten wherever it is possible that a Member Country may consider compulsory licensing
insufficient to satisfy public interest in the subject matter of the
patent. But forfeiture in one Member Country would leave an industry free to manufacture the subject matter of the patent in that
country, although it would not be free to distribute such goods to
other Member Countries where no forfeiture had occurred.
A patent owner is rarely, if ever, forced to exploit his own patent
in every one of the countries where working requirements exist. He
seeks out willing and qualified licensees with whom he can enter into
negotiated license agreements. An intra-Common Market arrangement according to which working of the invention in one of the Six
would be deemed to satisfy working requirements in all of the
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others, would permit the owner of a patent to consider only economic factors in selecting the country or countries of the Community
in which he or his licensees should work the patent. This would
further one basic aim of the Common Market-the rationalization
of production.
C. EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION ON
AMERICAN INTERESTS

The right to file a single patent application in a central Common
Market office or in the patent office of one of the Six (which would
transmit copies of the application to patent offices in the other Member Countries) could be made available to the nationals of any country or only to nationals of Common Market countries. If the latter,
justification would be sought in the Paris Union Convention. Article
15 of the Convention provides that the countries of the Paris Union
reserve the right to make separately, between themselves, special
arrangements for the protection of industrial property insofar as
these arrangements do not contravene provisions of the Convention.
On the basis of Article I 5 a number of countries of the Union
have concluded the Madrid Arrangement for the International
Registration of Trademarks. So long as the United States is not a
party to this Arrangement, its nationals cannot register at the International Bureau. 18 Similarly, an internal arrangement in the
Common Market for a special patent filing system need not be open
to Americans.
By the same token a system of common search for patent anticipations and single examination as to novelty could be closed to American nationals. Since the natural result of such a system would, however, be to eliminate searches and examinations in each country,
such a system would doubtless be opened to American patent applicants, and it would be to their advantage. In order to ensure such
advantage to its nationals the United States might, however, be
required to adhere to the Arrangement of The Hague of I 94 7
which established the International Institute of Patents.
Adoption of a uniform duration for patents in the Six could not
r€sult in a disparity between the duration of patents owned by nonCommunity nationals and those owned by Community nationals because of the national-treatment clause of the Paris Union Convention. Therefore the advantages of uniformity in this area would
18
This is the International Bureau of Berne set up by the Paris Union Convention
as a central organ of the Union.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

2 57

necessarily accrue to American owners of Community patents. The
same may not be true with regard to any special system of payment
of annuities in the Common Market countries, since such a system
need not effect a change of the laws of the Six with regard to patents not obtained under a single filing system. The total amount of
annuities paid by an American patentee in the Six might therefore
be higher since he would be forced to continue to pay them to each
of the Common Market countries.
A serious question may arise with respect to working requirements. Germany and Switzerland have long had individual treaties
with the United States providing that working of the invention in
one country exempts the patent from the requirement of working
it in the other. Other countries of the Paris Union cannot claim the
benefits of these treaties in Germany and Switzerland because they
are special arrangements under Article I 5 of the Paris Union Convention. Similarly the Six may invoke Article I 5 and provide that
working of a patent in one of them will be deemed to satisfy working requirements in the other five. So long as each of the Six retains
existing working requirements for its own nationals, the nationaltreatment clause of the Paris Union Convention would not entitle
American nationals to claim the benefits of such an arrangement.
This would put American patentees at a disadvantage in the Common Market since they would continue to be bound to work the
patent in each of the Six and not only in one of them.
III. INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS AND MODELS

A.

INDUSTRIAL DESIGN AND MODEL LAWS
IN THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES

Whether in theory industrial designs should form a separate
branch of industrial property or be classified as artistic property is
a problem which has long been discussed 19 and is at present the
subject of serious consideration by an international coordinating
committee organized by U.N.E.S.C.O. As a matter of fact, however, Article I of the Paris Union Convention includes industrial
designs in its definition of industrial property, and most countries
have special legislation for their protection which involves regulations of a hybrid nature related to both patent and copyright law.
In any case, the protection of designs involves the creation of legal
monopolies granting an exclusive right to make copies of the design.
19

See

LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

367

(1930).

2 58

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

The possibility that such monopolies, because of differences
among the laws of the Six, may impede the functioning of the Common Market requires consideration. Two of the Common Market
countries, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, have no special legislation at all on designs, 20 and no protection of designs is given in
their territory to either nationals or foreigners. At the last conference at Lisbon, the Paris Union Convention was revised for
the first time to require all signatory countries to protect designs
(new Article 5 quinquiens), and it may reasonably be expected that
upon ratification of the revised Convention, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands will adopt legislation on designs. Indeed it has recently
been announced that a Benelux industrial-designs law is under preparation.
The essential differences among the laws concerning industrial
designs in the other four countries of the Common Market relate to
administrative procedure, subject matter, scope of the right and
duration of protection.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

In Belgium and France, industrial designs are treated as artistic
works. A special law in each country 21 provides for optional deposit
of designs, but even without such deposit designs are protected by
the copyright law. No examination whatsoever is made of the deposit application. Indeed, the deposit may be made under seal. Since
the basis of protection is copyright, originality of creation rather
than novelty is material. Therefore, prior publication or public use
of the design by the author or owner of the design does not affect
the validity of the deposit.
In Germany and Italy 22 designs are, in the first place, protected
under special legislation for the protection of designs and models.
In Germany, in addition, copyright protection is possible if the design achieves a certain artistic standard. As a result, cumulative
protection both by the design and the copyright law is in many
cases possible.
In Italy, an artistic design or work of art applied in industry is
subject to copyright protection only if the design is a work of art
00
Designs can sometimes be protected under general torts provisions or, in special
cases, by the copyright law.
21
France, Law of July 14, 1909, [1909] Bulletin des Lois pt. I, at 1231; Belgium,
Royal Decree of January 29, 1935, [1935] Moniteur Beige No. 39·
22
Germany, Law of January II, 1876, [1876] Reichsgesetzblatt II; Italy, Royal
Decree of August 25, 1940, 7 Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e dei Decreti del Regno
d'Italia 5948 ( 1940).
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conceptually separable from the industrial product in which It IS
embodied as another entity. Cumulative protection in Italy by both
the design law and the copyright law is not possible. In any case,
protection of given subject matter as an industrial design requires
compliance with the special legislation on designs which in turn requires registration. Novelty is essential.
In Germany applications for registration of designs must be filed
before their public use in Germany or publication anywhere, and in
Italy before public use or publication anywhere. While examination
to determine novelty or registrability is not made, examination to
determine compliance with formal requirements-in regard to the
adequacy of representations, or to the proper titles of designs, for
example-is made.
2. SUBJECT MATTER

In Belgium and France a design must, like any other creation entitled to copyright under the law concerning artistic property, be
original. In Germany and Italy the courts have held that the design
must satisfy the artistic taste and sense of the public.
The German, French, Belgian and Italian laws contain no other
limitations of subject matter, and on the whole it may be said that,
subject to the requirement of novelty in Germany and Italy, a particular design when registered will be protected in all four countries.
In Belgium and France it will be protected even without registration.

3·

SCOPE OF THE RIGHT

The scope of protection in Belgium and France is measured by
the copyright law. Therefore, any "copying" which would be an
infringement of a work of art is also an infringement of a design.
Also, the right is measured not by the deposit but by the creation as
embodied in the design itself. The exclusive right in the design is
measured in Italy by the deposit, and the rights and protection of
the owner are similar to those of a patentee. It follows that in Italy
protection is limited to the application of the design to the particular
product or article for which the design is registered.
4·

DURATION OF PROTECTION

The fact that basic concepts of designs differ-some countries
viewing them as essentially artistic property, others as a separate
branch of industrial property-accounts for the difference in the
terms of protection. In France a design may be deposited for a
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term of five or twenty-five years at the applicant's option, renewal
making possible a maximum total term of fifty years. In Belgium
the term is the same as for artistic works in general, that is, the
life of the creator plus fifty years after his death, except that designs
created by corporations are limited to fifty years and that foreigners
are limited to the term of protection enjoyed in their country of
origin. In Germany, the applicant has the choice of a term of three,
ten, or fifteen years; a term of less than fifteen years may be renewed
for a maximum of fifteen years. In Italy, designs are registered for
a term of two years, renewable for another two years, or initially
for four years. Moreover, in Italy protection is conditioned upon
a working of the design within one year from grant.

B.

PossiBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION OF
LAWS RELATING TO DESIGNS IN THE COMMON MARKET

As already stated, the whole subject of design protection is
now under review by a coordinating committee organized by
U.N.E.S.C.O. It is not unlikely that the Six will find it possible,
under the impetus of this review and in response to the necessities
of the Common Market, to harmonize their laws.
Four of these countries, Belgium, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands, are already parties to the Arrangement for the International Deposit of Designs concluded at The Hague in 1925
by some of the member countries of the Paris Union. 23 Under this
Arrangement nationals of the contracting countries may deposit
directly at the International Bureau of Berne designs which they
desire to have protected in all countries which are parties to the
Arrangement. It is reasonable to expect that Luxembourg and Italy
may now accede to this Arrangement. This will resolve for the
Common Market countries the problem of a single filing office for
designs. A revision of the Arrangement of The Hague is planned
for November 1960 which, it is hoped, may attract a wider adherence to it from among countries party to the Paris Convention.
The adoption of a uniform law on designs by the Benelux countries may also advance significantly the harmonization of substantive and administrative law concerning designs in the Common Market a~ a whole, particularly if the Benelux law contains certain concessions by Belgium altering the too-liberal character of its present
design law. Such concessions might enable Germany and France to
harmonize their laws with the new Benelux law. The largest effort
23

The United States is not a party to this arrangement.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

261

to improve the protection of designs must be made by Italy, whose
present law is very inadequate.

C.

EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION
OF LAWS ON AMERICAN INTERESTS
IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS

Unification or harmonization of the law concerning industrial
designs throughout the Common Market should, on the whole, be
beneficial to American interests in designs. Under a unified Common
Market law American nationals would have to obtain only one registration for all six countries, thereby substantially reducing costs.
Harmonization of the law should at the least mean that designs
would henceforward be protected in Luxembourg and the Netherlands, and that the term of protection in Italy would be longer than
it is at present. It is not likely that the Common Market countries
will conclude other arrangements among themselves which benefit
only their own nationals.
IV. TRADEMARKS
A. TRADEMARK LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET
COUNTRIES

The protection of trademarks is an aspect of the protection
against unfair competition, and the principles of fair dealing and
avoidance of deception of the public are therefore fundamentals
of it. Trademarks are symbols which distinguish the goods of one
manufacturer or merchant from those of another. With use on goods
of such symbols goodwill accrues to them which the law recognizes
and protects as a property right. Free enterprise depends in large
measure on the legal recognition of this right. Competition would be
virtually impossible if competing goods were not distinguished from
one another, since purchasers would thereby be deprived of a means
of choosing among them. In protecting trademarks, the law protects owners against infringement, but it also shields purchasers
from confusion and fraud.
All six countries of the Common Market recognize the fundamental principles of trademark protection, but their laws are by no
means uniform and the territoriality principle may create conflicts
even more serious than those created as to patents. Trademarks are
more numerous than patents; while the latter have an average effective life of five to six years, trademarks are theoretically per-

262

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

petual. Insofar as trademarks create exclusive rights in certain
symbols or words, and insofar as they require for their protection
the exclusion of others even from the use of similar marks or from
the use of the same symbols or words with regard to similar goods,
they may operate as serious impediments to the free movement of
goods in the Common Market. Impediments resulting from the
recognition in one Member Country of trademark rights in symbols
or words which other Member Countries consider unregistrable,
and therefore available for use in trade, could be particularly serious. Avoidance of conflicts in this area is essential, and harmonization of the laws of the Six must therefore be sought.
Apart from the Paris Union Convention, little conscious effort
has been made to harmonize trademark laws in the Six. Administrative habits and traditions of the various countries, rather than differing political or economic philosophies, have been allowed to reflect themselves in the regulation of trademarks. The laws and
practice of the Six have drifted apart from one another and each
country has become excessively jealous of its own way of resolving
the conflicts of interest between trademark owners and the trade.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Formalities of application for registration of trademarks are
simple and any differences among them in the Six of no moment. The
procedure for dealing with such applications is of two kinds. In
Belgium, France and Luxembourg, the owner deposits what
amounts to a claim to a trademark. The registering authority makes
no examination to determine the registrability of the mark, either
with regard to its character or in the light of prior registrations.
In Italy only questions of form are considered. In Germany both a
formal examination and an examination to determine registrability
of the trademark in accordance with the law are undertaken. When
these are completed, the applicant is advised of any prior registrations, but the application is not rejected if prior registrations have
been found. The application is published, and interested persons
may oppose it. In the Netherlands, the mark is examined as to registrability both in terms of its character and prior registrations, and
the application may be rejected as a result of either examination.
No publication to permit opposition is effected but once registered
the mark is published and interested persons may demand cancellation by a complaint filed in the District Court of The Hague. Such
complaints are heard in summary proceedings.
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Germany requires proof of prior registration of the trademark
in the home country of the applicant as a condition of registration
of the same mark in Germany (except where exemption from this
requirement has been officially promulgated on a reciprocal basis).
Similarly, in Belgium and France courts have held that the validity
of a registration by a foreigner is predicated upon the existence of
a prior corresponding registration in his home country. Recently,
however, the OMEGA decision of the Cour d' Appel of Paris, affirmed by the Cour de Cassation on February 3, 1959, interpreted
the law of France differently. 24 In the other countries of the Common Market there is no requirement of prior home registration.
2. REGISTRABILITY

Views in the Six differ as to what constitutes a registrable trademark. While generally descriptive or generic words are not proper
trademarks which may be validly registered, Germany and the
Netherlands apply a much stricter test in this regard than do the
other countries. In Belgium and France the mark is not validly registrable only if it is the usual and necessary description of a product
(or if it is deceptive or misdescriptive). Letters per se or numerals
per se are not registrable in Germany except when they have attained
secondary meaning. Three dimensional marks are not registrable
in Germany and the Netherlands, but they are in Italy. Whether
registration in Italy may prevent others from putting goods on the
market having the form shown in the representation is a subject of
controversy. Combinations of colors without other distinctive elements are not registrable in Germany and the Netherlands. Names
in Belgium and France are validly registrable only when represented
in a special or distinctive manner.
Obviously, these differences mean that a certain mark may be a
valid trademark and validly registrable in some countries of the
Common Market while it cannot be the subject of an exclusive right
of use in others.

3·

EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION

In all the Common Market countries except Germany, property
in a mark is acquired by use, and registration is only "declaratory"
of title to the trademark. Therefore, registration may always be
•• Societe Omega v. Societe Omega Louis Brandt et Freres, Cour de Cassation (Ch.
civ., sect. comm.), February 3, 1959, [1959] Bulletin des arrets de Ia Cour de Cassation
56, [1959] Semaine Juridique II. uooo, [1959] GRUR Ausl. 299.
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contested by a prior user, and, if he proves his prior use, he may
cause the registration to be cancelled. In Germany ownership is
based on registration, and the first applicant is therefore entitled to
registration and may maintain it as against a prior user, unless the
mark of the prior user has become commonly and generally known
in the trade as distinguishing the goods of the owner. In Italy, the
rigor of the principle of prior use as the basis of ownership has
been mitigated by the provision that a registration uncontested by
a prior user for a period of five years from the date of registration
becomes incontestable and conclusive. This is now also the system of
most countries of the world including the United States.
The scope of the registrant's right is generally measured by the
description of the goods for which it is registered, but two exceptions should be noted. In all six countries, the applicant may file
for any description, but registration is not necessarily limited to the
products for which the mark is in fact used or for which its use is
proposed. (In Germany and the Netherlands, however, the goods
listed in the application must fall within the applicant's business
activity) . In general, therefore, registration may result in too broad
coverage.
In the second place, protection extends in principle to similar
goods but similarity is more narrowly construed in France and Belgium than in the other four countries. With regard to marks of exceptional reputation the protection may extend to dissimilar goods
in Germany, the Netherlands, and-in quite exceptional cases-in
Italy. This protection is based, however, on the law of unfair competition rather than on trademark law.
4· USER REQUIREMENTS

A condition of the continued protection of his registered trademark in some of the Six is the owner's use of his mark. There are
no user requirements in the trademark laws of France, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Germany, but non-use for three years may cause
forfeiture of the registration in Italy and the Netherlands. In Belgium, however, prevailing judicial opinion is that the trademark
right is lost by an unjustified non-use for a long period of time, and
in Germany marks that are not being used (reserve and defensive
marks) are protected by the courts only under special conditions.
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5·

TERM OF REGISTRATION

The term for which registration is granted to an applicant is ten
years in Germany and Luxembourg, fifteen in France, twenty in
the Netherlands and Italy and perpetual in Belgium. Renewal of
registration is always possible for a similar term prior to expiration of the previous term.

6.

ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES

Assignment of a trademark is permitted in France with or without the goodwill of the business. In Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg
the "establishment" attached to the mark must be transferred with
it. Since 19 57 in the Netherlands it has been sufficient that the part
of the enterprise situated in the Netherlands be transferred with
the trademark. In Germany, the entire business of the owner or a
part of it must be transferred to the assignee.
Licensing of trademarks is freely permitted in France and the
Netherlands. In Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy a license is deemed
an assignment of the right to use, and to be valid it must be accompanied by a communication to the licensee of specifications, formulae
and the like, which will permit the manufacture of equivalent products. In Germany the position is probably the same, but there has
been no judicial sanction of licensing as yet.

B.

PosSIBILITIES OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION
OF TRADEMARK LAWS IN THE COMMON MARKET

A certain degree of harmonization of the trademark laws of the
Six has already been achieved by two national treaties: the Paris
Union Convention, and the Madrid Arrangement for the International Registration of Trademarks (the "Madrid Arrangement"). Each of the Six is a party to both of these agreements.
By virtue of the latter particularly, nationals of, and persons
domiciled or having a bona fide and effective industrial or commercial establishment in, any of the Six may obtain an international
registration at the International Bureau of Berne for any trademark which is registered in their home countries. These persons,
therefore, need no longer apply for a national registration of their
marks in each of the Six. Filing through the Bureau of Berne, however, does not eliminate the substantive differences of the law of
the Six. Countries practicing prior examination may refuse an international registration and in the others the validity of the inter-
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national registration may always be contested by an interested
person under the provisions of the local Trademark Law.
At the last revision of the Madrid Arrangement at Nice on June
I 5, I 957, a provision was inserted that any of the signatory coun·
tries may notify the Berne Bureau that an international registration
may not extend to it unless the owner of the mark specifically requests such an extension in his application for international registration. The purpose of this amendment was to make possible territorial limitation of international trademarks which, prior to the
amendment, had automatically extended to all twenty-one signatory countries. Even assuming that any of the Six will send such
notification to the Berne Bureau, it is to be expected that applicants
for international registrations will specify that they request protection in all six countries.
Mention also should be made here of the Arrangement for International Classification of Goods for Trademarks, also adopted
at Nice on June IS, I957· This Arrangement adopts the classification of goods used by the International Bureau of Berne for the
international registration of trademarks and requires the signatory
countries to adopt it in regard to national registration of trademarks. France and Italy have already done so, and since Luxembourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands have had no classification in
the past, it should be easy for them to follow suit. Only Germany,
therefore, must abandon its own classification in order to adopt the
international classification.
By virtue of the Paris Union Convention the following aspects of
trademark law do or will receive uniform solution in the Six:
(1) Requirement of Prior Home Registration: The present requirement in Germany, Belgium, and France for prior home registration will be eliminated as a result of the amendment of the new
Article 6 of the Convention at Lisbon.
(2) Effect of Prior Home Registration: Article 6 of the Convention (new Article 6 quinquies in the Lisbon revision) establishes
the rule that a mark registered in the country of origin of the applicant must be accepted for registration in other signatory countries
subject to stated exceptions. These exceptions constitute in effect a
negative definition of what is not properly registrable as a trademark. The provision has left unresolved many differences among
national laws concerning registrability, but it has been helpful.
(3) Prior Registration. versus Prior User as Determinative of
Ownership: The rigor of the German law which bases ownership in
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a trademark on prior registration rather than prior user is mitigated
as a result of Article 6 his of the Convention in the sense that the
prior user of a well-known mark is permitted to contest an infringing registration. (The theory of the protection of "get-up" 25 of
Article 25 of the German Trademark Law, which results in the
protection of a reputation acquired in the trade with respect to a
mark, has a similar mitigating effect.)
( 4) Assignment of Trademarks: The provision of Article 6
quater concerning the assignment of trademarks is a uniform determination of the validity of an assignment of a trademark in a foreign
country. Thus, a national of one of the six countries may validly
assign his trademark in the other five countries, provided he transfers the local goodwill or establishment.
(5) Grace Period for Fees Payments: A period of grace of six
months for payment of fees for the renewal of registration is provided for in Article 5 his and must be given effect in the signatory
countries.
But there is a substantial scope for further unification of trademark law in the Common Market. Differences still exist among the
laws of the Six concerning: acquisition of ownership in a trademark
by prior use or prior registration, registrability, user requirements,
terms of registration, and licensing. These differences may impede
the free movement of goods within the Common Market.
The logical solution of the problems created by these differences
is the adoption of a uniform trademark law applicable in all six
countries. The Benelux countries have been working toward the
adoption of a Benelux Trademark Law for some years, and it has
recently been announced that the text of such a law had been initialled by the three governments and was to be submitted to their
parliaments. Should this project result in a uniform trademark law
for all three countries, it might give impetus to a movement to adopt
a uniform trademark law for the Six.
In the meantime, other possibilities are open. A common search
bureau for trademarks, combining the search facilities of the Six,
is wholly feasible. A committee established by the Berne Bureau
has for some time now been discussing ways and means of creating
such a search center. 26 The essential problems are those of money
"""Get-up" is understood under German law to be "a device considered in commercial circles as a sign of identification of the same or similar goods of another
person," and this has been broadly interpreted to cover any distinctive sign including
trademarks.
211
74 LA PROPRIETI; INDUSTRIELLE 29-33 ( 1958). The Lisbon Conference of 1958
appears to have killed the proposal for a search center at the Berne Bureau.
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and time required to establish such a center, and these may be minimized if the center's sphere of operation is limited to the Six.
The adoption of a uniform term of registration is also a possible
improvement, given the fact that terms in the Six range from ten
years to perpetuity and that for international registrations at the
Berne Bureau the term is twenty years. Uniform provisions on assignment and licensing of trademarks are also possible and highly
desirable. Agreement could be reached on a quantum of goodwill
which must accompany transfer of a trademark and on basic requirements of a valid license-which should include an obligation to
record the license for the information of the public.
The only subject on which general agreement will be truly difficult is registrability. Based on differing concepts of what best suits its
own needs, each of the Six has struck a different balance between the
interests and claims of individual traders and those of the trade
generally. Must three-dimensional marks, that is, new forms of containers or products, be registrable? Must monopolization by the
first user or applicant of numerals and letters, color combinations,
slogans, surnames and geographical terms be permitted?
It is essential to arrive at a unified standard of registrability for
the Common Market. Otherwise goods, bearing a word or symbol
which is open to the trade to use or common to the trade in one of
the Six, may be stopped at another's borders because that word or
symbol is the subject in the latter country of a statutory monopoly
resulting from its registration as a trademark. Such a uniform standard could be achieved by an arrangement among the Six providing
that a mark refused registration in one of them, on the ground that
it is not a proper trademark, shall not be admitted to registration
or protection in the others. Another possibility would be to establish
a Bureau analogous to the International Institute of Patents at The
Hague which would give opinions on registrability controlling in
all six countries.
A third possibility would be to adopt the revised provision in the
new Article 6 quinquiens, para. C ( I ) of the Paris Union Convention, as a basis for unification. This provision permits the owner of a
trademark to prove that his trademark has acquired distinctiveness
by long and exclusive use; and any trademark, be it a three-dimensional mark or a mark consisting of numerals, letters, slogans, surnames, or geographical terms, may be admitted to registration on
that basis, although it may not have been originally registrable when
first adopted and used.
Similarly the differences among the laws of the Six on user re-

269
quirements for trademarks may be reconciled by the adoption by
each of a provision (which would have been voted into effect as
part of the Paris Union Convention at the Lisbon Conference but
for the objection of Japan) that the registration of a trademark
may be expunged from the register on proof that the mark has not
been used for a period of five years. The provision could add that
use in one of the Six would satisfy user requirements in the others.
Uniformity of the law on all of the subjects hereinabove discussed may be brought about, short of the adoption by treaty of a
single Common Market trademark law similar to the proposed
Benelux law, in two ways: by amendment of the trademark legislation in each country through the adoption of uniform provisions
pursuant to a directive of the Council or through the conclusion of
a Common Market trademark arrangement which would provide
for a single search and single registration at a common trademark
bureau and would cover such points as registrability, basis of ownership, opposition, user requirements, assignments, licenses and term
of registration, leaving to each country to determine by its own law
other matters such as infringements, remedies, fees, renewals, and
the like.
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

C.

EFFECTS OF UNIFICATION OR HARMONIZATION
OF THE LAWS OF THE SIX ON AMERICAN
INTERESTS IN TRADEMARKS

The adoption of a single Trademark Law (like the proposed
Benelux Trademark Law) for the whole of the Common Market
would be in many respects beneficial to American interests. European Common Market trademarks would replace separate French,
German, Dutch, Italian, Belgian and Luxembourgean trademarks.
Reduced registration and renewal expenses and the simplification of
procedure for the obtaining of registration and for the recording of
assignments and changes of name would result. American nationals
would be treated as Community nationals would be, and would, in
addition, be entitled to the benefits of the Paris Union Convention.
If, instead of adopting a single law, the Six should merely amend
their national laws in order to harmonize them on certain material
points (registrability, duration, user and the like), American nationals would also be benefitted, since advantages accruing to Community nationals as a result of harmonization would also accrue to
American nationals by virtue of the national-treatment clause of the
Paris Union Convention.
Certain problems for American trademark owners would arise
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only if the Six concluded a treaty arrangement containing provisions
taking precedence over the national trademark laws of the Six.
Any such provisions which were applicable only to nationals of any
one of the Six seeking protection in the others would not change the
protection afforded by each country to its own nationals. Therefore
national-treatment protection of the Paris Union Convention could
not be invoked. Moreover the compatibility of such provisions with
the Convention might be defended by contending that they constitute a special arrangement sanctioned by Article 1 5. One result of
such provisions would be discrimination against American owners
of trademarks in the Community Countries.
Such an arrangement might provide that use of a trademark in
one of the Six shall be deemed to satisfy the user requirements of
the other five countries. This would discriminate against American
trademark owners who would continue to be required to satisfy the
user requirements provided for by the law of any of the Six on penalty of forfeiture.
It is impossible to believe, however, that provisions of an intraCommon Market arrangement can be adopted which will not be
accompanied by a change of the national law of each of the countries. For instance, it is wholly unlikely that Germany will agree to
an arrangement under which a trademark belonging to a French
national may be freely assigned without goodwill and yet continue
to consider invalid a similar assignment of a German national's trademark. Equally unlikely would be its agreement to an arrangement under which a French national might register in Germany a three-dimensional mark, even though German nationals continued to be unable
to do so.
V. OTHER RIGHTS OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

A.

PROTECTION OF TRADE NAME

A trade name purports to distinguish the commercial activity of
a person as distinct from a trademark which distinguishes the products of a manufacturer or trader from similar products of another.
The concept of a trade name is broader under the law of some countries than under that of others, but the protection of trade names is
generally ensured by the general law of unfair competition. The
formalism and technicalities which have developed with reference·
to trademark protection are, therefore, not encountered. 27
21

The Netherlands has a special Trade Names Act of

1921.
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Registration of trade names in the commercial register of the
place where the business is located is required either for the recognition of the right in a trade name or simply as a means of informing the public. In Germany, Belgium, and France trade names are
registered in the Commercial Register, in Italy with the Registry of
Companies and in the Netherlands with the Registry of the Chamber of Commerce.
Conflicts in trade names, like conflicts in trademarks, may create
obstacles to the free movement of goods in the Common Market.
In this connection it should be noted that Article 8 of the Paris
Union Convention provides :
the trade name shall be protected in all countries of the
Union without obligation of deposit or registration,
whether or not it forms part of a trademark.
Thus, a French or a German national may be required under his
own national law to register his trade name in order to protect it,
whereas he will be assured of its protection in other Union countries
without registration. But does this also mean that a trade name
adopted and used in France must be protected in the other Union
countries without the fulfillment of any other condition or requirement as against the adoption and use of the same or a similar name
by another? Is protection in the entire Common Market based on
prior use anywhere in the Common Market or on first use also in
the other countries in which protection is sought? Article 8 of the
Paris Union Convention is not clear, and these questions are in
dispute.
The extent of protection is left to the laws of each country. Thus
they control the protection of trade names consisting of or containing surnames as against the adoption and use of similar trade names
by persons lawfully entitled to the same surname, the scope of protection of trade names with respect to the businesses in which they
are used, the protection of generic trade names and the like.
For the purposes of the Common Market the most important
problem to be solved is that of protection of trade names throughout the Six upon their adoption and use in one of them. Failure to
solve it may create conflicts of rights and obstacles to the free movement of goods. The problem is a difficult one, particularly when a
trade name consists of or contains a surname which two firms, established in two different countries in the Common Market, have an
28
The commercial register in civil law countries is maintained by the clerk of the
commercial tribunal.
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equal right to use. One possible solution would be to require registration of trade names in a central trade name bureau, or to centralize in such a bureau for search purposes all trade name registrations
made in the individual countries. The other possibility would be to
interpret Article 8 of the Paris Union Convention to mean that the
person who first adopts and uses a trade name in one of the Six
shall be protected against the use of the same or a confusingly similar name by another in the others. Article 8 was recently so interpreted by an Austrian TribunaJ.29 If deemed necessary, this interpretation could be adopted for the Common Market by an agreement among the Six. The scope of protection of trade names and
remedies against infringement may be left to determination by the
laws of each Member Country.
No unification or harmonization of the laws of the Six concerning trade names can involve discrimination against American trade
names, again because of the national-treatment clause of the Paris
Union Convention.

B.

REPRESSION OF FALSE INDICATIONS OF ORIGIN

Goods originate not only from particular manufacturers or
traders but also in particular places where these products are produced, manufactured, grown, or otherwise derived. This latter origin is indicated by appropriate expressions affixed to the goods.
These are of two kinds: indications of geographical source which
arc direct or indirect indications of the places (country, region,
locality) from which the products or merchandise come; 30 and
appellations of origin which are geographical names of the places
(country, region, locality) where the products are grown, manufactured, or otherwise obtained and which by virtue of their soil,
climate, or techniques give such products their qualities. 31
Indications of geographical origin which are false or misleading
-for instance, the use on a perfume of the indication "Made in
France" although the perfume was not, in fact, made in France, or
"Swiss Watch" on a watch not made in Switzerland-deceive the
purchasing public. If the products are of inferior quality or other20

Judgment of September 16, 1958, [1958] 0 PatBI. 189. It is to be noted, however,
that this is based also on Articles IO and 22B of the Austrian Trademark Law. Furthermore, it involved a family name rather than a trading name.
""For instance, the indication "Made in U.S.A." or the marking of an address of
establishment or factory, such as "Detroit."
31
For instance, "Moselle wine" or "Roquefort cheese."
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wise unsatisfactory, they may also damage the reputation of the
particular country or locality whose name is thus falsely used. The
law in all countries generally prohibits false or misleading indications of origin of this kind. In the Six, the general provisions of the
unfair competition law and penal provisions on mismarking or
fraud may be invoked to suppress such false or misleading marking.
Difficulties with respect to the second kind of indications of origin,
appellations of origin, are of two kinds: those involving delimitation of the area of the locality or region within which producers
may use the appellation in question; and those involving a determination of the cases in which a geographical term or name is a true
appellation of origin, and not merely an arbitrary designation or a
generic or descriptive term.
An appellation of origin is a badge of distinction when, either
because of some natural advantage of its soil or climate, or because
of traditional techniques and the skill of its producers, a locality or
region has created a special reputation for its goods. Goodwill attaches to such appellations of origin in favor of the producers of
that locality or region which the law seeks to protect. The right to
the exclusive use of an appellation of origin by the producer of a
given region or locality and the correlative right to prevent others
from using it were not recognized earlier as industrial property
rights. National legislation and regulations defining the rights by
delimiting the region in question and by controlling the use of appellations of origin are developments of the twentieth century. By the
time such definition had been effected, however, a number of such
appellations had lost their distinctiveness and had become generic
terms indicating merely that the goods in connection with which
these appellations were used had certain characteristics or qualities.
The difficulty today is to decide whether in a particular country the
geographical designation in question is still an appellation of origin
or has become a generic term. For example, Eau de Cologne and
Suede Gloves are now generally admitted to be generic terms of
special kinds of goods. But the generic character of other names,
such as Champagne, Cognac, Camembert, Roquefort, Pilsner, and
Porto is still subject to controversy.
Italy and Germany have some interest in the protection of appellations of origin but France has a far larger stake in such protection
than any other country because of the exceptional reputation many
French local or regional names enjoy, particularly those used in
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY

274

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

connection with wine and cheese products. France has also gone
much further than any other country in defining the right to the use
of such names and in controlling their use.
Generally four countries of the Common Market protect appellations of origin in a uniformly effective manner either by legislation or by international treaties among themselves. These are
France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy. The Netherlands and Germany look to deception of the public rather than to property rights
in appellations of origin as the basis for protection.
The Paris Union Convention does not go very far in the protection of appellations of origin. Article 10, as revised at Lisbon, prohibits "the direct or indirect use of a false indication of origin," but
this leaves open the question whether the use of a particular appellation in a certain country must be deemed false. The claim that a
particular term is used in trade as a generic term and is not an appellation of origin may, therefore, always be made.
With a view to obtaining more effective protection and enforcing
stricter rules for the protection of appellations of origin, certain
countries of the Paris Union have concluded among themselves the
Madrid Arrangement for the Repression of False Indications of
Origin. Generally, it permits the tribunals of each country to decide
whether an appellation of origin by reason of its generic character
cannot be protected, but it specifies that regional appellations of
origin of wine products may not be so treated. They must always be
protected, and no allegation that such an appellation has become
generic will be considered. Germany, France, and Italy are party to
this Arrangement. It is not unlikely that the Six will agree on uniform protection of appellations of origin. Free movement of goods
in the Community would be seriously hampered by the failure to
reach such an agreement.
A new Arrangement was also adopted at the Lisbon Conference
by some countries for the international registration at the Berne
Bureau of appellations of origin. Any appellation of origin recognized and protected in the country of origin may be so registered.
The other countries may refuse protection by an appropriate motivated declaration addressed to the Berne Bureau within a year. If
they make no objection, the appellation of origin thus registered at
the Berne Bureau must be protected in the contracting countries, and
they are not free to assert later that it is a generic term. At Lisbon,
only France and Italy among the Common Market countries signed
this Arrangement. It is not unlikely that the other four countries
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may accede to it or that it may, in a modified form, be adopted as a
particular agreement among the Six. This may prevent American
producers from exporting to the Six certain products in connection
with which appellations of origin are used generically (for instance,
Champagne, Sauterne or Burgundy for wines). Theoretically such
trade was possible in the past-but this is hardly a significant factor
in American trade.
C. PROTECTION AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION

In contrast to patent, design and trademark law, where by legislation, regulation or administrative technique the Six have developed
differences which create serious obstacles to uniformity, the fundamentals of the law of unfair competition-the requirements of good
faith toward competitors and the public-are in many respects uniformly viewed by the Community countries. The reasons are historical. The French Revolution abolished guilds and merchant corporations, and the principle was recognized that every person should
be free to engage in such business or to exercise such profession,
art, or trade as he sees fit. Secondly, and as a corollary to the first
principle, it was recognized that this freedom should be limited to
those competitive efforts which are the results of one's own labor and
merit and that the first principle should not be extended to sanction
commercial benefits derived from usurpation of the fruits of a competitor's labor. Thirdly, the need was recognized to make civil
remedies available where either intentional or negligent usurpation
had occurred. Articles I382 and I383 of the Napoleonic Code were
broadly enough stated to do so. Article 1 3 8 2 reads:
Any person who causes injury to another by any acts
whatsoever is obligated to compensate such other person
for the injury sustained.
And Article I 3 83 provides:
A person is responsible for damages not only for those
acts which he has actually committed but also for any damage caused by his negligence or imprudence.
These provisions are still in the French and Belgian Civil Codes.
They are also copied in Articles I40I and I402 of the Dutch Civil
Code and Article 2598 of the Italian Civil Code of I942 (replacing Article I I 5 I of the old Italian Civil Code). The courts of these
four countries, with admirable resourcefulness and flexibility, have
created a vast law of unfair competition by a body of decisions
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which goes beyond anything we have been able to accomplish
through the supposedly adaptable instrument of our common law. 32
Germany has a special Act against Unfair Competition of June
7, 1909 (which served as a model for similar legislation in many
other countries). Its first section contains the so-called general
clause which, first of all, outlaws competitive conduct contrary to
honest practices. In its subsequent sections the Act specifies and prohibits various acts of unfair competition, such as deceptive and unfair advertising, the interference with contracts of employees, the
discrediting of a competitor, his business or goods, the misuse of
business secrets and acts causing confusion. German courts, even
before this Act, had protected against unfair competition on the
basis of general provisions of law.33
Indeed, the Six already had a well-established system of law
against unfair competition by the end of the last century so that they
could readily agree on the inclusion of provisions in this area of law
in the Paris Union Convention. These are contained in Article 10
his which, as last revised at Lisbon, reads as follows:
(I) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to
persons entitled to the benefits of the Union effective
protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices
in industrial or commercial matters constitutes an
act of unfair competition.
(3) The following in particular shall be prohibited:
I. all acts of such a nature as to create confusion by
any means whatever with the establishment, the
goods or the industrial or commercial activities
of a competitor;
2. false allegations in the course of trade which are
of such a nature as to discredit the establishment,
the goods, or the industrial or commercial activities of a competitor;
3· indications or allegations the use of which in the
course of trade is liable to mislead the public as
to the nature, the manufacturing process, the
characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or
the quantity of the goods.

This provision of the Paris Union Convention is self-executing,
and, in the area which it covers, it summarizes the law of unfair competition as enforced in the Common Market countries. But there are
82
Derenberg, The Influence of the French Code Civil on the Modern Law of Unfair
Competition, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L. I (1955).
83
KOHLER, DER UNLAUTERE WEITBEWERB (1914).
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aspects of unfair competition which are not covered by this pro·
vision, such as comparative advertising, enticement of employees,
interference with contracts or advantageous relationships of competitors, use of marks of great reputation on dissimilar products,
reference to a competitor's name or trademark in the sale of spare
parts, use of the original trademark on repaired or reconstructed
products, servile imitation of appearance of products, and the like.
In these areas the domestic law of each country is controlling.
The Paris Union Convention obligates the contracting countries
to assure "effective protection" against unfair competition. Does
this imply the obligation to make injunctions or other summary proceedings available in addition to civil actions which may provide too
slow a remedy? No such speedy remedy is available in France and
Italy. The German Law of 1909 affords an extremely speedy remedy
-the temporary injunction. In the Netherlands the general procedural law provides for provisional injunction by a summary
proceeding before the District Court. In Belgium a special summary
proceeding may be brought before the President of the Tribunal of
Commerce under the Arrete Royal of December 23, 1934.
The need to harmonize the laws of the Six concerning unfair
competition is minor, since they are, except with respect to comparative advertising, slavish imitation of products, regulation of prices,
gifts and discounts and the like, generally uniform. The Community should be little disturbed by differences of detail in the application of such laws. On the other hand, because of the broad similarity
of the law, a uniform law against unfair competition should not be
difficult to adopt, and it would be useful, since it could ensure uniform treatment particularly of more recent problems created by
competitive activity such as the novel problem of know-how.
Americans would welcome any such efforts in the Common Market. The existence of a uniform code for fair competition, and the
attendant certainty that a given act would be uniformly condemned
in every part of the Common Market, would be highly desirable
from the American businessman's viewpoint, however strict the requirements of good faith and fair competition.

D.

PROTECTION OF KNow-How

Although still at the law's periphery, know-how is a subject of increasing importance in international agreements and international
investment. It is intimately related to patents, designs, and trademarks, is frequently included in licensing agreements and may, in-
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deed, be the only subject matter of such agreements. The success of
an industry in the competitive market depends on the development
of know-how by costly research of its own or on the availability of
know-how developed by others. New inventions permit an industry
to make rapid advances but not until new technology and new organizational practices have been developed which make exploitation
of the inventions technically and economically feasible. 34
The challenge of our times is the achievement of a greater economic development and higher standards of living. The sharing of
technical knowledge and experience-of know-how-is of essential
relevance to such achievement. Manufacturers in economically developed, and even more in economically underdeveloped countries,
are anxious to share and to acquire from others technical information and experience, and thousands of agreements are today being
concluded to accomplish this. The rules which determine the conditions under which know-how is to be communicated, the restrictions
imposed on the recipient, and the enforcement of these rules are
obviously of material importance, therefore, in meeting the challenge we face.
It is arguable that Article 36 of the Treaty includes protection of
rights in know-how in the broad notion of "protection of commercial
property." If this is so, the laws of each of the Six will determine
the protection of these rights by virtue of the express provision of
Article 36. In any case, no other provision of the Treaty contemplates action in regard to protection of rights in know-how by the
authorities of the Community except, of course, Article 100 of the
Treaty, the application of which could result in harmonization of
laws relating to those rights.
I. DEFINITION OF KNOW-HOW

The English term appears to have acquired an international acceptance and is generally employed in contracts in languages other
than English. It is generally understood to cover both tangiblesrecipes, formulae, designs, drawings, patterns, technical records,
specifications, lists of materials, and the like-and intangibles-information concerning processes, practical procedures, details of
workshop practice, technological experience and training. No dis.. For instance, a patent for an antibiotic may broadly define the organism, or
describe its fermentation in a nutrient medium as demonstrated by laboratory experiment, but commercialization of the subject matter will entail very considerable additional expense since practical manufacturing techniques must be developed which will
permit production at a reasonable cost.
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tinction is made in the legal treatment of these two elements of
know-how in the countries with which we are concerned. In license
agreements both elements, tangible and intangible, are covered and
in the actual execution of these agreements, both may be furnished.
Practically they differ in that the communication by the licensor to
the licensee of tangibles is more readily proved, and in regard to
problems of secrecy of the subject matter.
In European countries, know-how, which is the subject of license
agreements, is distinguished from industrial and business secrets.
The latter are protected without regard to the existence or absence
of contractual obligations, and such protection is available only if
a betrayal of secrets or breach of confidence in bad faith has occurred. The fact that industrial secrets may be the subject of license
agreements can neither increase or decrease the protection afforded
by these rules.
There is general agreement that the elements of know-how in a
given instance must be of practical commercial or industrial value to
merit protection. But must they also be secret in the sense that prior
to disclosure to the licensee they were known only by the licensor;
or is it sufficient that they were unknown to the licensee only, or that,
even though known to some competitors, they were also kept secret
by them and were not, therefore, known to competitors generally?
In Belgium and France, opinion is divided. In the Netherlands
and Germany it may, perhaps, be sufficient that know-how is valuable to the licensee in that without the license he could only obtain
the information and knowledge it comprises by expending time and
money. In Italy exclusive knowledge of the licensor is not required,
but there must be secrecy in the sense that the matter is not generally
known to competitors or readily available to the licensee from
normal sources.
2. NATURE OF THE RIGHT IN KNOW-HOW

Is the right in the know-how, as the subject matter of a grant, a
property right or is it only a right based on a contractual relationship? If know-how is considered to be property, certain consequences follow: transfer of possession only might be contracted for, the
grantor retaining title; in such a case a third party without notice
might be prevented from using or disclosing the know-how, and it
would not be part of the goodwill of the licensee transferable along
with other elements of goodwill. Moreover, creditors could not attach it. If, on the other hand, title were transferred to the grantee,
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creditors could attach the know-how. Here the distinction between
tangible and intangible elements of know-how, as well as the contract terms, might be of importance.
In this field, as in others, the right is defined by the remedy available under law. In the Six the remedy available is one for a breach of
contract. Breach of the obligation to respect secrecy may also be
considered a tort, and the penal law affords a sanction as well.
Articles I7 and I9 of the German Law against Unfair Competition provide for both civil and criminal sanctions, and injunctions
are also available under its general provisions. In Belgium and
France, an action for damages is available under the broad provisions of Article I382 of the Civil Code, which is the basis of the law
against acts of unfair competition. Article 309 of the Belgian Penal
Code and Article 4 I 8 of the French Penal Code provide for criminal punishment of anyone who fraudulently, or with intention to
cause harm, communicates manufacturing secrets to third parties.
In addition, Article 2 of the Arrete Royal of December 23, I934,
of Belgium provides for a summary remedy akin to an injunction in
certain cases of unfair competition, which include the unauthorized
use of models, specimens, technical combinations, and formulae of
a competitor, and generally, of all information or documents entrusted to another. In Italy, the general principles of unfair-competition law based on Article 2598 of the Civil Code protect knowhow. A special provision in Article 2 I o 5 of the same Code affords
protection against the divulging of information relating to the organization or methods of production of an enterprise. Anyone who,
having had access by reason of his status or profession to information intended to remain secret, communicates such information to
others or exploits the same for his own benefit is subject to criminal
punishment under Article 623 of the Penal Code, and damages may
also be obtained. In theN etherlands, a contract or a tort action may
be brought and there are also penal provisions (Articles 272 and
273 of the Penal Code) against intentional divulgation of secret
information which should be kept confidential because of the actual
or previous professional position of the person who divulges or
because a commercial or industrial enterprise had ordered that such
information be kept secret. The courts also may enjoin the unauthorized use of know-how.
In the absence of recognition of property in know-how, a third
party is not liable to action and may keep and use the know-how
received from the communicatee so long as he has paid value for it
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and had no knowledge of the contractual restrictions between the
licensor and licensee. In Germany tortious conduct by a third party
-for instance, the employing of a former employee of the licensee
who was able, by reason of inadequate control, to obtain information or documentary material relating to the know-how-exposes
such third party to an injunction.
Availability of know-how to the public, after communication to
the licensee, which is not attributable to the fault of the licensee,
terminates the right to obtain an injunction against the licensee in
order to prevent violation of the license agreement under both German and Belgian law, but damages may still be obtainable if the
agreement is violated and if the contract makes no exception in regard to public availability. The obligation to pay royalties in such
cases may, however, cease under German law according to a decision
of the Bundesgericht ( I 9 5 I, r 7 B.G.H. 2, p. 42), but not under
Dutch or Belgian law, unless the contract provides otherwise. Even
in Germany, however, there are exceptions in the case where the intention of the contract was to give the licensee a time advantage or
where it provides for a continuous flow of know-how to him and the
royalty is presumed to be unaffected by the publication of a portion
of know-how from time to time.
The undertaking by the licensee not to use the know-how after
termination of the license agreement is fully enforceable under the
laws of Belgium and the Netherlands, but in Germany the right to
use is so limited only during the period from termination of the
agreement until know-how becomes generally accessible.

3·

RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES

License agreements involving the communication of know-how
may contain stipulations restricting the licensee for the term of the
agreement or even after its termination. These include:
(I) clauses prohibiting the licensee from selling the products
made with the aid of know-how outside a defined territory;
( 2) clauses prohibiting the licensee from communicating the
know-how to subsidiaries or branches abroad;
( 3) clauses restricting the licensee to use of the know-how in the
manufacture solely of products, the components, ingredients or raw
materials for which are supplied by the licensor;
( 4) clauses prohibiting the licensee from manufacturing competitive equipment or products for a period of years after termination of the agreement;
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( 5) clauses obligating the licensee to use exclusively the t~ade
mark or trademarks of the licensor;
( 6) clauses requiring the licensee to use the know-how only for
the manufacture of a certain type of products designated by the
licensor.
The German Law against Restrictions on Competition of June
27, I957, is the only national law in the Community which purports
to deal with restrictions to competition relating to know-how. Article 2 I makes applicable to know-how the provisions of Article 20
concerning agreements for patents. Article 2 I provides that these
provisions of Article 20 apply in the case of:
agreements concerning the cession or use of results of inventive character not protected by law, manufacturing
processes, constructions, other results enriching technique
as well as results not protected by law which enrich cultivation in the field of growing plants insofar as they
represent commercial secrets.
Under the provisions of Article 20, agreements are without legal
effect if they impose restrictions on commercial activity which exceed
the scope of the patent monopoly. Under this law restrictions relating to the nature, the extent, the quantity, the area, or the period
of the use of such commercial secrets are permissible.
Of the six restrictive clauses listed above which may appear in
agreements concerning know-how, numbers (I), ( 2), ( 5), and ( 6)
are permissible under German law. Clause (3) is of doubtful legality, and Clause ( 4) is definitely illegal. The same answers obtain under the French Law Decree of August I9, I953· Under Dutch law,
any of these clauses are unenforceable if held contrary to public
interest by administrative decision. On the other hand, in Belgium
and Italy, in the absence of any law against restraints of competition
and in view ofthe broad recognition of the freedom of contract, all
six clauses would be fully enforceable. 35
VI. GENERAL QUESTIONS

A.

PROBLEMS OF TERRITORIAL ASSIGNMENTS AND
LICENSES IN THE COMMON MARKET

The assignment by a patentee or a trademark owner who has obtained protection throughout the Common Market, of his patent or
35
The International Chamber of Commerce through its International Commission on
Industrial property is studying the whole subject of know-how with the view to adopting model provisions for insertion in agreements which would receive uniform enforcement in all countries.
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trademark rights in one or some of the Six, or his licensing of the
use of such rights on an exclusive or non-exclusive basis raises new
problems. One of these-whether such agreements are affected by
the rules against restraint of competition under Articles 8 5 to 90 of
the Treaty-will be considered in the next section of this chapter.
A right of industrial property implies the power to exploit it
commercially, and such exploitation includes the grant of assignments or licenses for a particular country, which are valid under its
industrial property laws. Such grants may, however, create much
the same barriers to the free movement of goods as may result where
adverse rights have been initially obtained by different persons. The
question, then, is whether barriers which may be created by such
assignments and licenses are sanctioned by Article 36 of the Treaty.
Article 36 is directed at the powers of governments of the Member States, reserving to each freedom to legislate in order to protect inter alia industrial property within its territory. Article 3 6
therefore permits prohibitions and restrictions on importation, exportation, and transit justified by legislative protection of industrial
property. In short, it does seem to sanction barriers created by the
assignment or licensing of patents or trademarks.
Moreover, such assignments and licenses are, as a matter of
policy, to be encouraged: they further economic progress and develop competitive conditions. The assignment by a German patentee
of his Italian patent to an Italian enterprise permits the establishment of a new industry or the improvement of national production
in Italy. Licensing by a Dutch trademark owner of his Belgian trademark to a Belgian firm coupled with communication of the relevant
know-how permits the establishment of a new industry in Belgium.
The prohibition of such assignments and licenses would result in
the retention in each country of the Common Market of all technical
improvements achieved in it and therefore in a possible imbalance
of economic development. Yet Article 29 of the Treaty specifically
entrusts the Commission with the task of promoting:
. . . (b) the development of competitive conditions
within the Community to the extent to which such development will result in the increase of the competitive capacity of the enterprises;
. . . (d) a rational development of production and an
expansion of consumption within the Community.
The ultimate question is whether the geographical partitioning of
industrial property rights which results from assignments and licenses can be permitted without creating obstacles to the free move-
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ment of goods within the Community. It can be, perhaps,. if only the
right of the assignee or licensee to manufacture and sell is recognized,
but not his right to prevent the free circulation of goods originating
with the assignor or licensor. Denial of the latter right would permit
purchasers of any goods lawfully placed in the market of one of the
Six by the owner, assignee or licensee of a patent or trademark, to
move them freely throughout the Community.
The Treaty may, indeed, be found to embody such a denial, for it
may be argued that restriction of the free movement of goods which
have been placed in the market of one of the Six would constitute
"a disguised restriction of trade" in the sense of the last sentence of
Article 36. In any case it seems certain that the Council and the
Commission will have to grapple with this problem. 36

B.

RULES AGAINST RESTRAINTS OF COMPETITION AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

It is reported that a wave of consolidation, concentration, specialization and rationalization of industry in the Six is rising. A recent
study lists sixty consolidations of industries in the Six and seventyone agreements between or among financial, industrial, commercial,
and professional enterprises across Community borders involving
the building of new plants and the sharing of technical processes. 37
Some of these arrangements will raise questions when viewed in the
li~ht of the rules against restraints on competition of Articles 8 5-90
of the Treaty. 38
Article 85 provides in general terms that agreements of all kinds
which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market are incompatible with the Common Market and void. Article 86 prohibits the
abuse of a dominant position in the Common Market by one or
more enterprises. Article 87 provides for machinery to establish,
within three years, the regulations and directives necessary to give
effect to Articles 8 5 and 8 6. Article 8 8 makes provision for the
30
The suggested solution of the problem of territorial assignment and licensing would
reflect also the position taken in the United States by the Department of Justice in
U.S. v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), and embodied in H.R. 7234,
86th Cong., rst Sess. ( 1959). The Supreme Court subsequently noted probable jurisdiction in the Guerlain case, 355 U.S. 937 (1958) and later vacated and remanded the
case for consideration of a motion to dismiss by the United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
31
N.Y. Times, March 29, 1959, § r, p. 19, col. 3 (late city ed.).
38
A thorough analysis of these Articles is undertaken in another chapter. The possible significance of Articles 85 to 90 of the Treaty to industrial property agreements or
to dominant positions centered in industrial property rights alone will be considered
here.
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period before the regulations contemplated in Article 87 are issued,
requiring each Member State to pass upon agreements and the use
of dominant positions in accordance with its own law and the provisions of Articles 8 5 and 8 6. Article 8 9 provides for the policing
of Articles 8 5 and 86 by the Commission. Article 90 applies only to
public enterprises, fiscal monopolies, and similar non-private corporate bodies.
Whether these provisions apply in the field of industrial property,
for example to license agreements involving patents, designs or
trademarks, or to action by one or more firms based on a dominant
patent position, has been debated. One argument has been that in
excluding prohibitions or restrictions in respect of importation, exportation or transit justified by the protection of industrial or commercial property from the Treaty's reach, Article 36 must also exclude those due to commercial use and exploitation of such property.
Article 90 relating inter alia to enterprises to which Member States
accord special or exclusive rights, has also been interpreted as applicable to industrial property, since the owner thereof must, by
the nature of things, be deemed to receive from the Member States
"special or exclusive rights." 39
These views must be discounted. The terms of Articles 85 and
86 are too general and broad to permit the assumption that they
were not intended to apply to industrial property. Had there been
such an intention, it would have been clearly indicated as, for instance, is done in the British Restrictive Trade Practices Act of
I 9 56 (Section 8) and in the German Restrictive Trade Practices
Act ( Gesetz gegen W ettbewerbsbeschrankungen) of June 2 7, I 9 57
(Articles I6, 20 and 2I). Article 36 of the Treaty leaves to the
Member States the power to legislate to protect industrial property rights, but this is not in conflict with Articles 8 5 and 86 which
will affect the action or agreements of those entitled to industrial
property rights which tend to restrict competition unduly.
The real issue, therefore, is how far it is possible to reconcile two
equally important objectives of the Common Market: the promotion of economic progress and development by recognizing and protecting lawful monopolies involved in industrial property; and the
elimination of concentrations of economic power and of agreements
unduly restricting competition by enforcing anti-monopoly and antitrust rules.
39
Gotzen, La Propriete lndustrielle et les Articles 36 et 90 du Traite instituant la
Communaute Economique Europeenne," REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT COMMERCIAL 261

( 1958).
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European jurists generally advocate special rules for restrictions
related to industrial property rights, since such restrictions have
always been accepted as a normal and necessary method of exploiting industrial property. The owner of such rights, who is fully entitled to prohibit others from using his property, should also be able
to grant limited rights-for instance, exclusive rights limited to
one country only, or rights conditioned upon his control of production by the licensee or upon sale by the licensee at fixed prices. 40
In the view of these jurists the regulations to be issued under Article 87 by the Council should specifically except such "normal" exploitation of industrial property rights, and a list of clauses of agreements which should be permissible has been suggestedY
40
Bodenhausen, The Effect of the European Common Market and Free Trade Area
on Industrial Property, British Group of International Association for the Protection
of Industrial Property, Feb. 25, 1958. Professor Bodenhausen states the position quite
forcefully:

It is not only normal, but also in principle desirable, on account of the common
interest underlying the recognition of industrial property, that the owner of such
property, whose rights fully entitle him to prohibit others from using his property,
should also be able to grant limited rights to certain selected parties, for instance
in the form of exclusive licenses confined to one or more countries or by means of
a series of non-exclusive licenses on mutually differing terms. In granting such
licenses, production control, price fixing, and so on, are indispensable adjuncts. If
such arrangements are no longer permitted, the owners of industrial property will
either prefer to exercise their rights solely by prohibiting others from industrial
property altogether, that is to say, they will apply for fewer patents or none at
all and instead try to keep their inventions secret, or they will invest less in the
exploitation and protection of trademarks. If this were to happen, industrial property, which has hitherto been recognized as being in the public interest, would to
some extent cease to serve its purpose.
"The Commission d'Etudes de Ia Propriete lndustrielle of the Belgian Group of the
International Association of Industrial Property attached to a report dated September
6, 1958, the following appendix on what must be considered "normal exploitation of
industrial property":
I. In granting licenses the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to decide
on the licensee and on the scope of the license which he wishes to grant.
For example, he may
(a) stipulate the geographical area;
(b) stipulate the technical scope;
(c) stipulate whether the.license shall be exclusive or not;
(d) grant merely a sales license or limit the manufacturing license solely to licensee's own use or to sales in a specified territory;
(e) fix the term on the license;
(f) decide on quantity and quality.
2. In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to stipulate
conditions relating to the creation and keeping in force of those rights.
3· In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty, in order
to safeguard the commercial value of his rights, to stipulate the conditions under which
the products or services covered by the license shall be traded or performed by the
licensee.
For example, he may stipulate
(a) price conditions, possibly at second or further hand (think of branded goods);
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Reference in this connection is made to the Treaty establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community which contains provisions,
analogous to those of Articles 8 5 and 86 of the Rome Treaty, in
Articles 6o, 65, and 66. The High Authority of the Coal and Steel
Community in its Fourth Report on its activities covering the period
April 1955-April 1956 on page 151, stated:
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The High Authority holds the view that agreements relating solely to the working of patents are not to be
regarded as a restriction to the normal operation of competition within the meaning of the Treaty, and that accordingly, the granting of exclusively regional rights in the
present case is not at variance with the provisions of the
Treaty.
This statement of the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Community is rather limited in its scope and cannot be cited in support of
the general proposition that any agreement or action which does
involve undue restraint is permitted so long as it is related to an
industrial property right.
(b) that the goods or services shall be used only for specified purposes or in
specified territories;
(c) that mention shall be made of the fact that the process, product or services
are being traded or performed under the license.
+ In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to fix the
system of remuneration, which may e.g. take one or more of the following forms:
(a) a lump sum payment;
(b) payment of royalties;
(c) agreement on a minimum remuneration;
(d) a remuneration independent of the number or actual use of the industrial
property rights to which the license relates;
(e) a ceiling amount for the payment of royalties;
(f) payment of fees necessary to keep the rights in force (think of the exclusive
licensee) ;
(g) acquisition of ownership of, or license on, industrial property rights belonging
to the licensee.
5· In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to impose
conditions to safeguard the technical exercise of the industrial property rights.
He may, for example, stipulate
(a) quality control;
(b) the obligatory use of specified raw materials, semi-manufactured products,
components or tools.
6. In granting licenses, the holder of industrial property rights is at liberty to attach
the following conditions to the licfnses:
(a) the licensee may be prohibited from concluding similar license agreements
with others;
(b) the licensee may be bound to supply to the patentee goods manufactured or
services performed under the license, possibly limited to a specified quantity
and/or at a specified price.
7· It is admissible in itself to pool industrial property rights for the purpose of exploiting them.
In all the cases mentioned above, the holder is at liberty, when granting licenses to
different parties, to vary the extent of the conditions from one licensee to another.
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Instead of this overly general proposition would it not be more
reasonable to hold that insofar as agreements involving industrial
property rights keep within the scope of the grant of the patent,
design or trademark right, the making of such agreements constitutes the exercise of the lawful monopoly embodied in such grant,
but insofar as they go outside the scope of the grant, they may be
prohibited by Articles 8 5 and 86? Fixing the price at which the
licensee shall sell is not within the scope of the grant nor is a clause
obligating the licensee to buy raw materials, available in the market,
from the patentee. On the contrary, the grant by the patentee or
trademark owner of a license limited to a particular territory is
within such scope.
Indeed, if industrial property rights are deemed to be agencies
of economic progress and industrial and technical advance, then
agreements granting rights thereunder would be agreements "which
contribute to the improvement of the production or distribution of
goods, or to the prom<1tion of technical or economic progress" under
paragraph 3 of Article 85 of the Treaty. As such they would not
be prohibited, provided they:
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions not indispensable to the attainment of the
above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition
in respect of a substantial proportion of the goods
concerned (Article 8 5 para. 3) .
To European lawyers the concept of "restrictions of competition"
is a novel one. In the Six, and particularly in the field of industrial
property, the familiar concepts are "abuse of right" or "offense
against the public interest." For example, in contrast to American
patent law, which in no case does so, European patent laws penalize
non-working of patents by compulsory licensing and enable the application of restrictions to the patentee's rights for reasons of public
interest (national security, promotion of public health and safety,
and the like) .
It is doubtful, however, whether Article 8 5 paragraph 3 will be
interpreted, under the directives and regulations to be issued under
Article 87, as incorporating only the ideas of "abuse" and "offense
against the public interest."
A further question is raised by Article 88 which provides that,
pending the promulgation of appropriate regulations or directives
under Article 87, the Member States shall pass upon agreements
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(involving inter alia, industrial property rights) according to their
own laws and to the provisions of Article 8 5, especially paragraph
3. The domestic law of the Six plainly differs from the rules established by Articles 8 5 and 86. Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy have
no antitrust law of any kind 41 n and certainly agreements of the "normal" type described above relating to industrial property rights
would be entirely proper and valid. In the Netherlands, the law of
June 28, 1956, requires agreements to be registered and the Minister
of Economic Affairs has the right to annul, by means of an administrative decision, an agreement contrary to public interest. In Germany, the law of July 23, 1957 declares all agreements in restraint
of competition, with certain exceptions, to be in principle null and
void. Among these are vertical price agreements in respect of trademarked goods (in Article I 6) and a number of restrictive clauses in
contracts concerning the acquisition or use of patents (in Articles
20 and 21). In France, the Decree of August 9, 1953, prohibits
the fixing of minimum prices, but exceptions are permitted in cases
of exclusive rights based on a patent, license or design.
The Treaty goes well beyond the national law of the Member
countries. Nonetheless it is difficult to conclude that at least "normal" agreements involving industrial property rights will be invalidated. This is true even if Articles 8 5 and 86 are held to be selfexecuting and even if they are held applicable to industrial property
agreements. 42
The final definition of the scope of Articles 8 5 and 86 in regard
to agreements relating to industrial property is of importance to
Americans. The Common Market subsidiaries of U.S. corporations
will, of course, be subject to Community law, even if they are beyond
the reach of United States antitrust law. Moreover Community
law will be relevant to the validity of agreements between American corporations and their subsidiaries or third parties in the Community.
If regulations or directives issued under Article 87 exempt agreements relating to industrial property rights or if such agreements
ua By February 1960, antitrust bills have been introduced before the Parliaments
of Italy and Belgium.
'"Tuberies Louis Julien S.A. v. Van Katwijk's Papier-en carton verwerkende Industrien, Rechtb, Zutphen, July II, 1959, [1958] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 984
(Neth.) held that Articles 85 and 86 were not applicable, and that the existing domestic law continued to apply.
On the other hand, the decision in Judgment of February 19, 1959, 2 Beschlussabteilung des Bundeskartellamts, [1959] GRUR Ausl. 252 held that the provisions of Articles 85 If. of t~e Treaty are applicable law in a case dealing with provisions in the
license of a patent which limited competition.
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are within paragraph 3 of Article 85, properly construed, American
owners of industrial property rights may, on the one hand, be required by Common Market licensees to enter into the kind of agreements which in the light of American decisions may be frowned upon
by our courts.
VII. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

A

THE LIKELIHOOD THAT CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY LAw WILL OccuR

The adoption by the Six of a uniform patent, design or trademark
law is unlikely in the near future. So, probably, is any major rewriting of their industrial property laws. These laws reflect a balance of
the interests of those who own industrial property rights, the consuming public, and the state. Their amendment would shift this
balance, and the reappraisal and attempted new reconciliation of
interests which would necessarily precede it would be a difficult
process even if the ends sought were purely domestic. Since goals
in this context would be those of a community of six nations, the
difficulties would obviously be far harder to overcome.
It seems equally unlikely-as the above discussion has indicated
-that industrial property law in the Common Market will remain
unchanged. The question is how far changes will go and how soon
they will take place.

B.

THE PROBABLE KINDS OF CHANGES

It may be reasonably expected that procedure will be simplified,
both as a result of forces which were already at work in Europe
and of others which the Common Market will inevitably set in motion. The Conventions for Uniform Formalities and Uniform Classification of Patents will almost certainly be ratified by the few countries of the Six that have not already done so, but further simplication is possible. An agreement may be reached making it possible to
institute a common search for novelty through the Institute of The
Hague, or even to file a single patent application, copies of which
would thereafter be communicated to the individual patent offices
of the Six.
These changes, however, are not of immediate significance to the
principal goal of the Common Market-the creation of an area
within which goods, persons, services, and capital can circulate with
ever-increasing freedom. A second question is, therefore, whether
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the law will be harmonized in order to avoid obstacles to the free
movement of goods which industrial property rights, arising under
six disparate legal systems, would otherwise tend to create.
The probability of harmonization will be determined by two
factors. The first-which will exert pressure in favor of harmonization-is the fact that where industrial property rights are created by
differing laws, obstacles to the free movement of goods do inevitably
tend to result. The discussion in the previous pages of the problems
resulting from differences in the laws of the Six makes this clear.
The second factor which will determine the probability of harmonization (essentially by determining what weight will be given
to the first factor) is the direction in which the Common Market will
evolve. The Treaty's effect should be ultimately to free trade, permitting it to flow increasingly in natural economic channels and to
conform to the logic of mass production, specialization, and centralization. But political and economic policies of the Member States
may retard this process, and nationalistic attitudes may prevent appropriate counteraction by Community authorities. If these pessimistic apprehensions do not materialize, integration should inevitably proceed. The Rome Treaty would then be only a beginning,
and logic would compel extension of common action to new fields.
Harmonization of industrial property laws in such an environment
would necessarily follow.

C.

LAWS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE HARMONIZED

Harmonization of the law is most likely where it is essential and
therefore least likely to provoke vigorous opposition. Harmonization of the patent laws of the Six may probably be expected, therefore, which will:
(I) result in a uniform duration of patents;
( 2) make possible a single payment of annuities to be apportioned among the Six;
( 3) create a system of working requirements under which working in one of the Six will satisfy requirements in each of the others;
and
( 4) result in a common definition of novelty of inventions.
Harmonization even after the twelve to fifteen years transition
period seems improbable in other areas of patent law. Some of the
problems in other areas-opposition procedure, patentability, subject-matter-have been discussed. Others-inventions of employees, the treatment of inventions of additions or improvements by
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others, the incontestability of patents after a certain period, compulsory licensing for reasons of public interest-were not touched
on.
Harmonization of certain aspects of the laws of the Six governing
designs may come about through the agreement now being discussed
by the inter-Governmental Committee sponsored by U.N.E.S.C.O.
Otherwise even an agreement on uniformity of duration appears
difficult in view of the wide divergence between the fifty-year term
in France and the four-year term in Italy. The only safe prediction
is that Luxembourg and the Netherlands will pass legislation to protect designs.
Harmonization of the trademark laws of the Six may be very extensive. I am advised that plans are already being discussed in
Germany for the institution of a "European Community Trademark., The adoption and registration of such a mark at a central
office would be given effect throughout the Common Market area.
The already existing system of international registration at the
Berne Bureau should give added impetus to such a plan.
The new Convention of Nice of 19 57 providing for a uniform
classification of goods will most probably be ratified by all six
countries. The creation of a common search center for trademarks
of the Common Market countries to enable easy searches for anticipations should not, moreover, be difficult. Harmonization could also
result in a uniform duration of trademark registrations, a provision
that use of a registered trademark in one of the Six will prevent forfeiture of the registrations of the mark in the other five. Finally,
uniform provisions may be adopted defining the quantum of transfer
of goodwill which will validate an assignment of a trademark and
the requirements of a valid license. The latter may include recording
in a central European office in order to ensure notice to the public.
Leaving aside problems of trade names, appellations of origin,
unfair competition, and know-how, harmonization of laws controlling territorial assignments and licenses and agreements involving
industrial property, which may involve unlawful restrictions of
competition, is also indicated. Free circulation of goods throughout
the Common Market, once they have been lawfully placed on the
market by the owner of the industrial property right, calls for uniform regulation. With regard to the application of Articles 8 5, 8 6
and 88 to agreements involving grants of industrial property rights,
it is assumed that the Council will issue directives under Article 87.
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How HARMONIZATION MAY BE EFFECTED

Harmonization of the laws may be brought about in two ways.
The domestic law of the Six may be changed pursuant to directives
of the Council. If this should be the avenue chosen, nationals of
countries outside the Common Market, and therefore American
nationals, will be entitled to the benefits of these changes by virtue
of the national-treatment clause of the Paris Union Convention.
On the whole, these changes will be advantageous to American
owners of European industrial property rights since simplification
and uniformity of procedural and substantive law will result. Because of the compromises which the changes will necessarily entail,
some Americans may find new laws in individual countries less advantageous than are the present ones, however.
A second means of bringing about harmonization of the procedural and substantive laws of the Six would be intra-Common Market arrangements extending defined reciprocal benefits to the nationals of the other countries of the Six. If this means is chosen, the
primary question will be whether such arrangements will be closed or
open to countries which are not members of the Common Market
Community. If closed, only American nationals and branches or
subsidiaries of American corporations established in the six countries will be entitled to the benefit of such arrangements; if open,
and if the United States becomes a party to them, Americans and
American corporations established in the United States and elsewhere may avail themselves of the provisions of such arrangements.
It is not likely that there will be an attempt to conclude closed
arrangements. Should closed arrangements be concluded, it is nevertheless probable that they will be followed by the enactment of laws
in each Member Country making their provisions applicable to its
nationals and consequently to persons enjoying national treatment
under the Paris Union Convention. This conclusion is based on a
number of considerations.
First, it is plainly to the interest of each of the Six to extend to
its own nationals in its own territory any benefits or advantages extended to other Community nationals. If Italy is to agree that the
obligation to work a patent owned by a German national will be
complied with if the patent is worked in Germany, Italian patentees
will also want to be able to meet Italian working requirements by
working their patents in Germany. If Italian patentees alone are
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to continue to be required to work their inventions in Italy, they
may be forced to transfer their inventions to associates in the other
countries of the Common Market, or run the risk of forfeiture.
Transfer or forfeiture in Italy for non-working would represent
economic loss to Italy, destroying an Italian asset in the European
Economic Community.
When each country is a separate economic unit sheltered by economic barriers, it may, moreover, make sense to require local manufacture of patented inventions. Having created a unified economic
area within which products, services and capital may move freely,
the Six can no longer justify working requirements, however.
Secondly, a special arrangement among the Six extending reciprocal benefits to their nationals but leaving unchanged the domestic
law in each country would, in effect, create discrimination against
nationals of the other 41 Paris Union countries. It may be argued
that such a special arrangement is authorized by Article I 5 of the
Paris Union Convention, which reads :
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve
the right to make separately between themselves special
arrangements for the protection of industrial property,
insofar as these arrangements do not contravene the provisions of the present Convention.
Examples of "restricted Unions" created under Article 15 are
those of the Madrid Arrangement for the International Registration of Trademarks, the Madrid Arrangement for the Repression
of False Indications of Origin, the Arrangement of The Hague for
the International Deposit of Designs, and the Lisbon Arrangement
for the International Registration of Appellations of Origin.43
These Arrangements give the nationals of the parties thereto special
advantages not available under the Paris Union Convention, but
they remain open to accession by any Paris Union member.
A special arrangement of the Six providing that working of a
patent by a Community national in one of them would satisfy working requirements in the others, would obviously discriminate against
patentees of the other 41 countries of the Paris Union. If the Six
concluded such a closed Treaty, however, its conformity with the
spirit of the Paris Union Convention would be questionable. Article
I 5 does not require that special arrangements be open to accession
by all countries of the Union, but the general qualification that such
arrangements should not "contravene the stipulations of the Con.. The United States is not a party to any of these Arrangements.
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vention" must be understood to imply that arrangements may not
defeat the fundamental purpose of the Convention-the most complete and effective protection of industrial property possible-nor
may they substitute reciprocity for national treatment as the basic
principle of the Union.
Thirdly, even if such a closed treaty were permissible under Article 15 of the Paris Union Convention, it would be self-defeating.
For one of its main objects would be the removal of barriers to the
free flow of Community trade and yet it would of itself encourage
the creation of substantial trade barriers in the Community. For
if a non-Community national could not avoid compulsory licensing
or forfeiture of his patent by working it in only one country of the
Six, he would be motivated to create barriers either by entering into
exclusive license agreements with particular manufacturers in each
of the six countries or by forfeiting his patent in some of the countries and retaining it in others, thereby preventing the free circulation of the relevant goods in the latter.
Finally, an attempt by the Six to create special rules for industrial
property rights not applicable to non-Community nationals might
provoke similar moves by others, for example, the Outer Seven.
This would not only counter-balance the Community's action but
might also be fatal to the Paris Union Convention.
The only logical solution is therefore uniformity of the law on
the points which may create obstacles to the free movement of goods
in the Common Market so that the same benefits will be available to
all owners of Community industrial property rights regardless of
their nationality or domicile.
For these reasons, American owners of industrial property rights
should welcome progress towards harmonization of industrial
property laws in the Common Market.

Chapter VI

Labor Law and Social Security
Otto Kahn-Freund

*

INTRODUCTION
It is the object of this chapter to consider the effect of the establishment and functioning of the European Economic Community
on the legal principles and institutions governing labor-management relations in the members of the Community. The Treaty of
Rome contains a number of provisions on social policy, of which
some are potentially very important, indeed perhaps indispensable
to the functioning of the Community. At the time of writing ( 1959)
the Community is, however, still at the beginning of its formative
stage, and the social policies embodied in the Treaty are largely
promises rather than achievements. Moreover, some of the provisions of the Treaty are simply general statements of policy or of
legislative programs-blanks to be filled in in accordance with economic and political developments which cannot now be predicted.
No prophecies of any kind will be attempted here; the following
pages will within certain limits give an account of what has happened and of what is happening. They will leave it to the reader,
if he is so inclined, to form his own judgement as to what is more or
less likely to happen in the future.
Nor will any attempt be made to analyze the details of labor law
in the Six; there, as everywhere, labor law is extremely complex.
Such details as are discussed will only serve to illustrate the broad
principles and to explain the fundamental institutions of labor-management relations which are thought to be of interest to those to
whom this book is addressed. A very brief account of the salient
features of social security law will also be included. Social security
"'Doctor of Laws, Frankfurt, 1925; Master of Laws, London, 1935. Professor of Law
in the University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science, since
1951; Visiting Professor at Yale Law School, 1955-56. Judge in German courts, 1928-33.
Barrister-at-Law (Middle Temple), 1936-. Co-Editor, Modern Law Review. Author
of numerous publications on labor law and other subjects.
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law is not only complex, however, it is extraordinarily kaleidoscopic,
so that everything said today may very well have lost its validity
tomorrow.
Accordingly this chapter falls under three headings, the last of
which is an appendix. The first part is an attempt to analyze the
Treaty itself and its impact on labor law and social security. The
second is, as it were, a sketch map of the intricate landscape of
the labor laws in the Six, including in particular the mutual relations of constitutions, treaties, legislation, and collective bargaining, the structure of unions, employers' associations, and their mutual relations, the role of the law in the enforcement of collective
agreements, the legal representation of employees at plant level,
the settlement of collective and individual disputes, and the special
problems relating to the termination of contracts of employment.
The third part will deal with some features of social security law.
None of these matters will be sufficiently analyzed to make possible the solution of practical issues. The object is to help the reader
to ask the right questions rather than to give those answers which
only the expert on the spot can provide.
I. THE IMPACT OF THE TREATY ON LABOR LAW
AND SOCIAL SECURITY

A.

GENERAL

The report made to the foreign ministries of the Six on April
21, 1956, by the Heads of the Delegations forming the Intergovernmental Committee set up by the Messina Conference (commonly
referred to as the "Spaak Report") must serve in this field as the
point of departure for an analysis of the Treaty itself.l The Report emphasizes that the removal of internal tariffs and import
quotas is in itself not sufficient for the creation of a common market.
Other measures are required, and among these special importance
attaches to provisions designed to promote mobility of labor and
to those facilitating re-adaptation so as to protect workers from the
"burdens and risks" attending progressive change. One of the aims
of the Community must be the free circulation not only of goods
and services, but also of the "factors of production themselves, that
1
Comite Intergou'IJernemental Cree par la Confirence de Messine, Rapport des Chefs
de Delegations aux M inistres des A/faires Etrangeres (April 21, 1956) [hereinafter
cited as Spaak Report]. The Inter-Governmental Committee had been established by
the Messina Conference in June, 1955, under the Chairmanship of M. Paul-Henri
Spaak, then Belgian Foreign Minister.
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is of capital and of men." "Thus we must give hope to an unemployed labor force, which instead of being a burden for some countries, will be transformed into an asset for Europe." This, however,
cannot be achieved overnight. "Transformations as fundamental
as these cannot be accomplished without long delay. Within reasonable limits, one year more or less makes no essential difference. The
chances that the Common Market will be firmly established are
all the better if the period provided for its establishment permits
a gradual coalescence of monetary policies and of social policies." 2
"A gradual coalescence of social policies" ( uune convergence
progressive . . . dans les politiques sociales") appears in the
Spaak Report not perhaps as an indispensable condition for the
functioning of a common market, but as one of the elements which
may greatly assist in giving it firm foundations. At the end of the
transitional period labor should be free to circulate in the Community and common social legislation for which the Treaty provides
should have been enacted. 3
It is useful at the outset to bear in mind that, within the framework of the Spaak Report as well as within that of the Treaty itself,
the gradual assimilation of social and labor legislation and administration is intended to serve two related but distinct purposes: the
removal of obstacles to migration of labor, and the removal of
what are called "distortions" of competition. More will have to be
said about the first point, especially with regard to social security
law. The Spaak Report approaches the second problem with great
caution. It deals with the "correction of distortions," pointing to
the possibility that legislative and administrative measures, other
than those of an openly discriminatory kind and those openly supporting certain industries or enterprises, may in fact falsify "the
conditions of competition between national economies as a whole or
certain of their branches." 4 Yet, the Report is at great pains to
point out that differential burdens-for example, through public
expenditure or through social security programs-do not in themselves falsify the conditions of competition, since they may be compensated for by rates of exchange. The Report also indicates that
it is quite wrong to think that competition can develop only on the
basis of equalizing the conditions which determine prices. "On
the contrary: it is on the basis of certain differentials that equilibrium can be established and exchange be developed. It is thus for
• I d. at 17-19.

• I d. at

20.

• I d. pt. I, tit.

2,

ch.

2

at 6o.
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example with differences in wage levels if they correspond to differences in productivity." And the Report points to the common
interest in establishing labor-intensive industries in regions where
labor is abundant. The Report is strongly influenced by the expectation that, as the demand for labor rises where labor is cheapest,
wage rates will tend to rise, and that, on the other hand, the free
circulation of labor will gradually facilitate an equalization of conditions of employment. 5
These passages of the Spaak Report are of fundamental importance for an understanding of the Treaty and of the policies to
which its provisions seek to give effect. "Equalization, so far from
being a condition precedent of the operation of the common market,
is, on the contrary, its result. Hence it is useless to try somehow
to modify by decree the fundamental conditions of an economy
which arise from its natural resources, its level of productivity, the
significance of public burdens. Part of what is commonly called
harmonization can therefore only be the result of the functioning
of the common market itself, of the economic forces which it releases, and of the contacts between those interested to which it
leads." 6
This is clearly not intended to be a plea for laissez-faire. "Deliberate and concerted action" is necessary for the functioning of
the Common Market. But it must be "limited." It must consist in
"correcting or eliminating the effect of specific distortions which
further or hinder certain branches of (economic) activity." 7
At first sight the problem here looks like that of the chicken and
the egg-that is, is harmonization of labor conditions a prerequisite
or a consequence of the Common Market? The answer given by
the Report is clear-generally speaking new economic conditions
should be allowed to have their impact on labor conditions, and
"harmonization" should be resorted to only where there are "specific distortions."
These policies are reflected in the Treaty, but not as clearly as
might have been the case. This may be due to the fact that the
relevant provisions were drafted only at the end of the crucial conversation between the French and West German Prime Ministers. 8
It seems to have been argued, especially by the French Government,
"/d. at 6o-6r.
• /d. at 6r.
7
/bid.
8
See Katzenstein, Der /lrbeitnehmer in der europaischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft,
31 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 (1957).
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that an elimination of gross distortions was not enough, but that
it would be necessary to assimilate the entire labor and social legislation of the Member States completely so as to achieve parity of
wages and social costs. The relevant provisions show the traces
of a compromise between these two policies, but the general policy
of harmonization as visualized by the Treaty would not appear
to run counter to the principles of the Spaak Report, and only
one of the special clauses imposes upon the members a compulsory obligation to take any concrete steps towards its realization. 0
At the same time the Treaty places more emphasis than the Report
on a deliberate policy of social improvement.
This is the meaning of the key Article I I 7 which has obviously
confronted the Commission with difficulties of interpretation. Article I I 7 provides:
Member States hereby agree upon the necessity to promote improvement of the living and working conditions
of labor so as to permit the equalization of such conditions
in an upward direction.
They consider such a development will result not only from
the functioning of the Common Market which will favor
the harmonization of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for under this Treaty and from the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions.
At first sight this Article seems to disinter "the chicken-versusthe-egg" issue which had been so effectively buried by the Spaak
Report. The first paragraph looks like a prescription and the second is more nearly a prediction; the first purports to inaugurate a
policy, the second expresses a prophecy. In the first paragraph the
"equalization" of the living and working conditions "in an upward
direction" is envisaged as one of the objectives of the Community,
no doubt as being desirable in itself, and at the same time as a part
of the foundation of the Common Market. This means that by
appropriate measures the conditions are gradually to be improved
until they are at the level of that Member State which has the
highest standard. But the second paragraph seems to express the
view, adumbrated to some extent, as we have seen, by the Spaak
Report, that, if coupled with "the procedures provided for under
this Treaty and . . . the approximation of legislative and administrative provisions," the automatism of the Common Market itself
9

Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, art. II9
[hereinafter cited as Treaty], 298 U.N.T.S. 14 (1958).
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will produce the harmonization which in the first paragraph is seen
as the end product of deliberate policies directed towards it.
That this is very far from being a legal "point," a lawyer's quibble, is shown by the attitude of the Commission, which has been at
great pains to clarify the interpretation of Article I I 7. 10 The
second paragraph might have been thought to be compatible with
a policy by which conditions of employment are not forced up but
forced down. Competition may produce a uniform level of prices and
wages below that prevailing in any given Member State. One country
may be forced to dilute its social security system so as to remain
competitive with others. This interpretation has been emphatically
rejected by the Commission. It
. . . considers that Article I 17 provides for the equalization in an upward direction of the living and working conditions of labor, and a functioning of the Common Market
which will favor the harmonization of social systems cannot imply a levelling on a theoretical average standard of
living, as this would, for example, force those countries
with the most advanced economic and social development
to hold up their social evolution till less fortunate countries have managed to catch up. Against this equalization
should be placed the desire to encourage and help all
peoples in the Community to improve their existing social
situation, as the equalization provided for by the Treaty
must be sought by means of more rapid progress in those
areas where progress seems to be most needed. 11
This official view of the Commission was further expounded by
Signor Petrilli, a member of the Commission and President of its
Social Affairs Group. He added the significant observation that
. . . the concept "equalization in an upward direction"
constitutes neither a reason to hold up development in
the countries at present most favored nor a Utopian yearning after mechanical equalization of living and working
conditions. For the Commission, this concept means an approach directed to offering individuals, social groups, geographical areas and economic sectors equal opportunities
to play their part in social progress. 12
This latter point is of importance. The "living and working conditions" referred to in the first paragraph of Article I 17 are clearly
10

See (Sept. 18, 1958-Mar. 20, 1959] E.E.C. COMMISSION, SECOND GENERAL REPORT
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY, ch. 6 (hereinafter cited as SECOND GEN'L REP.].
11
I d. para. 169 at IO]-Q8.
l2 See Petrilli, The Social Policy of the Commission, in Bulletin of the European
Economic Commission, May 1959, at 5 [hereinafter cited as Bulletin].
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understood, and to be understood, as an aggregate, and it will thus
be legitimate, for example, when comparing wage levels, to take
into account the effect of social security schemes or of public services (health, housing and the like) provided out of governmental
funds. This has two significant consequences: In the first place, the
Treaty does not inaugurate a policy of "mechanical" assimilation
of legislation. It does not visualize uniformity of labor and social
legislation, not even, necessarily, uniformity of social security burdens as a condition for the functioning of the Common Market. It
does not, after all, give effect to a general program corresponding
to that aspect of French policy in this matter which, in a more special
context, has found expression in the "Protocol relating to Certain
Provisions of Concern to France." 13 In the second place, the interpretation put on Article I I7 by the Commission, by the President of
its Social Affairs Group, and also by the European Parliamentary
Assembly, 14 effects, so to speak, a second burial of the problem of
automatism and planned action which, needless to say, is not really
a mere logical conundrum but a profound problem of economic and
social policy. It reads Article I I 7 as an expression of the views expounded in the Spaak Report in the sense that the automatism of
the Common Market is permitted to have free play as long as it
produces an equalization of working conditions in an upward direction, but that corrective and planned action will have to be taken
if it impedes social progress or-this is implied rather than expressed-leads to a deterioration in the conditions of the more advanced members. In so far, then, as Article I 17 thus interpreted
permits and indeed demands conscious action not only to promote
migration and to remove distortions of competition, but also to
promote social progress, it constitutes a program which goes beyond that envisaged in the Spaak Report.
But even with this third objective of equalization added to the
first two, it is not a program for wholesale legislative and administrative uniformity. Such uniformity is neither one of the objectives
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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Treaty, Protocol Relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France, March 25,
1957, pt. II, 298 U.N.T.S. 14, 133 ( 1958).
"See its Resolution sur les questions sociales traitees dans le premier rapport
general sur l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, pt. I, paras. 2-4,
[1959] jOURNAL 0FFICIEL DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES [hereinafter cited as J'L
OFF.] 167. Numbers 4 and 5 of the Resolution reflect the dilemma discussed in the text.
In the same Resolution (numbers 7-10), the Assembly also expressed the view that
the Commission should urgently pursue a policy of developing the underdeveloped
regions of Europe, and, in this connection, promote development programs transcending
national frontiers, and cooperate in these matters with the Council of Europe and
with O.E.E.C.
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of the Community nor considered a necessary step to achieve the
purposes of the Community formulated in Article 2 of the Treaty.
"The approximation of their respective municipal law" appears in
Article 3 (h) as one of the activities of the Community, but only
"to the extent necessary for the functioning of the Common Market." Any other attitude towards the unification of law would, it is
suggested, be wholly unrealistic generally, and especially in connection with labor and social legislation. The important differences
between the various systems of labor legislation and social security
in the six countries are no doubt partly the result of disparities in
economic development such as the authors of the Spaak Report
and of the Treaty hoped gradually to overcome. To a very large
extent, however, they are caused by differences in tradition, in political outlook, in social mores-differences which are deeply rooted in
the political and social history of Europe and quite incapable of being eliminated by a stroke of the pen of a legislator or treaty maker.
The analogy with the evolution of the United States may be very
misleading. There is all the difference in the world between developing the economy of a largely unpopulated continent for which a
"common market" as well as a bond of political unity was provided
in advance by a common constitution, and seeking to convert into an
economic unit a continent enjoying the benefit, and suffering from
the burden, of rich and manifold and very deep-seated traditions
of thought and action. This may be a truism, but it happens to
be a thought of special significance when contemplating the effect
of the Treaty on social legislation. If, in two neighboring countries
which are as closely connected economically as France and Western
Germany, the structure and significance of collective bargaining and
its relation to legislation, are very different (as in fact they are),
the causes cannot, or cannot only, be found in economic disparities.
They must be looked for in the political history and public opinion
of these countries, and there is nothing to show that even a functioning common market would, within an appreciable future, produce uniformity where for centuries there has been diversity.
Although any thought of unification of labor and social legislation
en bloc may, then, be dismissed at the outset, the "procedures provided for under this Treaty" and "the approximation of legislative
and administrative provisions" are nevertheless expected-as Article I I 7 indicates-to make a contribution to the equalization of
living and working conditions in an upward direction. The "procedures" here referred to are very obviously the steps which, in ac-
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cordance with Article 8, will be taken during the transitional period,
that is, before the Common Market can be said to "function"; and
the gradual reduction of customs duties and elimination of quantitative restrictions within the Community, the gradual establishment
of a common external customs tariff, the raising of agricultural
productivity, the gradual freeing of the movement of workers, services and capital are thought in themselves to be able to help towards
the desired improvement.
A closer look at the Treaty itself and at the Spaak Report is useful, however, in order to determine what role has been assigned to
the "approximation of legislative and administrative provisions,"
in the life of the Community and in the constitutional structure
created by the Treaty.

B.

THE APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

In the Spaak Report 15 the "Assimilation of Legislation" is linked
in one chapter with the "Correction of Distortions," though in a
separate section. It is pointed out that distortions of competition
can arise, for example, where in one country social security services
are financed out of general taxation and in another out of contributions with the result that labor-intensive industries in the former
country enjoy an advantage compared with those in the latter. Different methods of financing social security and different conditions
of employment-for example, the relation between male and female
wages, hours of work, overtime pay, and holidays with pay-are
especially mentioned as possible causes of distortion. But the assimilation of legislation is not envisaged as the only primary remedy.
Even where, as may be the case, several distortions do not so to
speak cancel one another out, the Commission is, in the first place,
not to go further than to propose that the governments concerned
either recommend to the organizations adjustments in collective bargaining or submit legislative changes to their parliaments. In the
event of the rejection of its proposals the Commission is to have
the power of agreeing to countervailing "escape clauses" permitting
subsidies or delaying tariff reductions in proportion to the retained
"distortions." Unification of legislation appears as an ultimate device where such measures do not promise success.
In certain cases the best way of making the distortion disappear will turn out to be to assimilate in the various coun15
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tries the legal provisions the disparity of which gives rise
to the distortion itself.
But even in such cases one ought to proceed with caution:
One must not however lose sight of the effect on costs
which such modifications of legislation may have; it will
also be necessary to endeavor to give priority to different
modifications which between them can in this respect produce an effect of mutual compensation. 16
Although the assimilation of legislation thus appears in the
Spaak Report primarily as an instrument to be applied in the last
resort for the elimination of distortions which cannot otherwise be
removed, it is recognized that it may serve more far-reaching purposes, for example, the removal of customs barriers (through unification of revenue legislation), or the removal of obstacles to the
free circulation of goods and persons through the unification of social
security systems. It will be noted that the Spaak Report does not
envisage simply the preservation of social security rights for migrant workers (such as has already been largely achieved in the
course of recent events) 17 but the unification of social security
systems as a whole. These more far-reaching measures will, however, have to be adopted unanimously.
No one can read the section of the Spaak Report which deals with
assimilation of legislation without becoming aware that the two
branches of the law which must have been foremost in the minds of
its authors were revenue law and labor and social security legislation. As regards labor law in particular, the Report leaves no doubt
at all that the Common Market is expected to bring about a high
degree of uniformity. The relevant passages are important enough
to be given here in extenso: 18
As regards the conditions of labor, one cannot easily visualize the continued existence inside a common market of
systems which are noticeably different from each other.
The spontaneous tendency towards the harmonization of
the social systems and wage levels and also the pressure
exercised by the trade unions in order to obtain a co-ordination of the conditions of labor will be supported by the
gradual creation of the Common Market. The unification
which should proceed naturally, and without in any country
encroaching upon the conditions of life and labor, will
10

I d. at 64.
Reglement N° 3 concernant Ia securite sociale des travailleurs migrants [1958]
}'L OFF. s6x [hereinafter cited as Reg. No 3].
18
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moreover contribute to facilitating to a considerable extent the gradual creation of freedom of movement of
labor.
Again we see, here more particularly with regard to legislation, the
thought which runs like a leitmotiv through the Spaak Report, that
assimilation must be the fruit primarily of economic development,
subject, however, to the principle, more fully articulated in the subsequent pronouncements of the Commission, that the development
thus engendered will always be upwards and not in the direction of
deteriorating conditions. And again, as previously in a more general
context, there is a warning against precipitate action.
On the other hand, one should not underrate the difficulty
of solving these problems exclusively by governmental
action and in accordance with a time-table rigidly fixed in
advance. Thus, a shortening of the legal or normal work
week constitutes in fact an increase of wages. Wage increases, however, are not compatible with stable prices unless they either accompany an increase of productivity or
can be carried into effect through an increase of the wage
earners' share in the national income. The procedure
which will have to be set in motion will have to give all
the incentives which are necessary so as to make use of the
given conditions in order to bring about an assimilation
of the conditions of labor: it will in particular be a case
of giving to such upward movements of wages as are
compatible with stability a character which ensures the
desired assimilation.
These procedures will have to make it possible to take
account of the diversities of economic conditions, working
class traditions, and the elements which go into the making
of a policy of raising the standard of living of labor in
their entirety. It will therefore be necessary to entrust the
Commission with the task of making proposals which will
take into account the forms and the times of change which
are most propitious.
Here, as is true of the correction of distortions, these proposals
will, during the first stage, require the unanimous consent of the
Council representatives of the Member States; subsequently they
can be adopted by a qualified majority vote. If there is in fact a
distortion and if there is no agreement on the counter-measures
proposed by the Commission, the state concerned should, in the
opinion of the authors of the Spaak Report, be given by the Commission the benefit of an escape clause.
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The Treaty itself has, with some modifications, given effect to the
policy formulated in the Spaak Report. The programmatic pronouncement in Article 3 (h) is implemented in Part III, Title I,
Chapter 3 of the Treaty which bears the heading "Approximation of
Laws." This Chapter makes clear that the legal power of the Community to enforce an approximation of legislation is very limited indeed. It has no power to legislate in a "supranational" manner with
direct effect upon the laws of the Member States. The Council is by
Article 100 instructed to "issue directives for the approximation of
such legislative and administrative provisions of the Member States
as have a direct incidence on the establishment or functioning of the
Common Market." "Directives," in contradistinction to "regulations," are, of course, not directly applicable as part of the law of
a Member State, but merely bind "any Member State to which they
are addressed, as to the result to be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to form and means." 19 Moreover,
one exception apart, the Council can issue such directives only "by
means of a unanimous vote" 20 so that each of the six members
has an absolute veto. This is, of course, in line with the recommendations of the Spaak Report. The Council must act "on a proposal of the Commission," that is, a directive can only issue if a
majority of the Commission 21 and all members of the Council are
in agreement, and, where a directive involves legislative amendment in any Member State, the Assembly and the Economic and
Social Committee must be consulted. The Spaak Report recommended that, after the first stage, proposals for unification of legislation should be passed by the Council with a qualified majority,
and this has-with some qualifications-been adopted, thereby
creating the one exception to the principle of unanimity. Where the
Commission has found that a disparity between the legislative and
administrative provisions of the Member States distorts the conditions of competition and thereby causes a state of affairs which
must be eliminated, and where consultation between the Commission and the interested Member States has not resulted in an agreement which eliminates the distortion (a situation which may, perhaps, be regarded as not altogether unlikely in connection with
social legislation), the Council will be able, after the first stage ends,
to issue directives, acting by means of a qualified vote on a proposal
10
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of the Commission.22 Since the vote has to be by qualified majority,
the issue of the directive could, of course, be vetoed by any two of
the three Members which have four votes on the Council (France,
Germany, Italy) or by any one of them with the concurrence of
either Belgium or the Netherlands. 23 A compromise between conflicting interests in the form of an amendment of the directive proposed by the Commission requires either the concurrence of the
Commission itself or a unanimous vote of the Council. 24
It is certainly not the policy of the Treaty to make supranational
legislation easy, and, as we have seen, this cautious approach to
the problem corresponds not only to the attitude reflected in the
Spaak Report but also to the needs of the situation. It would be
unrealistic to place much reliance on the legislative powers of the
Community as an instrument to assimilate social and labor legislation in the six countries.
This, however, is in no way to imply that certain branches of the
law cannot, or should not, be gradually assimilated to one another.
In fact, in a Resolution passed on January rs, 1959, 25 the Assembly
expressed the view that importance should be attached to the harmonization of conditions of employment in the Community, and
that to this end the Commission should not only furnish the representatives of the interests involved with the necessary documentary
material, but should also take active steps to promote assimilation
of the legal rules which apply in the various countries and should
make contact with the relevant organizations with a view to achieving it. The Directorate-General of Social Affairs, which is the relevant administrative service of the Commission, 26 is actively engaged
in a number of investigations, for example, of the existing legal situation with respect to the entry and the employment of foreign
workers and their families, 27 of collective agreements, 28 of the way
in which the principle of equal remuneration for men and women is
applied in the six countries, 29 and of other matters. A certain measure of conformity among employment conditions in the Six may be
I d. art. 101, para. z.
I d. art. 148.
"'I d. art. 149.
25
Resolution sur les questions sociales traitees dans le premier rapport general sur
l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, op. cit. supra note 14, pt. V,
paras. 13-16, at 168-69.
26
SECOND GEN'L REP. Annexes A, B, C.
27
I d. para. 174.
28
[January I, 1958-Sept. 17, 1958] E.E.C. CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT ON
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY para. 108 [hereinafter cited as FIRST GEN'L REP.].
29
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 79•
22

23

310

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

the fruit of these endeavors. Whatever is achieved will more nearly
resemble the efforts of the United States Commission on Uniform
State Laws than those of the United States Congress. In other
words, it will result from cooperation under the auspices of the
Community rather than from any direct intervention by the Community. Article I I 7 may be, in sum, the expression of an aspiration
rather than of a program of action. To say this is not necessarily
to imply a defeatist attitude concerning the possibility of gradually
assimilating the legislation of the Six, but may only be to suggest
that voluntary cooperation is the most promising method of doing
so. This means that the policy of Article r I 8 may be more significant
than the (at first sight) more ambitious pronouncements of Article
I I7.

C.

CooPERATION IN GENERAL

Article I I 8 provides that "without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with its general objectives,
it shall be the aim of the Commission to promote close cooperation
between Member States in the social field."
The Treaty does not attempt an exhaustive enmuneration of
methods envisaged to achieve this aim. Mutual advice may, of
course, be sought and given directly between Member States, but
the Treaty reflects the view that the Commission and its administrative services are the "chosen instruments" of assistance to Member States and are to act as intermediaries, presumably adopting
methods already well tested by the International Labor Office at
Geneva and by the High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community.
The Commission has already established contacts with both of
these organizations. On July 7, I958, the European Economic Community entered into a very important Agreement with the International Labor Organization, 30 in which the two bodies agreed to
consult regularly with one another on questions of mutual interest,
to keep each informed about the other's programs, and to seek
coordination of work. The I.L.O. also agreed to give the Commission technical assistance. Since this Agreement was concluded,
the Commission has established relations with the I.L.O. especially
in connection with problems of safety, industrial hygiene, health
protection, and vocational training, and the Commission has sent
30
Accord Concernant Ia Liaison Entre !'Organisation lnternationale du Travail
et Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne [1959] ]'L OFF. 521; FIRST GEN'L REP.
para. 105·
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observers to I.L.O. meetings at which problems of this kind were
discussed. 31
In regard to social as well as other problems close liaison has
been established between the Commission and the High Authority
of the European Coal and Steel Community 32 especially with respect to the health and safety problems referred to. 33 The history
of what has so far been the most significant achievement of the
Community in the field of social policy-the Regulations Concerning the Social Security of Migrant Workers 34-indicates that the
work done over the past few years by the Coal-Steel Community
and especially by the High Authority is a very important basis for
the work of the Commission. The comprehensive research done by
and on behalf of the High Authority, particularly in the fields of
labor law 35 and of social security, 36 cannot fail to be of great benefit to the future work of the Economic Community. As regards health
and safety, contact has also been established between the Commission of the Economic Community and that of Euratom, which is
obviously faced in this area with very important special problems
of its own. 37
The Commission must "act in close contact with Member States,
by means of studies, the issuing of opinions, and the organizing of
consultations both on problems arising at the national level and on
those of concern to international organizations." 38 The extensive
investigations which formed the basis of the two Exposes published
by the Commission, 39 on the Social Situation in the Community were
31
SEcoND GEN'L REP. paras. 62, r86, 189; see also Bulletin, May 1959, ch. III, para. 33·
•• FIRST GEN'L REP. paras. 39, 104.
33
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 189.
34
See below, and for the history; FIRST GEN'L REP. paras. II7-r8; SECOND GEN'L
REP. para. 165.
85
Especially the work of a group of six experts appointed by the High Authority.
Three volumes have so far been published: They deal with sources of labor law,
with workers' representation at enterprise level and with job security. It is understood that a fourth volume on the law of strikes and lockouts is soon to be published.
Each volume contains a detailed analysis of the law in each of the six countries,
preceded by a general report. These volumes are of the highest quality and quite
indispensable for any research in this field.
36
Especially the two volumes of synoptic monographs on the social insurance systems
of the six countries and of Great Britain.
37
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 189.
36
Treaty art. u8, para. 2.
89
Pursuant to Treaty art. 122. The first EXPOSE SUR LA SITUATION SOCIALE DANS LA
CoMMUNAUTE A L'ENTREE EN VIGUEUR DU TRAITE INSTITUTANT LA COMMUNAUTE EcoNOMIQUE EUROPEENNE, dated Sept. 17, 1958, describes the situation at the time of the
coming into force of the Treaty (Jan. r, 1958); the second, dated May 1959, covers
the development in 1958 and during the first three months (broadly) of 1959 [hereinafter cited as First ExPOSE and Second EXPOSE].
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carried out with the assistance of the appropriate authorities in the
six countries. This is also true of the series of preparatory studies
which have been made or are now underway and to which reference
is made in the Second Report of the Commission: for example, the
studies of the legal and administrative situation in each of the six
countries with regard to the entry and employment of foreign workers and their families; the material collected in preparation of a
legal instrument directed at the suppression of discrimination; the
surveys concerning holidays with pay, hours of work, overtime pay;
the legal situation in regard to collective agreements, equal pay for
men and women; and the detailed analysis of the labor market and
its prospects, of occupational training 40 and other matters.
The employers' organizations and the trade unions of the Six
have established permanent organs of liaison at the seat of the
Commission. Through these, and, of course, through the Economic
and Social Committee of the Community as well as the Social Affairs
Committee of the European Parliamentary Assembly, contacts are
established across the borders of the Member States, and between
the Commission and its services on one side and representatives of
the interests concerned, the "social partners," on the other. One of
the most valuable features of the Community may be that it
strengthens the ties between employers and unions in Europe and
that it may give rise to an international set of "pressure groups"
without which a modern constitutional organism is hardly capable
of operating. The Treaty itself 41 requires the Commission to consult the Economic and Social Committee before issuing opinions.
The Assembly and especially its Social Affairs Committee have
taken a very active interest in the social aspect of the work of the
Commission.42
Article I I 8 appears to place the Commission under a duty to aid
Member States in shaping their policies with regard to the ratification of I.L.O. Conventions and the application of I.L.O. Recommendations.43 The Commission may conceivably also assist Member
States in framing future reports required by the I.L.O. Constitution,44 and in formulating policies to be pursued at I.L.O. conferences.
Over and above all this, however, elucidation and compilation
"'SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 174, 178, 179, 181, 183.
41
Treaty art. uS, para. 3·
'"SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 161; see also ]'L OFF., passim.
43
Adopted pursuant to I.L.O. CONST. art. 19.
•• Id. art. 19, paras. s(c), (e); 6(b), (d); 7(b) (iii), (iv), (v).
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of facts with regard to social and labor conditions, and comparative
legal and statistical studies like those so successfully completed over
a number of years by the Coal-Steel Community will be a major
benefit which the Community can confer on all those interested in
the economic and social situation in the Six.
In Article 1 I 8 a number of matters are mentioned as particularly
suitable for collaboration, but the Commission has emphasized that
this list is enumerative and not exhaustive. 45 It has pointed out that
the Treaty provisions on "the action to be taken by the Community
in the social field are in general less rigid than the provisions affecting the economic field" and it considers that "this is in a way balanced by the fact that the field of activity of institutions in the social
sphere is not strictly delimited." On this basis the Commission has
defined the scope of its activities:
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

The European Commission has already been able to state
to the European Parliamentary Assembly and to the Economic and Social Committee that it is not the Commission's
intention that the interpretation (of the relevant Articles
of the Treaty) shall be restrictive; it cannot conceive that
the Community has no social purpose, and it has grounds
for supposing that the other institutions of the Community
share its views in this connection. 46
Among the items of collaboration expressly mentioned in Article
8, "employment" was given place of pride. This aspect of collaboration is closely connected with the implementation of the provisions (especially Article 49 (d)) which serve the gradual creation
of freedom of movement. The two Exposes on the Social Situation
which the Commission has published to date in accordance with
Article I 22 of the Treaty contain surveys of the employment situation in the six countriesY The Commission is, however, preparing
a general detailed study of the labor market, and, so far as possible,
forecasts by geographical and occupational sectors of what the manpower situation in the next few years will be, taking into account
economic data, demographic developments, and foreseeable technological changes. 48 The study will be in two stages: the first will consist in an analysis of the present situation, the second in the formulation of forecasts. It will include an analysis of employment-of
men and women separately-from I954 to 1958, and of the main
I I

'"FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 103.
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47
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lines of development (disparities in rates of expansion in different
branches of activity or regions, changes in migration and the like)
and a study of existing or proposed measures to establish equilibrium (for example, vocational training, decentralization, and regional development). The study is being undertaken jointly by the
Directorate-General of Social Affairs of the Commission and the
Joint Statistical Office of the three Communities, 49 with the assistance of a group of statistical and labor experts of the various governments who conferred in January 1959 and approved the scheme.
These studies should, when completed, prove to be of great practical interest to all those concerned with the future of the Community.
The Commission is also considering a general scheme to coordinate
measures aimed at improving employment services. 50
The subject "occupational and continuation training" which is
also singled out in Article I I 8 as a particularly important topic for
cooperation is very closely connected with the problem of freedom
of movement as well. As the experience of the Coal-Steel Community shows, it is easier to create conditions of geographical mobility for skilled than for unskilled labor. 51 Moreover, it is a commonplace that this is one of the decisive elements in raising the
productivity of labor. Pursuant to Article I 25 (I) (a) it is one of
the purposes of the European Social Fund 52 to cover one half of
the expenses of a state or a public corporation in ensuring productive
re-employment of workers by means of occupational re-training.
Article 128 requires the Council, on a proposal of the Commission
and after the Economic and Social Committee has been consulted,
to "establish general principles for the implementation of a common policy of occupational training capable of contributing to the
harmonious development both of national economies and of the
Common Market." This power and duty of the Council is closely
connected with one of the aims of the European Social Fundachievement of a higher degree of labor mobility in Europe not only
in law but in fact. The two Exposes which have so far been published
by the Commission in accordance with Article I 22 of the Treaty
contain surveys of the institutions for occupational training which
exist in the Six and of their significance in statistical terms. 53 In
•• FIRsT GEN'L REP. para. 39; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 19.
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 182.
51
Spaak Report pt. I, tit. 3, ch. 3, and esp. at 89. And on the labor policy of the
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both, analysis of the training of apprentices and other young workers on the one hand, and re-training, re-adaptation, or rehabilitation
centers for adults on the other, are separately treated. In its First
Report 54 the Commission expressed the view that, for the time
being, no common occupational training policy was feasible, but
that it would seek to achieve a measure of coordination, including
exchange of information between governments and undertakings,
and joint projects. The Second Report 55 indicates gradual progress:
a general program has been drawn up which lays down an order of
priority for such action as may be undertaken, but little has so far
been done to implement Article I 28, which obviously confronts the
Commission with a most difficult task. Under the regulations to be
issued pursuant to Article I 2 7 for the purposes of the Social Fund 56
the term "re-training" will have to be defined, a definition which
will be of great importance for the social activities of the Community. Draft regulations have, at the time of writing, been agreed
on by the Commissioners and passed on to the Council. In these 57
"re-training" is defined to include all measures concerning the training and adaptation of skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers
in accordance with a training scheme. The Commission also attaches
great importance to the exchange of young workers which, according to Article 50 of the Treaty, "Member States shall, under a common program, encourage." It proposes 58 a first program making
it increasingly possible for young workers to spend a period of
apprenticeship abroad, and then, through regular annual exchange
programs, to enlarge the scope of such multilateral and bilateral
arrangements as are already in existence, but this scheme is still
in a preparatory stage. 59 In connecti-on with all questions of vocational training, the Commission 60 cooperates with other international organizations and especially with the I.L.O. Meetings have
been held under the auspices of the High Authority of the CoalSteel Community and of O.E.E.C., and these have been attended
by observers from the Commission. From the point of view of the
future prosperity of Europe this problem of occupational or voca54
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tional training may well turn out to be one of the most important
aspects of the Common Market. It is a matter of general knowledge
that in some parts of Europe, especially in Italy, 61 unemployment
and under-employment is most acute among unskilled workers for
whose services there is comparatively little demand.
Another subject mentioned in Article I I 8 as especially important
for cooperation is "protection against occupational accidents and
diseases." Such protection is closely connected with "industrial hygiene," (also mentioned in this context) and, of course, with social
security. The Assembly showed its special interest in these matters
in a resolution passed on January I 5, I 9 59, 62 urging the Council
to provide the financial means to enable the Commission to carry
into effect a program for the prevention of occupational diseases and
industrial accidents, and for compensation for both. The Assembly's
Resolution also urged the Council to carry out in conjunction with
Euratom and the Coal-Steel Community a program for the coordination of the existing health and safety services. In its First Expose
on the Social Situation the Commission devoted a brief chapter 63
to these problems containing a survey of recent legislative changes
and administrative arrangements in the Six; this survey was brought
up to date in the Second Expose, 64 but a great deal of information
in this field clearly remains to be collected. Here especially the
extensive work done by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. 65 ought
to be invaluable as an example, and the Commission reports 66 that
it has established contacts with the High Authority, the I.L.O., and
the Euratom Commission. The Commission is planning a number
of general studies including one on the possibility of extending insurance to accidents and diseases not at present covered by social
insurance legislation. 67 In accordance with a special request of the
Parliamentary Committee on Safety, Industrial Hygiene and
Health Protection, a list of occupational diseases recognized as
such in the Six has been drawn up by the services of the Commission,
but this is considered to be only a "first working paper" for the study
of occupational diseases. The Commission is to make a systematic
61
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study of every disease and to publish a series of monographs on the
subject. This in turn is to lead to a comprehensive study which will
consider medical, legal, technical and statistical aspects. 68
The problem of geographical mobility of labor in Europe is overshadowed by the housing shortage, and like the High Authority
of the E.C.S.C., 69 the Commission was almost compelled by the
force of circumstances to give it special attention. The significance
of the housing shortage is obvious to anyone who reads the especially informative passages on social housing in the First 70 and Second 71 Exposes on the Social Situation. For some reason, this topic
does not appear among those enumerated in Article I I 8, a fact
which emphasizes the importance of the Commission's conclusion
that this enumeration is not exclusive. In its First Report 72 the Commission expressed its intention to devote special attention to housing problems (as well as to social services generally) and, in collaboration with the employers' and employees' organizations, to
undertake as the first order of business a systematic collection of
factual data. When the First Report of the Commission came before the European Parliamentary Assembly, questions were addressed 73 both to the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. and to the
Commission with special reference to a passage in the latter's Report
to the effect that the Commission would endeavor to stimulate the
raising of additional funds. It was suggested that the two executive
bodies should enter into consultation with a view to creating a joint
housing service. The answer was to the effect that, although contact
had been established in order to make the High Authority's experience available to the Commission and although the Commission would remain fully informed about the activities of the High
Authority, a joint service was not feasible by reason not only of the
different scopes of activity of the two organizations but also, and
essentially, because the Commission lacked the financial resources
which were at the disposal of the High Authority. The point was
again made in the Second Report. 74 This is clearly one of the essenSECOND GEN'L REP. para. 190; Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 19s8, ch. III, para. IS;
Bulletin, Feb. 19S9, pt. III, para. so.
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tial weaknesses of the European Economic Community compared
with the European Coal and Steel Community. In a sense the in·
terest the Commission is taking in "social dwellings for workers,
large families, old people, refugees and repatriates, migrants and
any other economically weak persons" is bound to be theoretical
and to be restricted to obtaining and examining "the necessary information on which to base future action." It remains to be seen
whether and to what extent the "re-settlement allowances" which
will be payable out of the European Social Fund 75 will be able to
bridge the gap.
The Commission is also concerned with what in its Exposes 76 and
Reports 77 are called "social services," that is, mainly the voluntary
welfare services initiated either by individual firms or by charitable organizations. In its Second Expose, 78 special attention was paid
by the Commission to the training and status of welfare workers.
As pointed out in the Second Report 79 this too is a matter very
closely linked with migration problems. It stands to reason that,
in the event that family migrations materialize, specialized welfare
services will be necessary. A conference of senior officials in the
field, of social service specialists, and of heads of social welfare
schools and organizations was held under the Commission's auspices
in Brussels in December I 9 58. 80
Other topics mentioned in Article I I 8 as subjects for "close cooperation" include "labor legislation and working conditions" and
"the law as to trade unions and collective bargaining between employers and workers." This may, of course, eventually lead to the
creation of common standards which do not necessarily have to be
legislative in character. Thus, consultation between the "social
partners" organized by the Commission may in the fullness of time
lead to assimilated collective bargaining practices, provided that
trade union organization and the facts of labor-management relations in the Six are sufficiently similar-of which there is no evidence
at present. 81 Perhaps it may even lead to collective bargaining on
a supranational level, or, on the pattern of the remarkable work
done in this field by the I.L.O., 82 to supranational safeguards of
75

Treaty art. 125 (1) (a) discussed infra in PART I, Section G of the text.
First ExPOSE ch. D.III (b) ; Second EXPOSE paras. 128-34·
77
FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 122 j SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 191.
78
Second ExPOSE paras. 135-41.
79
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 193·
86
Bulletin, Feb. 1959, ch. II, para. 28.
81
See PART II of this Chapter.
82
See JENKS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM (1957).
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freedom of organization, or even to supranational methods for the
prevention or settlement of industrial disputes.
This is only speculation, however. What is now certain is that
the important work done by the High Authority of the Coal-Steel
Community, in setting up a "working party" of distinguished academic lawyers and the extremely useful series of scholarly comparative studies on "Sources of Labor Law," on "Stability of Employment," and on "Workers' Representation at Enterprise Level"
which this group has so far produced 83 are more likely to serve as
a pattern for the immediate future activities of the Commission's
services in this area. The two Exposes of the Commission contain
progress reports on labor legislation as well as on trends in trade
union claims and in collective bargaining. In its First Report 84
the Commission announced that it would have prepared (and would
keep up to date) a series of comparative studies on labor law, trade
union law, and collective bargaining, as well as on labor conditions,
including wages and hours, with special emphasis on matters especially mentioned in the Treaty, 85 that is, equal pay for men and
women, holidays with pay, and overtime remuneration, as well as
problems of techniques of production (including automation) and
productivity. The Second Report shows that preparatory work on
holidays, hours of work, overtime, and working conditions in the
more important sectors of the Community is under way, and that a
study on labor costs is contemplated. Studies on the law of collective
bargaining and on equal pay for men and women have been begun,
and a conference on automation is due to be held in the near
future. 86

D.

SociAL SECURITY

One of the most important fields of cooperation mentioned in
Article I I 8, and in some respects the most promising, is "social
security." The problem of social security has, within the framework
of the European Economic Community, two distinct aspects: one
is linked with the freedom of movement of workers within the Community and the other concerns the elimination of "distortions" and
a gradual approach to the distant goal of "harmonization."
"' See note 35 supra.
"' FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 108.
SG Treaty arts. 119, 120 and Protocol cited note 13 supra.
"' SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 178-80.
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I. THE REGULATIONS CONCERNING MIGRANT WORKERS

The Spaak Report attached some importance to the promotion
of freedom of movement in Europe, 87 and its authors pointed out 88
that the machinery of re-adaptation 89 and of centralized financial
assistance for unemployed workers might lead to a harmonization
of unemployment insurance and that this in turn would facilitate
freedom of movement. The Treaty itself went considerably beyond
this modest prognostication. Its provisions are based on the insight
that social security-like employment and re-training-vitally affects the facts as distinct from the law concerning freedom of movement. If a migrant worker loses a legally protected expectation of
benefits acquired through payment of contributions, or if benefit
payments cannot be made across the boundaries of Member States,
a serious obstacle is placed in the path of that "free movement of
workers" which, according to Article 48, "shall be ensured within
the Community not later than the date of expiry of the transitional
period." Even before 1957 a network of conventions had been concluded in Western Europe-partly under the auspices of the Council of Europe and partly under those of the Brussels Treaty and of
Western Union 90-which were designed to protect the social security
rights acquired by workers in one country and to make them transferable to another, as well as to facilitate the payment of benefits
abroad. On December 7, 1957, the Member States of the Coal-Steel
Community signed a Convention concerning the Social Security of
of Migrant Workers, arrived at with the assistance of the I.L.0., 91
and giving effect to these principles on a very broad scale. Although
concluded under the auspices of the High Authority, this was merely
a Convention; to become law it would have required ratification by
the six parliaments. The Treaty of Rome, on the other hand, contains a provision-Article 5 r-which, in regard to social security
provision for migrant workers, permits the adoption of international legislation in the strict sense. The Article requires the Council to adopt, in the field of social security, measures to facilitate the
free movement of workers:
87

Spaak Report pt. I, tit. III, ch. 3, at 88.
at 91.
89
See PART I, Section G of the text infra.
90
HAAS, op. cit. supra note 51, at 374-75; and for an enumeration of these conventions, see Reg. N" 3, op. cit. supra note 17, Annex D at 587.
1
91
FIRST GEN L REP. para. I 17; SECOND GEN 1L REP. para. 165.
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The Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a
proposal of the Commission, shall, in the field of social
security, adopt the measures necessary to effect the free
movement of workers, in particular, by introducing a system which permits an assurance to be given to migrant
workers and their beneficiaries:
(a) that, for the purpose of qualifying for and retaining
the right to benefits and of the calculation of these benefits,
all periods taken into consideration by the respective municipal law of the countries concerned, shall be added together; and
(b) that these benefits will be paid to persons resident in
the territories of Member States.
According to the wording of this Article, the "measures" taken by
the Council with the object of encouraging freedom of movement
among those in expectation or in receipt of benefits might have been
"directives" only. Instead, the Council issued Regulations incorporating the Coal-Steel Community Convention of December, 1957,
thereby automatically making its content law in the six countries. 92
It is no exaggeration to say that the Regulations concerning the
Social Security of Migrant Workers of December 16, 1958, 93 and
the accompanying Regulations for their Application 94 are, at the
time of writing (autumn I 9 59), not only the most important step
taken by the Community in the fields of labor law and social security, but by far its most significant achievement in legislation altogether. The transformation of the E.C.S.C. Convention into E.E.C.
Regulations had been envisaged in a Protocol to the former, 95 and
the preparatory work for the Regulations to be issued by the Council
of the E.E.C. had, so to speak, been done before the Community
itself had seen the light of day. This was therefore a unique situation in which a very comprehensive piece of Community legislation
could be carried into effect within a comparatively short time. As
early as April 1958 the Commission made the requisite proposals
to the Council, proposals without which, according to Article 51,
the Council could not have acted. Some of the governments registered a number of reservations with regard to certain aspects of
"See Treaty art. 189, para. z.
Reg. N° 3, op. cit. supra. note 17.
94
Reglement No 4 fixant les modalites d'application et completant les dispositions
du reglement no 3 concernant Ia securite sociale des travailleurs migrants, [1958]
J'L OFF. 597 [hereinafter cited as Reg. N° 4].
'"FIRST GEN'L REP. para. n8. This paragraph contains the history of the making of these regulations which is epitomized in the text.
93
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the Convention, but, after the European Parliamentary Assembly
had, on June 26, 1958, urged the adoption of the Regulations and
expressed its regrets that the unanimous consent of the six governments had not yet been forthcoming, the Council was able, on July
2, to approve the Regulations in principle. All objections having
been settled by agreement, the Council could then adopt them on
September 25, 1958, by the requisite unanimous vote. 96 The technical administrative Regulations 97 for the application of the new
scheme were drafted with the aid of the I.L.O. and passed early
in December, and on December I 6 bo.th sets of Regulations were
published in the official journal of the Communities. In accordance
with Article I 2 I the implementation of these measures was assigned to the Commission. For this, too, a unanimous vote of the
Council was required, as well as prior consultation with the Economic and Social Committee, actions occurring on February 26
and 27, 1959. 98 It may be noted that the Regulations are expressis
verbis based not only on Article 51, but also on Article 227, paragraph 2 of the Treaty, and are applicable to Algeria and the "overseas Departments" of France (Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, and Reunion) as well as to metropolitan France itsel£. 99
The application of these Regulations has been entrusted to a Commission of Administration with far-reaching powers. 100 This Commission consists of representatives of the six governments (who,
even prior to the coming into force of the relevant part of the Regulations, met as an informal group of experts; later they transformed
themselves into a formal Commission) / 01 and they are assisted by
technical advisers. A representative of the E.E.C. Commission and
a representative of the High Authority of the Coal-Steel Community take part in the work of the Commission of Administration, but
only in a consultative capacity. The I.L.O. is to give technical assistance in accordance with the Agreement of July 7, 1958, between
the I.L.O. and the E.E.C. 102 The Secretariat of the Commission of
Administration is provided by the E.E.C. Commission by virtue
of the decision of the Council of the 26th and 27th of February.
96
97
08

Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 1958, ch. III, para. 14.
Ibid.; FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II9.

SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 167.
Reg. N" 3, op. cit. supra note 17, Annex A.
100
!d. arts. 43, 44; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166.
101
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 168; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. II, para. 26.
102
Reg. N• 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 44 (I) ad fin em. For the Agreement of
July 17, 1958, see note 30 supra.
99
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The functions of the Commission of Administration are, as
pointed out in the Second Report of the European Commission, 103
judicial, administrative, and financial. They are judicial inasmuch as
the Commission of Administration is required to ensure a uniform
interpretation of the Regulations in the six countries, by settling
differences among them, by supplying authoritative definitions and
the like. They are administrative because it is one of the tasks of
the Commission of Administration 104 to draw up the forms of such
documents as the certificates and declarations required by the Regulations. The necessary documents for short-term benefits, especially
for health insurance, were approved by the Commission of Administration on December I9, I958, and published in the official journal
of the Communities on January I 6, I959/ 05 whereas those for pensions and other long-term benefits were published on May I 6,
I 9 59. 106 Lastly, the Commission of Administration has financial
functions acting as a clearing house by effectuating the payments of
the Member States to each other which, as a result of the new European scheme of social insurance for migrant workers, will fall due.
For this purpose it will, for example, have to lay down criteria for
the fixing of exchange rates and to settle the method of calculating
certain lump-sum payments between the various social security institutions. This raises statistical problems which have been studied
by a working party. They refer in particular to situations in which
benefits are to be supplied or payments are to be made in one country in which the recipient resides on behalf of an institution in
another country to which the relevant contributions have been or are
being paid. 107 One additional function of the Commission of Administration is to initiate cooperation between the Member States in
matters of health and social administration.
As pointed out in the Second Report of the E.E.C. Commission,
the Commission of Administration is not a mere consultative body,
but a permanent institution, to some extent with executive authority,
and part of the constitutional structure of the Community. 108 DurLABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

""SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166.
'"'Reg. No 4, op. cit. supra note 94, art. 2.
Modeles de formules arretes par Ia commission administrative pour Ia securite
sociale des travailleurs migrants pour !'application des reglements n° 8 3 et 4. [1959]
]'L OFF. 37-92; see also SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 168.
106
Modeles de formules arretes par Ia commission administrative pour Ia securite
sociale des travailleurs migrants pour !'application des reglements n°' 3 et 4. [1959]
}'L OFF. 581-636 j see also SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 169.
107
SECOND GEN'L REP. paras. 166, 169; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. II, para. 27.
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' SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 166.
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ing the initial period it has been meeting every month to assist in the
solution of problems arising from the application of the Regulations.109
The above-mentioned agreement settled the objections of anumber of Member States by incorporation into the Regulations of a
number of very important reservations. Thus, the so-called ufrontaliers"-workers who live in a frontier area and work in a neighboring country-and seasonal workers are largely,no if not entirely,m
excluded as are seamen.U 2 Other reservations refer to pre-existing
international treaties on social security, 113 and to restrictions on
payments of certain unemployment benefits outside the country of
last employment. 114
The provisions setting up the Commission of Administration
came into force on December 19, 1958, 115 the remainder of both
sets of Regulations on January I, 1959Y 6 Their general effect is,
in the words of the Commission, that "equality of rights between
natives and foreigners is made general, periods in insurance are
added together and in certain cases benefits are paid out in another
Member State." "Consequently frontiers no longer prevent wage
earners from benefiting from the rights acquired in the field of
social security."
2. ASSIMILATION OF SOCIAL SECURITY LEGISLATION

The first step in fulfilling the much more ambitious and longterm task of gradually assimilating the various social security legislations must be to collect information concerning both the legal and
the financial aspects of existing social security, and especially social
insurance schemes. In this respect the High Authority of the CoalSteel Community has done pioneer work of very great importance 117 and paved the way for the further studies which the Commission is contemplating.ll 8 The work of the two organizations in
this field will be closely coordinated. The Commission plans to embark on a general analysis of the various systems of social insurance
100

/d. para. 169; Bulletin, Feb. 1959, pt. III, paras. 44-46.
Reg. N° 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 4, paras. 3, 4, 7, and Annex C.
See on this: Bulletin, May 1959, pt. III, para. 3 I.
112
Reg. No 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 4, para. 6.
113
/d. art. 6 and Annex D.
'"/d. art. 37 and Annex C.
liS SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 165.
liO /d. para. 164.
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Especially through the series of monographs on the systems of Social Security
in the six Member Countries and in Great Britain.
lis FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 120; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 187.
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law in existence within the Community, and on special studies-for
example, concerning social security financing and the relationship
between social security and labor law. One aim is to arrive at a
statistical basis for the comparison of the total labor costs of enterprises, a comparison which presupposes not only an investigation of
wages but also of social expenditure by employers. 119 The Exposes
on the Social Situation will, if one may judge by the two Exposes
which have so far seen the light of day, contain valuable information on current developments in this field. 120 The First Expose also
contains a number of comparative tables 121 which should be of
great assistance to the readers of this book.
It is only when this preparatory and informative work is much
further advanced that the Commission will be able to initiate substantive measures to assimilate legislation. The aim is in the first
place to bring about a measure of uniformity in matters such as
administrative procedures, age limits, various time limits, the lists
of insurable occupational diseases and the like, and eventually, in
application of the European Code of Social Security and the additional Protocol, prepared by, and adopted under the auspices of,
the Council of Europe, 122 to coordinate the systems of social security in the Member States and thus to contribute to an equalization
of the conditions of competition. This, however, will obviously require years of study and preparation. Meantime the Commission
considers that one of its objects is not only to keep an eye on the
effect of social security on the functioning of the Common Market,
but also on the repercussions which the operation of the Common
Market may in turn have on the various aspects of social security. 123

E.

THREE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF HARMONIZATION

Among the factors of "distortion" which should be eliminated
by practical measures of assimilation, the Spaak Report 124 mentions
with special emphasis "conditions of labor, such as the relation between the wages of men and women, the systems of working hours,
overtime, or vacations with pay." The authors of the Report consider these topics as particularly important in connection with the
harmonization of legislation:
119
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. r88.
L."' First EXPOSE ch. D.I; Second EXPOSE paras. 107-1 r.
121
There are three tables at the end of First ExPOSE showing the scope of Social
Security legislation.
""'See note r88 infra.
,.. FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 120.
124
Spaak Report pt. I, tit. 2, ch. 2 at 6g.
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Even if the existing disparities did not give rise to distortions, it would be necessary for the governments to make
special effort gradually to harmonize the existing systems
with regard to:
i. the principle of equal pay of men and women;
ii. the length of the normal working week beyond which
overtime is payable, and the rates of overtime pay;
m. the length of paid vacations. 125

If its proposals for the elimination of distortions are rejected, the
Commission is, after the end of the first stage, to be entitled to
agree to the application of escape clauses. For example it could
permit subsidies or the delay of tariff reductions commensurate
with the continuing distortions. 126 Once more it is emphasized that
"escape clauses" were, according to the Report, to be applied primarily in connection with the three topics referred to above. 127
The Treaty has accordingly crystallized the general aspirations of
the Community in the areas of labor law and social policy into more
tangible policies in these three respects. It mentions (in Article I I9)
"the principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between men
and women workers," "paid holidays" (in Article I 20) and (in a
very different form and in the Protocol relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France, No. II) working hours and overtime
payment.
I. EQUALITY OF THE SEXES

Of these three provisions the only one to create at once a legal
obligation among the Member States is Article I 19, the operative
first paragraph of which is as follows:
Each Member State shall in the course of the first stage
ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the
principle of equal remuneration for equal work as between
men and women workers.
The background of the provision is to be found not only in the
proposals of the Spaak Report but also in the Preamble of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization of 1946 128 and
especially in the I.L.O. Equality of Remuneration Convention of

=

Id. at 6s-66.
l2o I d. at 64.
,.., I d. at 66.
128
"And whereas conditions of labour exist involving such injustice, hardship
and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace
and harmony of the world are imperilled; and an improvement of those conditions is urgently required: as, for example, by the . . . recognition of the principle
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I95 I 129 which has been ratified by Belgium, France, the German
Federal Republic, and Italy, but not by Luxembourg or the Netherlands.130 The relationship between the obligations imposed by the
I.L.O. Convention and those arising from Article I 19 of the Treaty
is a matter of some complexity which has been studied by the competent departments of the Commission's organization both in the
light of the history and in the light of the wording of the two documents. The Commission hopes to analyze this relationship in a
study of the problems raised by Article I I 9 which it will publish.
The Treaty refers to "equal remuneration for equal work," whereas
the Convention, in its Article 2, speaks of "equal remuneration . . .
for work of equal value," and one of the problems of interpretation
is whether these phrases are to be treated as synonymous. 131
Before the Commission has completed the comparative legal
and statistical investigation on which it embarked soon after the
Treaty came into force/ 32 it is impossible to say to what extent the
principle of Article I I 9 is a social aspiration and to what extent
it represents aims which have already been achieved. That it represents a live issue is clear. The Second Expose of the Commission
on the Social Situation in the Community indicates that, at any rate
in some countries, trade unions are actively campaigning for the
rule of equal pay, 133 and an active interest in the problem has been
shown in the Assembly. To aid it in elucidating the law and facts
obtaining in the Six, the Commission has contacted the governments
concerned, the I.L.O. and employers' associations and trade unions.13~

The legal problems are complex because it is necessary not only to
compare constitutional and legislative texts, but also case law and
collective bargaining practices of the various countries with one
of equal remuneration of work of equal value . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The
italicized words were not in the original I.L.O. Constitution of I9I9 but were added
in I946.
120
Convention (No. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women
Workers for Work of Equal Value [hereinafter cited as Convention 100], I.L.O.,
Record of Proceedings, 34th Session, Geneva, I95I, at 65o-57; I.L.O., 34 OFFICIAL
BULLETIN 9-I3 (I95I). See also I.L.O., I THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR CODE I95I
[hereinafter cited as I I.L. ConE I95I], arts. 233 (K) -233 (0) at I83-86 (I952).
130
This was the state of ratifications at the moment of the entry into force of the
Treaty of Rome and was still the state of affairs in the summer of I959· See also
Reponse de Ia Commission de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, [I959] J'L
OFF. 85I [hereinafter cited as Reponse].
131
For all this see Reponse, op. cit. supra note I30.
132
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. I79·
133
Second EXPOSE, para. 64 (Belgium), para. 74 (Italy).
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' See Reponse, op. cit. supra note I30.
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another. Many regulations and other subordinate legislation may
also be relevant. Moreover, even a minutely detailed legal analysis
will yield no conclusive results regarding the actual facts. This becomes clear from even a superficial comparison of some legal and
statistical data. The Preamble to the French Constitution of I946
laid down the principle that, in every respect, the rights of women
should be equal to those of men/ 35 a principle incorporated with the
rest of the I946 Preamble in the Constitution of I958/ 36 also embodied in French legislation on collective agreements 137 and applied
in the fixing of the National Minimum Wage. 138 The Basic Law of
the German Federal Republic of I949 in its Article 3 also provides
that men and women have equal rights, and legislation at variance
with this principle is unconstitutional, null and void. 139 Moreover,
the courts and most learned writers hold that the principle must
be applied in collective bargaining. 140 Yet, in I 9 52 an inquiry instituted by the I.L.O. revealed that in France the average earnings
of women workers amounted to only 9 I percent of those of men,
whereas the corresponding figure for Germany was as low as 78
percent (and for Great Britain 66 percent) .141 How much significance attaches in practice to Article 3 7 of the I tali an Constitution
of I 94 7 which guarantees equal pay for male and female workers,
and to the prevailing view that this is a norm of positive law and
not a mere program, 142 is a matter for conjecture. The difference
between embodying the principle of equal pay in law (even constitutional law) and giving it practical effect is evidently great.
We do not know, of course, how far the figures produced by the
135
The Constitution of October 27, I946, "garantit a Ia femme, dans tous les
domaines, des droits egaux a ceux de l'homme." See for the significance of this and
of the Preamble: Durand, Les Sources du Droit du Tra'llail en France, in E.C.S.C.
HIGH AUTHORITY, ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS
DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 9I-II3 (I957); BRUN &
GALLAND, DROIT DU TRAVAIL 54 (I958).
136
In the Constitution of 1958, "the French people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of N a tiona) Sovereignty as defined
by the Declaration of I789, confirmed and completed by the Preamble to the Constitution of I946." [Translation by Campbell & Chapman, Oxford (Blackwell)
1958].
137
Law of Feb. II, 1950, [I950] Journal officiel de Ia Republique Fran,.aise [hereinafter cited as J.O.] I688 (Fr.) inserting into the CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. II, tit. II,
inter alia, art. pg, second para., (I) (d).
133
2 DURAND (with the concurrence of Andre Vitu), TRA!TE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL
64I ( I950) [hereinafter cited as 2 DURAND]; BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note
I35• at 451.
139
I NIKISCH, ARBEITSRECHT 302 (I955).
14
°For a detailed discussion: id. at 304.
"'Quoted BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note I35, at 445, n. I.
""MAZZONI, MANUALE Dl D!RITTO DEL LAVORO 140 (1958).
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I.L.O. inquiry of 1952 should be attributed to disparities in wage
rates rather than to differences in employment opportunities or
(within piece rate systems) of actual performances. The Commission itself, in answering a relevant question in the Assembly, 143
emphasized that one could not, on the basis of existing statistics,
determine with any degree of precision how far in any given country
the rule of equal pay had been given effect, and that one would have
to undertake "case studies," presumably of selected industries. The
Commission promised to prepare a general survey, based on collective agreements, regulations and the like, but it observed somewhat
sceptically that no more than a general movement towards adaptation of female to male wages could be reliably ascertained from the
existing material.
Although it creates binding obligations among the Member
States, Article I I 9 is very cautiously formulated. The principle of
equal pay for equal work does not ipso facto become part of the
legal systems of the members, and the Council has not even been
given power to issue regulations enacting it into law. The Member
States have gone no further than to accept an obligation to each
other and to the Community to transform their systems of wage
rates so as to ensure application of the principle in the course of the
first stage of the transitional period. Article I I 9 does not, therefore,
confer any rights or impose any obligations on any individual based
on the principle of equality. It does no more than to create an obligation binding the Member States in international law. Furthermore,
it would appear that Article I I 9 implicitly incorporates the same
rule which is expressed in Article 2, paragraph 2 of the I.L.O. Convention of I95 I, that is, that the states are free to choose whatever
method they wish so as to give effect to the principle. Thus, if, in
practice, equality is achieved by collective bargaining, legislation is
unnecessary. The principle is confined to "remuneration" and does
not cover workers' rights of a different character, such as, for example, representation on works councils, trade union membership,
or membership of trade union committees or other governing bodies.
The term "remuneration" is, however, defined very comprehensively, and in this respect the relevant provision of the Treaty 144
repeats verbatim the definition of Article I (a) of the I.L.O. Convention. "Remuneration" includes not only the "ordinary basic minimum wage or salary" but also "any additional emoluments what143
1
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soever payable directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by
the employer to the worker and arising out of the worker's employment." This covers merit rates and skill differentials, family allowances and bonuses of all kinds, and also "fringe benefits" such as
vacation payments and participation in pension schemes. As regards basic wage rates it means what is generally called the "rate
for the job," or in the words of the Treaty: "remuneration for work
at time rates shall be the same for the same job." 145 As regards piece
rates the Treaty provides "that remuneration for the same work
. . . shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of measurement." 146 This is obviously intended to say that the same rate must
be promised for identical units of work, or, in the words of the I.L.O.
Convention, it "refers to rates of remuneration established without
discrimination based on sex." 147 What it does not mean is that either
time merit rates or piece rates have to be calculated in such a way
as to make up for any differences in the average performance of men
and women which may influence their aggregate earnings. It may
even be arguable that an attempt to do so might itself be a contra·
vention of the principle. In other words, wage rates must be fixed
so as to give equal opportunities to all, but they need not, and perhaps must not, even out such inequalities of opportunity as are the
result of natural differences. The I.L.O. Convention 148 suggests
"measures [to J ... be taken to promote objective appraisal of
jobs on the basis of the work to be performed" and goes on to provide that "differential rates between workers, which correspond,
without regard to sex, to differences, as determined by such objective
appraisal, in the work to be performed, shall not be considered as
being contrary to the principle of equal remuneration for men and
women workers for work of equal value." This principle must, it
is submitted, be considered as being implicitly incorporated in the
Treaty. If this submission is well founded, there would, after all,
be no difference between "equal remuneration for equal work" and
"equal remuneration for work of equal value."
2. HOLIDAYS WITH PAY

The provision on holidays with pay is much more vague. Article
I 20 requires Member States to "endeavor to maintain the existing
equivalence of paid holiday schemes." During the negotiations some
145
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expressed anxiety that differences in this area might lead to distortions of competition. In France, 149 Belgium/ 50 and Luxembourg 151 the employees' right to annual vacations is regulated by
statute, whereas in Western Germany 152 and in Italy 153 it is entirely
or mainly based on collective agreements. This is also true of the
Netherlands, 154 where, however, the Council of Mediators has certain powers to regulate holidays 155 and where a bill on annual vacations with pay is pending at the time of writing. The fact that in
one country paid vacations are based on legislation and in another
on collective bargaining does not in itself have any influence on the
conditions under which the industries of those countries compete.
Collective agreements are, however, plainly more adaptable than
statutes to changing conditions of the market. This element of
rigidity which is inherent in legislative as distinguished from autonomous industrial regulation may perhaps be considered as the
most significant "distorting" factor arising from vacations with
pay.
This observation is especially relevant in connection with French
law. The French legislation governing annual vacations is very deLABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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tailed, and, especially since the amendment of the Labor Code by
a Law of March 27, I956, 156 is very favorable to the employee. The
employee is entitled to one and a half days of paid vacation for
each month he has worked for the particular employer, that is, I8
days per year, a minimum which is subject to extension on various
grounds. This rigid, detailed and (from the point of view of the
employers) onerous system of paid vacations made it desirable from
the French point of view to reduce the flexibility of the vacation
schemes existing in other Members of the Community, and to ensure that the other Member States would at least do nothing to
reduce the existing vacation rights conferred upon employees by
legislation, collective bargaining, or usage. No attempt was made
in this respect to produce anything like equality between members,
an attempt which in view of the complexity and multiplicity of existing vacation schemes would, in any event, have been doomed to
failure. Article I 20 envisages only that the existing basis of competition should in this respect be "frozen," that is, that nothing should
be done to increase whatever distorting effect present vacation
schemes may have on the competitive power of the Member States.
Article I20 creates no more than a mutual obligation of the members and an obligation of each towards the Community, and even
this obligation is couched in terms of "endeavor" and not in terms
of an undertaking. It is not very likely to play a major role in practice.157 What is significant, however, is that the existence of this
Article I 20 has induced the Commission 158 to undertake surveys
concerning vacations with pay and official holidays in what it calls
"the more important sectors of the Community." This is no doubt
a long term scheme which so far has reached the state of "preparatory work only," but it is another illustration of the fact that in
many areas the Treaty is most effective in providing the machinery
to obtain better factual information on the conditions of competition.
3·

WORKING HOURS AND OVERTIME PAY

With regard to working hours and overtime pay the Treaty itself is silent. It imposes no obligation to adopt the 40-hour week or
any particular scheme of overtime pay, nor does it enable the Community to introduce such measures directly into the legal systems of
156
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the Member States. Yet, in fact, the French scheme of the 40-hour
week, based on the famous "40-hour law" of I936/ 59 and modified
by later legislation, especially by the Law of February 2 5, I 946/ 60
has been treated by those participating in the negotiations as a kind
of "signpost," 161 which should point the way for the members of
the Community. If one considers that, according to French law, the
compulsory overtime rate for each hour between 40 and 48 per week
is time and a quarter, and for anything beyond 48 hours time and a
half, it is possible to understand the anxiety of those representing
French interests. This anxiety appears even in legal textbooks, ~
and is probably a result not so much of the legal principle of the
40-hour week itself, as of the system of overtime pay which, with
working hours averaging somewhere around 45 per week/ 63 is
thought to constitute a considerable handicap in international competition. As the Exposes of the Commission show, working hours
have, over the last few years, in France as elsewhere, 164 shown a
downward trend-in France from 46 in 1957 to 45.6 in I958, and
as of January I, I959, to 44·9· However, and this is not unimportant
from the point of view of any given industry, the differences in
actual working hours concealed by these averages are very considerable. On March I, 1959, about 37Y2% were estimated to work
more than 48 hours, and only 8% less than 40 hours.
Conditions such as these form the background of the-at first
sight enigmatic-Part II of the "Protocol relating to Certain Provisions of Concern to France" which is "an integral part" of the
Treaty itself. 165 The Protocol imposes no obligation on any Member State, but it expresses an expectation on the part of the Member
States
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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. . . that the establishment of the Common Market will
result, by the end of the first stage, in a situation where the
basic level for overtime payment and the average overtime rates in industry will correspond to those existing in
France according to the average figures for the year 1956.
No prescription, then, but once again a prediction. It is, of course,
quite impossible to speculate on the chance that the prediction will
159
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be fulfilled. The Commission, in an answer given in July I959 to
a question in the Assembly, expressed the hope that it would be, 166
but also pointed out that it was taking the necessary steps to be prepared, as it were, for the worst. This preparatory work now being
done by the officials of the Commission consists in the first place in
an attempt at a precise assessment of the average overtime rates
paid in France in I956, a task which, in the opinion of the Commission and of the French government experts assisting the Commission in this matter, presents no major difficulties. 167 The Commission has also started preparatory work on surveys concerning
working hours and overtime 168 and in the two Exposes on the
Social Situation 169 it has already collected a certain amount of material of interest in the present context. In France, where the normal
week is 40 hours, weekly working hours averaged 45.6 in I958. In
Belgium, on the other hand, the normal week of 4 5 hours (that is
five days at nine hours each) was in I 9 58 the almost universal rule,
and, in view of the recession, which hit Belgium harder than the
other members of the Community, very little overtime was worked.
In the West German Federal Republic the trade unions concentrated
their demands in I957 on the reduction of the normal working week
and succeeded during that year in obtaining, without loss of wages,
a reduction for two thirds of all workers-in the usual case from
48 to 4 5 hours. Average working hours (including overtime) were
46.5 in I957 and 45-7 in 1958. Employees of the Bund (including
railway, postal, telegraph, and telephone workers) and of the
Lander have the 45-hour week, the metal, printing, and clothing
industries a 44-hour week, and the coal miners in the Ruhr now
have a 40-hour week. Information about Italy is not quite so specific, but it appears that in 1958 90.7 percent (as against 90.9 percent in I 9 57) worked 40 hours or more, and only 9-3 percent (as
against 9.1 percent in 1957) less than 40 hours. The average actual
monthly hours were 168.07 in 1958 as against 168.58 in 1957. In
Luxembourg, the working week is 44 hours for industry, and the
unions are trying to achieve a 40-hour week without loss of wages.
The 4 5-hour week prevails in the Nether lands, and the intention is to
reduce it cautiously, gradually, and industry by industry or enterprise
by enterprise with a view to taking account of individual conditions
and to avoiding a major dislocation.
1
..
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In the light of such information only a prophet could predict what
the situation is likely to be at the end of the first stage. The possibility cannot be ruled out that at that time working hours and rates
of overtime pay may, in the countries of the Community, have
reached a point at which the Protocol is of little significance, but on
the other hand it may produce a crisis. It would be a fatal mistake
to think that the vagueness of the prediction in the Protocol and the
absence in it of any legally binding obligation deprive it of practical
importance; far from it. If the prediction proves to be wrong, that
is, if in any given branch of industry the basic level for overtime
pay (the normal working week) and the average overtime rate do
not throughout the Community correspond to those prevailing in
France in 1956, then
. . . the Commission shall [emphasis added] authorize
France to take, in respect of branches of industry affected
by the inequalities in payments for overtime, measures of
safeguard of which the Commission shall determine the
conditions and particulars. . . .
What this obviously means is that, as already adumbrated in the
Spaak Report, 170 France will have to be permitted to establish or
re-establish tariffs or subsidies, or (a possibility not mentioned in
the Spaak Report) quantitative import restrictions.
The standard of comparison is the French basic level for overtime pay and the average overtime rate of 1956, and any variations
of either after 1956 are to be ignored. The working week and overtime rates of the other members of the Community obtaining at the
end of the first stage will have to be compared with the corresponding French figures of 1956.
Moreover, whereas the general prediction of the first paragraph
of Chapter II of the Protocol refers to the French economy of
1956 and the economies of the five other Member States as of the
end of the first stage, each economy taken as a whole, the sanction
contained in the second paragraph refers to "branches of industry"
(usecteurs industriels"). No one seems as yet to know what this
phrase means, and, in its answer in the Assembly in June 1959, 171
the Commission emphasized the need for an agreed definition. In
order to be prepared for the situation at the end of the first stage,
the Commission obviously will also have to be informed about working hours and average overtime rates in each "branch of industry"
in the Six.
170
Spaak Report at 64, 66.
m Reponse, op. cit. supra note

130.

336

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

In one respect the French development since 1956 will have to be
taken into account by the Commission in its delicate and difficult
task of comparison at the end of the first stage. The Commission
will have to compare the average increase since 1956 in the level of
wages paid in the particular "branch of industry" in the various
Member States other than France with the corresponding increase
in that industry in France itself. If the increase outside France exceeds that in France "by a percentage fixed by the Commission with
the approval of the Council acting by means of a qualified majority
vote," then the Commission is not to authorize France to take
"measures of safeguard" for that particular branch of industry,
although the working week and average overtime rates outside
France in that branch of industry do not correspond with the French
situation in 1956. The Commission has informed the Assembly
that 172 it has organized an inquiry into the cost of labor in a dozen
industries which will yield the required data about wages. The inquiry is based on the pattern established by the Coal-Steel Community for the investigations it has conducted for years, and the statistical methods of comparing real wages evolved by the Coal-Steel
Community will also be used in assessing wage increases. The questionnaire and other aspects of the inquiry have been discussed and
agreed on at two conferences with governmental experts. The governments have been officially notified of the inquiry, and, to give it
legal status, the Council will be asked for a decision under Article
2 r 3 since, in the opinion of the Commission, such a decision would
remove such legal obstacles to the conducting of the inquiry as might
exist in the Member States. For example, in Germany this procedure would, in the opinion of the Commission, obviate the need for
special legislation with reference to the inquiry. The representatives
of the employers' associations and trade unions have also promised
their support. The Commission has expressly stated that the Member State governments have been cooperative in this matter, since.in
a parliamentary question in the Assembly some suspicion had been
voiced that the Commission had met with difficulties. 173
In the present connection it may not be unimportant that, according to the Second Expose on the Social Situation in the Community
published by the Commission, 174 France is the only Member Country
in which the level of real wages fell, however slightly, in 1958. This
fall was accompanied by a rise in nominal wages (nominal wages
172
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also rose in the other members of the Community) and by a reduction in hours. The situation at the time of writing may thus be said to
illustrate the difficulties which will confront the Commission at the
end of the first stage in the event of its having to apply Part II
No. 2 of the Protocol. Although the Protocol does not say so expressis verbis, it seems to be clear-and it seems to be the view of
the Commission itself 175-that what will have to be compared will
be real and not nominal wages. A comparison of nominal wages
would be wholly unrealistic and it would also raise rate of exchange
problems of a most delicate character.
The concession made by the members other than France when
accepting and signing this Protocol is formidable. How formidable
it is one can see if one analyzes the constitutional situation which
will arise at the end of the first stage. The Commission-acting if
need be by a majority vote 176-is then under an obligation
("shall") to authorize France to take protectionist measures to
make up for disparities in working hours or overtime rates. But
the countervailing exception, intended to account for disparities in
the development of wage levels since 1956 favorable to French industry from a competitive point of view, can only be applied if the
relevant minimum percentage is fixed by the Commission with the
approval of a qualified majority of the Council, an approval which
can thus be prevented, if she so desires, by France herself, provided
she obtains the support of any one member other than Luxembourg.177
As a German commentator has pointed out, 178 the immediate
effect of the Protocol is admittedly nil. Neither the legislation nor
the collective bargaining practice of any member of the Community need be affected by it. Nevertheless, the sanction behind the
expectation expressed in the Protocol is in a sense much more potent
than that behind the obligations as to equal pay for the sexes or
vacation with pay, laid down in the body of the Treaty. In a sense
the entire future of the Common Market has been made to hinge
upon the adoption, in all the six countries, of something like the
40-hour week and the French overtime scheme. The scheme of overtime rates conceivably may prove a more serious hurdle than the
principle of the 40-hour week itself.
These then are the directions in which the Treaty seeks to mLABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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fluence conditions of employment. But the questions discussed so
far do not exhaust those concerning labor and labor relations with
which the Treaty deals.
F. FREEDOM OF MovEMENT
I. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

The principle that workers should be free to move from one country to another-a principle which when implemented will create a
common labor market-is, of course, fundamental to the plan for
the European Economic Community. The Spaak Report 179 emphasizes a psychological aspect, the need for destroying prejudices and
for spreading the elementary truth that an influx of foreign workers
may be a source of strength. The Spaak Report also observes 180
that "liberation" of the movement of unskilled as well as skilled
workers is necessary. In this respect-and in others-there is, as
pointed out in the Spaak Report, a fundamental difference between
the European Economic Community and the Coal-Steel Community. The problem of defining skills in the latter was and is a matter of first importance, but a community which is not limited to two
specific industries has, as the Spaak Report convincingly demonstrates, an even greater interest in promoting freedom of movement for the unskilled (who are especially exposed to the risk of
unemployment) than for skilled workers.
The Spaak Report also sounds a very necessary note of warning:
it is dangerous to overestimate the magnitude of the actual movement of labor even in a completely free market. The information
published by the Commission in its two Exposes on the Social Situation in the Community 181 confirms the general impression that movement of labor is as yet quite insignificant in Europe. It would be
entirely unrealistic to attribute this exclusively or perhaps even principally to legal obstacles. As the Spaak Report says, even within a
given country-any European country-men and women are reluctant to change their occupations or their homes. Even if there
were no housing shortage (as there is, and it must be counted as an
overwhelmingly important factor) "mobility of labor" would not
come naturally to people; it must be stimulated. This is not to say,
1711
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as the Spaak Report also points out, that it should always be stimulated. The most recent tendency (of which the British Distribution
of Industries Acts are an example) is to develop employment opportunities on the spot, that is to stimulate the migration of capital
rather than of labor. The "European Social Fund" 182 is partly intended to assist in this process and the relevant Treaty provisions
thus complement those on freedom of movement. Given the psychological and cultural (including linguistic) inhibitions militating
against geographical mobility of labor, it may be especially necessary for an American observer to "think afresh" when considering
Europe. It is, to say the least of it, possible that the reluctance to
sever one's links with an accustomed environment is rooted in traditions and sentiments which Europe could forego only at the risk
of losing the richness and variety of its civilization.
Part II, Title III, Chapter I of the Treaty contains the provisions
which are intended to remove the legal obstacles to freedom of
movement within the Community, that is, in the words of the Spaak
Report to establish
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

. . . the right in all countries of the Community to accept
work in fact offered and, in the event of obtaining a job,
to live in the particular country without any restriction
which does not apply in the same way to workers who are
citizens of the country.
Article 7 of the Treaty which appears in the introductory Part I
(entitled "Principles") provides that within its field of application
"and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned therein"
"any discrimination on the grounds of nationality shall hereby be
prohibited." The provisions in Part II, Title III, Chapter I 183
are clearly "special provisions." The power of the Council, acting
by a simple majority pursuant to Article 49, to take measures to
give gradual effect to the free movement of workers is by the same
token not impaired by the second paragraph of Article 7 under
which the Council, acting by a qualified majority, may lay down
rules in regard to the prohibition of any such discrimination as is
mentioned in Article 7, paragraph I.
Article 7 may, however, be of importance in connection with the
rights of persons employed by public enterprises or enterprises to
which any Member State grants "special or exclusive rights," for
example, concessions. This is by virtue of Article 90, but although
18
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this may conceivably be of some practical significance to American
enterprises in Europe, it is not further considered here because, for
the time being, that is as long as the Council has not exercised its
rule-making power under Article 7, paragraph 2, this aspect of
Article 90 is not operative.
The provisions of Articles 48-5 I had been foreshadowed by Article 8 of the Convention for European Economic Cooperation of
April I6, I948, which applies to the (now) I8 Members of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation and which is
as follows:
The Contracting Parties will make the fullest and most
effective use of their available manpower.
They will endeavor to provide full employment for their
own people and they may have recourse to manpower available in the territory of any other Contracting Party. In the
latter case they will, in mutual agreement, take the necessary measures to facilitate the movement of workers and to
ensure their establishment in conditions satisfactory from
the economic and social point of view. Generally, the Contracting Parties will cooperate in the progressive reduction
of obstacles to the free movement of persons.
Decisions of the O.E.E.C. can of course be taken only "by mutual
agreement of all the members" (Article 14 of the Convention),
and, in the absence of such decisions, the O.E.E.C. can implement
the policy of Article 8 only through recommendations. One such
recommendation 184 is based on Article I 6 and Article I 7 of the Revised I.L.O. Migration for Employment Recommendation of
1949. 185 It provides that, after five years of residence and employment, foreign workers should be free to accept employment of their
choosing. The Spaak Report 186 prefers this method of increasing
freedom of movement to another scheme, also proposed by the
O.E.E.C., according to which recruitment of foreign labor by any
given employer could not be prohibited after the lapse of a maximum period (in principle one month), during which unsuccessful
attempts have been made to fill the vacancy, by engaging labor available in the territory. The disadvantage of the latter system is that it
may, in the opinion of the authors of the Spaak Report, result in
something akin to a game of "musical chairs," that is, a situation in
which a vacancy is filled by a workman who in accepting the vacant
,.. Summarized in FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II3.
See r I.L. ConE 1951, art. ISII, at II32·
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job has himself given up another and so on ad infinitum so that the
occasion for the recruitment of foreign labor never arises. As against
this, the O.E.E.C. proposal for a five-year maximum for any restrictions to be placed on choice of employment could, as the Spaak
Report says, be the starting point for a more promising development if the period were gradually reduced. A third possibility (also
appearing in the Spaak Report, but not in the O.E.E.C. proposals)
would be gradually to enlarge (by stages fixed in advance) the number of foreign workers to be admitted for employment, taking as
the basis the mean of the numbers of foreign workers admitted during the last three years, and enlarging it annually by at least one
percent of the total labor force of the country, all of this to be
coupled with escape clauses to protect particular industries in times
of unemployment.
None of these specific proposals have been written into the Treaty
of Rome. 187 Its relevant provisions are thus more general and vague
than the O.E.E.C. proposals. The legal powers wielded by the institutions of the Community, however, are plainly very much greater
than those of the organs of O.E.E.C. Thus, although the policies
written into Article 8 of the O.E.E.C. Convention and those which
are given expression in Article 48 et seq. of the Treaty are similar,
the means available for their execution are very different. Within
the framework of O.E.E.C. a free labor market can only be brought
about by agreements between the Contracting Parties (although
the organs of O.E.E.C. may, of course, be empowered to prepare
and carry into effect such agreements). But under the Treaty a
supranational body of law may be created which will take effect
during the transitional period, and a supranational principle, which
will take effect at the end of the transitional period, has been created
by the Treaty itself. This emerges from Article 48 of the Treaty
which must be regarded as one of its cornerstones and therefore
deserves analysis in some detail. Four points seem to call for special
comment.
In the first place it should be noted that, with respect to the establishment of the common labor market, no four-year "stages" are
envisaged. Article 48 (I) provides that "the free movement of
workers shall be ensured within the Community not later than at
the date of the expiry of the transitional period." According to
Article 49, the "free movement of workers" is to be brought about
"progressively," that is gradually, during the transitional period,
m Treaty arts. 48, 49·
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but the Treaty is silent concerning the rate or rhythm of progression. The Treaty does, however, indicate the steps which the organs
of the Community are to take to make a free labor market possible (Articles 49-5 I), and it further indicates (Article 49) that
these were to be initiated as soon as the Treaty came into force.
The second noteworthy point is that, "at the end of the expiry of
the transitional period," legal obstacles to freedom of movement
(with certain exceptions) are automatically to disappear. The
Treaty does not provide for decisions by any Community institution
at that point, but its Article 48 contains substantive law which, if
unamended, will come into force in the six countries at the end of
the transitional period. Needless to say, this applies to legal obstacles only, for example, to restrictions on immigration or on the
employment of foreign workers. Other impediments to free migration, such as those caused by wage differentials, differences in social
security expectations, 188 language difficulties, social mores, and national allegiances are either beyond the reach of legislation or dealt
with in other provisions of the Treaty.
Thirdly, however, this automatic implementation of the principle
of a free labor market in the Community has been expressly limited
so that it has no application with regard to "the non-European countries and territories which have special relations with Belgium,
France, Italy and the Netherlands" (Articles 13 rand 135) and with
regard to "Algeria and the French overseas departments" (Article
227). The "non-European countries and territories" referred to
in Article 131 are subject to the special provisions contained in
Part IV of the Treaty (Articles IJI-136), and are listed in Annex
IV of the Treaty. They consist of those territories of the French
Community which are situated outside Europe (other than territories such as Algeria which are, for constitutional purposes, part of
metropolitan France), of the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-U rundi,
of Italian Somali! and, and Nether lands New Guinea. 189 The main
188
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Gen'l Rep. para. 120. For the Council of Europe agre :ments: Europ. T.S. Nos. 12,
13; Five European Conventions put out by the Directorate of Information of the
Council of Europe; ROBERTSON, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE ch. 8, at I3D-3I (1956).
189
According to the Protocol relating to tl:e,Application of the Treaty to the NonEuropean Parts of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is annexed to the Treaty,
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body of the Treaty does not apply to these territories, but the Member States have by Article 131 agreed to associate them with the
Community. This is not the place to discuss the politically momentous aspect of this differentiation with regard to the Common Market in general, a differentiation which is regulated in Articles 13 1134, and for the first five years from the entry into force of the
Treaty by the implementing Convention annexed to it (Article
136). This Convention, although it deals with the "Right of Establishment" in the Overseas Territories (Article 8 of the Convention) and in Algeria and the French overseas departments (Article
r6 of the Convention), that is with matters regulated for the European territories of the members in Articles 52 to 58 of the Treaty,
has no provisions concerning freedom of movement for workers.
This freedom is regulated in Article· r 35 of the Treaty which provides:
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Subject to the provisions relating to public health, public
safety and public order, the freedom of movement in
Member States of workers from the countries and territories, and in the countries and territories of workers from
Member States shall be governed by subsequent conventions which shall require the unanimous agreement of
Member States.

If no such conventions can be unanimously agreed on, there will be
no freedom of movement from the overseas territories, or into or
among them, either at the end of the transitional period or at any
subsequent time. This provision in Article 135 does not, however,
apply to Algeria or the French overseas departments. Neither,
however, do Article 48 et seq. on free movement of workers. These
are not among the Treaty provisions which, by Article 227 ( 2) of
the Treaty, have been made to apply to Algeria and the French
overseas departments. The conditions for the application of these
and other Treaty provisions not applicable to those territories
. . . shall be determined, not later than two years after
the date of [the Treaty's] . . . entry into force, by decisions of the Council acting by means of a unanimous vote
on a proposal of the Commission.
the Netherlands may ratify the Treaty so as to include only the Kingdom in Europe
and Netherlands New Guinea, thus excluding Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.
The parties to the Treaty are however-according to a Declaration of Intention
annexed to it-ready, at the request of the Netherlands, to open negotiations for
the economic association of these territories with the Community.
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All measures designed to ensure free migration of labor, then, must
be confined to the European territories of the Member States, and
no one can say how far such measures ever can or will be applied to
any overseas territories. It is even more difficult to predict to what
extent the free movement of labor which is to be guaranteed by the
end of the transitional period in the Community will apply to the
overseas territories.
The principle of free movement and of the abolition of legal obstacles to its exercise is further subject 190 -and this is the fourth
point of importance-to a number of significant exceptions even
where Europe is concerned.
Restrictions on free immigration or emigration or upon the employment of foreigners for reasons of "public order, public safety
or public health" (Article 48) can be maintained. It will be a somewhat delicate task for the Court of Justice to distinguish between
limitations imposed for economic reasons and limitations prompted
by reason of public order, safety, or health. One can think of any
number of situations in which these motivations may overlap; for
example, where housing or medical facilities are inadequate or
where there are political or religious dissensions among groups of
workers or disputes concerning trade union organization, or where
potential immigrants are not sufficiently familiar with the safety or
hygienic requirements imposed by the country of immigration and
the like. The need of these exceptions to the principle of freedom
of movement is nonetheless clear. This is just another illustration
of the difficulties facing an economic community which is to be established in an environment of cultural, political, and legal diversity.
Another exception concerns "employment in public administration" (Article 48 (a) ) , which may also be difficult to interpret. The
central and municipal government administrations of the Member
Countries are clearly included, but is employment by public corporations? Does the exception in fact ri-Iean that the principle of freedom of migration is not to extend, for example, to the railway services which in all European countries are public services? Or to public
utilities?
2. CHANGES DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Such questions are even now not entirely academic since pursuant
to Article 49 Community institutions are to "lay down the measures
necessary to effect progressively the free movement of workers as
100

Spaak Report, supra note 186.
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defined in the preceding Article." Indeed, the Commission has, according to its Second Report, 191 practically completed the preparatory work which will enable it to draw up proposals for the application of Articles 48 and 49, but before seeking an opinion from the
Economic and Social Committee and approval of the Council, the
Commission will submit a draft of its proposals to experts in the
various countries.
The measures to be taken are to be directed at a gradual achievement of certain legal changes enumerated and explicitly described in
Article 48. The matters affected will be these:
I) Discrimination based on nationality between workers of
Member States is to be abolished as regards employment, remuneration, and other working conditions (Article 48 ( 2)). Of these "employment" is perhaps the most important. It means not only that
nationals of all Member States have equal rights to seek employment 191 n and to accept it, without any need for the approval of any
governmental authority (this point is specifically mentioned in Article
43 ( 3) (a) ) but also that employment exchanges must not, in finding employment for workers or workers for vacancies, make any
distinction between their own nationals and those of other Member
States. It further means that no discrimination must be agreed upon
between trade unions and employers or employers' organizations,
or be practiced by statutory works councils or by councils of shop
stewards, whether such councils are based on statutes or collective
agreements.m Industrial conciliators, mediators, and arbitrators are
bound by the rule of non-discrimination whatever the basis of their
authority. As soon as the principle of non-discrimination becomes a
rule of law in the Member States (and this might happen-at any
rate in some industries-by virtue of measures taken pursuant to
Article 49 long before Article 48 gives automatic effect to the principle), individual employers will also be bound by it. An employer
could, in accordance with the procedural rules prevailing in the country concerned, be prevented from practicing systematic discrimination in the hiring of labor, and he could certainly be compelled to
reinstate an employee upon proof that the worker had been dis191

SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 173·
Art. 48, para. 3, appears to be enumerative and not exhaustive, but the matter
is not free from doubt. The principle established in para. 1 goes beyond the particular
instances mentioned in para. 3· This means that workers will be free to enter any
Member Country in order to seek work there, and not only to accept work already
offered. This is a matter of great importance. An early clarification of this question
of interpretation is desirable.
193
See PART II of this Chapter.
191
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missed because he was a national of a Member State other than that
of the employer. Clearly "discrimination as regards employment"
refers to "firing" as well as "hiring." It would therefore also be
illegal for unions and employers or employers' associations to adopt
by collective agreement any principle of "seniority" which would, in
the event of dismissals, give preference to nationals of one Member
State over those of another. \Vorks councils, arbitrators, and the
like would be similarly restricted.
2) Discrimination with regard to remuneration is less likely to
occur, at any rate as a systematic measure. The word "remuneration" 193 clearly covers not only wages and salaries of various kinds
(time and piece rates, overtime rates and the like), but also "fringe
benefits," and discrimination regarding fringe benefits, especially
among salaried employees, may be more likely than wage discrimination. Discrimination between nationals of the Community states
with regard to paid vacations, to pension schemes, or to bonuses is
forbidden, and the same prohibition applies to other "working conditions."
3) Two matters of very great potential importance are not expressly referred to in Article 48-social security rights and trade
union membership.
Social security rights are not expressly covered by Article 51 because this provision, which is concerned with assimilation of qualification periods and benefit payments, does not deal directly with the
question of the equal treatment of workers employed in the same
country. Any differences of treatment in this area would nevertheless clearly violate the spirit of Article 48, and provision against it
is therefore within the powers vested in the Council under Article
49· The question has in fact been settled by Article 8 of the Council's Regulation No. J, concerning the Social Security of Migrant
Workers. 194 It provides that all residents of one of the Member
States to whom the Regulation applies are subject to the obligations and entitled to the rights established by the social security
legislation of each Member State under the same conditions as the
nationals of that State.
Trade union membership raises a much more formidable problem. In this respect the experience of the American courts in relying
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution may
103
See the definition in art. 6 (r) (a) (i) of the I.L.O. Migration for Employment
Convention (Revised), 1949, in 1 I. L. CODE 1951, art. 1499, at 1110. Article 6 also
deals with trade union rights, social security, and kindred matters.
'"'See Reg. N• 3, op. cit. supra note 17, art. 8.
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perhaps be of some assistance. It may be arguable that the rule
against non-discrimination makes it incumbent on unions not to reject any applicant for membership for reasons condemned by law,
but such a principle, however desirable, is obviously very difficult
to enforce. As is true in a similar situation in the United States, 195
the rule against non-discrimination can perhaps be more usefully
applied to collective bargaining practices of unions than to their
membership policies. Article 48 might, in other words, play a role
comparable to that of American provisions which make the union
the statutory bargaining representative of all members of the bargaining unit and invalidate any agreement purporting to discriminate between members and non-members in so far as non-membership is in fact the result of the non-members' nationality. It might,
moreover, implicitly provide a check on expulsions from trade union
membership which are in fact based on discriminatory policies.
4) Freedom of movement implies not only the "right . . . to
accept offers of employment actually made" (Article 48 (3) (a)),
but also the right to move about freely in order to do so, a right
to stay in the country in which one has found employment, and-a
point of great importance-a right to continue to live in the country
of employment even after the loss of the actual job. All these matters are mentioned in Article 48 ( 3) (b), (c), and (d), but the last
is subject to "implementing regulations laid down by the Commission." 196 The effectiveness of the entire scheme may well depend
on these regulations. If a foreign worker has to face expulsion in
the event of a loss of his employment, he is not in fact on a par
with indigenous workers, and would moreover find himself in a
state of dependence which is undesirable. On the other hand, in
the event of protracted unemployment a repatriation of foreign
workers may become an urgent economic necessity. The regulations
to be issued by the Commission are clearly a matter of great importance. The Treaty is silent as regards the right of the worker's
family to live in the country of his employment, 197 and silent as regards his rights in relation to the allocation of housing accommodation, the schooling of his children, public assistance, and public
190

Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 ( 1944).
When laying down tl::ese Regulations, the Commission " . . . shall take due
account, in so far as the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is concerned, of the particular demographic situation of that country." Treaty, Protocol Concerning the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, art 2. The number of foreign workers in Luxembourg is proportionately very large: see First EXPOSE A. II, para. 24 ad finem.
107
See arts. r6, 17 of the I.L.O. Migration for Employment Recommendation
(Revised), 1949, in I l.L. CODE 1951, art. 1511 at II3Z.
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health services (other than those based on social security legislation). In this respect as in others the scheme of the common labor
market is still fragmentary.

3·

METHODS OF GIVING EFFECT TO THESE CHANGES

The powers vested in the Council by Article 49 for the purpose
of gradually effecting the free movement of workers are far-reaching. The Council has been placed under a duty to (it "shall") adopt
measures by means of directives or regulations. Neither a unanimous decision nor a qualified majority vote is required so that the
Council can in this case 198 create law applicable in each Member
State by majority vote provided the measures it adopts are based
on the required proposals of the Commission 199 and provided the
Economic and Social Committee has been consulted. Whether, in
fact, the Council is likely to act by means of regulations and
whether the measures mentioned in Article 49 would not more appropriately take the form of directives is a matter of opinion. The
Commission in its Second Report leaves the matter open, speaking
of a "legal instrument" which is in course of preparation. 200
Article 49 requires immediate steps to achieve the aims of Article 48, and two methods of doing so are envisaged: ( 1) the removal of certain restrictions on the employment of foreign nationals
(Article 49 (b) and (c) ) , and ( 2) the improvement of employment opportunities by reforms in the employment exchange services
(Articles 49 (a) and (d) ) .
I) The Commission emphasized in its First Report 201 that its
proposals would have to deal with three fundamental problems:
access to work, freedom of movement, and the possibility of residing, and settling down in, the country of employment. It further
stated that the progressive removal of restrictions "according to a
plan" as required by Article 49 would have to take account of the
experience of the Coal-Steel Community in applying Article 69 of
the E.C.S.C. Treaty and also the decision of the O.E.E.C. 202 It
indicated more particularly that during a first phase the lapse of
time between application for work permits and their grant or refusal would have to be reduced to a minimum and grounds for their
refusal restricted to reasons of public order and health. Renewal
198

Treaty arts. 148 ( r), 189.
I d. art. 149.
200
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 175.
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FIRST GEN'L REP. para. III.
"""See text preceding note 184 supra.
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procedures would have to be improved by lengthening the duration
of permits and liberalizing the grounds for extension, and reform
and unification of procedures for acquiring permission to enter and
remain in a country-which are at present extremely complexwould also be needed. The Commission envisaged measures to implement the Recommendation of the O.E.E.C. that foreign workers
should have complete freedom of choice of employment after five
years' residence and that this period should be gradually reduced. 203
This program, although "preliminary," is sufficiently ambitious to
require very extensive preparations, and the Second Report of the
Commission contains an account of the preparatory work done so
far. A systematic comparative analysis of the legal position of foreign workers in th·e six countries has been completed, 204 but not published. It includes a study of the conditions of entry and residence for workers and their families as well as of labor permits,
whether based on legislation or administrative practices or bilateral
and multilateral treaties, as well as of methods of bringing together
offers of work and persons seeking it. A draft of an "instrument"
has also been prepared by the Commission which will have "limited
objectives and will cover only a first stage," 205 affecting the entry
of workers and their families, employment and residence, the right
to remain in the territory entered, and the right of establishment
there. The Commission will also initiate "a thorough and systematic
study of the legal position of nationals of Member States who
have established themselves in the territory of another Member
State." 206 Finally, a committee is to be set up to assist the Commission and to propose practical measures by which freedom of movement is to be created. 207
At the end of this first phase the need for labor permits, time
limits restricting the free choice of jobs (Article 49 (c) ) and exclusion from certain, or from all but certain, occupations (Article
49 (d) ) should have disappeared-whether they were created by the
law of any Member State or by existing treaties.
2) A reform of the system of labor exchanges to promote freedom of movement can be brought about by instituting a common system of such exchanges. This can be done either by close collaboration
of the national labor administrations (Articles 49(a)) or (Article
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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49 (d)) it can be effected by a supranational machinery designed to
even out regional unemployment and regional excesses in the demand
for labor over its supply. The Treaty describes the latter as the:
appropriate machinery for connecting offers of employment and requests for employment, with a view to equilibrating them in such a way as to avoid serious threats to
the standard of living and employment in the various
regions and industries.
The reorganization of the labor exchanges is obviously a necessary
preliminary for the establishment of a common labor market.
The Commission hopes 208 to improve the. liaison between the employment services of the Member States, to promote direct contacts
between employers and workers and to ensure that workers can
make use of employment exchanges. It also hopes to create a coordinating agency to study labor market developments, to cooperate
with national employment services in helping employers to find
workers in other Member Countries, to promote closer contacts
between existing employment services and to suggest improvements.
When the Assembly received the Report of the Commission which
contains this program, it passed a resolution 209 strongly recommending the creation of a European Employment Exchange with
a view to coordinating the activities of the national employment
exchanges. The "legal instrument" of which the Commission has
prepared a draft does not go quite so far, but it provides for measures of cooperation between labor exchanges to bring together supply and demand and for the general coordination of their work
under the aegis of the Commission. The Commission further aims 210
at a gradual harmonization of the working methods of labor exchanges and at a regular exchange of information between them.
4·

EXCHANGE OF YOUNG WORKERS

The best that measures to be taken by the Council can be expected
to achieve is the removal of legal obstacles to the free fluctuation
of supply and demand in labor markets. They cannot by themselves
overcome the economic and ideological barriers which separate the
..,. See FIRST GEN'L REP. para. r 14; SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 176; Bulletin, Feb.
1959, pt. II, para. 49·
209
Resolution sur Ies questions traitees dans Ie premier rapport general sur
l'activite de Ia Communaute Economique Europeenne, pt. IV, paras. II and 12,
[1959] }'L OFF. 168.
210
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 176.
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unemployed or under-employed worker and potential employers.
The Treaty does, however, envisage during the transitional period
action in several directions in addition to the progressive abolition
of legal and administrative restrictions on employment. Besides
measures (already taken) in the field of social security the Treaty
envisages that "Member States shall, under a common program,
encourage the exchange of young workers" (Article so). Unlike
the social security measures, this program is not to be effected by
supranational legislation, but by the Member States themselves. No
organ of the Community has been assigned specific tasks in this respect, except, of course, that the Commission, by virtue of Article
I I 8, is to promote close cooperation among Member States in
this as in other employment matters.
The importance of such exchanges to the creation of "Europe"
could be great, and it augurs well that the Commission proposes a
first program making periods of apprenticeship abroad for young
workers more feasible. 211 Bilateral and multilateral understandings
to this effect already exist, but the Commission believes that an annual program is needed so as to make foreign apprenticeships available to a substantial number of workers.
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

G.

THE EuROPEAN SociAL FuND

"The European Social Fund is intended to be a cornerstone in
the edifice of social security which is to be built up side by side with
the measures of economic expansion in the Community." 212 The
need for it arises, in the words of the Spaak Report, 213 from the
"risks which accompany the changes" demanded by economic progress. The aim is to protect labor against these risks and to "reconcile
the necessary mobility and the stability of employment," which must
not be confused with a policy permitting workers to cling to their
jobs. The authors of the Spaak Report, in proposing what they
called an "adjustment fund" (fonds de rtf adaptation) were convinced that this device, by protecting the worker against the consequences of labor mobility, would promote mobility. They also
thought that the fund should be used to assist workers who were
undergoing re-training or changing their homes. The Treaty accordingly defines the aim of the Fund as one of "promoting within the
211
FIRST GEN'L REP. para. II6.
"'-'SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 170.
213
Spaak Report, pt. I. tit. III, ch. 2, at 83.
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Community employment facilities and the geographical and occupational mobility of workers." 214
A similar policy is embodied in the Treaty instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, 215 but in a number of respects the
structure and function of the European Economic Community are
so different from those of the Coal-Steel Community that the arrangements applicable to the latter have not been able to serve as
a pattern. Under the E.C.S.C. Treaty this policy is carried out by
the High Authority by means of funds raised through the CoalSteel Community's "taxing" power, but the Treaty of Rome confers
no corresponding powers either on the Commission or on the Council. The European Economic Community has no power to levy taxes,
and for the time being 216 the revenues of the Community consist of
the financial contributions of the Member States.217 These contributions are not intended to cover expenses incurred in assisting
Member States to implement Treaty policy. Therefore a special
fund will be established to be known as the European Social Fund.218
This is in accordance with the proposals of the Spaak Report, 219
but the Spaak Report also pointed out 220 that the system of readjustment grants would have to differ from that administered by
the High Authority of the E.C.S.C. in respects other than
the source of the funds. Inevitably such a scheme, if applied to a
general common market, has to be different from a scheme applied
to two particular industries. It is, for example, quite impossible to
require-as the Coal-Steel Community Treaty does 221-that the
payment of grants to workers be justified by proof that the loss of
employment resulted either from the introduction of technical processes or new equipment or from the operation of the Common
Market-that is, from increased freedom of competition and movement. Further, under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty, grants presuppose that the state to which a grant is made will itself make a
214

Treaty art. 123.
Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, art. 56. Convention
containing the Transitional Provisions, sec. 23. See on this: Bebr, Labor and the Schuman Plan, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1010 ( 1954); HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE 88 (1958).
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Treaty art. 201 envisages the possibility that eventually the Community may
have its own revenue, e.g., from the common customs tariff.
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Treaty art. 200 ( r).
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grant over and above its normal payment of unemployment insurance
benefits or assistance. 222 This rule, too, was regarded by the authors
of the Spaak Report as not easily applicable to the European Economic Community. They thought that the principle of re-adaptation grants should gradually be integrated into the general systems
of unemployment insurance or assistance, and that these systems
might be harmonized in the process, which in turn would aid in
rendering labor more mobile. They pointed to the American system
of unemployment insurance to show how one could arrive at harmony of legislation without "federalizing" the administration of
the scheme.
Hence, neither the requirement of causal nexus between the operation of the Common Market and the dislocation of labor nor the
requirement of special financial assistance by the state concerned
have been incorporated in the Treaty. The basic function of the
Fund 223 is to cover, at the request of a Member State, 50 percent
of the expenses incurred by that state or by a body under public
law 224

. for the purpose of:
(a) ensuring productive re-employment of workers by
means of:
-occupational re-training,
-resettlement allowances; and
(b) granting aids for the benefit of workers whose
employment is temporarily reduced or suspended as a result of the conversion of their enterprise to other productions, in order that they may maintain the same wage level
pending their full re-employment.
The fund is fed by financial contributions of the Member States
according to a special scale laid down in Article 200, paragraph 2.
This special scale differs substantially from the general scale of
contributions. This, too, is in accordance with the Spaak Report
proposals, 225 which are to the effect that contributions to the Fund
""""'See for these provisions of the E.C.S.C. Treaty and their operation in practice:
HAAS, op. cit. supra note 215, at 92 et. seq. Since the above was written, the text of
E.E.C. Treaty art. 56 has been amended so as to enable the High Authority to grant
assistance in the event of dislocation due to fundamental changes in marketing conditions
( 1960). Section 23 of the Convention on Transitional Provisions expired on Feb. 9,
1960.
223

Treaty art. 125 ( r).
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should be proportionate to the total of wages and statutory or
agreed social insurance contributions, that is, to total (direct and
indirect) labor costs (except in sectors covered by the Coal-Steel
re-adaptation scheme). The differentiation between the proportionate distribution of the general contributions to the Community and
those to the Social Fund is important. It means that the highly industrialized countries contribute proportionately more than the
potential sources of labor emigration. Germany and France pay 32
percent each of the expenses of the Social Fund, but only 28 percent
of those of the Community in general, Belgium pays 8.8 percent of
the expenses of the Social Fund, as against 7·9 percent of general
expenses. Italy, however, contributes only 20 percent of the Fund
compared with 28 percent of the general expenses.
The Fund is established by Article I 2 3 of the Treaty "in order to
improve opportunities of employment of workers in the Common
Market and thus contribute to raising the standard of living." This
is entirely in accordance with the general principle underlying the
proposals of the Spaak Report. The Report-rejecting the view
that the Fund should intervene only where unemployment could be
shown to be the result of the Common Market itself-indicated
that the Community was interested in progressive change in the
industrial structure, in the rationalization of undertakings, and in
better employment of the labor force; it was interested in all of
these because they will increase productivity and improve standards
of living. Such aims justify the Community in bearing part of the
cost of protecting labor against the risks which accompany such
changes. The drafters of the Treaty wholly accepted this general
principle, and, although they did not adopt many of the detailed
proposals of the Spaak Report, 226 the general rule that the Community would bear 50 percent of these costs (as the Report suggested) has been adopted, but adopted as a rule not of prospective
but of retrospective participation. The Spaak Report indicated 227
that the distributive trades and professional and other services
should be brought within the orbit of the Social Fund only from
the moment and to the extent to which they would come within the
Common Market, but no such limitation has been written into the
Treaty. On the other hand, only wage-earners and not small independent craftsmen or peasants may benefit from the fund, whereas
the authors of the Spaak Report took the view that the latter might
c.,• Not, e.g., the proposal to use the Fund towards assisting enterprises in "staggering" closures: Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 85.
=/d. at 87.
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be made eligible for Fund aid if they were also eligible for re-adaptation assistance provided by Member States.
The Fund will be administered by the Commission which will be
assisted by a Committee presided over by a Member of the Commission and composed of government, trade union, and employers'
association representatives. 228 The Committee has not yet been
formed. 229 The activities of the Fund will be circumscribed by regulations to be issued by the Council (by qualified majority vote) on a
proposal of the Commission, and after the Economic and Social
Committee and the Assembly have been consulted. 230 The Commission submitted its proposal to the Council on July I, 1959, and
shortly thereafter draft regulations were sent by the Council to the
Economic and Social Committee and to the Assembly in order to
obtain their views. 231 The Fund can and will begin to operate as
soon as that Committee and the Assembly have been consulted and
the Council has made its decision. 232 The Assembly has already expressed the opinion that the Commission should be given the widest
possible scope of action and that the Fund at its disposal should be
sufficiently large for the creation of opportunities for employment
and for the improvement of the free circulation of manpower. 233
The Assembly also expressed the view that, in administering the
Fund, the Commission should cooperate with the European Investment Bank and with the High Authority so as to prevent unemployment, for example, in regions in which coal mines have to be
closed down on a large scale. In accordance with a desire expressed
by the Assembly, the principles underlying the draft Regulations
were discussed in its Social Affairs Committee, 234 and a statement on
the subject was also made to the Economic and Social Committee.
In preparing its draft, the Commission ascertained from the Member Governments 235 what action had been taken and what expenses
had been incurred by them or by public bodies under their jurisdiction in I 9 58 for purposes which would qualify for assistance by
223
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the Fund. The draft consists of three parts, one which defines the
scope of activity of the Fund and the conditions under which its
assistance can be claimed, a second which lays down the procedure
for obtaining a grant, and a third which deals with the advisory committee.236 Experts in the ministries of labor and finance in each of
the Member States have been consulted, and contact had been made
with employer and union representatives. 237 In preparing its draft,
the Commission obviously faced a difficult problem of definition
since the relevant concepts-for example, "unemployed worker"
or "occupational re-training"-vary from country to country and
had to be precisely determined for the purposes of the Fund. 238
The functions of the Council should be distinguished: it has to
issue the regulations, but it must also adopt the budget of the Social
Fund. The provisions fixing the conditions on which assistance can
be granted and the categories of enterprises whose displaced workers are to benefit must be adopted by a qualified majority vote, 239
so that any two members, neither of which is Luxembourg, have the
power of veto. The weighing of the votes for the adoption of the
budget relating to the Social Fund is however differently regulated 240 by reason no doubt of the difference in rates of contribution.
Here a majority of at least 67 out of I oo votes is required, which
gives the veto power to any two members either of which is Germany
or France and neither of which is Luxembourg, while Germany and
France together with any other member except Luxembourg can
carry a favorable vote.
"Within the framework of the rules" laid down by the Council
the Fund can in accordance with Article I 2 5 make certain grants.
These grants are never made to private firms or to individual
workers, but always to a Member State or to a "body under public
law." The quoted words presumably refer to public corporationsthe Belgian Office National de Placement et du Chomage, the
German Bundesanstalt fiir Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung, the Italian Istituto N azionale della Previdenza
Sociale, the Luxembourg Office National du Travail, or the Netherlands Algemeen Werkloosheidsfonds. 241 (There is no system of un280
The draft has not yet been published at the time of writing, but for a detailed
description, see: Bulletin, Sept. 1959, pt. III, paras. 4o-41.
231
Bulletin, May I 959, pt. III, para. 32.
238
SECOND GEN'L REP. para. 172.
239
Treaty art. q8, which requires 12 out of 17 votes.
0
"' Treaty art. 203, para. 5·
241
All these are public corporations whose activities fall within the purposes of
the Fund.
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employment insurance in France.) The state or public body can,
however, never recover more than 50 percent of the expenses incurred. Within these limits there are three kinds of grants:
I) Occupational re-training grants. These can only be made
towards expenses incurred for re-training workers who cannot find
employment except in a new occupation. It is not a grant for retraining in general, but only assistance towards overcoming the
consequences of unemployment. Moreover-and in this respect the
structure of the system inaugurated by the Treaty differs materially
from that proposed in the Spaak Report-the grant is retrospective,
that is, it cannot be made until the re-trained workers have been
productively employed for at least six months in the new occupation.
The Fund is not, therefore, to participate in re-training experiments,
but only to reimburse part of the expenses of successful re-training.
This retrospective character of grants made it possible to dispense
with a number of additional "controls" proposed in the Spaak
Report, for example, that grants could only be made where undertakings or plants were totally or partially closed down or where
partial shut-downs or dismissals affected at least IO percent of the
workers of an enterprise. The fact that the grant is retrospective,
following a change of occupation, guarantees that the resources of
the Fund will be spent on cases originating in structural economic
changes. Though the methods of the Treaty differ from those
recommended in the Spaak Report, their object is, of course, the
same-to promote occupational mobility.
2) Resettlement allowances. Here the object is to promote geographical mobility. The assistance granted is conditional upon the
unemployed workers having been obliged to change their residence
within the Community. This may prove to be important in those
cases in which effective freedom of migration depends on financial
assistance, and this aspect of the Social Fund is thus clearly a corollary to the provisions in Article 48 et seq. concerning freedom of
movement from one country to another within the Community.
The power to make grants is not, however, restricted to such cases,
but extends to changes of residence within any one Community
country. Thus the Fund could participate, for example, in the expenses of the re-settlement of Italian workers in France or in Belgium, but it could also do so if workers from one part were to be
re-settled in another part of Italy. Here, too, the grant is retrospective since it can only be given in respect of workers who have
been "in productive employment for a period of at least six months
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in their new place of residence." What was said above about the
relation between the proposals of the Spaak Report and the Treaty
with regard to occupational re-training grants applies mutatis mutandis to the resettlement grants as well.
3) Aids for the benefit of workers temporarily displaced as a
result of the conversion of their enterprise to other production.
Workers will be benefited who have not lost their employment
permanently, but who have suffered temporary wage cuts or suspensions or whose work weeks have been reduced-in the words
of the Treaty "whose employment is temporarily reduced or wholly
or partly suspended." The object of the grant is to assist in maintaining wage levels pending full re-employment, the Fund paying
half the lost wages if the government or public corporation concerned pays the other half. In this case no grant can be given except
on proof that the suspension of employment was the result "of the
conversion of the enterprise to other production," but-as the
Spaak Report has suggested-it is not necessary to show that the
conversion was in turn the result of the operation of the Common
Market.
The conditions of this type of grant are particularly stringent in
other respects, too. Not only is the grant retrospective in the sense
that the grant cannot be made before the workers concerned have
again been fully employed in the same enterprise (not necessarily in
the same plant) for at least six months, but the conversion plan for
the particular enterprise, including a plan setting out the financing
of the re-conversion, must have been drawn up by the enterprise in
advance, the government concerned must have submitted it to the
Commission and the Commission must have given its approval. This
is in accordance with the Spaak Report proposals. But the proposal
in the Report of a special system of grants to assist in staggering the
closing-down of undertakings in order to prevent sudden mass unemployment has not been incorporated in the Treaty, although
there is, of course, nothing in it to prevent the Commission from
giving especially favorable consideration to such cases provided
they are within the reach of Treaty provisions. In this respect as in
others much will depend on the Regulations to be issued by the
Council.
As especially emphasized in the Spaak Report, 242 this system of
grants imposes no obligation on states should they find it difficult to
finance increased unemployment benefits, but it is intended to give
each Member State a powerful financial incentive to make financial
"'" Spaak Report, supra note 213, at 86.
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provision for various kinds of re-adaptation grants. The American
scheme of financial incentives, which is part of the United States
system of unemployment insurance law, 243 has doubtless to some
extent served as a model. The Commission hopes 244 that, "through
its retrospective financial activities the Fund will serve as a powerful corrective helping those states and bodies under public law
which have taken positive action in connection with re-employment
to prevent the workers in certain economic sectors or certain areas
from being harmed by the structural changes which are inevitable,
and which can even be considered desirable."
But, as the Commission also says in its Second Report, the Fund
may achieve a great deal more. By fostering occupational re-training
(and also re-settlement) it may help to make freedom of movement
a reality and thereby aid in "the attainment and continued existence
of a high level of employment."
This plan for grants has been devised for the transitional period.
At its end various procedures may be adopted 245 to terminate part
of the assistance functions of the Fund, and also to entrust it with
new tasks. These, however, must be within its general mandate
which is to promote employment facilities and the geographical
and occupational mobility of workers in order to improve employment opportunities and thus to contribute to the raising of living
standards.

H.

CONCLUSIONS

In many ways one of the most important activities of the Community is likely to consist in the collection of social and economic
facts and the explanation of social and economic trends. Experience
has already shown the great value of the work of the Commission in
this respect, as could have been expected from the precedents set by
the International Labor Office and the High Authority. In concluding this analysis of the Treaty provisions on labor and social policy
special emphasis can therefore appropriately be placed on Article
I 22, which requires the Commission in its annual report to the Assembly 246 to include a special chapter on the social situation within
the Community. The first two of these Exposes, on the social situation at the beginning of I 9 58 and on its development from early
1958 to March 1959, are mines of information. For the future the
Commission is particularly anxious to promote comparative studies
213

244
246

I d. at 84.
SECOND GEN'L REP.

Treaty art. 126.
248
I d. art. 156.
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170.
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of the structure of wages, 247 and of-and this may prove very important-the costs of labor in the six countries. 248 The preparation
of this latter study is being undertaken jointly by the DirectorateGeneral of Social Affairs and the Joint Statistical Service, in conjunction with the competent department of the High Authority. A
joint conference of these bodies was held in November I 9 58 249 to
which the heads of the Statistical Departments of the Member Governments were also invited. If and when this study reaches fruition,
it may yield the most valuable information to those interested in
investing in the industry of any of the six countries.
The Assembly also may invite the Commission to draw up reports on special problems concerning the social situation, presumably on such matters as safety measures, minimum wage laws, methods of wage payment and the like. A broad interpretation will
probably be placed on the words "social situation" so as to make
them cover not only such questions as employment, wages, social
security, and housing conditions but also education and health services, all of which are closely connected with labor and with social
security. The existing Exposes show a welcome tendency to deal with
such things as superannuation schemes, private housing schemes,
private insurance against illness and funeral expenses and other
"special services." 250 The work of the Commission may thus open
up the possibility of providing the factual information required for
a unified and enlightened social policy in Europe.
It is obvious-and the Commission and its officials appear to be
very much aware of the fact-that the success of these inquiries
depends to no small extent on the cooperation of the governments
concerned and on that of the representatives of labor and management. During the summer of 1959 a major question of policy in this
connection was raised in the Assembly. 251 Did the Commission consider the cooperation of governments, labor, and management so
important that it would refrain from an inquiry unless it had obtained the approval of all of them or at any rate of the latter two?
Did not the Commission consider that it had a measure of autonomy
in selecting topics for inquiry? To this searching question (which
goes to the essence of the relation between the Community and its
members) the Commission, as might have been expected, gave a
7
..
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FIRST GEN'L REP. para. 108.
SEC. GEN'L REP. para. 188.

Bulletin, Sept.-Dec. 1958, pt. III, para. 16.
"""First ExPosf ch. D.! II (h) ; Second EXPOSE paras. 128-41.
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highly diplomatic answer. It said
that it was free to deal with
all questions connected with the application of the Treaty, within
the framework of its own organization and within the limits of its
budget. Yet the Commission considered the closest collaboration
with governments and the two sides of industry as valuable in itself and as absolutely necessary for the performance of its own obligations and for the achievement of the objects of the Treaty. Is
it an exaggeration to say that the pattern of the relation between
governments and representatives of labor and management, which
has become an essential feature of western democracy, is beginning
to find its counterpart at an international level?
Despite the limitation of the labor and social provisions of the
Treaty to the European territories of the Member States, 253 the investigative functions of the Commission may extend to the overseas
areas. On January I 5, I 9 59, the Assembly passed a Resolution 254
inviting the Commission to study carefully the social conditions of
the overseas peoples and as soon as possible to report its findings.
The services of the Commission in conjunction with government
experts have now drafted a working plan for this purpose.255 The
significance of this matter for the Overseas Development Fund
needs no emphasis. 256
The Treaty's provisions on labor and on social policy create a
network of policies and promises rather than a set of legal principles which can be immediately translated into practice. The effect
on labor law in the Six is, therefore, for the present not likely to be
conspicuous. The trend towards harmonization of the various legal
systems is unmistakeable, but it is anyone's guess how far it will go.
For a long time to come those interested in the labor conditions and
relations of the Six will, therefore, have to consult national legal
sources.
II. A SKETCH MAP OF LABOR LAWS IN THE SIX
Despite the great diversity of the systems of labor legislation in
force in the Six they share a number of common features of basic
importance. To Continental lawyers, employers, or trade unionists
262

I d. at 852.
Treaty arts. 131-36.
••• Resolution sur les problemes concernant !'association des pays et territoires
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these basic characteristics are matters of course, but they are unfamiliar to many Americans. Even though they are unfamiliar to an
American lawyer, however, his European colleague may fail to
draw his attention to them simply because he recognizes no need for
doing so. An attempt will therefore be made in the following pages
to explain five fundamental characteristics of Western European
labor law and with regard to each of them to indicate what the laws
of the Six have in common and in what respects they differ. It goes
without saying that this can be no more than an introductory survey.
The five matters which have been singled out for discussion are:
(a) the role of legislation in shaping labor-management relations
and defining the rights and obligations arising from employeremployee relationships; (b) the method and legal significance of
collective bargaining; (c) councils or committees at plant or enterprise level which represent the interests of the employees or are
entitled to be consulted concerning, or to cooperate in resolving,
questions of management; (d) the settlement of conflicts, collective
and individual, including the structure of labor courts; and (e) the
restrictions imposed by law or collective agreements on the power
of the employer to terminate the contract of employment. These
five matters are likely to be relevant to the routine work of anyone
engaged in business on the Continent, or in advising businessmen
in the Community.

A.

THE ROLE OF LEGISLATION 257

The simple fact is that legislation in that part of the European
Continent with which we are concerned is of greater importance in
regulating labor relations than it is in the United States or in Great
Britain. There is, to be sure, an important and voluminous body of
labor legislation in the United States, but its principal role is to
ensure that the collective bargaining process can work and can
produce the substantive rules which are to govern labor-management relations. On the Continent, however, the bulk of legislation is
257
See for information on the content of this section: E. C. S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY,
ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER (1957). This is the first of a
series of monographs published by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C., and written
by a group of six experts. In this volume the part on Germany is by Prof. G. Boldt,
the one on Belgium by Prof. P. Horion, the one on France by Prof. P. Durand, the
one on Italy by Prof. L. Mengoni, the one on Luxembourg by President A. Kayser,
and the one on the Netherlands by the late Prof. A. N. Molenaar. Prof. Molenaar
also wrote the general introductory summary.
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designed to regulate these relations directly. A great many things
which in the English-speaking countries are left either to collective
bargaining or custom are subject to more or less detailed statutory
regulation. Such statutory regulation is frequently (but not always)
mandatory, that is, it cannot be avoided, at any rate not to the detriment of the employee, either by contract of employment or by collective agreement. In some cases collective agreements can do what
the individual contract cannot do, that is, vary in either direction the
terms of employment provided for by statute. 258 In other cases the
statute provides no more than an optional norm which can be displaced by the contract of employment between the individual employer and worker. As a general rule, however, statutory provisions
on labor are mandatory, and-a point which an American observer
may find difficult to grasp at the outset-even in countries with a
very highly developed and efficient collective bargaining system
(such as Belgium or Germany) important aspects of the labormanagement relation are not subject to collective bargaining since
they are regulated by mandatory legislation. In Belgium "there
are no collective agreements which deal with the terms of notice:
this question is the object of very detailed statutory provisions." 259
A similar observation could be made about Germany. The decisive
bearing of legislation on the discharge of employees (so unfamiliar
in America) will have to be constantly borne in mind by anyone interested in labor relations in any of the Six.
To some extent, but with great variations in the six countries,
the constitutions themselves contain principles of law which have
a direct bearing on the relation between management and labor.
This is true of France, Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, but not of
Belgium, and only to a very limited extent of the Netherlands. In
some cases the constitution contains positive law. For example, one
of the provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal German Republic on "fundamental rights" 260 declares that any agreement which
aims at restricting or impairing the freedom of organization of any
person is null and void, with the result that "yellow-dog" contracts
as well as closed-shop agreements are illegal and invalid, and with
the further result that an employer cannot discharge any employee
258
E.g., with regard to working hours in Germany and with regard to terms of
notice in the Netherlands.
258
Horion, National Report for Belgium on Contents of Collective Agreements 8,
znd International Congress on Labor Law (Geneva, 1957).
200
Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 9, para. 3·
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by reason of his membership or non-membership in a, or in any
particular, trade union. 261 The act of discharge would be invalid and
the obligation to pay wages would continue.
Another equally important example of the direct effect of constitutional norms on the labor relationship is that of Article 40 of
the Italian Constitution of December 27, 1947, 262 according to
which "the right to strike is exercised within the framework of
the laws by which it is regulated." The highest Italian court and
the prevailing opinion among learned writers consider this as a
norm of positive law, and not merely as a legislative program, and
the highest court has held that, as a result of this provision, contracts of employment are not terminated but merely suspended by
a strike and the strikers have an automatic right of reinstatement.
This direct effect of constitutional provisions on labor-management
relations may in itself be familiar to American lawyers, but it may
come as a surprise that such an effect has also been ascribed to
seemingly programmatic pronouncements such as those contained in
the Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, which has been
expressly incorporated in and confirmed by the Constitution of 1958.
Freedom to organize, is, for example, guaranteed by the Preamble
to the Constitution which also provides that "no one may be injuriously affected in his work or in his employment by reason of his
origin, his opinion or his belief." 263 Moreover, the highest French
court has drawn from the Preamble of the Constitution of 1946
precisely the same conclusions, in regard to the right to strike, which
the highest court of Italy came to on the basis of a similar clause
in the body of the I tali an Constitution. 264
On the other hand, it is very common to find in Continental constitutions provisions which are not intended to be applied as rules
binding the individual and the courts, but as programs addressed to
the legislature, either in the form of general ethical, social, or economic maxims or in the form of specific mandates to legislate on a
particular matter. The Italian Constitution contains provisions of
this kind with reference to hours of work, to the effect of collective
261
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agreements, to workers' councils and other matters. 265 The Constitution of theN etherlands 266 supplied the programmatic foundation for
the Dutch law of 1950 concerning the Economic and Social Council,
which exercises important consultative functions, and concerning
the various kinds of Industrial Councils comprised in each case
of labor and management representatives, which are intended to
exercise consultative, and also to some extent regulatory, functions
for particular industries. The Constitution of Luxembourg was
amended in 1948 in order to guarantee to each citizen the right to
work, and to enjoin the legislature to provide for social security,
for the protection of the health of all workers and of their hours of
rest and for guarantees of the freedom to organize. All of this is
nothing more than a program for legislation, except that the courts
have held that the concluding words concerning freedom of organization confer an immediate right to strike. 267
These examples should suffice to emphasize the fact that European constitutions can be very misleading. One must in each case
look at the decisions of the courts and at the opinions of learned
writers in order to determine the extent to which a given provision
of a constitution creates rights and obligations of labor and management, and to what extent it merely holds out promises of future
legislation. This is especially important if one's view is colored by
American constitutional law since American and European canons
of interpretation differ greatly. On the Continent it is the object of
a constitution not only to define the limits of legislation but, to some
extent, to provide a blue-print for it-that is, to say what the legislature should do and not only what it may not do. Whether the legislature will accept the assigned tasks is generally determined by political considerations (as is vividly illustrated by the debates concerning the implementation of Article 39 of the Italian Constitution) .268
The courts can do nothing to enforce such constitutional mandates
unless they decide that they embody norms of positive law, and
whether they will do so or not cannot be predicted. Where courts
are unfavorably disposed towards policies embodied in constitutional provisions, they are unlikely to see in such provisions more
"""Italian Constitution, art. 36 (3), art. 39, art. 46. See Mazzoni, op. cit.
note 262.
266
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AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 161, 166.
267
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than legislative programs. This fact explains to some extent court
decisions in Germany between 1919 and 1933, and these decisions
in turn explain why so many of the constitutional provisions of the
Bonn Basic Law are expressly formulated as positive norms. On
the other hand, the important clauses on labor law and social policy
contained in the Constitution of the Fourth French Republic and
now incorporated in that of the Fifth were written into the Preamble rather than the body of the Constitution in order to make it
impossible for the then competent "constitutional committee" to
scrutinize legislation with regard to its compatibility with these
provlSlons.
In France and in the three Benelux countries, it should be added,
judges have no power to declare a law unconstitutional, and in Germany and in Italy this power is reserved to a "constitutional court"
to which all litigation must be submitted in the event of an allegation of unconstitutionality. Under the Constitution of the Fifth
French Republic the Constitutional Council can be asked to determine on the constitutionality of legislation prior to its promulgation,
but the right to submit ordinary legislation to the Council is reserved
to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the presidents of the two houses of Parliament. 209
The question of the distribution, in matters concerning labor relations, of legislative powers between a federal parliament and the
parliaments of members of a federation arises only in Germany. 270
Labor law and social insurance belong to the sphere of "concurrent
legislative jurisdiction" of the Federal Republic and its states
(Lander). This means that as soon as the Federal Republic has exercised its legislative jurisdiction (as, in fact, it has in most fields of
labor and social security) the field is "pre-empted" and the Lander
can no longer legislate. Labor and social security problems clearly require uniform solutions, and the federal government is therefore expected to enact legislation in these areas. 271 Nonetheless some areas
remain-industrial arbitration is one-where some laws of the Lander are still in force. Anyone concerned with German labor legislation must keep an eye not only on the legislation of the Federal Republic but also on that of the states, as well as on some still existing
""'For the foregoing: E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, passim;
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;AISE art. 6I (I958).
270
Except with regard to the Italian "regions." This matter is not further pursued
here.
271
See Boldt, Les Sources du Droit du Travail en Allemagne, in E.C.S.C. HIGH
AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 257, at 5I-62; arts. 72, 74, No. I2 of the Basic Law of
the Federal German Republic.
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remnants of legislation of the Inter-Allied Control Council and of
the transitional legislative bodies which preceded the formation of
the Federal Republic. A vast amount of consolidation and simplification of legislation has been achieved in the last few years, but
there are still vestiges of the chaos which prevailed during the years
following the collapse of the Nazi State.
The status accorded to treaties by constitutions is important to
an understanding of labor law in the Six not only because of the
need for analyzing the relation between the Treaty of Rome and the
municipal laws of the Member States, but more importantly in
order to have a clear understanding of the status in municipal law of
conventions of the International Labor Organization which have
been ratified by the Member States. Nothing in the laws of the Six
corresponds to the provisions of the United States Constitution concerning the treaty-making power or stating that treaties form part
of the "supreme law of the land." The provisions of a treaty do not
acquire the force of law so as to impose obligations or to confer
rights upon any individual unless the treaty has been ratified or approved by an act of the legislature. In some of the Member States
ratified international agreements are said to prevail over ordinary
legislation. This principle was expressed in the Constitution of the
Fourth French Republic, 272 but according to the present Constitution 273 the principle applies only if the other contracting parties
fully apply the treaties or agreements concerned. 274 In the case of
I.L.O. conventions the obligation of the governments concerned to
place the matter before their legislative organs "for the enactment
of legislation or other action" is based on the Constitution of the
I.L.O. itsel£. 275
All the six countries have, at one stage of the development of
their legislation, enacted a civil code. The extent to which the provisions of those codes are now of importance in regard to the law
governing labor relations depends largely on the date at which the
particular code was enacted. The French and Belgian Civil Codes
were enacted at a time when industry was in its infancy and when
legislation was still dominated by the economic principles of laissezfaire. They have almost completely lost their importance in prac"" CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE art. 28 ( 1946).
73
CONSTITUTION DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRAN<;:AISE art. 55 ( 1958).
274
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tice: their special provisions concerning the contract of employment
were, in France, either repealed or incorporated in the Labor Code
(Code du Travail) . 276 In Belgium the Code was superseded by
later legislation, notably the statutes of I900 and I922, amended in
1954 and I955, regulating the contract of employment of manual
and of non-manual employees, but no labor code has ever been
enacted in Belgium. In Luxembourg the Civil Code, to which much
special legislation has been added, continues to apply to manual
workers, but as regards non-manual workers it has been superseded
by legislation first enacted in I 9 I 9 and then considerably amended
in I937· In the Netherlands the Civil Code would have suffered
the fate of the French and Belgian Codes had it not been, as it were,
rejuvenated by the law on the contract of employment of I 907,
which (differing from legislation enacted elsewhere) took the form
of a comprehensive amendment of the Code itself. Italy got an
entirely new Civil Code in I 942, and, consequently, the provisions
of the Civil Code (Articles 2096-2 I 29) are of greater importance
in Italy than in any other of the six countries. In Germany the
amended provisions of the Civil Code of I 896 are still of importance, but they are supplemented and partly superseded by special
rules contained (with regard to industrial workers and employees)
in the Industrial Code ( Gewerbe-Ordnung) originally of I 8 69 and
often amended, in the Commercial Code (with regard to clerical
workers) and in many special enactments. 277 The Industrial Code
comprises the bulk of the protective rules on labor in factories.
It goes without saying that labor legislation in all countries is voluminous. Legislation concerning health, safety, and welfare of workers in factories, mines, and offices, and in the various branches of
transport, concerning hours of work and the employment of women,
children, and young persons, concerning the payment, and to some
extent the amount, of wages, concerning collective bargaining, trade
unions, labor disputes and their settlement, labor courts, labor inspection and employment exchanges, and many other matters besides, has been passed in all six countries. Everywhere there is a vast
and unwieldy mass of statutes and statutory regulations which only
specialists can hope to master. French law, however, differs in one
respect from legislation in the other Community countries. In France
an attempt has been made to consolidate the existing labor legis276
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lation in what is misleadingly called a "labor code" (Code du Travail), originally enacted (in installments) between 19 ro and
1927 278 and more or less kept up to date by means of amendments.
Although the work is (and presumably always will be) incomplete,
the volume of the "non-codified" texts being many times that of the
Code, the consolidation has made it a little less difficult to find one's
way through French legislation than through that of the other
nations. In Germany a private venture, the looseleaf publication of
labor legislation by H. C. Nipperdey, 279 performs up to a point a
similar service.
As was said above, legislation plays a greater role in the regulation of labor relations on the Continent of Europe than it does either
in the United States or in Britain, but the extent to which this is
true differs greatly in the six countries of the Common Market.
With some exaggeration one may say that the role of legislation in
determining the rights and obligations of employers and employees
in a given country is inversely proportional to the quality of its collective bargaining machinery. The stronger the latter, the less need
there is for invoking the aid of the legislature, and the strength and
quality of collective bargaining in turn depend very much on the
structure of the trade union movement. The political and other difficulties which beset the French trade unions 280 and in particular their
disunity should be kept in mind when trying to understand the role
played by labor legislation in France. Legislation is more important
than collective bargaining as a source of the mutual rights and obligations of employers and employees in France, much more than
in Germany, Belgium, or the Netherlands, and certainly no less
so than in Italy. Thus in Belgium 281 collective bargaining functions
well, largely, though not exclusively, through standing bilateral
committees known as commissions paritaires. Consequently, if
one compares the situation with that half a century ago, "state intervention emerges today as very much less important: this is a
fruit of trade unionism." 282
The increasing importance of collective bargaining is exemplified
by the shift in methods of shortening hours of work in Belgium.
178
For its history and structure: 1 DURAND & }AUSSAUD, TRAITE DE DROIT DU TRAVAIL
para. 98, at 117-120 (1947) [hereinafter cited as I DuRAND].
179
NIPPERDEY, ARBEITSRECHT 5th ed. ( 1958).
280
See LORWIN, THE FRENCH LABOR MOVEMENT (1954), esp. at 145·
•on The structure of Belgian industrial relations in some ways resembles that in
Britain. See text at note 310 infra.
280
Lagasse, National Belgian Report on Individual Labour Relations 7, 2nd In·
ternational Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958).
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"Fifty years ago one thought only in terms of legislative intervention or intervention of the executive (for example, the law of December 3 I, I 909 concerning working hours in mines). In I 92 I,
the law established the general principles of the eight-hour day and
of the 48-hour week, but appealed to collective bargaining (at industry or plant level) to introduce divergent schemes (that is,
schemes more favorable to the workers). In 1936, when the question of reducing the working week to 40 hours arose, Parliament
was content to invite the bilateral committees to take the initiative
in this direction. More recently, in 1955 and 1956, when the trade
unions started a movement for the five-day week, no proposal for
legislation was laid before the Chambers (of Parliament) : reform
was carried into effect exclusively by agreements with the employers'
associations, first at the inter-industrial, then at the industrial, and
finally at the plant level." 2Ra
This should be contrasted with the development in France. The
40-hour week was introduced by statute in 1936, and the system
of overtime pay was again changed by legislation in I946. Collective bargaining has made much progress since the enactment of
the law of 1950, 284 but a very large proportion of all collective
agreements in France continue to be agreements about wages only,
leaving all such matters as working hours and overtime pay, holidays and holiday remuneration, or the employer's obligation to
compensate the employee in the event of dismissal, to regulation by
statute. Two of the most distinguished French authorities on labor
law have, indeed, attributed the slowness of the growth of collective
bargaining to the impoverishing effect which the rapid development
of labor legislation has had on the content of collective agreements.285 One may wonder, however, whether the tendency to invoke the aid of the legislature (so markedly different from the tendency in Belgium) was not itself partly a result of the weakness of
the collective bargaining machinery caused both by the structure of
the French economy and by the split among the trade unions.
Despite the complete destruction of the German trade unions by
the Nazi government and the cessation of all collective bargaining
between 1933 and 1945, collective agreements are in many respects
of far greater importance in Western Germany today as sources of
Z"3

Ibid.

""'Law of Feu. II, 1950, [1950] ].0. 1688, the basis of collective bargaining in
France today.
285
RoUAST & DURAND, PRECIS DE LEGISLATION INDUSTRIELLE para. 196, at Z53 (4th ed.
1951). See also Lorwin, op. cit. supra note z8o, at 134.
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rights and obligations than statutes. The rapid and spectacular revival of collective bargaining in the Federal Republic since 1945 280
is partly due to the unity of the German trade union movement
which distinguishes it so dramatically from the French. It would be
wrong to attribute this unity exclusively to the virtual absence of
Communist influence in the West German trade unions, but that
this is a contributing factor cannot be doubted. In any event the
regulation of the details of the employment relationship by collective agreement has become the rule to such an extent in Germany
that legislative intervention affecting the contract of employment
has, in this century, been comparatively inconspicuous. 287 The "statute law concerning the contract of employment . . . is still essentially that of the codifications of the end of the 19th century, that is,
in particular of the civil code and the commercial code. This selfrestraint on the part of the legislature was only possible because
the collective parties had taken the development of labor law in
this area out of its hands." 288 The great exception to this general
statement is that of the law of Kundigungsschutz which protects
the employee in the event of dismissal and fulfills to some extent
the function of the American collective agreements on seniority. 289
This is a significant example of a matter which, in Germany and in
France, is governed by statutes 290 but which Americans do not see
as a subject of legislation.
Italian labor law is still in a state of transition, and it is more
difficult to gauge the relative importance of legislation and collective bargaining in shaping labor relations in Italy than it is in the
other five countries. Fascist legislation has disappeared, 291 but the
promise-held out by Article 39 of the Constitution of 1947-of
legislation to define the legal status and effect of collective agreements has not yet been fulfilled. A provisional and transitional statute of 1959 has, however, empowered the Government for the
period of one year to issue decrees fixing legally binding minimum
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Kerr, Collective Bargaining in Postwar Germany, in CoNTEMPORARY CoLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES (Sturmthal ed. 1957). See also Second EXPOSE para. 68.
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This observation does not, of course, apply to matters such as protection of health,
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infra.
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Dietz, National German Report on Collective Labour Relations, submitted to the
2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958) .
... See PART II, Section E, Subsection 3 infra.
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The matter is discussed below in section E. As will be seen, what has been said
here about France and Germany cannot be applied to all the six countries. In Italy
collective bargaining is today more important in this context than legislation.
m Law Decree of Nov. 23, 1944, No. 369, [1943-44] Lex. Legislazione Italiana 521.
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wages and other conditions of employment. These are to correspond
in substance to collective terms agreed upon prior to the coming
into force of the statute. 292 The constitutionality of this statute will
remain doubtful until the Constitutional Court has spoken.
At the moment of writing no one can predict which of the many
definitive legislative projects under discussion in Italy will be translated into law. 293 It is noteworthy that, despite the absence of legislation on collective bargaining and despite the complicated and voluminous legal controversies which surround the status of the trade
unions and of their agreements with employers and employer associations, collective bargaining has had a considerable development since the end of the second World War. 294 One of the most
remarkable features of this development is the formulationchiefly by two "inter-industrial agreements" of October 18 and
April 21, 1950-of certain principles of procedure to be observed,
and concerning indemnities to be paid, in the event of individual
discharges or discharges caused by reduction of personneJ.295 These
agreements, which have been sustained by the courts, amplify the
relevant provision of Article 2120 of the Code of 1942 and embody
what is probably the closest parallel to the American conception of
"seniority" agreements to be found in Europe today. Nevertheless,
in spite of the survival or revival of collective bargaining in Italy,
the over-all picture seems to resemble that of France. "State legislation certainly constitutes the most abundant source of provisions
with regard to the regulation of labor relations, and one can even
observe an unmistakable tendency on the part of the legislature to
reserve to its own jurisdiction an increasingly important range of
topics which are thus withdrawn from that of the autonomous organizations in industry. With regard to certain topics the Constitution itself provides that they will be regulated by legislation, for
example, working hours, the weekly period of rest, and annual vacations (Article 36); legal status in industry and working conditions
of women and children (Article 37) ; restrictions on the right to
strike (Article 40); and the participation of workers in the man"""See for the situation apart from the statute of 1959, Mazzoni, National Italian
Report on Collective Labour Relations, 2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958). The statute of 1959 is further discussed below.
..., On the bill submitted by Signor Rubinacci in 1951, the most widely discussed of
these attempts to solve the problem, see Mazzoni, supra note 268, at 99·
2
"' Sanseverino, Collective Bargaining in Italy, in CONTEMPORARY CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 210 (Sturmthal ed. 1957). However, compared with the
development in Germany, that in Italy is modest. Second EXPOSE para. 73·
295
Mengoni, supra note 262, at 278; see also Mazzoni, supra note 268, at 109, where
the relevant cases are cited.
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agement of undertakings (Article 46) . On the other hand, one topic,
and, of all things, that which concerns wages, appears, on principle
at any rate, to have been withdrawn by the Constitution from legislative intervention and to have been reserved to collective agreements." 296 The legal status of collective bargaining in Italy more
nearly resembles that of collective bargaining in Britain and in the
United States than that of the other Member States, but its significance, compared with legislation, cannot-or, perhaps, cannot yet
-be compared with that of its counterparts in the English-speaking
countries.
It is only in the Netherlands of all the Community countries that
wages and conditions of employment are subject to the control of
a governmental institution, the Council of Mediators. 297 Nevertheless-or perhaps because of the stimulus which the Council has deliberately given to collective bargaining since 1945-the number of
agreements and the number of workers subject to agreements has
risen spectacularly. 298 TheN etherlands is one of the European countries in which collective bargaining flourishes. The significance of
legislation in shaping the employment relation is nevertheless great,
greater probably than in Belgium or in Germany, both because the
law concerning the contract of employment of 1907 (which
amended the Civil Code of 183 8) was a comprehensive measure
of 70 articles, and because an important law concerning the termination of contracts of employment was enacted on December q,
1953. 299 As in France and in Germany provision has been made by
statute not only for the periods of notice to be given by the employer
to the employee prior to the termination of the contract but also
for compulsory payment by the employer of a special compensation
in the event of an unfair use of the right to give notice. 300 Although
the Council of Mediators has in some cases made supplementary
provision for the regulation of the termination of contracts of employment, this important statute of I 9 53 remains the principal
source of law and is therefore decisive, inter alia, in that area which
corresponds to the American regulation of "seniority" rights.
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In Luxembourg there is a very marked difference between the
position of manual and non-manual workers. The position of the
latter is controlled by a fairly up-to-date codifying enactment, but
there is no corresponding statutory regulation for manual workers.
It is perhaps a fair generalization to say, therefore, that the importance of collective bargaining overshadows legislation in determining the relation of manual workers to their employers. 301
This very brief survey should suffice to convince the reader that
any analysis of the mutual rights and obligations of employers and
employees in the Six must take legislation as well as collective bargaining into account. The I.L.O. has long since recognized that
standards established by it can be adopted, and obligations to introduce such standards can be implemented, by either method. 302 By
the same token "harmonization" pursuant to the Treaty will lead
nowhere unless bargaining practice as well as legislation is taken into
account. In France paid holidays are regulated by statute, in Germany mainly by collective bargaining, and in the Netherlands regulation of paid holidays is in a state of transition from one to the
other. From the point of view of harmonization, what matters, of
course, is the substance of the mutual obligations, not their source.

B.

THE METHOD AND LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 303

\Vhere bargaining methods and the legal effect of collective agreements are concerned, European ideas and practices differ from those
"'"See Kayser, supra note 267, at 151. The law concerning salaried employees dates
from 1937.
302
Preface to I INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE 1951 at Jxxvi (1951).
:JO:l General Reference is made to the following works:
a) COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS (Galenson ed. 1952).
b) CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SEVEN COUNTRIES ( Sturmtha) ed.
1957).
c) STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND FRAGEN DES KOLLEKTIVEN
ARBEITSRECHTS ( 1957 ).
d) E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU
TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE
L'ACIER (1957).
e) Kahn-Freund, Collective Labour Relations, Report prepared for the 2nd International Congress on Social Legislation, Brussels, 1958 (published in English
in RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMPARATO DEL LAVORO, Vol. 3, pp. 353409 (196o)).
f) Among the national treatises, the third volume of Durand's TRAIT!l DE DROIT
DU TRAVAIL (1956) is of special importance.
g) Much the best comparative treatise on the matters discussed under this subheading is Spyropoulos's "Le Droit des Conventions Collectives de Travail dans
les Pays de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de I'Acier," 16 TRAVAUX
ET RECHERCHES DE L'INSTITUT DU DROIT CoMPARE DE L'UNIVERSITE DE PARIS ( 1959).
The present writer expresses his special indebtedness to this excellent monograph.
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in the United States, and there are some important differences
among the Six as well.
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

I.

BARGAINING BY EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS

Without any doubt the most important difference between collective bargaining all over Europe (on the Continent as well as in
Britain) and in the United States is the prevalence of bargaining
in Europe by employers' associations. Collective bargaining by
individual employers is not unknown and indeed it is inevitable
where-as is true of railways all over Europe, of coal mining in
France and partially of coal mining in the Netherlands, and of the
postal, telephone, and telegraph services everywhere-the bargaining employer is either the state or a public corporation administering an industry as a public enterprise. Even in such cases, however,
the bargaining unit on the employer's side is likely to be the enterprise and not the plant. It is, in American terms, "company-wide"
and not "plant-wide" bargaining.
The usual bargaining partner of a trade union or unions is, however, an employers' association or a number of such associations.
This does not necessarily mean that bargaining is nation-wide. In
France district bargaining is very common, whereas, for example,
in Germany "industry-wide" or "nation-wide" bargaining prevails,
as it does in Italy and the Benelux countries.
Plant-wide bargaining is, not without reason, viewed with a certain amount of suspicion, especially in France. 304 Hence French
law, according to what is probably the correct solution of "one of
the greatest riddles" in the law of collective bargaining, seeks to
counteract the danger that, "within the framework of a plant,
agreements might be concluded between an employer and a union
which is too accommodating." 305 Although the matter is not free
from doubt, it appears that under French law only that organization
which is "most representative" (a highly technical term explained
below), and therefore sure to be independent, can enter into collective agreements which cover only one plant or several enumerated
plants. Moreover, in the absence of a national, regional, or local
agreement such an ''accord d' hablissement" or plant agreement can
only deal with wages, and in the presence of a national, regional,
or local agreement it can modify its terms only in favor of the employees. The details of the highly technical distinction between
304
See the reference to the debates in the National Assembly preceding the passing
of the law of Feb. nth, 1950, in 3 DuRAND para. 181.
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3 DURAND para. 241.
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((accords" and ((conventions" need not be further discussed here. 306
The reason or reasons why collective bargaining in Europe has
in this respect developed along lines so different from those which
its development has followed in America cannot be explored either.
They must be sought in the history of industrial relations and in
general economic and political trends. Clearly, however,-whether
this be a cause or an effect of bargaining by employers' associations
or both-collective bargaining in Europe has a very important function in determining relationships between enterprises or management units as well as those between labor and management. It helps
to regulate competition and to prevent certain kinds of undercutting.
Moreover, it is quite impossible to understand the law relating to
collective agreements without realizing that, in principle, there are
two kinds of firms from the point of view of collective bargaining,
those who have and those who have not joined the appropriate employers' associations. The distinction among workers between organized and unorganized labor has its counterpart, therefore,
among employers-that between federated and non-federated firms.
Once an agreement has been concluded by an employers' association,
its members are very likely to be interested in the "extension" of
its terms to non-federated employers. Such an extension is not normally effected by collective bargaining, however, since non-federated
firms will frequently be those unwilling to bargain with unions. Only
the law can effect such extensions and this is one of the reasons, but
not the only one, why the law has played such a prominent role in
the evolution of collective bargaining in the Six. In five of the six
countries there exist, in one form or another, procedures to extend,
by administrative act, the effect of collective agreements to "nonfederated" employers, and in the sixth country, that is, in Italy,
similar legislation was-in substance though not in form-provisionally introduced in I959. 307
From the point of view of an American firm wishing to operate
in one of the six countries this point is important. The American employer cannot, in the countries of the Community, remain outside
the nexus of collective bargaining if he is inclined to do so, any more
than he can in the United States. To some extent the "extension,"
and similar, provisions of European legislation fulfill a function like
that of American laws which compel employers to bargain in good
faith. The non-federated employer must contemplate at least the
300

!d. para. 242.
It is, however, controversial whether this provisional statute is constitutional in
view of Art. 39 of the Constitution.
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possibility of being placed under a legal obligation to observe the
terms of an agreement on which he had no influence. In view of the
legal requirements to be fulfilled as a condition for an "extension" or
similar order, 308 the likelihood of this happening may be less in some
cases than in others, but the possibility is always there, and its
practical corollary is the advisability of joining an employers' association.
Collective bargaining is, then, on the whole, more centralized in
Europe than in America. This is reflected in the structure of the
trade unions. By and large, the powers of the "local" or "branch"
union compared with those of the district or national organs are
smaller in Europe than in America. Even in France, where a strong
tradition of decentralization inside the unions grew out of the organizational and ideological traditions of the labor movement, 309
the real power rests with the central union institutions. It would be
very misleading to compare the functions of an American "local"
with those of its European counterpart, and the causes of the difference can only partly be found in the size of the United States as
contrasted with that of any of the Six. The process of centralization
does not stop at "industry-wide" bargaining. For example in Germany, in Italy, and in Belgium confederations of trade unions (that
is, the equivalents of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.) enter into compacts on vital
questions with central associations of employers' federations. In
Luxembourg, the smallest of the Six, this phenomenon is particularly marked.
2. CONTRACTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARGAINING

Another aspect of collective bargaining in the Six which might
strike an American as unfamiliar is the existence of two types of
bargaining machinery, which-for want of a better word-might
be called "contractual" and "institutional." In two of the six countries, Germany and Italy, bargaining machinery is purely "contractual" (as it mainly is in the United States). The bargaining partners,
normally organizations on both sides, occasionally a single employer
on one side and a union or unions on the other, meet, discuss, and,
if all goes well, arrive at a contract. At the opposite extreme is Belgium, where collective bargaining is highly developed, but in a form
more reminiscent of the British than of the American type. Begin308 I.e., an order extending the legal effect of a collective agreement to non-federated
employers and making it a "common rule." See below. This applies to France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and, in substance, also to Belgium.
309
See LORWIN, op. cit. supra note 28o, pt. I.
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ning shortly after the end of the first World War, the two sides of
industry have there set up-and for a long time they were entirely
outside the law-bilateral committees (commissions paritaires)
consisting of equal numbers of employers and employees, that is,
employers' association and trade union representatives in equal
numbers. These committees fixed wages and other conditions of employment by unanimous decisions and sought to settle industrial
conflicts, in very much the same way as British "joint industrial
councils" and similar bodies do. 310 They were (and are) generally
established on an industry-wide basis, although sometimes their
scope is national and sometimes district-wide. Originally they had
no official status whatever, but were simply collective bargaining
organs established by the joint action of the unions affiliated to certain top organizations and of the employers' organizations. In
311
I 94 5, after the Liberation, they were given legal status.
Each of
them now has an impartial president and vice-president (usually
civil servants), a secretarial staff and the like, appointed by the Minister of Labor, but only the management and labor representatives
can vote. They usually meet at the offices of the Ministry. The whole
of Belgian economic life is now covered by the more than 100 existing committees, some of which deal only with manual workers,
whereas others deal with salaried employees, and still others with
both. The resolutions (accords) adopted by a committee ( necessarily unanimously) can be given a legally binding effect by royal
decree. This possibility is certainly important, but the overwhelming
majority of these "resolutions" are never made legally binding, anJ
are neither contracts nor enforceable norms, but, like British collective agreements, no more than social compacts. Collective bargaining outside the committees is not insignificant, prevailing for
example in the textile industry around Verviers and in the cement
industry, but the overwhelming majority of all collective agreements
are today resolutions of the permanent bilateral committees.
The collective bargaining system of Luxembourg resembles that
of Belgium. In Luxembourg there is only one bilateral committee
(commission paritaire) established by a Decree of r 94 5 312 as part of
310
See for the commissions paritaires: Horion, supra note 259, Van Goethem, National
Report for Belgium, 2nd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958);
STEINMANN-GoLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303, at 94 et seq.
811
Law Decree determining the status of Commissions Paritaires of June 9th, 1945,
[1945] Moniteur Beige 4337·
312
Decree of the Grand Duchess of Oct. 6, 1945, arts. 1-5, [ 1945] Pasin. Lux. 540.
Much of the information in this paragraph (and elsewhere in this chapter) concerning
Luxembourg is derived from a series of answers to a questionnaire of the Institute of
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theN ational Conciliation Office. As in Belgium, most but not all collective agreements are concluded in the form of resolutions of this
committee, which consists of three employer and three union representatives but, unlike the Belgian bilateral committees, the Luxembourg committee consists of representatives of the top organizations and not of the individual unions, a type of bargaining which
can, of course, only exist in a very small country-at any rate as the
normal type of bargaining. Again, whereas in Belgium some of the
committees deal with salaried employees, there has so far been virtually no collective bargaining for salaried employees in Luxembourg, their conditions of employment being largely governed by a
comprehensive statute. 313 There is a very appreciable difference between the legal effect of collective agreements in Belgium and in
Luxembourg, the law of Luxembourg being in this respect much
more akin to French than to Belgian law.
Generally speaking, the French type of collective bargaining is
"contractual" rather than "institutional." Nevertheless, a very
strong "institutional" element has been introduced by legislation. 314
Joint committees (commissions mixtes) are, and in some cases have
to be, 315 summoned by the Minister of Labor ad hoc, that is, for the
sole purpose of concluding a collective agreement capable of being
"extended" by the Minister to non-federated employers, and thus
of being made a "common rule" of industry. Only the "most representative organizations"-that is, in practice, on the employers'
side, the National Council of French Management 316 (the French
National Association of Manufacturers) and, on the employees'
side, the C.G.T., 317 the Force Ouvriere (F.O.), and the C.F.T.C. 318
(the three leading French top organizations )-are represented on
these committees, which are presided over by a representative of the
Minister, who does not vote. Some of these committees operate on a
national and others on a regional or local basis.
Unlike the Belgian and Luxembourg bilateral committees, the
joint committees are not, then, normal bargaining bodies, but operComparative Law at the University of Paris. The author expresses his gratitude to
M. G. van Verwecke, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Labor, and to M. F. Ewen
of the same Ministry for having put this and other material at his disposal.
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Law of Oct. zrst, 1919, substantially amended by Law of June 7, 1937, [1937]
Pasin. Lux. II9.
310 CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 3If, introduced by the Law of Feb. IIth, 1950,
[1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.).
310
See the detailed analysis in 3 DURAND, para. 219.
316
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ate only in those exceptional (but also exceptionally important)
situations in which "the most representative organizations" are
called upon to agree to terms and conditions which the Minister can
then convert into a "law for the trade." In addition, French law 319
provides for a purely consultative body, made up of representatives
of both sides of industry and of other interests, the Higher Committee on Collective Agreements (Commission Superieure des Conventions Collectives) which is called upon to advise the Minister of
Labor in the event that management and labor cannot agree and
also in the event of an application to "extend" the terms of an agreement to outsiders. Its most important function is in connection with
the fixing of the statutory over-all minimum wage.
In the Netherlands the pattern of collective bargaining is largely
determined by the existence and the powers of the Council of Mediators, which, being a body of impartial outsiders appointed by the
government, cannot be compared with the representative committees of Belgium, Luxembourg, and France, quite apart from the fundamental difference in functions and in jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the
Foundation of Labor, in which labor and management cooperate
and which is completely independent of the government, gives to
collective bargaining-seen from a social rather than a legal point
of view-the imprint of the "institutional" pattern. The Foundation has only consultative functions but the Council of Mediators
neither approves nor disapproves of an agreement without consulting it, and normally, when the Foundation recommends approval,
the Council will approve. 320
3·

UNION STRUCTURES AND IDEOLOGIES

321

An American looking at the European scene is likely to find much
that is unfamiliar not only in trade union structures but also in trade
union ideologies, and he will soon realize that these ideological differences have had their effect on collective bargaining methods and
on the substance of collective bargaining. In the first place he cannot
fail to notice the continuing strength of working class solidarity.
Each union is, and sees itself as, not only an organization for the
defense of the interests of its members but also a part of the
working class movement. In the second place, however, Western
European trade unionism is linked with political programmes and
319
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Pels, supra note 298, at II9; see also Levenbach, supra note 297·
321
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320

38 I
ideas and with religious persuasions-although this differs greatly
from country to country. In the Netherlands there are unions with
Socialist, Communist, Protestant, and Catholic leanings; in France
there are three types of unions whose tendencies are, broadly speaking, Communist, Socialist, and Christian; whereas in Germany, as
a result of the dire experience of the Nazi system, the division
among "free" (that is, Socialist), "Christian" and "Liberal" ( nationalist) unions was eliminated in I 94 5 when the present "united"
trade union movement came into being. This dual phenomenonworking class solidarity and the political-religious affiliation of trade
unions-has meant that "splits" between unions and jurisdictional
disputes are not normally the result of purely "organizational"
rivalries, but rather of conflicts concerning lines of demarcation,
for example, between two craft unions which cannot come to terms
concerning the allocation of certain work processes or between unions of different political persuasion. Working class solidarity certainly does not mean trade union unity, since the ideological differences remain, but it does mean that, vis-a-vis the employer or the
employers' association, the various unions, however divided among
themselves, can form a united front. Joint collective bargaining by
trade unions of different political and religious persuasions is common and, where industrial unionism is not fully developed, unions
with the same political or religious persuasion but organizing different types of workers or employees, may, and often do, appear
as joint bargaining partners. This is one of the principal reasons why
the American observer will look in vain for anything corresponding
to the procedures for the determination of the "statutory bargaining representative" with which he is familiar. There is no need for
determining the union which may bargain since many unions may
bargain together.
Moreover, the structure and the ideology of the European trade
union movements leave little room for a counterpart of the American "union security agreement." Trade unions everywhere aim at
I oo percent trade union organization in the industries in which they
operate, and everywhere they may, if the law allows them to do so,
go to the point of obtaining the agreement of an employer or employers not to hire anyone who is not a member of a trade union or
perhaps of a trade union of a particular political persuasion or one
affiliated to a particular federation of unions, although even these
types of agreements appear to be rare in Europe. But the American
variety of union security agreement, tending to reserve employment
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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to members of the contracting union, though perhaps not unknown in
Europe, is certainly not frequent. In France all discriminations in
hiring and firing based on membership or non-membership in a
union have been made illegal by statute, 322 and to some extent the
same applies in Belgium under a law of 1921. 323 In Germany the
courts have held closed-shop agreements to be illegal as against
public policy. 324 In the Netherlands a closed-shop agreement of what
above has been called the American variety has been declared void
by statute 325 (as it has been, of course, in the United States), but a
dosed-shop agreement excluding non-union labor without seeking
to reserve employment to members of a particular union 326 is valid,
although it cannot be "extended" so as to bind non-federated employers. But agreements of this kind appear to be of no great significance in community countries with the exception of France. The
exception is explained by the conflict between the Communist
C.G.T., the Socialist F.O. and the Catholic C.F.T.C. The recent
French statute of 1956 was an attempt to give some protection to
the smaller groups vis-a-vis the C.G.T.
Within this very broad framework the differences among the
union movements in the Six are very great, and what separates them
is as important for an understanding of the law as what they have
in common. The contrast between the situation in France and in
Western Germany illustrates the point. In France the trade union
movement has been split along political lines for many years, and
of all its various schisms that of 1947 was the most important. The
decisive events of I 94 7 themselves were closely connected with the
international political situation (the opening of the rift between
East and West), and the French trade unions have in many respects
remained at the mercy of political upheavals. The policy of the
C.G.T. has in the past been all too obviously subservient to that of
the Communist party, and the general revulsion against Communism all over Europe which the events in Hungary in 1956 created
3
"' Law of April 27, 1956, [1956] ].0. 4080 (Fr.). This made it unlawful for an
employer to take any account of the union membership of his employees or to exercise
any pressure in the direction of joining or not joining an organization. The "check-off"
is also illegal.
"""Law of May 2-J., 1921, [1921] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 956;
see Van Goethem, supra note 310, at 8.
... Judgment of Apr. 6, 1922, 104 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen
328 (Ger.) .
... Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. I, para. 3, [1927] Staatsblad van bet Koninkrijk der
Nederlanden [hereinafter cited as Stb.] No. 415.
326
Law of May 25, 1937, art. 2, [1937] Stb. No. Sot (Neth.).
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led to widespread resignations from the C.G.T. The inherent weakness of the French trade unions stems not only from their disunity
but also from the low percentage of workers organized, which is only
partly to be accounted for by disunity. It is estimated that of something like 20 million persons gainfully employed only two million
are members of trade unions-approximately one million of the
C.G.T., 4oo,ooo of the C.F.T.C. and about 3oo,ooo of the F.O.
unions (the latter being to a very large extent civil servants and
white collar workers) .327
In Western Germany trade unions were compelled in r 94 5 to
start their organization "from scratch." They were not burdened
with the damnosa hereditas of the inter-war tradition from which
they were separated by the gulf of twelve years of suppression. Before Hitler, the German unions, too, had been split on ideological
lines, and the "free" (socialist) unions always occupied a position
of overwhelming strength. In 1945, however, the unions rallied
behind a drive for "unity," with the result that, at any rate as far
as manual workers are concerned, there are today no ideological
schisms in the German trade unions. Sixteen "unified unions" (Einheits-Gewerkschaften) are combined in one top organization, the
D.G.B., 328 the total number of D.G.B. union members being estimated at well over six million. 329 German union structure and "official" German trade union ideology exhibit an impressive but perhaps
slightly deceptive simplicity.
In France and in Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, the principle
of industrial union organization clearly prevails over that of craft
unionism. This is a tendency inherent in the development of modern industry. In France craft unionism survives at a few not very
significant points-in Germany it seems to be dead, as far as manual
workers are concerned. The result of this development towards industrial unionism is of course most important from the legal point
of view because it minimizes the risk of demarcation disputes, and
the difficult problems connected with the simultaneous a·pplication of
several agreements in one enterprise. Industrial unionism makes for
large and powerful unions: the German metal workers union (I. G.
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These figures are given by Prof. G. Friedel of the University of Nancy in his
National Report for France on Collective Labour Relations, made to the znd International Congress on Social Legislation (Brussels, 1958}, at 3·
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D. G.B. stands for "Deutscher Gewerkschafts-Bund."
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For this, and other statements on German trade unions and employer's association:
2 HUECK & NIPPERDEY, LEHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS 128 (6th ed. 1955-57).
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M etall) has over 1.6 million members, and the union organizing
transport workers and workers employed by municipal authorities
well over 8oo,ooo. 330
Nevertheless, there is in one respect an important difference between the principles of union organization in Germany and in
France. In France the non-manual workers (civil servants, teachers,
white collar workers) belong to unions affiliated with the same top
organizations with which manual worker unions are affiliated. In
Germany, however, whereas about one million white collar workers
and civil servants belong to industrial unions affiliated with the
D.G.B., others belong to separate unions affiliated with separate,
comparatively small, top organizations such as the D.A.G. the
D.B.B. 331 and a few very much smaller ones. This deviation from
the principle of industrial unionism is closely connected with the
German tradition of a separate status for non-manual workers, a
tradition reflected in social insurance law. 332 It does not, however,
involve a conflict between the various organizations concerned. In
fact, for collective bargaining and other purposes the D.G.B. and
the D.A.G. cooperate, a cooperation to which both were formally
committed by a solemn resolution adopted by both in 1953. The
number of organized workers and civil servants in 1956 totalled
more than seven million of the 18.6 millions employed.
In Italy, as in Germany, trade unions had to be rebuilt following
a period of totalitarian dictatorship, and, as in Germany, an attempt was made to overcome the ideological rifts of the past and
to erect a structure of unified organizations. 333 But, for a number of
reasons connected with the past history of Italian trade unionism,
with the economic structure of the country, and with the resulting
influence of Communism, the attempt, which was successful in Germany, proved abortive in Italy. The present situation in Italy is
reminiscent of that in France-there are three principal groups of
trade unions of which one, the C.G.I.L. ( Confederazione Generate
880
See 2 HUECK & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 329, and the very informative survey by Kerr, supra note 286, esp. at 176. Special reference should also be made to Taft,
"Germany," in Comparative Labor Movements 243 (Galenson ed. 1952), but its statistical material is slightly out of date having been published in 1952. This is, for an
American reader, the best introduction to the history and background of the German
situation.
331
D.A.G. stands for "Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft," D.B.B. for "Deutscher

Beamten Bund."
332
Separate organization for old age and survivors pensions. See PART III infra.
333
For Italy, see LA PALOMBARA, THE ITALIAN LABOR MOVEMENT, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS (1957); Adams, Italy, in COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS 410 (Galenson ed.
19 52) ; Sanseverino, supra note 294·
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ltaliana del Lavoro) is regarded as being under Communist influence, one, the C.I.S.L. ( Confederazione ltaliana Sindacati dei
Lavoratori) is generally considered to be politically close to the
Christian Democrats, and one, the U .I.L. ( U nione I taliana del
Lavoro) is said to favor the Socialist and Republican Parties. Reliable information concerning the strength of these groups is apparently unobtainable, 334 but it is clear that the C.G.I.L. is far
stronger than either of the others, and that the C.I.S.L. is stronger
than the U.I.L. Broadly speaking, the unions affiliated to these
groups are industrial unions, called federations. In short, there is
a close factual resemblance between the French and Italian unions,
despite important differences in their legal situation. Collective bargaining is generally on a national basis.
The situation in Belgium differs fundamentally from that in
France and in Italy. It also differs from that in Germany since Belgian trade unions have not succeeded in unifying the two large politically-orientated groups, the General Federation of Labor in Belgium ( F idiration Ginirale du Travail en Belgique) (which in some
respects cooperates with the Socialist Party) and the Catholic Confederation of Christian Unions ( Confidiration des Syndicats Chritiens). Trade unions affiliated to the former group were thought to
have some 681,000 members in 1955, and those in the latter group
some 625,000 members in 1953. Both groups cooperate closely in
collective bargaining and also as political pressure groups. 335 In
addition there are in certain occupations and localities unions affiliated with the General Central Office of Liberal Unions ( Centrale Ginirale des Syndicats Libiraux) said in I 9 52 to number
about 90,000 members. These are the three groups of unions which
are represented in the bilateral committees (commissions paritaires), but the latter two are not on all of them. The Communists
appear to be quite insignificant, and are not represented at all on the
bilateral committees. The employers' associations represented on
these committees are affiliated to the Federation of Belgian Industries (Federation des Industries Belges). The very high standard
of development of collective bargaining is demonstrated not only
by the organization of the bilateral committees, but also by the
significant agreements on particular topics reached by the top union
organizations, especially the agreement concerning shop steward
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organization-that is, the representation of the unions at plant or
enterprise level-concluded in I 94 7. In F ranee and in Western
Germany such representation is regulated by statute (consultative,
as distinguished from representative organization in the individual
undertakings being regulated by statute in Belgium as well) .336 The
over-all picture of collective bargaining in Belgium is one of centralization, coupled with a minimum of legal intervention or enforcement. In such a scheme of things there is little room for craft unions
or for agreements between unions and individual firms.
A comparison between Belgium and the Netherlands reveals
great contrasts but also striking similarities. The Dutch trade unions, like their Belgian counterparts, are split on ideological lines,
with the difference, however, that the divisions are much more complicated. The largest group is the Netherlands Federation of Trade
Unions (N.V.V.) which is loosely linked with the Labor Party, and
which (in ideology but not in proportional significance) corresponds
to the Force Ouvriere in France. Others are the Catholic Workers'
Movement, and the (Protestant) Christian National Federation
of Trade Unions in the Netherlands. "Each of these trade union
organizations comprises, for instance, trade unions of workers in
the metal industry, the building industry, food establishments, transport undertakings, miscellaneous branches of industry, as well as
unions of government servants, office staff, and the like." 337 What
is more, there are three groups of employers' associations, one nondenominational, one Catholic and one Protestant. The strength of
denominational feeling, which may reflect the dramatic history of
the Netherlands, appears to have very little impact on the social
realities of collective bargaining. The three groups of trade unions
and the three groups of employers' associations customarily engage
in joint collective bargaining, and such other groups, for example,
Communist groups, as exist are not significant. To this extent the
picture presented by the Netherlands is not too different from that
of Belgium. "Nationwide" bargaining between associations is usual
in both countries, the coverage of central regulation of wages and
other conditions of employment is broad in each country and both
the Dutch and Belgian wage regulation systems operate efficiently.
Here, however, the similarities end. The second World War and
its aftermath-which included the separation of Indonesia from
"""See PART II, Section C infra.
"'"Pels, supra note 298, at 105.
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the Netherlands-made it necessary in the Netherlands-as it apparently still is-to counteract inflationary tendencies by governmental control of wages and conditions of employment. The Netherlands is the only country in the Community to impose a system of
maximum wages. Collective agreements require the approval of a
board of experts, the Council of Mediators appointed by the government. This Council can itself issue regulations, and the number of
persons affected by these regulations is apparently larger than that
of persons within the scope of collective agreements. 338 The importance of the distinction between collective agreements and central regulation can, however, easily be exaggerated. The Council
of Mediators acts in close cooperation with the Foundation of
Labor, a central organization comprising both the trade union and
the employers' top organizations, and it appears that, far from
suppressing collective bargaining, state regulation of wages and
conditions since 1945 has helped to stimulate it in the Netherlands.
The difference between the situation in the Netherlands and that
obtaining in the other five Member Countries may be more one of
legal form than of social substance. The fact remains that, within
the Community, Belgium (together with Italy) today represents
the minimum, and the Netherlands the maximum of legal regulation of collective bargaining. 339
Luxembourg has a very highly developed system of collective
bargaining on an industry-wide basis. In 1956 four-fifths of all
industrial workers (including mining) were covered by collective
agreements. An official memorandum of March 1957 states that
all agreements have been concluded in accordance with a general
pattern; they cover not only wages and hours, the making and unmaking of the contract of employment, holidays and vacations, as
well as family allowances and bonuses, but also the settlement of
differences by a bi-partite commission at the enterprise level. In the
event of failure of settlement the matter must be taken before the
"National Conciliation Office." 340 The memorandum adds that
838

I d. at 103.
The Expose on the Social Situation attached to the Commission's Second Report
shows that, compared with the other members of the Community (except Luxembourg)
the Netherlands has had remarkably few strikes in the recent past. Only 7,214 working days were lost in 1957, and 37,241 in 1958. The Commission attributes this partly
to the "spirit prevailing in the (Netherlands) Economic and Social Council in which
employers, workers and the general interest are represented," and partly "to the fact
that the Council of Mediators has the power to impose, in case of conflict, compulsory
regulations." (Second ExPOSE para. 77).
340
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 9, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540.
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"since the conclusion of these collective agreements and the establishment of the National Conciliation Office, strikes have practically
ceased to exist in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg." 341
The collective agreements cover manual workers in both the private and public sectors of the economy, whereas the working conditions of clerical, technical, and administrative employees are regulated by a rather elaborate statute. 342 It is a unique feature of
collective bargaining in Luxembourg that it is, generally speaking, a
function not of the unions but of the top organizations. There are,
as in Belgium, two principal confederations of unions, and collective
bargaining is entrusted to a committee which they have jointly
formed.
4·

LAW OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN GENERALFREEDOM OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND ITS RESTRICTIONS

The legal aspects of collective bargaining and of collective agreements in the Six are complex, and only some of the problems thought
to be of special importance for readers of this book can be touched
on here. The topics of principal significance are freedom of contract
with regard to collective agreements, the effect of the agreement as
a contract, its effect as a compulsory norm, its extension to outsiders,
its enforcement through administrative and similar measures, and
the publicity which by law must be given to collective agreements.
The legislative treatment of collective agreements is profoundly
different in France, Germany, and the Netherlands on one hand
and Belgium, Italy, and Luxembourg on the other. In France, Germany, and the Nether lands systematic and comprehensive legislation has been passed to regulate the conclusion and the effect of
collective agreements, whereas such legislation as exists in the remaining three countries is unsystematic and fragmentary. The relevant legislation is:
-in France, the Law of Feb. I I, 1950, which has considerably
amended the Labor Code (Code du Travail) ;
-in Germany, the Law Concerning Collective Agreements
( Tarifvertrags-Gesetz) of April 9, 1949, originally applicable in
the American and British Zones of Occupation only, and extended
to the entire Federal Republic by the Law of April 23, 1953;
-in the Netherlands, the Law on Collective Agreements of Desn The Commission notes in para. 75 of the Second
strikes in 1957 or 1958 •
... See note 313 supra.

EXPOSE

that Luxembourg had no

389
cember 24, I927, the Law of May 25, I937, concerning the binding force of collective agreements, and the Emergency Decree of
October 5, I 94 5, on labor relations.
In Belgium the relevant legislative texts are the Decree of June
9, I945, concerning bilateral committees, and certain provisions in
the Law concerning contracts of employment, consolidated by the
Decree of July I955· What legislation there is in Luxembourg is
contained in the Decree of October 6, I 94 5, concerning the N ational Conciliation Office. Article 39 of the Italian Constitution of
I 94 7 provides that legislation should be passed to give legal effect
to collective agreements, but no such legislation has yet been passed,
nor can it be expected in the near future. A provisional statute has
been approved by both Houses of the Italian Parliament, however,
and this law of I959 regulates in a fragmentary way the effect of
collective agreements. There is, however, considerable doubt
whether it is constitutional.
In five of the six countries freedom of contract prevails in relation to collective bargaining in the sense that, in so far as a collective agreement has legal effect as a contract or as a compulsory norm
binding on individual employers and employees, it derives this effect
from the act of contracting as such and no consent or approval of
any governmental authority is required. In the Netherlands, however, the so-called "Extraordinary Decree" of October 5, I 94 5,
provides that no collective agreement is valid without the consent of the Council of Mediators whose task it is to protect the
economy against potential inflationary effects of the bargaining
process, a function which may remind Americans of that of the
former War Labor Board in the United States. The Council is in
close contact with labor and management, and its powers do not
seem to be regarded as a serious encroachment on the freedom of
industry, no strong agitation for its abolition being apparent.
In a different sense, however, freedom of collective bargaining
is much more seriously "hedged in" in the Six than in either the
United States or in Great Britain. Mandatory legislation is of importance in the Six (though not of the same importance everywhere), and there is a general rule that any provision of a collective
agreement which runs counter to mandatory legislation is null and
void. Where, as, for example, in Germany, France, Luxembourg,
and the Netherlands, 343 the election or appointment and the functions of shop stewards are regulated by statute, collective agreeLABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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ments at variance with the statute are void, so that even by agreement between unions and employers or their associations the powers
and duties of shop stewards cannot be restricted, though they may
perhaps be enlarged. Similarly, where, as in Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and to some extent in Luxembourg, the law fixes
periods of notice which the employer and the employee must observe when terminating the contract of employment, collective
agreements concerning terms of notice are valid only to the extent
to which the relevant statutes expressly provide that their provisions may be abrogated in this way (as is the case, within certain
limits, in the Netherlands). 344 A similar observation could be made
about the regulation by statute of the employer's obligation to continue wage or salary payments in the event of the employee's sickness. Where such payments are concerned as well as with regard to
the regulation of working hours, 345 German law provides examples
of mandatory statutory provisions of which the effect can be rendered inapplicable by collective agreement but not by an individual
contract of employment. This is also true of the Belgian law with
regard to working hours. 346 It is as if in America a statute, such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act, could be derogated from by collective agreement but not otherwise.
The two most significant restrictions on the freedom of collective
bargaining imposed by legislation are, however, those which concern freedom of organization and minimum wage standards. In all
of the Member States any collective agreement which seeks to restrict the employee's freedom to join a union would be null and void.
In France, under the Law of April 27, 1956, in Germany by virtue
of the relevant provision of the Bonn Basic Law and of general
principles, and to some extent in Belgium and in the Netherlands
this means that union security agreements are void, and, although
this is not so clear, the same result, based on general principles, is
likely to be reached in Italy.347
Far more important, however, is the limitation which minimum
wage legislation imposes on freedom of collective bargaining. The
French National Guaranteed Minimum Wage (Salaire Minimum
""See on all this: PART II, Section E infra.
340
BiiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as BGB] para. 616; Decree on
Working Hours of April 30, 1938, para. 7, [1938] Reichsgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited
as RGBl.] I, 448 (Ger.) .
... Law of June 14, I9ZI, arts. z, 5, 7, [I9ZI] x Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux
de Belgique roz8.
841
See note 322-26 supra, and for Italy: MAZZONI, MANU ALE Dl DIRJTTO DEL LAVORO
92 (1958).
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is comparable
to the American Federal Minimum Wage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act in that it constitutes a "floor" for all wages and
makes it impossible, either by individual contract or by collective
agreement, to undercut in any way the specified minimum. A similar
system exists in Luxembourg under two Decrees of I 944 and
1956,349 but no comparable institution exists now in any of the
other four Common Market countries. In its economic and social
functions, however, the French National Minimum Wage Act differs considerably from the scheme inaugurated by the American
Fair Labor Standards Act. The French National Minimum Wage
is not (as is the corresponding Luxembourg minimum wage) fixed
as a rigid absolute figure. It is constantly kept under review, and,
through a complicated system of computation, linked with the cost
of living index. It moves up if the monthly average expenditure of
an average family in Paris (as ascertained by the National Institute
of Statistics) rises by more than five percent, although it can never
by the operation of this sliding scale be altered more than once in
any four-month period. This system was introduced by an amendment of the Labor Code in 1952, and whereas all sliding scales in
collective agreements were forbidden by the Order of January 7,
1959, 350 as part of the program of the De Gaulle government to
stabilize prices and the currency, the automatic sliding scale applicable to the statutory minimum wage was expressly preserved.
Nor is the cost-of-living sliding scale the only method of keeping
the statutory minimum wage flexible. Under the Law of 1950, 351
by which free collective bargaining for wages was re-introduced in
France, after being suppressed since the outbreak of the second
World War, a method was provided for and is still used by which
the minimum can be changed by government decree on the basis of
a recommendation made by the Higher Committee on Collective
Agreements. This recommendation does not, however, bind the government. The minimum is fixed for the Paris region, and reduced
for other regions in which the cost of living is lower. Since all these
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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minima are fixed on an hourly basis, they immediately affect the
system of overtime pay to which reference has already been made.
Although in practice the wages paid in industry exceed the national
minimum, the National Minimum Wage doubtless plays a far
greater role in the economic and social life of France than does the
federal minimum wage in the United States. The French system is
(through the interaction of a number of statutes with conflicting
tendencies) extraordinarily complex, and only a very superficial idea
of its operation can be gleaned from the above remarks. In collective bargaining the National Minimum Wage operates, as one author puts it, as a "minimum of minima."
The term "minimum wage legislation" is (somewhat misleadingly) also used for a different type of statutory wage regulation of
which the British law is today the principal example. 352 This "selective" system, under which there is no national over-all minimum, but
minima can be fixed for particular industries in which collective bargaining does not function satisfactorily, was introduced (for wages
and other conditions of employment) in the West German Federal
Republic by a law of 1952. 353 It is not, however, of great importance
in practice. Similar legislation exists in Belgium, France, and the
Netherlands 354 for homeworkers, and, in a different form in Italy,
for homeworkers and also for caretakers and similar personnel. 355
The Italian provisional statute of I 9 59 356 to which reference was
made above restricts the freedom of contract of the parties in the
sense that, once the government has regulated the wages or other
conditions of employment of a given category of workers on the
basis of an existing agreement-and the agreement is only the pattern on which the government moulds its decree-any subsequent
collective agreement applicable to the same workers is invalid in so
far as it purports to derogate from the governmental decree to their
detriment.
More important even than these restrictions on the parties' freedom of contract (with the exception of this temporary Italian law
352
Agricultural Wages Act, I948, II & I2 Geo. 6, c. 47; Wages Councils Act, I959,
7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 69; Kahn- Freund, Minimum Wage Legislation in Great Britain, 97
u. PA. L. REV. 778 (I949).
"""Law on Fixing Minimum Conditions of Employment, Jan. II, I952, [I952] Bundesgesetzblatt [hereinafter cited as BGBI.] I, I7 (Ger. Fed. Rep.). See also Dietz, supra
note 288, at 8.
... On Belgium, France, and the Netherlands: STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra
note 303, at 78, 99, I I7.
"""Law No. 23 of Feb. 4, I958, [I958] I Lex, Legislazione Italiana 5o6; Law No.
264 of Mar. I3, I958 [I958] I Lex, Legislazione Italiana II35·
358
Law of July 14, 1959, No. 74I, Norme transitorie per garantire minimi di trattamento economico e normativo ai lavatori, [Sept. 18, I959] Gazzetta Ufliciale (No. 225).
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of 1959 if constitutional) is the power of the Dutch Council of
Mediators to fix wages and other conditions of employment by collective regulations. These are absolutely binding, that is, they do
not permit any variation in favor of the employers or of the employed. But since in the Netherlands collective agreements require
the approval of the Council of Mediators and since, on the other
hand, the Council does not decide either on the issue of collective
regulations or on the approval of agreements until it has consulted
with both sides of industry and especially with the Foundation of
Labor on which they are both represented, there would not, from a
practical point of view, appear to be any appreciable difference between the two types of collective determination of the conditions of
employment. 3 " 7
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5·

THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS A CONTRACT

It is today generally recognized on the Continent that a collective
agreement has a dual legal function: to create obligations between
those who have concluded it, that is, between the organizations on
both sides, or between the union or unions and an individual employer, and also to establish a code for the individual employers and
employees in the industry. It is customary to refer to these two aspects of a collective agreement as its contractual and normative effect. Perhaps it is unnecessary to point out that, whether or not
these or similar terms are actually used in the United States, in substance collective bargaining has this same dual function there as
everywhere, and it may be sufficient to refer to the two decisions of
the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama 358 on the one hand, and in 1.1. Case Co. v.
N.L.R.B. 359 on the other, to illustrate the point.
The question whether a collective agreement is a contract is, as
the American experience has shown, of very great practical importance indeed. More than that, given an affirmative answer to the
question, a second question arises concerning the obligations implied by the contract. There is no unanimous agreement concerning
answers to either of these questions in the Six. In France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands 360 a collective agreement can
clearly be enforced as a contract between those who have concluded
857
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it. In Belgium, however, the question whether a collective agreement operates as a contract between the organizations which have
concluded it appears to be a question of fact to be decided in accordance with the intentions of the parties, 361 and this applies to agreements which take the form of a resolution of a bilateral committee
and to others. Where an agreement operates as a contract, each
party is under the usual duty to "keep the peace," to see to it that
its members carry out the terms of the agreement, and each is liable
for damages in the event of breach. 362 Moreover, there is nothing
to prevent the parties from creating by express provision additional
obligations, a matter of special importance in view of the contractual and non-statutory basis of the appointment and operation of
shop stewards. 363
In this respect as in others the situation in Italy 364 is complicated
by the fact that the Fascist so-called "syndicates" were abolished
by a law of November 23, 1944, but the same law provided that the
collective and individual relations would continue, subject to subsequent modification, to be governed by the terms of the existing collective agreements, awards and the like. Article 39 of the Constitution of I 94 7 provides for legislation under which registered unions
and employers' associations would make agreements having the
force of law erga omnes, but such legislation has not yet been passed.
In the meantime the old collective terms continue to apply (in so
far as they have not been modified) and new-so-called "post-corporative"-agreements have been concluded by the organizations
set up since the fall of the Fascist regime. There are thus at the moment two kinds of collective terms-those which survive from the
Fascist era under the law of 1944, and those which have since been
agreed upon. The former have survived the parties who made them,
and, although they continue to operate as norms binding individual
employers and employees, they cannot have any contractual effect
because the parties to the contracts from which they arose were suppressed. The "post-corporative" agreements on the other hand have
contractually binding effect on the organizations which are parties
to them.
bach, Netherlands National Report on Collective Agreements 8, znd International
Congress on Labor Law (Geneva, 1957).
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Horion, supra note 274, at 76.
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STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303, at 101.
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Horion, supra note 259, at 6.
... Mazzoni, II Diritto dei Rapporti Collettivi di La<Voro in Italia, in I Rapporti Colletti<Vi di La<Voro 45 (1959).
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The importance of this-and particularly to the reader of this
book-is that, generally speaking, the right to resort to hostile action in labor-management relations, the "freedom to strike" and the
"freedom to lockout" is to a very large extent restricted by the law
of collective bargaining. There is no such thing on the Continent as
a concept of "unfair labor practices," nor is there an administrative
agency comparable to the American National Labor Relations
Board. The borderline between that which is permissible and that
which is forbidden in collective labor management relations is in
some degree drawn by what corresponds to the law of tort and to
the criminal law, but much more importantly by the "peace obligation" which, even if unexpressed, is deemed to be implied in a collective agreement. The legal principles governing this "peace obligation" have been mainly developed in Germany, and subsequently in
France. With important exceptions, the obligation is deemed to be
"relative." This means that both sides implicitly undertake not to
resort, during the term of the agreement, to hostile action in an attempt to alter terms of the agreement. The organizations on both
sides are "bound to do nothing which might jeopardize the loyal
performance of the agreement." 365 These words are contained in
the French Labor Code but they summarize the essence of the
"peace obligation" everywhere. It follows that there is nothing to
prevent the parties from resorting to or supporting a strike or lockout for purposes unconnected with the agreement, for example, to
obtain an advantage in connection with matters not regulated by
it, or to enforce the agreement, or in response to a breach by the
other party, or for political or purely economic reasons. 366 The parties may, however, by an express clause in the agreement extend the
peace obligation making it "absolute." In regard to agreements
capable of "extension," the "peace obligation" has been made absolute by French, 367 but not by German, law. The German Courts
have, however, gone very far in their definition of what acts constitute a breach of the peace obligation, as is illustrated by a recent
decision of the Federal Labor Court 368 to the effect that arrange3611
CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31q. inserted by the law of Feb. II, 1950,
[1950] ].0. r688 (Fr.). ("Tenus de ne rien faire qui soit de nature a en compromettre
l' execution loyale.")
300
3 DURAND 594· For Germany: HUECK & NIPPERDEY, op. cit. supra note 360, notes 74
et seq. to para. I of the 1949 law.
""'CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31g(r) No. 8j see 3 DURAND 595·
308
Judgment of Oct. 31, 1958, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesarbeitsgerichts [hereinafter cited as BArbG] 321 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), a case arising from the SchleswigHol.tein metalworkers' strike which began on Oct. 24, 1956 and ended on Feb. 14, 1957·
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ments for a trade union poll concerning a possible strike is a breach
of a collective agreement. Both judgments for damages and injunctions or their equivalent may follow in the event of a breach.
Both parties to a collective agreement (as a rule the organizations on both sides) are further under an obligation to draw their
members' attention to its provisions and to the need for implementing them, and Dutch law expressly creates such a duty. 369 In Germany and in the Netherlands 370 the parties must go even further to
ensure loyal performance of the agreement. They are bound to
make use of such powers to this end as the by-laws or rules of the
organization put at their disposal, including if necessary, the power
to expel members. French law does not go nearly so far. 371
In addition the parties are, of course, bound to fulfil such special
provisions in the agreement as impose obligations with regard, for
example, to the establishment of organs of conciliation or arbitration, agencies to administer agreed vacation schemes, social welfare
schemes and the like.
This contractual function of collective agreements is enforced
through actions for injunctions, including mandatory injunctions
(or their equivalent), and for damages-the threat of which is a
formidable weapon. Such actions belong in France to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, and in Germany to that of the labor
courts. 372 In Germany, only the parties to the agreement (normally
the organizations) can be parties to such actions, except that as a
result of the third party beneficiary doctrine embodied in the German Civil Code, 373 a member of one organization may sue the organization which is the other party to the agreement. This is of
little practical importance, however. In France 374 and in theN etherlands,375 however, the members of the organizations are subject to a
similar liability.
6.

THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT AS A LEGALLY
ENFORCEABLE CODE

The "normative function" of a collective agreement means, in
the first place, that in the absence of an express agreement to the
360

Netherlands: Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. 4, [1927] Stb. No. 415.
This is the so-called "Einwirkungs-Pflicht": see HuECK & NrPPERDEY, op. cit. supra
note 360, notes 62 et seq. For the Netherlands: Law of Dec. 24, 1927, [1927] Stb. No. 415.
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3 DURAND 597·
""'See PART II, Section D infra.
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BGB para. 328.
37
' CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31r. See 3 DURAND 601.
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contrary between the individual employer and the individual employee, their mutual rights and obligations are governed by the
relevant collective agreement. This rule is expressly stated only in
two Belgian laws-that of I954 in regard to manual workers and
that of I 9 55 in regard to salaried employees 376-and it applies
whether or not the employer or employee is a member of the organization or union which is a party to the collective agreement. This
is, however, doubtless the law in all six countries. In French this is
often called the "automatic effect" of the agreement.
In Germany, 377 F ranee, 378 and the Netherlands 379 express legislation provides that this effect is not only "automatic" but also
"compulsory." In France this principle applies to the relations between an employer who is a party to the collective agreement or
member of an organization which is a party and all his employees,
irrespective of their union membership. In Germany and in the
Netherlands it applies only if the employee is a member of a contracting organization, but in the Netherlands 380 the employer may
be liable to damages or to an injunction on the complaint of a trade
union party to the agreement if he does not, in relation to unorganized workers, fulfil the terms of the collective agreement.
The effect of this legislation is that any agreement between an
individual employer and individual employee which is at variance
with the collective agreement is ineffective and replaced by the corresponding terms of the collective agreement, unless it is expressly
permitted by the collective agreement or more favorable to the
worker than the terms of the latter. In Belgium this applies only to
such resolutions of bilateral committees as have been declared legally binding by royal decree-and these represent a minority of
existing agreements. 381 In Luxembourg, on the other hand, it is
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Horion, supra note 259, at 10; Van Goethem, supra note 310, at 2. The relevant
clause which is contained in both statutes says that if no decision of a commissioll
Paritaire which has been made binding by Royal Decree applies, and if the parties to
the contract of employment have failed to deal with a matter, the terms laid down in
collective agreements or non-binding decisions of commissio11s paritaires apply as
implied terms of the contract of employment. Similarly the Dutch law of Dec. 24,
1927, art. 13, [1927] Stb. No. 415.
377
Law of April 9, 1949, para. 4, [1949] Gesetzblatt der Verwaltung des Vereinigten
Wirtschaftsgebietes [hereinafter cited as WiGBI.] 55 (Ger.), extended to the entire
territory of the Federal Republic by Law of April 23, 1953, [1953] Bundesgesetzblatt, I,
156. The parties to the contract of employment cannot waive their rights arising herefrom, except with the consent of the parties to the collective agreement.
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CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 31e.
7
' "Law of Dec. 24, 1927, art. 12, [1927] Stb. No. 415 (Neth.).
'""I d. art. 14.
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'
See Horion, supra note 259; STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 303,
at 103.
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thought that this principle, although incorporated expressly only in
a draft bill, is nevertheless part of the existing law. 382 The situation in Italy is less clear than that in the other five countries, since
Italian law is still in transition, but the courts appear generally to
assume that such a compulsory effect attaches both to the surviving
agreements of the Fascist era and to the "post-corporative agreements" which have since been concluded. 383
It may not be obvious to an American observer at first sight why
there should be a differentiation between members and non-members
of a union, but it must be remembered that the American concept of
a "statutory bargaining representative" is alien to European law.
In Europe, however strongly it may be union policy to induce or compel employers to apply the terms of collective agreements to nonorganized as well as to organized labor, the union "represents" no
one except its members. Moreover, union policy with regard to the
treatment of non-organized labor is far from uniform, and the desire to prevent undercutting by outsiders still conflicts with the desire to restrict the privilege of the "union wage" as an inducement
to joining the union.

7.

THE EXTENSION OF COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS

Whatever may be the policy of a given legal system with regard
to the compulsory effect of collective agreements on contracts between organized employers and unorganized employees, the problem of the position of unorganized employers remains. This is the
problem of "extending" the collective agreement so as to make it
a "common rule" of the trade irrespective of the membership of
the employer in a contracting organization. With certain important
variations the German Law of I949/I953, 384 the French Law of
I950, 385 the Dutch Law of I937 as modified by the Decree of I945, 386
the Belgian Decree of I945, 387 and the Luxembourg Decree of the
same year 388 all provide for such extension procedure.
In Germany, where this procedure was first introduced in I 9 I 8,
the extension order is made by the Minister of Labor after consultation with a committee consisting of representatives of the top organi.., Art. 8 of the Bill of 1955.
883
Mazzoni, supra note 364, at uS .
... Law of April 9, 1949, para. 5, [1949] WiGBI. 55 (Ger.), extended by Law of
April 23, 1953, [1953] B.G. Bl. I, 156.
885
CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. art. 31j.
888
Law of May 25, 1937, art. 2, [1937] Stb. No. Sox; Extraordinary Decree of Oct. 5,
1945, art. 15, [1945] Stb. No. F 214 (Neth.).
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Decree of June 9, 1945, arts. 12 and 13, [1945] Moniteur Beige 4337·
888
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art. 22, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540.
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zations on both sides, upon application by one or more of the parties
to the collective agreement. It is i condition of extension that those
employers who are either themselves parties to the agreement or
members of organizations which are parties employ at least 50 percent of the employees coming within the terms of the agreement. The
extension also must appear to the Minister to be required by the
public interest.
In France extension orders were first introduced in 193 6: under
the present law they are made by the Minister of Labor and Social
Security but only if the Higher Committee on Collective Agreements makes a positive recommendation to this effect. The conditions which must be fulfilled in France to enable the Minister to make
an extension order differ from those in Germany. Only agreements
made by the "most representative organizations" within the framework of a "joint committee" summoned for this purpose can be so
extended: the criterion is not, as in Germany, the factual significance
of the agreement, but the character of the parties, the degree to
which they are "representative" (their representativite) .389 This
depends on a number of factors listed in the statute, including their
membership, the total amount of dues, their independence, their
experience and length of standing, and their patriotic attitude under
the German occupation. Agreements which are to be extended may
have been concluded on a national or on a regional basis. If they are
national agreements, they must comply with very stringent and detailed provisions as to their compulsory content. They must, for
example, guarantee freedom of organization and opinion and regulate not only wages (providing for equal pay for men and women),
but conditions of "hiring and firing," terms of notice, the functions
of shop stewards, vacations with pay, conciliation proceedings, apprenticeship and so forth. They may also deal with many other matters.390 In the Netherlands the power to make extension orders was,
under the Law of 1937 by which they were introduced, vested in the
Minister of Social Affairs, but it was transferred by the Emergency
Decree of 1945 to the Council of Mediators. The extension order
presupposes an application by the "industrial council" 391 or by one
or more of the parties to the agreement, and it can only be made
with regard to agreements which cover the majority of those to
whom they apply.
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

389

This is defined in CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31(f). See 3 DuRAND 628.
CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31 (g).
891
Law of May 25, 1937, art. 3, [1937] Stb, No. Sox. "Industrial council" is a body
on which both sides of industry are represented.
399

400

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

The corresponding orders which can be made under the laws of
Belgium and of Luxembourg have a different character. In Belgium
only resolutions of bilateral committees come within the relevant
provisions, 392 and the order is made by royal decree upon application either of the bilateral committee which has passed the resolution or of one of the organizations. Its effect is to give the resolution obligatory force, to convert it into a "law of the trade" which
cannot be avoided by contract. In Germany, France, and theN etherlands a collective agreement cannot be avoided by individual contracts, at any rate to the detriment of the employee, between organized employers and organized workers. In France this is also
true where organized employers and unorganized workers are concerned, and it is true in all three countries whether or not it has been
"extended," the "extension" merely binding unorganized employers
to the same extent that organized employers are in any event bound.
On the other hand a Belgian royal decree is necessary to make the
agreement compulsory for organized as well as unorganized employers: it transforms an optional into a compulsory norm for all
those concerned.
In Luxembourg 393 the situation is in fact similar to, though in
law different from, that in Belgium. Only agreements concluded
before or confirmed by the National Conciliation Office, normally
that is, agreements made within the bilateral committee, can be
declared to be "generally binding." This is done by the government
on the basis of a unanimous application of the bilateral committee
and on a recommendation of the organizations on both sides, which
in turn may consult their members. An organization which has consulted its members cannot recommend the making of an order unless two thirds of the members concerned have voted in favor. On
the other hand, no organization can refuse to recommend the making of the order unless it has consulted its members and the majority
have voted against the order. The effect of this is in Luxembourg,
as it is in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, to extend to "outsiders" the compulsory effect which, even without the order, the
agreement has on "insiders." Legally it differs, therefore, from
the corresponding royal decree in Belgium.
Article 39 of the Italian Constitution of 1947, which envisages
a system enabling unions and employers' organizations to register,
and, when registered, to conclude agreements with binding force
392
393

See note 387 supra.
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, art.

22, [

1945] Pasin. Lux. 540.
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throughout the trade, that is, constituting a "common rule," has
not yet been implemented by legislation. It is useless to analyze here
the numerous draft bills which have been produced. No one knows
which, if any, of them will ever become law, and when.
Meanwhile, in the face of a lively discussion of the extraordinarily complex constitutional situation, Parliament has passed a
temporary statute which seeks to circumvent the constitutional issue-whether successfully or not remains to be seen. According to
this statute the Government can issue orders with legally binding
force, in order to secure to workers of a given catagory minimum
standards which cannot be bargained away ( minimi inderogabili
di trattamento economico e normativo). These "minimum wages
and conditions orders" must in substance be in accordance with the
relevant collective agreements which have been deposited in the
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Only agreements made prior
to the coming into force of the statute (summer, 1959) are taken
into account, and no orders can be made more than one year after
its coming into force. The object of the statute, is, of course, to produce the effect of an order making collective agreements into "common rules" without violating Article 39 of the Constitution which
reserves this universally binding effect to agreements made by unions
registered under a procedure which has not yet been introduced.
Hence the provision that the terms of the order have to "conform"
to existing agreements, but that the orders do not incorporate them
or extend them.
The effect of an extension or similar order is everywhere that no
one concerned can avoid the collective agreement by contract to the
detriment of the worker (in the Netherlands any derogation from
the terms of the agreement either to his advantage or detriment is
prohibited).
8.

SANCTIONS AND PUBLICITY

The sanctions which protect the standards established by collective agreements are not civil sanctions only. In France it is a criminal
offense for an employer to pay wages lower than those provided for
in an extension order, 394 and labor inspectors are under a duty to
see that the relevant provisions are observed. 395 Much the same
applies to violations of resolutions of Belgian bilateral committees
which have been declared binding by royal decree. These are also en""' CooE ou TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 31zb.
I d. arts 31Y and 31zc.
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forced by inspectors. 396 In the Netherlands 397 and Luxembourg 398
any violation of a collective agreement by an employer is an offense,
and in Luxembourg this applies also to an employee. German law
has no penal sanctions, but the civil sanctions, including injunctions,
of German law 399 are available to enforce provisions such as those
concerning limitations on the number of apprentices and generally
concerning the making rather than the content of the contract of
employment, which in other countries cannot be directly enforced.
The new Italian law also provides for penal sanctions and for enforcement by inspectors. 400
In France 401 and Germany 402 the employer must exhibit in the
plant the wording of relevant collective agreements, and in the
other countries this is often required by the agreement itself. In
Germany all collective agreements are entered in a Register kept
in the Ministry of Labor where they can be inspected. 403 In France
they are deposited in the local labor court ( conseil des prud'hommes) or failing this, the general local court. 404

C.

EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE PLANT AND
IN THE UNDERTAKING

405

Statutory employee representation at workshop or enterprise
level is alien to American thinking and experience. Nevertheless any
American, whether businessman, lawyer, or trade unionist, who has
anything to do with labor-management relations in any of the Six
will be inevitably and almost immediately concerned with questions
of employee representation as day-to-day problems.
Two things should be mentioned at the outset. In the first place,
there are two distinct, though often related, 406 social objectives
which the institutions to be discussed are intended to serve: one is
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the representation of the employees' interest at plant level, the other
is joint consultation on, and, in some cases (notably in Germany) 407
joint administration of, the affairs of the enterprise by employer
and employees. In the second place, although the union or unions
may in fact and even in law have a strong influence on the formation
and operation of these organs of representation and consultation,
they are independent from the unions. It is necessary to emphasize
this because the representative function which they exercise closely
resembles that of shop stewards in English-speaking countries, but
unlike shop stewards they do not generally speak for the unions;
they are representatives of the employees of the plant or enterprise,
irrespective of whether those employees belong to a particular or to
any union. To this there is one exception: De!Cgations syndicates du
personnel, or shop stewards are elected in Belgium pursuant to collective agreements and represent the unions at plant level, functioning along side the statutory works councils (or conseils d' entreprise).
The legal basis on which this representative and consultative
machinery rests may be either legislation or collective agreements.
It is entirely statutory in France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands; it is (for the time being) entirely a matter of agreement in Italy; and it is a mixture of both in Belgium.
The French legislation is contained in the following enactments:
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Order on Works Councils (comites d' entreprises) of February 22, I945, as amended by a law of May I6, I946;
Law of April I 6, I 946, on Employees' Representatives

(de!Cgues du personnel);
Decree of August I, I 94 7, on Health and Safety Committees (Comites d'Hygiene et de Securite).
The principal German enactments are:
Law of October I I, I 9 52, concerning the Constitution of
the Plant ( Betriebs-J7 erfassungs-Gesetz) ;
Law of October 8, I95I, concerning Protection of Employees in Case of Dismissal (Kiindigungs-Schutz-

Gesetz);
Law concerning Co-Determination by the Employees in
the Undertakings of the Mining and Iron-and-Steel-Producing Industries of May 2 I, I 9 5 I ;
Law Supplementary thereto of July 8, I956.
07
'
In the mining, iron and steel industries under the Co-determination Law, May zi,
1951, [1951] BGBI. I, 347 and the Supplementary Law, Aug. 7, 1956, [1956] BGBI. I,
707 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
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In Luxembourg older legislation has been largely superseded by:
Decree of October 30, I 958, concerning the Institution
of Workers' Representation in Industrial, Commercial
and Craftsman's Undertakings; and
Decree of November 2 I, I9 59, regulating elections
thereto.
Still in force are :
Law of June 7, I937, concerning the contract of Employment of Salaried Employees, and
Decree of May I I, I938, on the Institution of Salaried
Employees' Representations.
In the Netherlands the relevant statute is:
Law on Works Councils (Onderneemingsraden) of May
4. I950.
In Belgium the principles are found partly in statutes and decrees
and partly in collective agreements which, without having the force
of law, operate in fact as regulatory provisions:
Law of September 20, I948, concerning the Organization
of the Economy (Portant !'Organisation de!' Economie),
Section IV (Works Councils) ;
Decree of October 6, I958, concerning Works' Councils;
National Collective Agreement (Accord National) of
July I 6, I9 58, relating thereto;
National Collective Agreement relating to the General
Principles governing the Organization of Shop Stewards
(Accord National relatif aux principes generaux du s tatut
des delegations syndic ales du personnel des entreprises)
of June I6-I7, I947;
Law of July I7, I957, concerning committees dealing with
safety, health, and amenities at the place of work. (This
is only the principal of several enactments on these comites
de securite, d'hygiene, et d'embellissement des lieux de
travail).
In Italy the works committees ( commissioni interne) have been
established on the basis of the "interconfederal" national agreement
(between the top organizations) of May 8, I953· There is a special
agreement concerning salaried employees, dated October 23, I950.
In all Continental countries a distinction is made between the
plant or workshop ( hablissement, Betrieb) and the undertaking or
enterprise ( entreprise, Unternehmen), the first being a technical or
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organizational unit, the second commercial or financial. This distinction is relevant because, where, as in the case of most large undertakings, one company or other undertaking operates a number
of plants, it stands to reason that the "representative" function of
employees' representatives is most naturally exercised at plant level,
and much if not all of their "consultative" function at enterprise
level. This leads to a certain complexity of organization. In Germany, which has much the most elaborate scheme of employee representation in Europe, the representative function is exercised by
works councils which are elected for each plant. These works councils have the task of representing the employees' interests in relation
to the employer. For example, they make (within the framework
of the existing collective agreements) "plant agreements" with him
concerning matters such as the beginning and end of the daily hours
and intervals, the time and place of wage payments, vacation
schemes, apprenticeship, administration of welfare schemes and institutions, discipline, piece rates, principles and methods of remuneration, and health and safety measures. 408 They must try to induce
the employer to remedy grievances of the employees, and to see to
it that statutes, orders, collective agreements and the like, which are
designed to serve the interests of employees, are applied in the
plant. 409 Finally, they exercise such statutory functions as the workers' representatives have in connection with the hiring and discharge
of employees. 410 All this takes place within the plant, and, although
the law provides that where an undertaking consists of two or more
plants a "joint works council" can be formed, that council does not
supersede the individual works councils nor are they subordinated
to it. 411 Its jurisdiction is restricted to such necessarily exceptional
cases as concern more than one plant.
On the other hand, and generally speaking, the organs of joint
consultation operate at the enterprise level. If the total number of
employees in one undertaking (that is, the aggregate number of
employees in all plants belonging to the undertaking) exceeds I oo,
a joint consultative committee will be formed for that undertaking,
known as a Wirtschafts-Ausschuss 412 consisting of an equal number of employee and employer representatives which meets once a
month. It is the employer's duty-within the limits of the required
"""Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. 11, 1952, paras. 1 and 56 If., [1952] BGBI.
I, 681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
""'I d. para. 54·
""I d. paras. 6o If.
411
I d. paras. 46 If.
•,. I d. paras. 67-69.
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secrecy-to keep this committee informed about the affairs of the
firm ("the economic development of the undertaking"), including
methods of production, production programs, the volume of production and sales, and other matters "which intimately concern the
interests of the employees of the undertaking." This has to be done
in the light of such documentary material as in the employer's discretion is needed to explain his statement, and the employer must
explain to the joint consultative committee the annual balance sheet
and profit and loss account. Four times a year the employer, together
with the joint consultative committee and the works council in each
plant, gives an oral or written account of the development of the
undertaking which is addressed to the employees in their entirety. 413
On similar lines, and again at the enterprise rather than the plant
level, it is the policy of the law to associate the employees with the
larger undertakings by providing that one third of the supervisory
board (Aufsichtsrat) of all those corporations (normally the larger
ones) which are by law required to have such a board, must consist
of elected representatives of the employees. 414 All this is under the
general law, and it amounts to very much less than the special system of "co-determination" or "joint management" which under the
statute of May 21, 1951, applies to the mining and iron-and-steelproducing industries. In these industries (and by virtue of the supplementary law of 1956 also in the holding companies of those
industries) membership of supervisory boards consists half of employees and half of shareholder representatives under an impartial
chairman. One member of the board of directors (the Vorstand) is
a "labor director" appointed, normally in consultation with the
trade unions, by the supervisory board. In the operating companies,
he may not be appointed if the employee members of the supervisory board vote against him.
This is the barest outline of what is meant by "co-determination"
(Mitbestimmung), an institution which does not appear to have any
parallel in other European countries (and to which, for example,
British trade unions are, on the whole, strenuously opposed). "]oint
consultation" on the other hand (which in practice means very much
less since the powers of the supervisory board vis-a-vis the board of
directors in an ordinary German company vary greatly and are mal'"'See for all this: ld. paras. 67 and 6g.
"'I d. paras. 76 and 77· See Conard, Chapter VIII, where he discusses the difficulties
of translating such terms as /J u/sichtsrat. The term which he adopts, "supervisory
board," is hereinafter used. The Aufsichtsrat either makes the policy or (if the
J7 orstand does so) does nothing at all. It does not "supervise."
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leable) is a very general phenomenon in Europe. German law has
arrived at a compromise between these two principles by confining
"co-determination" to the mining and heavy industries, that is,
broadly speaking, to those which come within the jurisdiction of the
Coal-Steel Community. The reasons for this compromise are purely
historical: they are of course connected with the very special place
which the German coal, iron, and steel industries have occupied in
the political destinies of Germany and indeed of Europe.
Both joint consultation and co-determination aim at a closer association of the employees with the undertaking as an economic
unit. Where the special interests of the employees are concerned,
the relevant unit is the plant, even where the law restricts the managerial power of the employer. This is indicated by those provisions of German law 415 which confer a right of co-determination on
the works councils of all plants with normally more than 20 employees who are entitled to vote for the council. This right can be
exercised when management is planning changes which may have a
detrimental effect on the workers, such as cutting down, closure, or
transfer of a plant or any essential part thereof, its amalgamation
with another plant (whether or not in the same undertaking) or
fundamental changes in production or equipment (unless clearly
caused by the needs of the market) , or fundamentally new working
methods (unless clearly the result of, or the means towards, technical
progress). In all such cases the works council (not the joint consultation committee) must be asked for its consent, and, failing
agreement between employer and works council, a mediation procedure may be set in motion before an impartial tri-partite body the
chairman of which will, if necessary, be nominated by the President
of the competent Court of Appeal. This body has no compulsory
power; but if the employer resorts without adequate reason to measures at variance with an agreement arrived at with the works council or with a recommendation made by the tri-partite body, he must
compensate any employee discharged as a result of these measures
being put into effect.
Emphasis has been placed here on the difference between those
provisions which operate at plant level and those which operate at
the level of the undertaking because the latter do not apply to foreign companies, that is, according to the principles of the conflict
of laws generally accepted in Continental countries, to such coru• Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. II, 1952, paras. 72-75, [1952] BGBI. I, 681
(Ger. Fed. Rep.).
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porations as have their central management and control (siege
social effectif, P erwaltungssitz) abroad. Those operating at plant
level, apply to all plants within the territorial jurisdiction of the
country from which the relevant legislation emanates, irrespective
of the nationality or domicile of the company, for example, irrespective of whether the plant belongs to an American corporation
or to its local subsidiary.
The separation of representative and consultative functions is
known in the six countries, 416 though the corresponding distinction
between organs operating at plant and at enterprise level has nowhere been developed as fully as in Germany. In France there exist
side by side the works councils (comites d' en/reprises) and the employees' representatives (detegues du personnel). The consultative
function is exclusively reserved to the former, and the representative
function is divided between them, so, however, that in any undertaking which comprises more than one plant with 50 employees, a
separate plant committee ( comite d' hablissement) is set up which
takes over the representative functions of the works counciJ.4 17 None
of these representative functions amount to a right of co-determination, except with regard to the discharge of members of the representative organs themselves (which requires the consent of the
works council or, alternatively, of a factory inspector) 418 and with
regard to the administration of welfare arrangements. 419 Except
where collective agreements provide for more extensive powers,
the functions of the French representative and consultative organs
are otherwise purely advisory. The employer himself is a member
of the works council (which is not the case in Germany) . In undertakings which have the form of stock companies (socihes
anonymes) the works council is entitled to obtain the balance sheet,
the profit and loss account, and the auditor's report, and to employ,
at the expense of the undertaking, the services of an independent
accountant. The works council also sends two delegates to the
administrative board of the stock company, but they have no right to
vote. These provisions do not apply to foreign corporations. 420
The situation in Belgium resembles that in France inasmuch as
in Belgium, too, works councils ( conseils d' entre prise) and em.,. See Boldt, Rapport de Synthese, in E.C.S.C. HrGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note
405, ch. II, sec. V, at 2o-22.
m Durand, La Representation des Tra'Vailleurs sur le plan de l'entreprise en droit
fran(ais, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, esp. at 211.
418
Jd. at 218.
419
Id. at 236.
""'I d. at 212.
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ployees' representatives (deligations syndicales du personnel) exist
side by side. There is an important distinction, however, in that the
basis of the latter is an agreement and is not statutory, and that,
to a larger extent than in France, the functions even of the statutory
works councils are determined by collective agreements (notably
by the decisions of the bilateral committees) as well as by the statute
itself. 421
The collective agreements (decisions of the bilateral committees)
which created employees' representatives do not belong to those
which have been given legal force by royal decree. 422 The Belgian
"employees' representatives" thus resemble British shop stewards
in that they exist praeter legem. The consultative function is reserved to the works councils which so far have been established
only in undertakings with more than I so employees, 423 a figure which
was substituted for the previous figure of 200 by a royal decree of
October, 1958. 424 The employer is a member of the works councils. Detailed information about the development of the undertaking must be furnished at regular intervals, and in undertakings carried on in corporate form this includes furnishing balance sheets,
profit and loss accounts, auditors' reports and the like. 425 There
is no provision for employee representation in the organs of the
stock company, as there is in Germany and in France. Clearly the
consultative functions can be usefully exercised only at the enterprise level, and the name of the works councils ( conseils d' entreprise) appears to indicate that they are intended to operate at that
level. Nevertheless, there is in Belgium a certain amount of doubt
on this point, 426 which is understandable since the works councils
combine with their consultative functions purely social tasks appropriate to the plant rather than to the undertaking, for example,
those dealing with the fixing of annual vacations, the management
of welfare institutions, agreement on works rules, and above all,
the task of ensuring that safety and other protective social legislation is observed. 427 On the other hand, it is the employees' representatives and not the employee members of the works councils who
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

421
Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15, [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663. See Horion, La Representation des Tra<vailleurs sur le plan de l'entreprise en droit Beige, in E.C.S.C. HIGH
AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 155·
422
Horion, supra note 421, at 174.
23
'
I d. at 149.
""'See Second Exrosil para. 129.
""'Horion, supra note 421, at 158 et seq.
426
!d. at 150.
wLaw of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15(d), [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663. See Horion, supra
note 421, at 157.
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are the spokesmen of the employees in the event of grievances, but
they must take care not to usurp the functions of the works
councils. 428
One would expect the employees' representatives to be elected
at plant level, but the General Agreement of I 94 7 speaks in terms
of undertakings. It should be emphasized, however, that this Agreement does not operate automatically, but by virtue of its incorporation in decisions of bilateral committees for particular industries. 429
Incorporation on a large scale has, in fact, been effected and much
detailed regulation is to be found in these individual decisions pursuant to which sub-committees can be formed for individual plants
(as has happened, for example, in the coal mining industry) .430
In Luxembourg the situation is very much simpler than in Belgium. Existing legislation does not provide for any consultation
between management and labor representatives on purely economic
or commercial matters. There are no "works councils" but only
separate "workmen's delegations" (de ligations ouvrieres) and
"salaried employees' delegations" (delegations d' employes), of
which the employer is not, of course, a member. Their tasks 431 are
generally to defend the rights of the workers, to advise on works
rules to be adopted by the employer and to see that they are applied,
to transmit grievances to the employer, to try to settle difficulties, to
participate in the management of welfare institutions, to promote
the employment of disabled persons, to cooperate in the organization of apprenticeships for manual workers, and to assist in the
prevention of accidents and occupational diseases. Although it is
expressly said only with regard to salaried employees, it is clearly
also a function of these delegations to transmit communications of
employer to the workers. Unlike their German counterparts, the
delegations have no right to intervene in the case of dismissals, but
if an employer wishes to dismiss a manual worker without notice he
must inform the delegation of his reasons, and notice must be given
to them of any intended discharge of large numbers of workers, for
example, by reason of contraction of business. 432 All these are obviously functions which can be fully exercised only at plant level.
428

Horion, supra note 421, at ISS, 183.
I d. at 174.
""'Id. at 177.
11
"
Law of June 7, 1937, art. 25, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, I9S8, art.
3, (19s8] Pasin. Lux. S64; Kayser, La Representation des Travail/curs sur le plan de
l'entreprise en droit Luxembourgeois, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note
405, at 307.
'""Decree of Oct. 30, 19s8, art. 20, [I9S8] Pasin. Lux. s64.
429
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The law provides 433 that where an undertaking consists of several
plants, there will be a separate manual workers' and a separate salaried employees' delegation for each plant, but that (in forms which
differ for manual workers and for salaried employees) there can
be central committees for the entire undertaking as well. Manual
workers can have separate representation for each workshop inside a plant provided it contains at least 50 workers, but this appears
to be rarely applied. 434 The entire legislation does not apply to undertakings with less than fifteen employees. 435
The Netherlands legislation on employee representation is of
comparatively recent origin, and is still being gradually introduced.436 It is far less elaborate than that now in force in France and
Belgium, to say nothing of Germany. According to the relevant law
of 1950 each employer who employs at least 25 employees entitled
to vote (that is, who are over 2 I years old and have been employed
in the undertaking for more than one year) must set up a council
( onderneemings-raad). By the beginning of I 9 59 councils had, however, been established in only about one-fifth of the s,ooo undertakings to which the statute is applicable. It was expected that within the
foreseeable future this would increase to one-fourth. 437 In some industries (for example, textiles and banking) the figure is much
higher, and in the metallurgical industries, although only 2 5 percent of the undertakings had councils by the middle of I958, these
employed 74 percent of all metallurgical workers. 438 These councils
are designed to further understanding between labor and management; their tasks are purely deliberative and advisory; and they
have no power of co-determination (not even in purely social questions). Their functions 439 are to transmit grievances to the employer, to consider matters such as vacation rosters, shift work
schemes, and intervals (in so far as they have not been fixed by collective agreement), to see that the agreed conditions of employment
are observed as well as the protective provisions of statutes, and to
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433
Law of June 7, 1937, art. 24, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art.
85, [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. Kayser, supra note 431, at 302 states that the workers'
representation is concentrated in the plant, that of the salaried employees in the enterprise .
.,,. Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 4, [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564.
"'"Law of June 7, 1937, art. 24, [1937] Pasin. Lux. 119; Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art.
1, [19'8] Pasin. Lux. 564 .
..,. Molenaar, La Representation des Travailleurs sur le plan de l'entre prise en droit
Neer/andais, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 331.
031
FORTAN!ER & YERAART, ARBEITSRECHT 142 ( 1959 ).
488
Molenaar, supra note 436.
439
Law of May 4, 1950, art. 6, para. 2, [1950] Stb. K174 (Neth.) ; Molenaar, supra
note 436, at 329.
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inspect safety installations, canteens and the like, and also to suggest technical and other improvements. Like the French works councils (comites d' entreprises) they have one function which is more
than deliberative-to participate in the management of welfare
arrangements. Moreover, the employer, who is a member and chairman of the council, is under a duty to furnish the necessary information, to keep the council informed about the commercial situation of the undertaking, and to consult it before issuing works rules.
Although the relevant legislation is not explicit on the point, these
councils are apparently on principle designed to operate at the level
of the undertaking, but one provision seems to make it possible to
create a special council for each plant. 440 The councils are part of
the general organization of the Dutch economy provided for by the
legislation of 1950, under which undertakings are grouped both
vertically and horizontally, and organized by law to further their
mutual interests. Each "horizontal" group has a committee, consisting of equal numbers of employer and employee representatives,
which supervises the establishment and operation of the works councils, the idea being that an employer should be induced to create
these councils by persuasion and not by penal sanctions. 441
The structure and functions of the existing Italian system of employee representation, like those of the corresponding institutions in
Germany, can only be understood against the background of the
complex political and social history of the country. Although Article 46 of the Constitution of 194 7 provides for legislation dealing
with the cooperation of employer and employees in the management
of enterprises, no such law has been enacted. Of the far-reaching attempts to achieve participation of workers in management which
have from time to time played a dominant role in the political history of Italy in this century, only a few vestiges remain-such as
the councils of management of the Olivetti works at Ivrea and elsewhere,442 and certain experimental agreements between the Confederation of Christian Trade Unions and a number of employers
establishing mixed committees to consider the raising of productivity.443 Such general arrangements as exist serve mainly social and
not economic purposes, that is, the enforcement of collective agreements and protective legislation, the ventilation and settlement of
440

Molenaar, supra note 436, at 326.
'''/d. at 322.
442
Mengoni, La Representation des Travailleurs sur le plan de !'en/reprise en droit
/ta/ien, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 268.
448
/d. at 270.
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grievances, the formulation of works rules in cooperation with the
employer, the regulation of vacation rosters, methods of wage
payments, working hours and shift work, the management of welfare schemes, and, in certain very narrowly defined limits, the settlement of conflicts arising from dismissals and lay-offs. 444 These are
the matters with which the works committees ( commissioni interne)
are principally concerned. They are clearly subjects to be dealt with
at the plant level, and so are technical or organizational improvements suggested by workers and their transmission to the employer.445 The relevant provision in the Collective Agreement of
1953 has to be interpreted as envisaging a committee for each plant,
branch, or office which is "autonomous," that is, which has some independence as a technical and organizational unit. This Agreement
(and its amendments) apply to industry only, and only to those undertakings which are members of the General Confederation of Industry-to which most larger and medium-sized enterprises in fact
belong. Those which do not belong nevertheless observe the Agreement.446 A separate Agreement of October 23, 1950, applies to
purely commercial undertakings. 447 In industry, committees are provided for plants with more than 40 employees; for those with fewer
than 40 and more than five there is an individual "delegate." 448
It must be clear to an American observer that the great importance of these representative institutions in the Six results partly
from the fact that collective bargaining takes place at industry and
not at plant level. This makes it necessary to have "on-the-spot"
representative organs which can fit the provisions of the general collective agreement to the needs of the individual plants.
This relationship between collective bargaining and representation at plant level has important practical consequences. These committees and councils are legally not organs of the unions (with the
possible exception of the Belgian employees' delegates). This legal
independence from the unions exists even where, as in France, the
unions have a limited power to demand their "recall." 449 Whatever
their legal position, however, workers' representatives are bound in
fact often to be very closely connected with the unions.
The German statute 450 expresses a principle which is inherent in
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

'"'I d. at 284.
""Id. at 280.
""Id. at 272.
mId. at 271.
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I d. at 274.
••• Durand, supra note 417, at 215.
,.., Law of Oct. II, 1952, para. 49, [1952] BGBI. I, 681 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
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the legislation of all the six countries where it states that the employer and the works council are to collaborate "within the framework of the existing collective agreements and in cooperation with
the trade unions and employers' associations represented in the
plant." Collective agreements have priority over any agreements
the works council may make with the employer. The law of "plant
agreements" (Betriebsvereinbarungen) is particularly developed
in Germany and very complicated. On some topics such agreements
must, on others they may, be made, and an elaborate arbitration
mechanism is provided in case of failure of agreement. 451 But plant
agreements must always be subordinate to collective agreements to
which unions are a party, and in this connection it is useful to emphasize the difference between, on the one hand, an agreement between a works council (or other representative organ at plant level)
and the employer, and on the other hand a collective agreement for
a single plant (accord d' hablissement). In Germany the distinction
is relevant among other reasons because, in the event of disagreement between management and works council about the compulsory
plant agreement (concerning the beginning and end of the working
day, intervals, vacation rosters, apprenticeship, administration of
welfare schemes confined to plant or enterprise, discipline, piece
rates, time and place of wage payments, principles and new methods
of wage payments) arbitration is compulsory, 452 whereas arbitration between trade unions and employers and their associations is
entirely voluntary. In Germany, as well as in Belgium, Italy, and the
Netherlands, the representatives at enterprise or plant level have
expressly been given the task of watching over the enforcement of
collective agreements and of the provisions of protective legislation.453 Moreover, the works rules or reglement interieur must
either, as in Germany and in Belgium, 454 be agreed to by the employer and the works council or other representation, or, as in
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, be issued after
consultation between these parties.455
All the representative bodies here referred to-with the excep451

4152
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I d. paras. so, 56, 57·
I d. para. s6.

E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 109, 182, 281, 329.
Germany: Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. n, 1952, para. 56, [1952] BGBI.
I, 681; Belgium: Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 15(d), [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663.
'"' E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 405, at 230, 283, 307; Molenaar,
Rapport Recapitulatif sur les sources du droit du travail, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY,
ETUDE COMPARATIVE DES SOURCES DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL DANS LES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 42
(1957)·
454
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tion of the Belgian employees' representatives-are elected by the
employees in the plant or enterprise, and in Germany and Italy, as
also in Belgium in the larger undertakings, manual workers and
salaried employees vote for separate lists. 456 In F ranee there is a
separate list for certain supervisory and higher technical personnel.457 Clearly, whether the law says so or not, the competing lists
of candidates are frequently those put up by rival trade unions, but
the desire, for example, of the French trade unions, to exercise a
right of "direct appointment" has not been realized.
Members of the representative bodies will frequently be the most
active trade unionists in the enterprise. Hence the great importance
of the provisions which, in order to protect them from being victimized by the employer, restrict his right to dismiss any of them except for misconduct or with the consent of the works council or of
the workers' delegation itself, or of some outside body. In Germany 458 the employer cannot dismiss any member of a works council except if he is entitled to dismiss the member without notice by
reason of his misconduct or on any other ground which, according
to the provisions of the Industrial Code, the Commercial Code, or
the Civil Code enables the employer to discharge a worker without
giving notice. 459 Moreover, a member of a works council can be dismissed in the event of closure of a plant or of a division of a plant
if it is impossible to transfer the works council member to another
division. The employer may not take action in any form which hinders the members of the works council in the exercise of their functions or affects them to their advantage or to their detriment. 460
To some extent the purpose and effect of these provisions and of
similar provisions in others of the Six are comparable to those of
American statutes directed at certain kinds of unfair labor practices.
In France 461 the contract of employment of a works council member
cannot be terminated by the employer without the consent of the
council or, in the alternative, that of the labor inspector, and similarly no employees' representative can be discharged except under
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... E. C. S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. suPra note 405, at 104, 153, 274· Luxembourg is
the only member of the Community to have not only separate lists but also separate
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"' Durand, supra note 417, at 216 .
... Law on Protection in the Event of Dismissals (Kuendigungs-Schutzgesetz), Aug.
10, 1951, para. 13, [1951] BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
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'
Ordonnance of Feb. 22, 1945, art. 22, [1945] J.O. 954 (Fr.). For details, see
Durand, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 214 (1958).
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those conditions. The protection in France against discrimination
by the employer of members of councils, of employees' representatives, of candidates for one of these offices and of former office
holders was strengthened by a recent Decree of January 7, I 9 59. 462
Belgian law 463 is similar to German law, except that the employer
cannot dismiss a member of, or candidate for office in, a works council in cases other than those justifying instantaneous dismissal, unless there are "economic or technical" grounds for the termination
of the contract, recognized in advance as such by the bilateral committee. The employees' representatives are, in fact, also protected
by the collective agreements.
In Luxembourg 464 no member of a workmen's delegation can be
dismissed except for reasons justifying instantaneous dismissal or
with the consent of the delegation itself. In Italy 465 the members of
the "internal committees" are protected against discharge by a series
of complicated provisions in the Collective Agreement of 1953.
Normally the employer requires the consent of the relevant trade
union, and if this is withheld, as frequently happens, the matter is
settled by an arbitration tribunal which declares the discharge to be
void if it is found to be due to the representative activities of the
employee. In the Netherlands 466 such protection as exists would
appear to depend on the autonomous rules which the works councils themselves have power to adopt.
In all the six countries countervailing obligations are imposed on
the members of works councils and on employees' representatives.
These duties are mainly of two kinds: they must not interfere with
the powers of management to any larger extent than the law provides, and they are under strict duties of secrecy with regard to such
technical or commercial information as they obtain in their official
capacity.
This is only a bird's-eye view of workers' representation in the
six countries, since the details of the law are complicated and could
not be discussed. In order to understand fully the social significance
462
See Second EXPOSE, para. 53· The protection was, on the Belgian pattern, extended
to candidates and former members.
463
Law of Sept. 20, 1948, art. 21, [1948] Pasinomie Beige 663; Horion, in E.C.S.C.
HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA
C.E.C.A. I67 (1958).
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.. Decree of Oct. 30, 1958, art. 22, para. 4, [1958] Pasin. Lux 564.
465
Collective Agreement of May 8, 1953, art. 14, in I CONTRATTI CONFEDERALI DI
LAVORO NELL'INDUSTRIA ITALIAN A ( 1955); Mengoni, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY,
LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES MEMBRES PAYS DE LA C.E.C.A. 277-78 (1958).
486
Molenaar, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT
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of these institutions and also of collective bargaining it is necessary
to glance at the settlement of conflicts in the six countries.

D.

SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS

407

One of the outstanding legal characteristics of labor relations on
the Continent when compared with those in the United States is, as
has been suggested, the importance of the role of legislation in
creating rights and obligations of employers and employees. A similar observation can be made about the judicial function of the state
and about litigation. Litigation in the courts between individual employers and employees on matters such as wages and the legality of
dismissals is a common occurrence, and in many cases the courts determine the meaning of terms of collective agreements where such
terms have been incorporated in individual contracts of employment.
Litigation in the courts takes the place which, in broad areas of
American industry, is occupied by grievance arbitration. Arbitration
itself is very important in at least some Continental countries but,
generally speaking, it is arbitration between unions and employers'
associations concerning collective terms to be adopted for the future.
To appreciate the significance of litigation one should bear in
mind a number of facts which are not obvious. In the first place, it
is customary on the Continent to draw a sharp distinction between
"collective conflicts" and "individual conflicts," a distinction which
also exists, of course, in America and in Britain but is not nearly as
important there as, say, in Germany or in France. The distinction is
very clearly defined in a recent article by Professor Paul Durand of
the University of Paris:
Fundamentally, the collective industrial dispute differs
from the individual dispute in two respects. It presupposes
in the first place the intervention of a group, which may
be either a legally recognized group (such as a trade
union) or simply a de facto group consisting of an unorganized majority of employees. But this first feature does
not suffice of itself, for in that case the distinction between
individual disputes and collective disputes would depend
exclusively on the initiative of the group. A second condition is required: the existence of a collective interest. The
dispute will be a collective one if it involves a question of
467
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principle, the settlement of which affects the legal status
of the different members of the group. It will also have
this character if a common interest is at stake, e.g., free·
dom of opinion, trade union freedom, representation of
the staff in the enterprise, or recourse to strike action, even
though the settlement of the dispute may affect the legal
status of only one employee. The dismissal of an employee
on the ground of his membership of a trade union can give
rise to a collective dispute, because the attack on the "right
to organize" endangers a prerogative of workers as a
whole. 468
The mere fact that in a case of allegedly unlawful or abusive dismissal, for example, the trade union takes up the cudgels on behalf
of one of its members and that a union official negotiates with the
employer and, if necessary, acts for the member in court, does not
make the dispute a "collective conflict." The distinction is especially
important in countries such as France, Belgium, and Luxembourg,
where special courts deal with individual disputes, whereas collec·
tive disputes, in so far as they can go before any courts at all, are
dealt with by the ordinary courts. Many of those cases which in
the United States concern, for example, seniority issues in grievance
arbitration proceedings would, by French or German lawyers, be
characterized as individual disputes, although the employee may be
represented by his union. The distinction is vital in view of the procedural differences which are involved.
The second point which one should bear in mind when considering the significance of litigation is that, by and large, it is very much
simpler and cheaper than in America, and that people resort to the
courts with little hesitation. This is true quite generally, but especially in labor matters in those countries among the Six-France,
Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg-in which special labor courts
exist. These labor courts are tribunals provided by the state for the
adjudication of conflicts between employers and employees in proceedings which are speedy and inexpensive and in which the tribunal
makes special efforts to induce the parties to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Such tribunals have existed on the Continent for over
I
years, having been first introduced by Napoleon. No attempt
will be made to describe in any detail the composition and functioning of these labor courts. In France, Belgium, and Luxembourg they
are called conseils des prud' hommes and they are organized in France

so
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pursuant to Book IV of the Labor Code, in Belgium pursuant to
a law of 1926, 470 and in Luxembourg to a Decree of 1938. 471 In
Western Germany they are called Arbeits gerichte and governed by
a law of 1953 472 which, like the legislation in France and Belgium,
has taken the place of older statutes.
There are important differences between the various types of
labor courts. Thus in Germany, but not in France or in Belgium, the
whole country is covered by a network of these courts. In Germany
each court when sitting consists of a chairman who is a lawyer and
normally a judge 473 and one employer and one employee representative taken from panels nominated by the organizations on both
sides. 474 In France and in Belgium the court consists of an equal number of employees and employers, 475 and the chair is taken alternatively by a member of the employer and by a member of the employee group. 476 They are elected-one of the few examples of
elected judges in Europe. 477 In Germany and in France they have
jurisdiction over both manual workers and salaried employees, but,
whereas in Germany jurisdiction extends to all contracts of employment irrespective of the amount of the salary, excluding completely
that of the ordinary courts the conseils des prud'hommes in France
have exclusive jurisdiction only over contracts of employment of
the less highly paid employees. In the case of employees at the higher
levels, their jurisdiction is concurrent with that of ordinary courtsY~
The right of appeal is restricted in both countries to cases involving
more than a minimum amount. 479 In France the appeal is heard by
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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469
For discussions of the law, see: 2 DURAND paras. 502-30; BRUN & GALLAND,
DROIT DU TRAVAIL pt. I, paras. 96-n2, at 126-46 (I958).
470
Loi organique des conseils de Prud'hommes, July 9, I926, [I926] I Recueil des
Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique I4I4i amended by Law of Mar. I8, 1950, [1950] I
Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 634.
471
Decree of Dec. 3I, I938, [I938) Pasin. Lux. 571.
472
Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, [I953] BGBI. I, 1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.); for
a detailed commentary: DIETZ & NIKISCH, ARBEITSGERICHTSGESETZ (I954).
mLaw on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, para. I8(3), [I953] BGBI. I, I267 (Ger.
Fed. Rep.). The labor courts are organized by the Ministries of Labor of the Lander
which cooperate with the Ministries of Justice. Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953,
para. 14, id.
474
I d. paras. zo-23.
475
See notes 469 and 470 supra. France: CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, Art. 6. In Belgium
there is also an "assesseur juridique" who votes in certain cases: Art. 26 of the law
quoted in Note 470.
476
CODE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, art. IO.
477
CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. IV, arts. 7, 22-35· This applies also to Belgium.
408
Contrast Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, I953, para. 2, [I953] BGBI. I, 1267 (Ger.
Fed. Rep.) with CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, art. 8o, (Fr.).
m France: CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, arts. 80 et seq. (for details: BRUN. & GALLAND,
op. cit. supra note 469, at I44 et seq.). Germany: Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953,
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the ordinary courts, 480 but in Germany there is a Labor Court of
Appeal and, in the last resort, a Federal Labor Court. 481 The jurisdiction of the German labor courts is in some respects wider than
that of the conseils des prud'hommes. 482
No such tribunals exist at the moment in Italy, although there are
some special provisions to be applied by the ordinary courts when
dealing with labor matters. 483 Nor do they exist in the Netherlands,
although a similar function is exercised by a Dutch administrative
tribunal, the ontslagcommissie or "discharge committee" consisting
of one employer, one employee, and two officials, which must decide
whether the official consent required in the case of each discharge of
an employee, otherwise than for urgent reasons or by agreement,
should be given or withheld. 484
The frequency of litigation in most of the six countries is partly
explained by the existence and accessibility in most of them of inexpensive and expert tribunals. The parallel between their social
function and that of grievance arbitration in America is also suggested by the fact that in many cases the employee, who is normally
the plaintiff, will be assisted or represented by an official of his union, while the employer's case will often be presented by an official
of his employers' association. But the courts are, of course, open to
the unorganized on both sides as well as to organization members.
One would expect the interpretation of collective agreements to
be a principal activity of these labor courts, and this is true, especially in Germany. The terms of collective agreements become
terms of the relevant contracts of employment and a dispute conpara. 64, [1953] BGBI. I, at 1267 (for details: DIETZ & NIKISCH, op. cit. supra note 472,
at 458 et seq.).
'"'Contrast Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, para. 64, [1953] BGBI. I, at 1267
(Ger. Fed. Rep.) with CoDE DU TRAVAIL bk. IV, art. 83 (Fr.). In Belgium there is a
labor appeal court ( conseil des prud'hommes d'appel).
81
'
Appeal from the Labor Courts of Appeal (in exceptional cases from the Labor
Courts directly) to the Federal Labor Court in Kassel only on points of law. Law on
Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, paras. 72, 76, [1953] BGBI. I, 1267. For the special procedure concerning matters arising from the creation, operation, etc. of works' councils,
see paras. 8o-wo of the Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, id.
""'Especially because it comprises disputes arising between parties to collective
agreements as such, and also certain disputes between employees and certain delictual
claims: Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, para. 2(1) Nos. I and 3, [1953] BGBI. I,
1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
83
'
Aranguren, La Disciplina Collettiva delle Controversie di Lavoro, in I RAPPORT!
COLLEITIVI DI LAVORO 175 (1959).
'"'This arises under the Extraordinary Decree of 1945 under which the contract
of employment cannot be terminated either by the employer or by the employee without
the consent of the Labor Office. See FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. suPra note 437, at 58.
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cerning the meaning of any of these terms may arise between the
individual employer and employee and thus come before the court.
Disputes may, however, also arise between the parties to a collective
agreement, that is, between a union and an employer or employers'
association, or-in France-between an organization on either side
and an organization member on the other. Such disputes are heard
by ordinary courts in all Member States except Germany where the
jurisdiction of the Labor Courts, sitting with two representative
members of each side, extends to collective disputes on existing
rights. 485
All that has been said so far refers exclusively to disputes about
existing rights, including collective disputes concerning the interpretation of collective agreements or concerning, for example, such
matters as an alleged breach of a collective agreement by a trade
union in calling a strike or by an employers' association in failing to
use all available means to induce its members to observe the terms of
the agreement. As in the United States, but perhaps with even
greater emphasis, a distinction is made everywhere on the Continent
between disputes over existing rights (con flits d' ordre juridique,
Rechts-Streitigkeiten) and disputes over future rights, that is, "conflicts of interest" ( conflits d' ordre iconomique, I nteressenstreitigkeiten). Examples of disputes over future rights are disputes about
demands for wage increases or other matters concerned with the
making of new, or the modification of existing, collective agreements. The need for keeping this distinction clearly in mind in attempting to understand the conciliation, fact-finding, and arbitration in the various European countries is especially great in view of
the ambiguity of the word "arbitration." "Arbitration" covers both
types of conflict, and, indeed is used indiscriminately in the United
States to designate totally different proceedings-grievance "arbitration" on the one hand, and "voluntary arbitration and compulsory arbitration as procedures for the settlement of labor controversies arising in the course of collective negotiation" 486 on the
other.
Although the distinction is made in all the six countries, it has a
different practical significance in Germany, where labor courts deal
with all conflicts of right even if they are of a collective character,487 than it does elsewhere. In France, Belgium, and Luxem485Law on Labor Courts, Sept. 3, 1953, paras. 2(1) No. I, 16(2), [1953] BGBI. I,
1267 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
480
HANDLER & HAYS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 323 (3rd ed. 1959).
'" See note 48 5 supra.
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bourg
purely interpretive conflicts, that is, disputes about the
meaning of collective terms and their application which arise between the parties to the agreement, do not go to the courts at all, but
in France suits for injunctions or claims for damages by reason of
breaches of a collective contract (for example, in the event of a
strike) go to the ordinary courts. 489 In the Netherlands 490 and also
in Italy 491-although this is not absolutely clear in view of the uncertain state of the law-collective disputes as well as individual
disputes of a legal character belong to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, there being neither a statutory system of arbitration nor
a system of special labor courts.
The three methods of dispute settlement which have been developed in the United States and in Britain-conciliation, fact-finding (inquiry) and arbitration-are represented in the Six. Although
they differ very much from country to country, certain tendencies
are clearly discernible everywhere.
One is the preference for settlement machinery created by collective bargaining to that created by statute: In Italy there were
at the time this was written no statutory conciliation or arbitration
schemes, but, partly by ordinary collective agreements and partly by
agreements between top organizations ( accordi interconfederali),
schemes for conciliation and arbitration of disputes have been developed by the two sides of industry themselves. 492 In Germany
there are provisions for arbitration, and to an extent also for conciliation, in the Control Council Law of 1946 493 which is still in
force, and in a number of statutes of the individual states (Lander) .494 More significant, however, is the Model Arbitration Agreement adopted by the top organizations in 19 54, 495 which has been
incorporated in collective agreements in a number of industries. In
488
France & Belgium: Durand, suPra note 468, at 547; Luxembourg: Decree of Oct.
6, 1945, art. 27, [1945] Pasin. Lux. 540. As regards France, see however: 3 DURAND
para. 2I 5, at 607.
489
France: 3 DuRAND para. 216, at 6o8-1o. In Belgium the question does not seem
to have arisen (Horion, supra note 259, at 14) but if it arose, the ordinary courts
would presumably have jurisdiction. This would also appear to be the case in Luxembourg. For Belgium, see 2 GEYSEN, DROIT SoCIAL no. 1069, at 258 ( 1953).
400
STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, GEWERKSCHAFTEN UND FRAGEN DES KOLLEKT!VEN ARBEITSRECHTS 123 ( 1957) ; Levenbach, supra note 360, at u-12.
491
See Aranguren, supra note 483.
492
Aranguren, supra note 483, at 245.
493
Control Council Law No. 35 of Aug. zo, 1946, [1946] No. 10 Official Gazette of
the Control Council for Germany 174.
494
See NIPPERDEY, ARBEITSRECHT 5th ed. nos. 521, 524. (Baden, Rhineland-Palatinate)
(1958).
406
Printed in 7 RECHT DER ARBEIT 383 (1954).
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the metal industry, which is the most important of all, it has now,
however, been terminated by the union as a result of a decision of
the Federal Labor Court of October 1958 in which the Court interpreted the Agreement in a manner to which the unions took exception.
In the Netherlands the functions exercised elsewhere by conciliation and arbitration arrangements are to a large extent fulfilled by
the Council of Mediators. The Council is, as already pointed out,
a statutory institution, but it cooperates so closely with the organizations on both sides as they are combined in the Foundation of
Labor that it is hard to say whether its social function (as distinguished from its legal structure) more nearly resembles that of
an autonomous or a statutory institution. The Council has completely pushed the conciliation machinery established by a law of
1923 into the background, but arbitration based on collective agreements continues to be important. 496
In Belgium the effective machinery for the settlement of disputes
is that of the bilateral committees. A law of 1948 has even entrusted
to them the implementation of certain emergency measures. Older
legislation on conciliation by government officials, passed in 1926
and amended in 1929 and 1932, has lost its· importance, but the conciliation powers of labor inspectors and other similar officials, based
on legislation of 194 5, are still exercised. 497 In Luxembourg the
existing compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration scheme
is based on the Decree of I 94 5 498 and is given effect by the National
Conciliation Office. Inside the Office, however, settlement is handled
by a bilateral committee so that despite the statutory framework,
settlement is not by governmental organs but by cooperation of
labor and management. Preference for autonomous as compared
with governmental action in conflict settlement has, in sum, become
a developing principle of "European" scope.
Nor is this statement invalidated by the structure of the French
system, despite first appearances. The law of 1950 499 provides for
compulsory conciliation and voluntary arbitration, but this has been
largely a failure. On the other hand it is generally agreed that conLABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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Law of May 4, 1923, [1923] Stb. No. 182 (Neth.); Law of Apr. 7, 1933, [1933]
Stb. No. 160 (Neth.) (see Fournier, Pays-Bas, in GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN & PETIT, op. cit.
supra note 467, at 237) j STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op, cit. supra note 490, at 124j
Levenbach, ·supra note 360, at I I •
.., Seeuws & Fournier, Belgique, in GRUNEBAUM-BALLIN & PETIT, op. cit. supra note
467, at 48-50 j STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 490, at 103-o5.
498
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, [1945] Pasin. Lux 540•
... Law of Feb. u, 1950, arts.
9, 10, [1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.).
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ciliation procedures based on collective bargaining were much more
successful. This may, it is true, be partly due to the fact that the
courts stigmatized strikes in violation of an agreed conciliation
procedure as illegal but did not enforce statutory provisions concerning compulsory conciliation in the same way. Nonetheless it
appears also to indicate the greater vitality of agreed procedures. 500
Moreover, the great reform of French settlement procedure inaugurated in 1957 501 with the introduction of proceedings modelled
on American "fact-finding" machinery was the result of previous
experience with similar arrangements under collective agreements. 502
Another important aspect of settlement procedures which seems
to have developed in the countries of the Community is a general
aversion to compulsory proceedings. Even where conciliation, factfinding (inquiry) or arbitration is carried out by statutory organs, it
is generally voluntary. With the minor exception of compulsory
arbitration of certain disputes concerning "plant agreements" between employers and works councils in Germany and, much more
conspicuously, of the powers of the Councils of Mediators in the
Netherlands, the recommendations of conciliators, reports of investigators, and awards of industrial arbitrators in the Six have no
compulsory effect except where they have been accepted by both
sides either in advance or after the fact. In at least two of the Member Countries, in France and in Germany, compulsory arbitration
was a decisive feature of labor law for several years between the
Wars (to say nothing of Fascist Italy and its Magistratura di
Lavoro). It has been abandoned because of its adverse effect on collective bargaining.
On the other hand, in some countries, and especially France, proceedings are "compulsory"-at least according to the letter of the
law-in the sense that the authority seeking a settlement may intervene on the application of either side without the consent of the
other and the latter is under a legal duty to participate in the proceedings. In this sense conciliation has been compulsory in France
since the decisive statute of r 9 50, as it is in Luxembourg. Because
they lacked sanctions, these provisions of the French statute proved
quite ineffective, and they have now been replaced by the very much
more elaborate and effective provisions of the Law of July 1957·
This law is of great practical importance and of special interest to
600

BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 469, at 936-40.
Law of July z6, 1957, [1957] J.O. 7459 (Fr.), discussed in detail by Durand, supra
note 468.
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BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit. supra note 469, at 943·
501

LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

Americans because its model was the "fact-finding" provisions of
American federallegislation. 503 In its social function, if not its legal
structure, it is perhaps the nearest European equivalent of the obligation to bargain in good faith with which American lawyers are
familiar. Under the Law of July 1957 conciliation has remained
compulsory, but this fact has quite a different significance under
this new statute. All collective agreements must provide for the
conciliation of disputes arising between the parties, whereas hitherto
this was only required in those agreements which were to be "extended." 504 Furthermore, within one month after a dispute has
arisen, the matter must be taken before either an agreed conciliation
committee, or in the absence of agreement before the competent
regional, or before the national conciliation committee, consisting of
an equal number (a maximum of three) of delegates from the "most
representative" organizations on either side and up to three representatives of the public authorities under the chairmanship of the
Minister of Labor or a Divisional Labor lnspector. 505 The proceedings can be initiated ex officio by the Minister of Labor, the
prefect, or the directors of the Labor Inspection Service, 506 but the
authorities are somewhat reluctant to make use of this power.
Normally, therefore, the proceedings will be set in motion by either
side to the dispute, but regardless of how they originate, a party
who has been summoned to appear before an agreed or statutory
conciliation committee and fails to do so can be fined. This means
that the party must appear in person and, if a corporate body, must
be represented by someone in a managerial position who is empowered to negotiate and conclude an agreement.
This is a large measure of "compulsion," but under the new law
of 1957, as under the old one of 1950, a strike or lockout in defiance of the compulsory conciliation provisions is not for that reason
alone illegal. On the other hand, it is illegal if it violated a conciliation agreement, which may mean inter alia that participation in the
strike constitutes "serious misconduct" (faute lour de) which under
the relevant provision of the statute of 1950, 507 enables the employer to terminate the contracts of employment with the strikers.
""'Durand, supra note 468.
604
!d. at 552.
"""/d. at 562.
606
/d. at 579-81.
607
Law of Feb. 11, 1950, art. 4, [1950] J.O. 1688 (Fr.) : "La greve ne rompt pas le
contrat de travail, sauf faute lourde imputable au salarie. ("A strike does not terminate the contract of employment, in the absence of serious misconduct on the part of
the employee.")
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If the conciliation procedure is successful, the resulting "conciliation
agreement" is the equivalent of a collective agreement. 508 If it fails,
"mediation," that is, "fact-finding" proceedings, can be set in motion either by the chairman of the conciliation committee before
which the proceedings have taken place or by the Minister of Labor.
They are not, however, available where the dispute is about existing
rights. 509 These fact-finding proceedings on the American model
constitute the great innovation of 1957 in French law and may provide a pattern for similar legislation elsewhere in Europe. The
difference between the powers of the mediator, who is appointed
from a panel of names maintained by the Ministry of Labor, and
those of a conciliator is that the mediator, in addition to making a
further attempt at conciliation, formulates a recommendation based
on a systematic analysis of the facts. 510 This recommendation is not
only submitted to the parties but published, the idea being to mobilize public opinion in favor of a settlement of the dispute. According
to the most competent French authors, 511 the British experience in
dispute settlement has been repeated in France-the sanction of
public opinion proving far more effective in settling conflicts than
compulsory arbitration and the threat of legal penalties or damages.
In fact, one gains the impression that arbitration plays a very minor
role in France. The French law of 1957 is much the most interesting
recent development within the countries of the Community in the
general field of the law governing dispute settlement.
The German statutory arbitration schemes of the Control Council Law of r 946 and of the still surviving Lander legislation, are,
as has been pointed out, less important than those based on the TopOrganization Agreement of 1954 and its Model Arbitration Code.
The significance of what was said above about the "contractual"
function of collective agreements and the so-called "peace obligation" here becomes apparent. Once an obligation to refrain, until the
termination of the agreed arbitration proceedings, from "hostile
action" ( Kampfmassnahmen) has been written into a collective
agreement, both sides are under stringent and legally enforceable
obligations. Judgments awarding possibly heavy damages and the
008

I d. art. 16.
Durand, supra note 468, at 578, emphasizes the contrast in this respect between
art. 15 of the French Law of 1957 and the American attitude which does not exclude
from "fact-finding" proceedings questions "turning on the interpretation or violation
of a legal provision."
510
Durand, supra note 468, at 584-86.
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/d. at 594; BRUN & GALLAND, op. cit, supra note 469, at 947-48.
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equivalent of injunctions threaten an employers' organization, an
individual employer, or a union refusing to participate in arbitration proceedings, or one who initiates or (as the Federal Labor
Court has now held) 512 even prepares a lockout or strike. How
long this very serious restriction of the freedom to strike will be
tolerated by the German trade unions is difficult to guess. The contrast between the strength of the legal sanctions in Germany and the
French tendency under the new law of 1957 to rely chiefly on the
influence of public opinion is clear, but it should not be overlooked
that the German sanctions operate only where arbitration is based
on a collective agreement. Another feature which distinguishes the
German from the French (and also from the Luxembourg) 513 system of promoting industrial peace is the absence in Germany of a
clear distinction between the functions of conciliation and arbitration-arbitration agencies are expected to perform the function of
conciliators as well. 514
This merger of conciliation and arbitration functions is also characteristic of Belgium, the bilateral committees exercising both functions. Labor inspectors, on the ·other hand, act only as conciliators
and, if their efforts fail, they submit the case to the competent bilateral committee, 515 which may and often does act in such cases
through a conciliation sub-committee. Like the French "mediation"
of conflicts this Belgian procedure cannot be used to settle disputes
concerning existing rights. The parties may, of course, agree to accept the recommendation of the sub-committee. If they do not, the
settlement recommendation may be incorporated in minutes which
are deposited at the Ministry of Labor. The Belgian procedure is
singularly free from elements of compulsion and, unlike that in
France, does not even compel the parties to participate in the proceedings. Belgian industry is, however, strongly organized on both
sides and the autonomous forces of industry presumably exercise a
strong pressure in favor of settlements. In a decree of March
1946 516 the Belgian legislator made a highly original and interesting contribution to these efforts. This decree provides that, if an
employer does not avail himself of the existing arrangements for
610

Judgment of Oct. 31, 1958, 6 BArbG 321 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
Decree of Oct. 6, 1945, arts. 9, 18, [1945] Pasin. Lux 540.
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a settlement, the strikers can be treated as involuntarily unemployed
for the purposes of unemployment insurance which in effect means
that a recalcitrant employer is threatened with a governmentfinanced strike. By the same token workers can be deprived of unemployment benefit for six months if settlement fails through their
fault or through that of the union of which they are members.
In the Netherlands the functions of conciliation and, in so far
as this term can be used at all, of arbitration are mainly concentrated in the Council of Mediators to which frequent reference has
already been made.
In Italy, in addition to conciliation effected pursuant to collective
agreements and to agreements between top organizations, conciliation functions are exercised informally-but apparently on a large
scale-by the Ministry of Labor and its offices in the provinces, the
labor administration having been re-constituted after the war by a
decree of 1948. Like so much else which has been said about Italy,
this situation may sooner or later be changed by legislation. 517
E. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES IN THE
EvENT oF DisMISSAL

No American lawyer familiar with seniority arrangements in the
United States needs any special reminder of the profound importance of security of tenure in contemporary industry. This idea has
taken deep roots all over Europe. The job is the basis of the worker's livelihood, and the law cannot allow him to be deprived of it
unfairly and without just compensation any more than it can tolerate
the arbitrary expropriation of the property of a farmer or of a
businessman. The least that can be done for the worker is to ensure
that he is given due notice, just as it should be incumbent on him to
give due notice to the employer before quitting his job.
Generally speaking the idea of the arbitrary right to "hire and
fire" has, all over Europe, given way to what the French call the
principle of "stability of employment" or job security. The subject
has recently been analyzed, and the legislations of the Six have been
compared, in a volume published by the High Authority of the CoalSteel Community 518 to which the present writer is much indebted
and to which reference is made for further details.
017
STEINMANN-GOLDSCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 490, at 141.
""'LA STABILITE DE L'EMPLOI DANS LE DROIT DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA C.E.C.A. (1958),
being volume two of the publications on labor law under the auspices of the High
Authority of the E.C.S.C.
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I. PERIODS OF NOTICE

In Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, and, with regard to
salaried employees, in Italy and in Luxembourg, periods of notice
are fixed by statute. In France (one recently introduced exception
apart), and, with regard to manual workers, in Italy and Luxembourg, they are fixed by collective agreement, and failing this, by
usage. There is no general doctrine as there is in English law to the
effect that "reasonable" notice must be given, nor have the courts a
power to fix the time of notice, except in Belgium with regard to the
most highly paid salaried employees and in the absence of a contract.519
According to German law 520 the period of notice is two weeks for
industrial manual workers, but this may be extended or shortened
by agreement, including a collective agreement, provided that the
periods to be observed by the employer and by the worker are identical. For clerical 521 as well as technical 522 salaried employees the
period of notice is six weeks, and notice can only be given so as to
terminate the contract at the end of a quarter, that is, on March
31, June 30, and so forth. This, too, can be altered by contract, provided that the period of notice is not less than one month and that
the contract can by its terms only be terminated at the end of a
month, for example, on January 31, February 28, or March 31.
Special provisions relate to apprentices, 523 and particular industries 524 and where neither the provisions of the Industrial Code nor
those of the Commercial Code apply (for example, in the professions), the general provisions of the Civil Code supply a subsidiary
rule. 525 Special provisions also apply to the most highly paid employees.526 Salaried employees are in all undertakings employing
more than two people (not including apprentices) entitled to at
least three months' notice terminating the contract at the end of a
quarter, if they have been employed in the enterprise for at least
five years 527 (but only years after the employee's 2 sth birthday are
taken into account). After eight years' employment the period of
519

See Horion, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 127.
GEWERBEORDNUNG [hereinafter cited as GEw0] para. 122 (Ger.).
HANDELSGESETZBUCH [hereinafter cited as HGB] para. 67 (Ger.).
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GEwO para. 133a.
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E.g., GEwO para. 127h.
""'Boldt, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 73-74.
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BGB paras. 62o-25.
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E.g., GEwO para. 133ab; HGB para. 68.
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Law on the Period of Notice for Salaried Employees, July 9, 1926, [1926] Reichsgesetzblatt I, 399 (Ger.).
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notice is four months; after I o years, five; and after I 2 years, six
months. These seniority provisions do not, however, affect the period of notice to which the employer is entitled.
In Belgium as in Germany the periods of notice for salaried employees differ from those for manual workers. Manual workers 528
are entitled to two weeks' and must give one week's notice, the period
to begin running on the Monday after the day the notice is given, but
these periods are doubled for those who have been employed in the
enterprise without interruption for I o years, and quadrupled for
those who have been employed for 20 years. Individual contracts can
only reduce the period to be observed by the worker or extend that to
be observed by the employer, except in the case of workers employed
for less than six months, in which case special provisions apply. Special provisions also apply in the building industry. If orders for his
product are lacking the employer may introduce a shortened working week after giving seven days' notice, but there are special rules
for certain branches of the textile industry. Salaried employees 529
who earn less than I 2o,ooo francs a year must be given three
months' notice which begins to run from the beginning of the month
following that in which the notice is given. The period increases by
three months for each five-year period commenced, but not necessarily completed, by the employee after the first five years in the
same enterprise. These periods cannot be reduced by contract, but
the notice to be given to employees earning more than I 2o,ooo francs
a year is fixed by contract, and in default of a contract, by the court.
The court cannot, however, fix a shorter period of notice than that to
be given to the less highly paid employees. Contracts of employment
for a fixed period of less than three months concluded with the
intent of evading the statutes concerning notice are by the courts
considered as contracts for an indefinite period. In Belgium, as elsewhere in Europe, "chain contracts" for fixed periods designed to
evade periods of notice are frowned upon by the courts. The employee's required period of notice to the employer is half that of the
employer, but this can, within limits, be changed by contract. Special
provisions protect the employee under notice who has found another
job.
628

See arts. 19-19 ter and 28 quater of the Law of Mar. 10, 1900, [1900] Recueil des
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Belgique 864, as amended by the Law of Mar. n, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 2078;
See Horion, supra note 519, at 125-28.
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In the Netherlands
the period of notice is in principle identical
with the pay period, for example, one week for workers paid
weekly, one month for employees paid by the month. This rule
applies both to notices given by the employer and by the employee,
subject to a contractual agreement derogating from it. Such an
agreement must be in writing, may not enable the employer to discharge the employee on shorter notice than that required of the
employee, and may not be longer than six months. These periods of
notice are extended in the case of all employees who, after having
reached full age, have served the same enterprise for a full year. For
them the period of notice to be given by the employer is at least one
week for each year of service up to a maximum of 13 weeks, and
that to be given by the worker at least one week for each two years
of service up to a maximum of six weeks. This can only be abrogated
by collective agreement and within certain defined limits.
In Luxembourg 531 salaried employees can only be dismissed by
notice in writing, the period of notice beginning to run at the middle or the end of a calendar month. The period may not be less than
two months for employees who have been in the employer's service
less than five years, four months for those in service for five or more
but less than ten years, and six months for those who have been in
the service of the same employer for ten or more years. Periods
of notice required of the employee are one half of these. There are
no statutory provisions for manual workers, notice depending on
usage and in practice mainly on collective agreements which normally provide for up to two weeks' notice irrespective of duration
of service.
Until very recently no periods of notice were fixed by statute in
France. The Labor Code 532 merely says that these periods have to
be in accordance with usage or collective agreements, by which usage
can be abrogated, and that any term of a contract of employment
or works rule ( reglemcnt intirieur) purporting to reduce the period
of notice as established by usage or collective agreement is void.
Under a statute of I 9 58 533 any manual, clerical or other employee
who has served the same employer for at least six months without
LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY
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000
Law on Contracts of Employment, July 13, 1907, [1907] Stb. No. 193, amended by
the Law on Discharges, Dec. 17, 1953, [1953] Stb. No. 619 {Neth.); Molenaar, in
E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 306; FORTANIER & VERAART, op. cit.
supra note 437, at 41-55.
631
See Kayser, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 287.
632
CODE DU TRAVAIL bk. I, tit. II, art. 23.
633
Law of Feb. 19, 1958, [1958] J.O. 1858 (Fr.); Durand, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AuTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at 227.

432

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET

interruption is entitled to at least one month's notice, but the notice
he has to give is not affected by the statute. In practice notice periods
are invariably extended and not curtailed by collective agreements,
which may take into account the place of the employee in the hierarchy of the undertaking and his seniority. This is true even in industries such as the building industry where workers were entitled
to no notice at all according to usage. Contractual agreements
purporting to fix periods of notice which are too long may be void
as an infringement of freedom of work. 534 Under the statute of
I 9 58 the employer must give notice by registered letter and must
obtain a receipt. 535
The Italian Civil Code refers to usage and collective agreements
with regard to the notice to be given to manual workers, 536 but
salaried employees are entitled to statutory periods of notice which
apply in the absence of usage or collective agreements more favorable to the employee. These statutory periods range from I 5 days to
four months in accordance with seniority.
In the event of a violation by the employer of statutory provisions
concerning notice some laws provide that the contract continues and
wages are due to the end of the period of notice; others that the
contract is terminated by the notice but that the employer is liable
to pay damages for breach of contract. 537
2. GROUNDS FOR INSTANTANEOUS DISMISSAL

In all the six countries the employer has a right of instantaneous
dismissal, irrespective of any provisions or rules on notice, or special
protective provisions normally safeguarding the employee, if a
situation has arisen in which he cannot be expected to keep the employee in his employment. Similarly, a right to quit instantaneously
is given to the employee where he cannot be expected to remain
longer. This basic idea is shared by the six legal systems, but there
are great variations in detail.
In France 538 there are no general statutory provisions, but the
courts permit the employer to dismiss the employee on the spot if
63

Durand, supra note 533, at zxo-n.
!d. at 227.
CoDICE CIVILE art. 2II8 (Italy); Mengoni, in E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit.
supra note srS, at 242.
637
This matter is highly complex and cannot be discussed here. Reference is made
to Boldt, supra note 524, at 43 et seq. and to the discussions of the various legal systems in that volume.
"""Law of Feb. n, 1950, art. 4, [1950] ].0. 1688 (Fr.); Durand, supra note 533, at
203, 2II-I2.
'
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he has been guilty of a faute gra7.:e, that is, a breach of duty such as
breach of discipline, absenteeism, unauthorized work for another
firm, and the like, the seriousness of the offense always being weighed
against other factors such as seniority. Participation in a strike as
such is no cause for dismissal and leaves the contract suspended but
intact. In the case of some employees, for example, war pensioners,
the employer must according to statute be able to prove very serious
misconduct ( une faute tres grave). Special principles apply to contracts on approval.
In Germany 539 instantaneous dismissal is regulated by statute.
Manual workers who have a right to a term of notice of two weeks
or less-the normal case-can be dismissed on the spot only for
certain specific reasons enumerated in the statute such as theft, attacking or insulting the employer or his representative, or "persistent refusal to fulfil their obligations" ( beharrliche A rbeits-P erweigerung). Persistent refusal to fulfil obligations may include
participation in a strike. The worker may quit without notice forcertain specific reasons, such as assaults and insults, non-payment of
wages, and the like. Other employees, including commercial and
salaried technical employees, can be discharged and can quit "for
important reasons," a phrase which recurs in German legislation. It
is interpreted as envisaging facts, whether or not caused by the
fault of either side, so grave as to make it impossible to expect either
side to continue the relationship. This does not include every breach
of contract, but only serious breaches, and it certainly does not include a lack of orders for the product or a need for reducing personnel. The courts are very exacting in their interpretation of this
phrase.
In Belgium manual workers can be dismissed and can quit instantaneously for serious reasons 540 (juste motif), which in practice
are much the same as the "important reasons" of German law. Belgian statutes list certain situations to exemplify what such serious
reasons are. Much the same applies to salaried employees, except
that in the case of an instantaneous dismissal the employer must,
within three days, let the employee know by registered letter the
precise facts on which the dismissal is based. The law is similar in
1539
GEWO paras. 123, 124, 124a, 133b-133d; HGB paras. 7o-72; BGB para. 626;
Boldt, supra note 524, at 75-77.
uo Law of Mar. 10, 1900, arts. 16, 20, 21, [1900] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux
de Belgique 76, as amended by the Law of Mar. 4, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 1770;
Law of Aug. 7, 1922, arts. 18, 20, 21, [1922] Recueil des Lois et Arretes Royaux de Belgique 864, as amended by the Law of Mar. n, 1954, [1954] Moniteur Beige 2078;
Horion, supra note 519, at uo-22, 135-36.
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Luxembourg, except that the dismissal or the termination of the
contract bya manual or clerical worker must be based on a grave
default by the other party to the employment contract. 541 In the
Netherlands 542 either side can terminate the contract for "urgent
reasons" and can obtain a judgment for the termination of the contract for "important reasons." "Urgent reasons" in the Netherlands
means much the same as faute grave in France, or "important reasons" in Germany. A strike does not automatically terminate the
contract, but is generally an "urgent reason" for the employer to
discharge the strikers. 543 In Italy 544 either side can terminate a contract made for an indefinite time, if the other side has committed a
grave breach of contract.

3· SOCIALLY UNJUSTIFIED DISMISSALS
The principle of "job security" requires that an employee should
be either indemnified or reinstated if the employer abused his right
of discharge and acted in a way which is socially unjustified. This
principle has been given effect, especially in French, German, and
Dutch legislation, and it is not completely absent, though much attenuated, in the laws of Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In all
these situations it is assumed that the employer has given the requisite notice. If he has not, he will in France, 545 and may in Germany,546 be liable to pay a double indemnity: for the period of notice
and for abuse of right. Except in the Netherlands, 547 the principles
here under discussion do not apply where the employee terminates
the contract.
In France 548 the employer must compensate but need not reinstate, the employee if the discharge constitutes an abusive dismissal (rupture abusive). In the course of the many years since this
principle was first introduced, the courts have gradually enlarged
its scope until it now means that the employer must compensate the
employee if he has dismissed him in circumstances in which a reasonable employer would not have done so. According to the case law,
however, the employee bears the burden of proof.
6

Kayser, supra note 53 r, at 289, 294·
FORTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. supra note 437, at 56-57.
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Molenaar, supra note 530, at 302.
"" ComcE CIVILE art. 2119 (Italy) ; Mengoni, supra note 536, at 243-44.
"'"Durand, supra note 53 3, at 224.
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Law on Protection in the event of Dismissals, Aug. ro, 1951, para. rr, [1951]
BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.), Normally there will be only one indemnity .
7
., Molenaar, suPra note 530, at 308.
"'"CoDE DU TRAVAIL, bk. I, tit. II, art. 23; Durand, supra note 533, at 22o-24.
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French law has adopted this means of attempting to do what
the United States tries to achieve by counteracting "unfair labor
practices" on the one hand, and by giving effect to seniority principles on the other. Some of the cases in which the employer has had to
pay indemnity were, for example, plainly cases of discrimination;
others were cases of personal hardship of the employee. Apart from
the protection by statute of more senior employees against abusive
dismissal, there are also special arrangements under collective agreements to protect older employees.
The German principle 549 of Kiindigungs-Schutz or protection
against "socially unjustified dismissals" goes much further. It enables
all except managerial employees, who are more than 20 years old
and have had more than six months' uninterrupted employment in
a plant normally employing more than five employees, to ask the
labor court within three weeks of their discharge to declare the
discharge socially unjustified and therefore invalid. It is socially unjustified if it is not required by reasons connected with the person or
conduct of the employee or by urgent needs of the enterprise. All
this the employer has to prove, but even if he establishes the urgent
needs of the enterprise, it is open to the employee to prove that, in
selecting the employees to be discharged, the employer took insufficient account of social factors, for example, of seniority. The employer may then show that the discharge of a particular employee
was technically or economically necessary. If the labor court finds
that the complaint is justified, it declares that the contract was not
terminated by the discharge. Except in certain cases, it must at the
same time at the request of either side (which is frequently made)
terminate the contract of employment as of a date it considers appropriate and fix the compensation (up to one year's wages) which
the employer must pay to the employee.
Before invoking the jurisdiction of the labor court, the employee
may put the matter before the works council. If the council thinks
the complaint is justified, it should attempt a settlement with the
employer. Moreover, the works council must be consulted before
each discharge 550 and, although a violation of this obligation does
not render the discharge void, it will probably make it socially unjustifiable in the eyes of the labor court. Whether the powers of the
049

Law on Protection in the Event of Dismissals, Aug. 10, 1951, paras. 1-3, 7-8, 12,

21, [1951] BGBI. I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.).
550

Law on Constitution of the Plant, Oct. II, 1952, para. 66(1), [1952] BGBI. I, 681
(Ger. Fed. Rep.). This applies only in plants with more than 20 employees.
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works council can be enlarged by collective agreement is a moot
point much debated by German lawyers. 551
In the Netherlands protection against manifestly unreasonable
termination of the contract by either employer or employee was introduced in I954. 552 A discharge is manifestly unreasonable if no
reason is given, the stated reason for it is a pretext, or the reasons
for it are false, or if, in view of the difficulties of finding another
job, the hardship inflicted upon the employee by the termination of
the contract outweighs the employer's interest in terminating it, or
if the employee is discharged for complying with his military obligations, or if, except for serious reasons, the employer in discharging
the employee has contravened a regulation or usage concerning
seniority. The termination of the contract by the employee is manifestly unreasonable if he has no reasons or his reasons are a pretext
or false, or if the consequences of the employee's quitting the job
are so serious from the employer's point of view as to outweigh the
employee's interest in giving up his job. The judge fixes the compensation payable by the party whose action is manifestly unreasonable, but he may also order him to resume the employment relationship. The Netherlands is one of the few countries where what
corresponds to the penalties for contempt of court by reason of noncompliance with a decree of specific performance can be used to enforce a contract of employment. The importance of this legislation
of I954 is, however, overshadowed by the need for obtaining the
consent of the Regional Employment Exchange prior to the termination of a contract of employment.
No legislation corresponding to that concerning abusive dismissal in France, or socially unjustified dismissal in Germany, or manifestly unreasonable termination of the contract in the Netherlands
exists in the three other countries of the Community. In Belgium 553
an employer who gives the proper notice is liable to indemnify the
employee only if there is a real "abuse of right," for example, if he
has been dismissed for demanding payments due to him or if an
innocent employee has been accused of theft. The works councils
have nothing to do with individual dismissals but must cooperate in
1>51 See DIETZ, BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, MIT WAHLORDNUNG n. 12 to para. 66, at
5II (znd ed. 1955); Boldt, supra note 524, at 78.
552
This was introduced by the Law on Discharge, Dec. 17, 1953, [1953] Stb. No. 619,
which amended the Law on Contracts of Employment, July 13, 1907, [1907] Stb. No.
193 (Neth.). See Molenaar, supra note 530, at 308-10; FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit.
supra note 437, at 6o-6x .
... Horion, supra note 519, at u8, 166.
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defining general rules to govern engagements and dismissals in the
plant. In Luxembourg 554 collective agreements prohibit dismissals
by reason of union membership or activities, and special indemnities
are payable under statute to salaried employees dismissed after long
service. They amount to two months' salary after I 5 years, four
months after 20 years, and six months after 2 5 years. In the event
of a discharge without notice the works councils must be informed of
the grounds of dismissal.
In Italy 555 there are some rare cases in which, according to the
general principles of the law of contract, the dismissal may be void
by reason of illegality or immorality, but this is of little practical
importance. Apart from some special statutory provisions for certain branches of the economy, what is of interest is the restriction
which the law imposes on the power of the employer to dismiss an
employee during sickness, or a female employee during pregnancy
and during the first few weeks after confinement. During a lawful
strike the strikers, whose contracts of employment are suspended,
may not be discharged. 556 More important even than this are anumber of statutory provisions imposing upon the employer an obligation to pay "seniority compensation," except in the event of a serious
breach of contract by the employee or in cases in which he voluntarily quits his job. 557 Of principal interest and importance, however,
are the three "ipter-industrial" collective agreements of October
I 9 5o and May I 9 53 of which the one in force since October I 8,
I950, is here relevant. 558 According to this agreement any employee
who has been discharged can lodge a protest with his union, and
if the union does not arrive at a settlement with the employer, the
matter is sent to arbitration. If the arbitration board judges the employee's complaint to be justified, it can impose on the employer an
obligation either to re-engage the worker or to pay an indemnity.
This applies only in undertakings with more than 35 workers. The
"works committees" which used to play an important role in discharge procedures under previous collective agreements are no
longer concerned with them.
GM Kayser, supra note 531, at 292--93; Decree on Workers' Delegations, Oct. 30, 1958,
art. 20(1), [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564. See also Law of June 7, 1937, art. 22(4), [1937]
Pasin. Lux. 119.
655
Mengoni, supra note 536, at 236-38.
006
I d. at 245-51.
'"''I d. at 253-55.
8
"" Aranguren, supra note 483, at 245-72; Mengoni, supra note 536, at 274-'76.
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4·

DISMISSALS SUBJECT TO CONSENT

In a number of important situations the employer must have the
consent or authorization of some authority, whatever his motive
for discharging the employee. He is often spared the necessity of obtaining such consent or authorization, however, if the employee
was guilty of a serious breach of discipline or the employer for some
other reason would have been entitled to dismiss the employee on
the spot.
In the Netherlands 559 neither the employer nor the employee can
terminate the contract of employment without the authorization of
the Director of the Regional Employment Office. This does not
apply where the contract of employment is terminated not by unilateral notice but by mutual consent or where either side has an
"urgent reason" for putting an immediate end to the contract. The
need for authorization by the Director of the Regional Employment
Office arises from one of the provisions of the Extraordinary Decree on Labor Relations of 1945 560 designed to counteract inflationary tendencies by regulating the labor market. If either side
purports to terminate the contract by notice without having obtained
this authorization, he committs an offense and is liable to imprisonment up to six months or to a fine up to 1o,ooo florins. Moreover,
the contract continues, the employer is liable to pay wages and the
employee to work, and these obligations can be enforced by court
order. Here, then, the validity of the termination of the contract
depends on the decision of an administrative authority. In fact, however, the procedure is more "judicial" than at first appears. The
Regional Employment Office consults the organizations on both
sides and the Labor Inspector. In the more important cases the
matter is submitted to a "discharge committee" which hears the
parties and tries to bring about an understanding-successfully,
it is said, in about 40 percent of the cases. If unsuccessful, the discharge committee sends a recommendation to the Employment Office on which the latter acts. This recommendation is, so we are
told, usually made unanimously.
The authorities, including the "discharge committees," apply published directives issued by the Labor Department. The policies
it pursues are intended to ensure a distribution of labor designed to
559

Molenaar, supra note 530, at 300; FoRTANIER & VERAART, op. cit. supra note 437,
at 58-59.
"""Extraordinary Decree on Labor Relations, Oct. 5, 1945, art. 6, (1945] Stb. No.
F 214 (Neth.).
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guarantee the ~1aximum of production and to promote peaceful
labor relations. Moreover, the "discharge committees," which deal
with some so,ooo cases a year, consider the interests of both sides,
including matters such as seniority, the employee's age, and whether
it is more or less hopeful to attempt to restore the relationship between the parties. Hence the matters taken into account in this procedure coincide to some extent with those to be taken into account
by a court when asked to decide whether the termination of the contract is "manifestly unreasonable." This parallelism of judicial and
administrative procedures is criticized by Dutch writers. 561
A French Order of I 94 5, also requires the employer to obtain the
consent of the employment office 562 to hiring and discharges in industrial and commercial undertakings. Except in industry and commerce no consent is required, but in some cases the employment
office must be notified. In industry and commerce such consent is required even where the discharge, or termination of the contract by
the employee, is based on faute grave of the other party. In such
cases, however, the office must make its decision in three days,
whereas normally it has a week to do so. If no answer is given within
the required period, consent is deemed to have been given. If consent is refused, reasons must be given, and against the decision
there lies an appeal to a higher administrative authority (Directeur
Departmental du Travail) who hears a consultative committee in
which both sides of industry are represented. An infringement of
the provisions of this legislation is a criminal offense, but in radical
contrast to the Nether lands, infringement in France has no effect on
the validity of the contract or of its termination by notice. Another
difference from the Dutch law consists in the exclusively economic
(labor market) nature of the policies to be taken into account by the
authorities who are not concerned with the social situation at all.
Nevertheless, the employer commits an offense if he discharges an
employee without the necessary authorization, whether he does so
for economic reasons, for example, because he must reduce his
personnel-or for other reasons, for example, because of a breach
of discipline on the part of the employee. These rules have been
developed by the somewhat complicated case law of the highest
French courts.
No legislation of this kind exists in the other four countries, except in the case of lay-offs of large numbers of employees. In all
561

Molenaar, supra note 530, at 311.
DURAND 187-98; E.C.S.C. HIGH AUTHORITY, op. cit. supra note 518, at
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countries 563 the employer must notify the employment office of each
case of a discharge or other vacancy, and in Belgium this includes
a notification of the grounds on which the employee was dismissed.
The office may make inquiries, and by negotiating with the employer
sometimes produces a settlement where discharge was unjustified.
In Germany, Italy, France, and Luxembourg special provisions
regulate "mass dismissals"; these provisions are partly contained in
statutes and partly in collective agreements. No such legislation
exists in Belgium or in the Netherlands. 564 In the Dutch Extraordinary Decree of 1945 there is, however, a provision which prohibits
the employer from reducing working hours to less than 48 per week,
except in certain situations defined in the Decree. If he reduces the
hours below 48, he nevertheless remains liable to pay the wages
due for 48 hours of work.
The most elaborate provisions protecting the labor market
against the consequences of sudden mass dismissals have been enacted in Germany. 565 With exceptions they apply to each plant employing more than 20 employees and are directed at discharges of
five or more in plants with less than
employees, of IO percent or
more than 2S employees in plants with at least
but fewer than
soo employees, and of at least so employees in larger plants, not
counting managerial staff and not counting instantaneous dismissals
which are not affected by this legislation. The employer must first
notify the works council and consult with it on ways of avoiding
hardship. Next, he must notify the labor exchange in writing, and
submit a statement of the views expressed by the works council. The
contracts of employment terminate no earlier than one month after
this notification, unless the Regional Labor Office decides otherwise.
On the other hand, the Regional Labor Office may extend the period
as much as another month, and may also permit the employer to
shorten working hours during the period. The decisions of the
Regional Labor Office are made by a committee on which both sides
of industry are represented and which is presided over by the president of the Regional Labor Office or his deputy. The purpose of
these provisions is to "stagger" mass dismissals; the purpose of
other provisions seeking to ensure that the works' council is consulted and that no measures of this kind are taken without its con-
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Boldt, supra note 524, at 39-40.
Horion, supra note 519, at 166; Molenaar, supra note 530 at 306.
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Law of Aug. 10, 1951, paras. 15-18, 20, [1951] BGBI. 'I, 499 (Ger. Fed. Rep.):
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sent is social rather than economic-that is, to protect the individual
and not the labor market. The ultimate sanction for violation of
the latter provisions may be the imposition on the employer of a
duty to compensate employees who lose their jobs.
In Italy corresponding measures have been introduced by collective bargaining rather than legislation. 566 A statutory provision was,
however, enacted in I949 567 which provides that the employer may
engage labor only through the employment exchange and that a
discharged employee has, for a year after his discharge, a prior right
to be considered for re-engagement by his former employer. The
inter-industrial collective agreement of April 2 I, I 9
(in force
since October of that year) provides that an employer who wishes
to reduce the number of his employees because of a contraction of
business or because of a change in production methods must notify
the regional organizations (union and employers' associations) and
the discharges are suspended for the two weeks following this notification. Within these two weeks negotiations take place to regulate
the order of discharges, taking into account the economic interests
of the enterprise on the one hand and such matters as seniority and
family status of the employees on the other. If no settlement is arrived at, the employer may nevertheless, in accordance with the
provisions of the agreement mentioned above, be liable to pay indemnities to the individual employees if he ignores the social considerations which it is incumbent upon him to observe. The essential
features of the procedure applicable to mass dismissals are the need
for notification and the postponement of their effectiveness. Special
rules apply to small undertakings. If an employer starts to re-engage
labor after a mass dismissal, he is bound by the rule: "last outfirst in."
In France the order of discharges in the event of mass dismissals
is determined by collective agreement (and an agreement capable
of "extension" must contain such provisions) 568 or by a works rule
( reglement interieur) which, in the absence of a relevant collective
agreement, must be issued by the employer, 569 and must take account of seniority and family status. In practice much has been done
to regulate these matters by collective bargaining, including agreements which provide for compensation. 570
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""" Mengoni, supra note 536, at 278-79.
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In Luxembourg 571 the employer must notify the National Labor
Office if he wishes to discharge more than 10 employees at a time
and the discharges do not take effect until the end of the fourth week
after this notification, a period which can be reduced, or extended
up to six weeks by the Minister of Labor. Those discharged have a
prior right to be re-hired-that is, a right to damages if they are
not re-hired in preference to hiring others. The employer must, under statute, 572 notify the workmen's delegations, and, under collective agreements, the organizations on both sides, in the event of intended mass dismissals.
Certain categories of employees enjoy special protection in all
the six countries. Most important among these are the members,
and candidates for membership, of works councils and similar
bodies, as has been indicated. Other provisions protect disabled persons, women during pregnancy or during the first few weeks after a
confinement, sick employees and the like. 573

APPENDIX
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS : A SKELETON SURVEY

A.

574

BELGIUM
I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Comprises all employees. Contribution conditions (minima of
contribution periods) must be fulfilled. Duration (exceptions apart)
unlimited. Rate varies with age, sex, family status, the occupation
of the wife, and the classification of the place of residence from the
point of view of the cost of living. Special payments in case of short
time work and of short time interruption of work. Financing: Contribution of 2 percent of wages and (up to 6o,ooo francs per year)
rmKayser, supra note 531, at 287, 294-95; Law on National Labor Office, June 30,
1945, art. 12(2), [1945] Pasin. Lux. 310.
""'Decree on Worker's Delegations, Oct. 30, 1958, art. 20(2), [1958] Pasin. Lux. 564.
573
For details of these measures, see Coal-Steel Community publication cited in note
518 supra.
574
This skeleton survey is largely based on the two volumes of monographs on the
systems of social security applicable to the employees in the Coal and Steel Industries
in the Community and in Great Britain, published by the High Authority of the E.C.S.C.
From the very large literature on the subject the two short works by Rouast & Durand,
SEcURITE SociALE ( 1958), and by Caesar, SoZIALVERSICHERUNG in Schaeffer's GRUNDRISS No. 40 ( 1958) may be useful to readers of this book in view of their succinctness,
They are also up to date,
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of salaries, half paid by employer, half by employee. State supplement. Organization: National Institute for Labor Exchanges and
Unemployment Benefit (Office National du Placement et du Chomage.)
2. SICKNESS, DISABILITY, AND MATERNITY BENEFITS

Covering all manual workers and salaried employees and members of family. Contribution conditions to be fulfilled. For insured
and family: medical (including hospital, pharmaceutical, dental,
maternity) service. For insured only: cash benefit, 6o percent of
wages up to six months, then disability benefit of varying amounts
without time limit. Maternity grant of 200 francs, and for insured
women 6o percent of lost wages six weeks before and six weeks after
confinement. Contributions: For manual workers 7 percent of wages,
3·5 percent paid by employer, 3·5 percent by worker; for salaried
employees 6 percent, 2.75 percent paid by employee, 3.25 percent
by employer, but not beyond 6o,ooo francs per year. National Unions of recognized Local and Regional Insurance Funds, and Auxiliary Insurance Fund coordinated by National Insurance Fund (Sickness, Disability).

3·

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

Covering all employees. Payment either I 2.50 francs per day for
the first and second child, 17.20 for third, 2 1 for fourth and 2 7. So
francs for fifth and further children, or in monthly total amounts of
3 I 5 for first and for second, 430 for third, 52 5 for fourth child,
69 5 for fifth and further children, with special rates if father sick,
or victim of accident, or if child an orphan. Payments continue until
child at end of school age or he reaches age 2 I in case of further
education. Maternity grant: I 8oo francs for first birth, 900 for
second and each subsequent birth. Special payment of four francs
per day for first and two francs for each subsequent child (or 100
and 50 francs respectively per month) if mother not gainfully employed. Local and mutual funds coordinated in National Fund for
Family Allowances. Contribution: Employer pays 7·5 percent of
wages. Considerable state supplement.
4·

OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS' PENSIONS

Completely reformed in I 9 55. Separately organized for manual
workers (National Fund for Retirement and Survivors' PensionsCaisse N ationale des Pensions de Retraite et de Survie) and for sala-
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ried employees (Various Funds). Contribution for manual workers 8.5 percent of which 4.25 percent paid by employer and 4.25
percent by employee; for salaried employees I 0.2 5 percent of which
6 percent paid by employer, 4.25 by employee. Considerable state
supplement. All employees covered. Old age pension for men from
age 65, women age 6o, provided they have retired from work. Under system inaugurated in I955, which is being gradually introduced,
amount of pension equal to 7 5 percent (in certain cases 6o percent)
of ~5 (in case of women ~ 0 ) of the aggregate of the remuneration
received by the beneficiary during the years taken into account.
This adapted to purchasing power (retail price index). Also widow's benefit.

5· ACCIDENTS
No system of social insurance, but absolute liability imposed on
employers, as in U.S. workmen's compensation law, for accidents in
course of employment including way to and from work and for prescribed industrial diseases, excluding civil liability. Covers all employees. Insurance against accident liability optional, but only possible with licensed insurance companies (of which there are 7 5) or
one of the I 6 licensed mutual insurance societies. In fact 99 percent
of employers insured (state guarantee fund in case of insolvency of
non-insured employers). Insurance against liability for occupational
diseases in fact compulsory with Fonds de Prevoyance to which
contributions payable. Insured employer exonerated, insurer directly
liable to victim. Benefits: medical services including hospital, pharmaceuticals, and orthopedic care. Pension amounting in some cases
to IOO percent, in others to 90 or So percent of last annual wage,
maximum I 20,000 francs. In case of fatal accidents or disease, funeral grant and pensions for widows, orphans and other relatives.
Premiums payable by employers according to risk, e.g.) in iron and
steel industry, average 4·5 percent of wages, plus payment to cover
occupational diseases fixed by decree, varying between I 5 and about
20 francs per worker per year.

B.

FRANCE
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Organization
(a) Local, Regional, and National Social Security Funds linked
in National Federation of Social Security Organizations, dealing
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with all branches of insurance except old age and survivors' pensions. (b) Regional Old Age Pensions Funds. (c) Local Family Allowances Funds, linked in National Union of Family Allowances
Funds.
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b. Financing

For all branches of social security except industrial accidents and
diseases and family allowances, global contribution of I 6 percent of
wages (up to 66o,ooo francs per year) of which I o percent paid by
the employer, 6 percent by the employee; for family allowances,
I 6. 7 5 percent of wages, paid by employer; for accidents and diseases, variable rates in accordance with degree of industrial risk.
c. Coverage

All employees without ceiling, provided they have fulfilled contribution conditions.
2. UNEMPLOYMENT

No statutory unemployment insurance, but unemployment assistance paid by municipal authorities, and, since January, 1959, a
scheme of unemployment insurance agreed between unions and employers' associations which may be declared binding on all employers
and employees. Contribution: I percent of wages, o.8 percent paid
by employer, 0.2 percent by employee. Payment up to nine (in
certain cases I 2) months of 3 5 percent of last relevant wages, a
maximum of 80-90 percent which is constituted of payments out
of agreed insurance plus public unemployment assistance.

3·

SICKNESS, MATERNITY, AND DISABILITY INSURANCE

Medical services including hospital, maternity, pharmaceutical,
dental. For insured, wife, children and certain other family members in the household. No time limit as long as insured remains in
insurance. Expenses other than most maternity expenses not completely covered; maximum of So percent of doctor's and other
charges covered, and in the majority of cases a lower percentage.
Sickness benefit in cash up to three (in certain cases up to four)
years; on principle one half of "basic wage," in case of three children, two thirds, reduced in case of hospitalization. Payable to
women six weeks before, eight after confinement. In case of disability, i.e., reduction of working capacity by at least two thirds, full
medical expenses and pension of (depending on nature of cas·e) 30,
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40 or up to So percent of average of last IO years wages to age 6o
when old age pension begins.
4· FAMILY ALLOWANCES
Covers entire working population and those who for acknowledged reasons refrain from working. Basic allowance for each family with at least two children under I6 (if apprenticed, I7, or if
studying or incapacitated, 20) 22 percent of basic wage plus 33 percent for each further child, plus certain additional payments to make
up for former tax advantages. Basic salary fixed regionally in accordance with cost of living. Paid monthly. Where only one member
of family gainfully employed (e.g., husband) further payment
ranging in accordance with number and age of child or children,
from S to so percent of basic wage. (This payable also where only
one child, in some cases where no child in the family.) Prenatal allowances for pregnant women, and maternity grants (twice basic
salary for second, and four-thirds basic salary for each additional,
birth). Also other benefits such as rent subsidies and removal subsidies.

S. OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS' PENSIONS
Present system inaugurated in I94S 1 but transitional systems continue for older pensioners. Under definitive system entitlement from
age 6o for all those having insurance record of at least IS years and
from age 6s for those having record of more than five and less
than IS years. Percentage of basic wage (meaning here average
of last IO years) up to 66o,ooo francs per year, with allowances
for devaluation of the franc. The percentage varies according to
contribution record from 20 to 40, plus increments for spouse, children etc. If contribution record less than IS years but more than s
years, calculation in terms of percentage of contributions paid
(rente as distinguished from pension). Special and supplementary
allowances have to be paid on large scale by government. Also death
(funeral) grant, and widows' and widowers', but no other survivors' pensions.
6. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES
Financed from employers' contributions varying according to
size and nature of enterprise. Covering all employees with regard
to accidents arising either out, or in the course, of employment
(par le fait ou I' occasion du travail) or with regard to one of the

a
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diseases "recognized," i.e., prescribed as occupational diseases for
the occupation of the particular employee. Benefits in kind: medical (as in case of health insurance) and rehabilitation services. In
case of temporary incapacity, payment of
percent of basic wage
for first 28 days, subsequently two thirds. Basic wage calculated on
basis of last monthly earnings. In case of permanent incapacity permanent pension varying with degree of disablement, age, etc. In
case of fatal accident or disease: costs of funeral, widows', orphans'
and other special survivors' pensions. The civil liability of the employer is excluded, but not that of third parties.

so

C.

GERMANY
I. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Comprises generally speaking all employees except the most
highly paid salaried employees. Amount: regressive percentage of
wages during last 13 weeks before loss of job ( 90 percent for lowest,
SS percent for highest point of wage scale). Duration varies in accordance with contribution record. Minimum: 78 days, maximum
468 days. Besides: payment of wage supplement in case of short
work week (up to S 2 weeks) . Where no insurance, unemployment
assistance with means test. Organization: Federal Institute for
Labor Exchanges and Unemployment Insurance. Contributions:
two percent of wages up to a maximum of I7S DM a week (7SO
D M a month), borne So percent by the two parties to the contract
of employment.
2. SICKNESS BENEFIT (INCLUDING MATERNITY BENEFIT
AND DEATH GRANT)

Borne by local, regional and other sickness funds, comprising
manual workers and salaried employees up to income 7,920 DM
per year, granting insured and family medical and maternity services (including hospital) and cash benefit, in principle
percent
of basic wage plus increments. Contributions vary among sickness
funds; average 6.1 percent. Borne
percent each by employer and
employee, except lowest wage earners, where employer pays all.

so

so

3·

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

40 DM for the third and each further child per month up to the
age of 18 or, in case of full-time education, 2S. Organization: Family Compensation Funds attached to Employers' Mutual Insurance
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Institutes (Berufsgenossenschaften). Paid for employee!! by employer. Contributions vary between Mutual Institutes (estimated in
1957 at average 1.1 percent of wages).
4·

PENSIONS

(RENTENVERSICHERUNG)

Completely reformed in 1957. Covering old age pension (from
age 6 5), survivors' pension (widows', orphans'), disability (i.e.,
employability reduced by half or more) and unemployability. Covering all employees (and others). Organization: For manual workers
(exceptions apart) : State (Land) Insurance Institutes; for salaried
employees: Federal Insurance Institute. Principal benefits: (a) rehabilitation, re-training, etc., (b) pensions varying with the average
wages or salaries received during the 3 years preceding the first
payment of pension, and with the number of years of contribution
payments, plus certain increments. Percentages of various types of
pensions different. Contribution 14 percent of wages of which employer and employee pay one half each (only of wages and salaries
up to 9,6oo DM).

5.

ACCIDENT INSURANCE

That is, insurance against accidents in the course of employment
and occupational diseases covering, among others, all employees.
Includes accidents on way to and from work. Only such diseases as
prescribed by order recognized as occupational. Organization: Employers Mutual Insurance Institutes (Berufsgenossenschaften):
compulsory and statutory. Benefits: medical treatment (all stages,
hospital, etc.), rehabilitation, occupational therapy, assistance in
finding employment, pension up to two thirds of last annual wages,
varying with degree of disablement, death grant, widows' and orphans' benefit in case of fatal accident or diseases. Mutual Insurance Institutes supervise safety measures in industry. Employer and
his agents civilly liable for damages only if convicted by criminal
court for intentionally causing accident (broader liability in case
of road accidents), but liable to Mutual Insurance Institute (also
to sickness fund, etc.) to refund moneys disbursed on proof of intention or negligence. Contributions paid to Mutual Insurance Institutes by employers alone, varying for each employer in accordance
with rate of wages paid, number of employees and the "risk category" to which the plant belongs, i.e., the magnitude of the accident
risk and risk of diseases. There may be incremental payments in
case of bad accident record, and reductions in case of good accident
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record. The average was, in I 9 55, calculated at
or salaries.

D.

I

ITALY
I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

a. Organization

Three principal organizations (at national, provincial, local
levels): National Institute for Social Security (/stituto Nazionale
della Previdenza Sociale: l.N.P.S.) :unemployment insurance, family allowances, old age, disability and survivors' insurance, tuberculosis insurance. National Institute of Health Insurance (/stituto
N azionale Assicurazione M alattie: /.N.A.M.) : sickness and maternity benefit. National Institute for Insurance against Industrial
Accidents (/stituto Nazionale Assicurazione lnfortuni sul Lavoro:
J.N.A .I.L.) : industrial accidents and occupational diseases. Some
minor organizations, e.g., National Unit for Insurance of, and Assistance to, Orphans of Italian Workers (Ente Nazionale per la
Previdenza e l' A ssis tenza agli Orfani dei Lavoratori l taliani,
E.N.A.O.L.J.). Also the Social Housing Programme: /.N.A.C.A.S.A.
b. Financing
Two kinds of contributions: absolute and percentage. Unemployment, old age, disability, survivors' and tuberculosis insurance: absolute contributions ( contributi base) paid by employer from 8 lire
in case of wages up to 2,500 per week to 53 lire in case of wages of
more than 27,700 per week, and percentage contributions (contributi integrativi) I4.70 percent of wages, of which 3.05 percent
borne by employee, rest by employer. Health, maternity, orphans'
insurance: no absolute contributions, 6.93 percent of wages paid
by employer, o. I 5 percent (for health insurance) by employee.
Accident insurance: contribution approximately 3.70 percent paid by
employer. Social Housing program: I. I 5 percent paid by employer,
0.57 percent paid by employee. Family allowances and supplement
for workers working shortened week: 33·9 percent of wages up to
ceiling of 900 lire per day for men, 7 so for women, paid by employer. (The percentage is only seemingly high, in view of the very
low ceiling.) State subsidies to various branches of insurance.
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c. Coverage

All employees.
2. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE

Total unemployment: If contribution conditions fulfilled, basic
benefit proportionate to contributions paid during last year, plus
supplement of 200 lire per day and certain family increments, e.g.,
children, spouse, etc. Maximum I So days per year. If contribution
conditions not fulfilled-only for localities and occupations prescribed by Minister of Labor, and subject to willingness to undergo
re-training etc.-220 lire per day plus increments for 90 (in exceptional cases I So) days per year. Partial unemployment: for certain industries in case of reduction of hours below 40 per week two
thirds of the wages which would have been payable for the 25th to
40th hour per week (no time limit), and, in case of temporary layoff, normally up to one month (extension up to I 3 weeks) two-thirds
of I 6 hours' wages per week. In addition: unemployment assistance
in case of need. Re-training of unemployed under Ministry of Labor.

J.

SICKNESS, MATERNITY, AND FUNERAL BENEFITS

Contribution conditions must be fulfilled. Comprises services of
general practitioner, hospital, pharmaceutical and (within a financial
limit) dental services for insured and family, subject to a time limit
of (exceptions apart) I So days per calendar year. Sickness benefits
for up to ISO days amounting to so percent of average wage of last
month or quarter, reduced if insured hospitalized. Special rule for
tuberculosis: no time limit, cash benefit payable only during sanatorium treatment and for up to one year after, and fixed in absolute
figures (with family increments), irrespective of wages earned. Maternity: medical, etc. services plus So percent of wages for three
months prior to expected confinement and eight weeks after confinement. Funeral benefit in certain cases.
4·

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

Payable to all employees while employed, or if sick up to I So
days (in some cases three months) amounting (in industry and
trade) to 4,342 lire per month with respect to each child up to I 4
(or IS and in some cases 2 I, if living in the house and not gainfully
employed) (in some cases this covers brothers, sisters, grandchi 1-

LABOR LAW AND SOCIAL SECURITY

45!

dren), J,OI6lire per month with respect to wife, unless in receipt of
certain minimum income, or to husband, if incapable of self support,
and I ,430 lire per month for each parent or other ascendant relative above a certain age and dependent on recipient of family allowance.

5·

DISABILITY, OLD AGE, AND SURVIVORS' BENEFITS

Disability benefits, provided contribution conditions fulfilled, for
persons whose earning capacity reduced by at least one third, of
unlimited duration: full medical service and cash benefit depending
on contributions paid in the past, plus increment for children, minimum 6o,ooo lire per year if beneficiary over, and 42,000 lire per
year if under, 6 5. Reduced if beneficiary employed, in receipt of
sanatorium treatment, or in receipt of industrial accident etc. benefits. Old age pension for men from age 6o, women age 55, provided
contribution conditions fulfilled, amount depending on contributions, with increments for children under I 8 and subject to same
minima as disability pension. Reduction of pension in case of gainful employment or treatment in sanatorium. Survivors' pension for
benefit of widow or widower amounting to 50 percent of pension of
deceased, for benefit of full orphan (in certain cases 20 in others 30
percent of pension of deceased), and (exceptionally) for benefit
of parent. In certain cases no survivors pension payable, payment of
lump sum to survivors on death of insured. Orphans' benefit consisting in educational and medical services for orphans administered
by National Unit for Insurance of and Assistance to Orphans of
Italian Workers, financed by employers' contributions and subsidies
from various public funds.

6.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES

Contributions payable by employers in accordance with risk of
industry, varying from 2 to 7.6 percent of wages, average 3·7 perC:ent but payment of contribution not condition of benefit. Only undertakings covered which use certain kinds of machinery (including
those driven by steam, electricity, internal combustion) or belong
to defined branches of activity (e.g., building, transport, and many
others), in fact comprising major part of industry. Diseases only
covered insofar as prescribed as occupational for particular occupations. Industrial accident defined as violent event in the course of
employment leading to physical or mental injury, fatal or otherwise.
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Way to and from work not generally included. Medical services including orthopedic and rehabilitation. In case of temporary disability compensation of five-ninths of average daily wage during two
weeks preceding accident or onset of disease until cure, or commencement of pension as below. In case of permanent incapacity,
total or partial (i.e., at least IO percent disablement in case of accidents, 20 percent in case of disease), pension amounting to percentage (SS-IOO percent) of the last annual wage of beneficiary within
a minimum of I35 ,ooo and a maximum of JOO,ooo lire, plus family
increments and attendance supplement. Survivors' benefits for
widow or widower, or, in certain cases, orphan children, or parents.
Funeral benefits of varying amounts.

E.

LUXEMBOURG
I. GENERAL

One of the principal characteristics of the social security system:
coexistence of two separate schemes of insurance, one for manual
workers and one for salaried employees. These two schemes exist
side by side in (I) health, maternity and funeral insurance, and
( 2) disability, old age and survivors' pensions. The schemes of
family allowances, industrial accident insurance and unemployment
benefits are common for both categories.
2. ORGANIZATION

a. Health, Maternity, Funeral Insurance
For manual workers: three regional sickness funds ( Caisses Regionales de M aladie) acting through I 5 local offices and (in the
iron and steel industry) seven plant-level private sickness funds
(Caisse de Maladie d'Entreprises), linked in Union of Sickness
Funds. For salaried employees: One statutory Sickness Fund for
Employees, and three employer-owned sickness funds (in the iron
and steel industry).
·

b. Old Age, Disability, Survivors' Pensions
For manual workers: Old Age and Disability Insurance Board
( Etablissement d' Assurance contre la Pieillesse et l' I nvalidite),
part of the Social Insurance Office (Office des Assurances Sociales)
which, for some purposes, acts through the Regional Sickness Funds
(above). For salaried employees: Pensions Fund for Private Employees (Caisse de Pension des Employes Prives).
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c. Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases
Accident Insurance Society (Association d' Assurance contre les
Accidents), part of the Social Insurance Office (above).

d. Family Allowances
Family Allowances Fund (Caisse de Compensation pour A !locations F amiliales) managed by the Old Age and Disability Insurance
Board (above), and partly acting through the Regional Sickness
Funds.
e. Unemployment Compensation

(There is no system of unemployment insurance proper) : N ational Employment Office (Office National du Travail), acting for
some purposes through its three local agencies, through the Regional Sickness Funds, and through the municipalities.

3·

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

No insurance. Financed 7 5 percent by state, 25 percent by municipalities. Covers all employees (manual and salaried), certain categories (e.g., seasonal workers, commercial travelers, agricultural
workers) excepted, from age I 6 to 6 5, provided unemployment involuntary, unemployed ready to accept work and employed for 200
days during last I 2 months. No means test. For 26 weeks (in I 2
months )-less in cases of foreign nationals-6o percent of normal
wage or salary which is the basis for calculation of health insurance
contributions, ceiling: 220 francs per day. Income from occasional
work deducted, also other income above 25 percent of compensation. In certain cases also compensation for shortened working week.
In addition re-training and other similar services.
4·

HEALTH, MATERNITY, FUNERAL INSURANCE

Covers all manual workers and salaried employees, irrespective
of wage or salary (and certain others). Financed out of contributions fixed by individual sickness funds, maximum (in case of manual workers) 6. 7 5 percent, in fact 6 percent in case of Regional
Funds, 5·4 percent in case of Plant Funds. Ceiling in case of manual
workers 220 francs per day. Two thirds of contributions borne by
employee, one third by employer. State supplement to administrative expenses. Contribution conditions must be fulfilled. Medical
services for insured and certain members of his family ( wife 1 chil-
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dren in the house up to I 8 and in certain cases beyond, and other
persons), including hospital, dental services, maternity care, and
pharmaceuticals, with participation of insured in cost (in case of
manual worker not beyond 25 percent). Time limit for hospital
service. Funeral paid. Sickness benefits payable to insured or if in
hospital, etc., to members of his family, normally 26 weeks, sometimes extended. Minimum so percent of wage or salary, can be
increased by individual sickness fund up to 75 percent. Average
66% percent. Payment to family in case of hospitalization at lower
rates. At end of sickness benefit period disability pension may begin.
Maternity benefit: cash payments six weeks before and six weeks
after confinement, up to I 2 weeks for nursing mothers.
5·

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

Covering all employees, financed by employers at varying rates
of contribution, amounting in industry to 4·5 percent of wages (no
ceiling). State supplement. Maternity grant 5,ooo francs for first
birth, J,Ooo francs for subsequent confinements. For each child up
to I 8 (beyond in case of incapacity) 444 francs per month and more
for fifth and further children. Adapted to cost of living index.

6.

OLD AGE, DISABILITY, SURVIVORS' PENSIONS

Covering all manual workers and, under separate legislation,
generally speaking all salaried employees, irrespective of wage or
salary. Financed by contributions of 5 percent of wages from employers and 5 percent of wages from employees plus state supplement and supplement from municipalities. No ceiling for manual
workers but ceiling of I 59,600 francs per year for salaried employees. If contribution conditions fulfilled, on reduction of earning
power through sickness etc. by two thirds in case of manual workers,
and on permanent inability to exercise usual or equivalent occupation
in case of salaried empoyees ( invalidite) or, in case of manual
workers on reaching age 6 5 (in certain cases 62, 6o or 58) and in
cases of male salaried employees on reaching age 6 5 (in certain cases
6o) and female salaried employees age 55, pension between minimum and maximum depending on contribution record, plus family
increments. Treatment for certain diseases and support of family
during treatment. Survivors' pension for widow, orphans, in certain cases other relatives. Payment of funeral.
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INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES

Covering all manual workers and salaried employees earning up
to 90,000 francs per year. Financed by contributions (percentage
of aggregate of wages and salaries in enterprise or plant in accordance with category of risk to which it belongs, and fixed periodically,
subject, in case of salaried employees, to salary ceiling of 90,000
francs per year) paid by employers, plus state supplement. Industrial accident defined (as in France) as accident arising either out
of, or in the course of, employment. List of recognized occupational
diseases. Industrial accident includes way to and from work. Benefits: full medical treatment, payment of three-fourths of wages or
salary for first I 3 weeks as long as victim is incapable of work, beyond this a pension of So percent of wage or salary in case of Ioo
percent disablement, and correspondingly lower in case of partial
disablement, plus family increments, funeral cost, survivors' pensions. Other services in kind including rehabilitation. Civil action
for damages excluded (as in Germany) except where employer
convicted for causing accident intentionally.

F.

NETHERLANDS
I. GENERAL: ORGANIZATION

a. Health and Maternity Insurance: Medical Benefits

The local (or regional) General Sickness Funds (Algemene Ziekenfondsen) organized on a mutual basis, or by employers or by insurance companies, etc., linked in a (national) Council of Sickness
Funds which has a number of regulatory and other powers. Sickness funds must be licensed by Minister of Social Affairs and Public
Health.
b. Health and Maternity Insurance: Cash Benefits,
Family Allowances, Unemployment Insurance
Twenty-six "joint industrial associations" ( Bedrijfsverenigingen)
combining employer and employee representative and licensed by
the Minister. Employers compelled to be members. Fifteen of them
operate through a "Joint Office of Management." Central financial
organ for family allowances: Family Allowances Compensation
Fund. For unemployment insurance: General Unemployment Fund
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c. Disability, Old Age, Survivors' Pensions, Industrial
Accidents, and Occupational Diseases

(Cash benefit) Social Insurance Bank (a public institution: Sociale Verzekeringsbank) acting through the 22 regional Labor
Councils (Raden van Arbeid) each of which consists of three employer and three worker representatives and a full time chairman
appointed by the Minister.

d. Coordinating and Supervising Organ: Council
of Social Insurance
Responsible to Minister. (Note: calculation ceiling for all contributions and all benefits: 19 florins per day.)
2. UNEMPLOYl\IENT INSURANCE

Covers all employees below age 6 5 not earning more than 6,900
florins per year. Two kinds of benefit: Short unemployment ("suspension") benefit for a minimum of 48 days (or more if rules of
particular Joint Industrial Association so provide), and unemployment benefits proper for at least 7 8 days following upon the short
unemployment benefit. Contribution conditions must be fulfilled.
Amount: 6o percent to So percent of last wage (depending on age,
sex, family status) up to I 9 florins per day. Financing: Short unemployment benefit: equal contributions of employers and employees varying from industry to industry in accordance with risk
(between 2 percent and 5.8 percent of wages payable by either side).
Unemployment benefit proper: 1.2 percent of wages of which 0.4
percent paid by employer, 0.4 percent by employee, 0.4 percent by
state. Calculation ceiling 19 florins per day. In addition unemployment assistance financed by state, paid by municipalities.

J.

HEALTH AND MATERNITY INSURANCE

Sharp distinction between medical services and cash benefits.
Covers, generally speaking, all employees earning up to 6,900 florins
per year. Medical services also cover unemployed, pensioners etc.,
and cover the spouse, children up to 16 (in certain cases 2 7), and
(if living in the same household) certain other relatives of the insured. Financing: Medical Services: 4· 2 percent of wages (up to
19 florins per day) of which half paid by employer, half by employee. Cash benefit: contribution varying from industry to industry
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between 2 percent and 4 percent of wages up to I 9 florins per day, of
which one half but no more than I percent paid by employee, rest by
employer. Medical services comprise those of general practitioner
and specialist, and dental, hospital, sanatorium, midwifery services,
and pharmaceuticals, etc. Sickness fund enters into standard contract with medical and other practitioners (generally speaking no
full time employment by sickness fund), who are entitled to enter
into such contract. Claimant must be registered with a sickness fund.
No further contribution conditions. Hospital up to 70 days, but
90 percent of those insured have full coverage for small payment
to sickness fund. Cash benefit: So percent of wage (up to I 9
florins per day) and one-third of this(payable to family) if insured
in hospital, for up to 52 weeks (in case of tuberculosis in some cases
for three years). Maternity grant of 55 florins and maternity allowance of I oo percent of wage or salary (up to I 9 florins per day)
for six weeks before and six weeks after confinement.
4·

FAMILY ALLOWANCES

Covering all employed persons and others, with respect to each
child under I6 (in cases of incapacity or full time education up
to 27) on ascending scale, 58 cents per day for first, 6 5 cents
per day for second and third, 9 I cents per day for fourth and fifth
and I 02 cents per day for sixth and further children. Financed by
employer contribution of 5 percent of wage or salary up to I9
florins per day. Special supplement of IO cents per child per day for
employees earning less than I 6 florins per day.

5.

OLD AGE, DISABILITY, SURVIVORS' PENSIONS

Distinguish between the general old age insurance for the entire
population (employed or not) in force since I 9 57, and the special
old age, disability, and survivors' insurance for employees.
General insurance covering all persons resident or employed in
the Netherlands between ages I 5 and 64, irrespective of income or
nationality. Financing: Contribution of (until I962) 6.7 5 percent
of total income, up to 7,450 florins annually, payable by insured and
in case of employees deducted from wage or salary by employer and
paid over by him. Right to pension from age 65: 972 florins annually for single person, I, 584 florins for married couple. Condition: Payment of contribution for so years, but, generally speaking,
all those over I 5 on January I, I 9 57, deemed, subject to certain conditions, to have paid 50 years' contributions. Under final system 2
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percent deducted for each year of non-payment. Amount of pension
variable (adapted to wage index).
Special (additional) insurance of all employees over I4 earning
up to s,6oo florins per year, or having previously earned less, reaching s,6oo florins but no more than 6,900 florins (persons earning
more can join voluntarily and pay their own contribution), no one
over 3S can enter insurance for the first time. Financing: weekly
contribution from 25 to 6o cents, payable by employer, amount
depending on age and sex of employee, 6o cents for man, 50
cents for woman over 21. Contribution condition: payment of
I so contributions for disability pension. Benefits: old age pension
from age 6 s, pension in case of disability (i.e., reduction of normal
earning capacity by two-thirds or more whether permanent or, if
exceeding six months, temporary) amounts varying with number of
contributions paid plus certain family increments. In case of disability also special medical services. Widows' and orphans' pensions
depending on amount of contributions paid.
6.

INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND DISEASES

(Special legislation applicable to seamen, agriculture, etc. not considered.) Normally (see above) through Social Insurance Bank,
but employer may be authorized to insure through private insurance
company or as self-insurer. Financing: contribution paid by employer in accordance with the "risk category" (there are 93) to
which his plant belongs, percentage of wages up to I 9 florins per
day. Covers all employees against risk arising from (fatal or nonfatal) industrial accident, i.e., sudden event caused by external
force and resulting in impairment of physical or mental integrity,
in the course of employment, including during way to or from work,
or from one of the prescribed industrial diseases. Benefits: medical,
surgical, etc., treatment and re-training. In case of reduction of
working capacity by at least so percent up to 42 days So percent of
wages (up to I9 florins per day) (or one third of this if in hospital
and without family). In case of total incapacity to work (after 42
days) for I 2 months So percent of wages (up to I 9 florins per day)
and after that 70 percent. In case of partial incapacity proportionate
reduction, further reduction in certain cases of hospitalization, but
up to Ioo percent in case a permanent attendant is needed. Fatal
cases: funeral benefit and survivors' pensions for widow ( 30 percent), orphans up to age I 6 (Is or 20 percent), in certain cases
widower and certain relatives, aggregate to be no more than 6o percent of wage (up to I 9 florins per day).

Chapter VII

New Legal Remedies of Enterprises: A Survey
Eric Stein and Peter Hay*
The Community system is conceived of as "a government of laws"
rather than "a government of men." The Community Court of Justice is directed "to ensure observance of law and justice . . . in
the interpretation and application" of the Treaty. Any other system
would run counter to the basic principles underlying the democratic
institutions of the six Member States and would be incompatible
with their constitutions. A necessary component of this system is an
adequate armory of legal remedies available to persons whose rights
are unlawfully abridged by authorities administering the system.
Economic rights and interests of persons-individuals and enterprises-engaged in economic activities in the Community may be
affected in varying degrees by the acts of the Community institutions as well as by the acts of national authorities acting pursuant
to the Treaty or to a Community act. This applies to economic
rights and interests of natural persons whether or not they are
nationals of a Member State, as well as to legal persons whether or
not they are organized under the laws of a Member State or of a
non-member country if such persons are partly or wholly engaged
in economic activities within the Community. Thus, for example,
an American citizen doing business in the Community, a branch of
an American company or a subsidiary of an American parent may
be affected by these acts. 1 The principal purpose of this chapter is
*B.A., J.D., University of Michigan; Board of Editors, Michigan Law Review,
1957-58; Research Assistant, University of Michigan, 1958-59; University of Michigan
Foreign Law Fellow, Universities of Gottingen and Heidelberg, Germany, 1959-60;
Instructor of Law, University of Michigan, 196o-61.
[The authors are greatly indebted to Professor Paul Reuter of the Paris Law Faculty
and to Mr. Michel Gaudet, Director of the Legal Services of the European Communities, for their detailed and most helpful comments on this chapter.]
1
Art. 196 of the Euratom Treaty defines the term "person" as used in that Treaty as
"any natural person wholly or partly engaged in the territories of Member States
in activities" falling within the scope of the Treaty and the term "enterprise" as
"any enterprise or institution wholly or partly engaged in activities under the same
conditions, whatever may be its public or private legal status." Art. 8o of the CoalSteel Treaty provides that the term "enterprise" as used in that Treaty "refers to any
enterprise engaged in production in the field of coal and steel" within the Community
territory; "and in addition, with regard to Articles 6 5 and 66 as well as information
required for their application and appeals based upon them, to any enterprise or
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to outline the legal remedies available to enterprises against these
acts in the Community Court of Justice. Only brief reference is
made to remedies available in national courts. A study of national
remedies would entail an analysis of the procedural systems in the
six Member States, a task which is entirely beyond the scope of this
volume. Brief attention is given to legal remedies in suits based on
contracts to which the Community is a party and on tortious acts
imputed to the Community, as well as to the related conflict of laws
problems. Finally, the salient features of the procedure before the
Community Court and the Court's sources of law will be considered. 2
I. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS OF THE COMMUNITY
A. FORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTS

In the areas of their responsibility, the Council of Ministers and
the Commission adopt measures 3 which will be referred to here,
for want of a better term, as administrative acts. This term must not
obscure the fact that in form, content, and effect some of these acts
may resemble national legislation more than national administrative
measures. The effect of the administrative acts depends on whether
they take the form of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, or opinions. Of these, regulations resemble American
federal statutes in that they establish general rules applicable directly and without national implementing legislation in the Member States. Directives, on the other hand, are binding orders which
may be addressed only to Member States; they bind the Member
States as to the prescribed result but leave to each Member State
the choice of the means and legal form of implementation of the
order. 4 Decisions are individual rather than general acts and differ
from directives in that they may be addressed to an enterprise, as
well as to a Member State, and are binding in all respects. 5 Recomorganization regularly engaged in distribution other than sale to domestic consumers
or to craft industries-." The E.E.C. Treaty contains no similar definitions. It would
appear logical that the E.E.C. Treaty, like the two other Treaties, should be interpreted as applicable on the basis of the principle of territoriality. For the status of
aliens in the Community countries generally see 57• CoNGRES DES NOTAIRES DE FRANCE,
LE STATUT DE L'ETRANGER ET LE MARCHE COMMUN (1959).
• The composition and jurisdiction of the Court was outlined in "The New Institutions," Chapter II supra.
3
Art. 189.
• E.g., art. 69 provides for the implementation, by directives issued by the Council,
of the provisions of art. 67 concerning the abolition of restrictions on the free movement of capital.
5
E.g., art. 79 (4) empowers the Commission to issue decisions to remove discrimination practiced by carriers.
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mendations and opinions, finally, do not bind their addressees but
constitute advice to Member States or enterprises in those instances
in which the institutions have no power or do not choose to act with
a binding effect. 6 Recommendations and opinions are, nevertheless,
of importance because of the expertise of the Community institu~
tions 7 and of the possible measures which may be taken if a recom~
mendation or an opinion is disregarded. 8

B.

ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
AGAINST ENTERPRISES
I. IMPOSITION OF PENAL TIES

Failure to abide by a binding administrative act (regulation or
decision) subjects an enterprise to the enforcement procedure. Nor~
mally, such an administrative act will be enforced by fining the de~
linquent enterprise. 9 The E.E.C. Treaty does not expressly author~
ize enforcement by other means. 10
The Coal-Steel Community Treaty under which a number of fines
have been imposed specifically authorizes the High Authority to
impose penalties upon enterprises in a considerable number of instances; it envisages either a single fine 11 or a series of daily fines
for each day of continuing violation. 12 The E.E.C. Treaty expressly
requires penalties in one instance only: the Council must institute
fines to ensure observance of the antitrust provisions. 13 In addition,
• Art. 189 last para. The characterization of recommendations as "advice" points
up an interesting difference between them and the recommendations issued by political international organizations where recommendations are issued in lieu of decisions
and carry undeniable political weight. Nagel, Einige rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen
zu den Empfehlungen der 1' ereinten N ationen, des Europarates und des Nordirchen
Rates, 1958 lNTERNATIONALES RECHT UND DIPLOMATIE 223 at 234-235 (No. 3).
7
Examples are the recommendations concerning liberalization of capital beyond
the degree provided for by the Treaty (art. 71) and such technical problems as
special transport charges for frontier traffic (art. 81).
8
E.g., art. 91 (1) under which the Commission may authorize a Member State
injured by dumping to take "protective measures" against "the originator" of dumping who had disregarded the Commission's earlier recommendation to end the dumping.
• For the special enforcement procedures of the antitrust provisions pending regulation by the Council see Chapter X infra.
10
The E. C. S.C. Treaty did provide for one such instance in art. 66 ( 5) under which
illegal concentrations could be dissolved by forced sales and other measures.
11
Ordnungsstrafe; compare E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 66 ( 6).
"'This latter fine parallels the German concept of Zwangsgeld. E.C.S.C. Treaty
art. 65 (5).
13
"Geldbussen und Zwangsgelder," "amendes et . . . astreintes," art. 87 (2a). The
Treaty does, however, provide for other "measures" to assure compliance with Community policy apart from fines. Thus, art. 91 ( 1) provides that the Commission may
authorize Member States to take "protective measures" when parties guilty of dumping practices do not heed the Commission's recommendations.
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however, the Treaty contains a general provision to the effect that
the regulations adopted by the Council "may confer" on the Community Court "full jurisdiction in respect of penalties 14 provided
for in such regulations." 15 Consequently, it would seem that the
Council in any regulation may provide for penalties against enterprises and determine the respective roles of the Commission and
of the Community Court in the imposition of penalties. Three patterns seem possible.
1) The Treaty requires the Commission to "exercise the competence conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of
the rules laid down by the latter." 16 Thus the Council may authorize
the Commission to impose penalties on enterprises violating a Council regulation. In accordance with the general procedure discussed
below, the enterprise concerned may appeal the Commission decision
to the Community Court which may either sustain or annul the penaltyP
2) The Council may provide in its regulation that in hearing an
appeal from a Commission decision imposing a penalty the Court
exercises "full jurisdiction." 18 In that case the power of the Court
will be substantially broader than its general power of review on
appeal against administrative acts: the Court will act as a trial court
and consider such factors as the seriousness of the violation, recidivism, and the economic circumstances of the defendant. Moreover
the Court will not be limited to confirming or annuling the penalty
but will also be able to modify it. 19
""Zwangsmassnahmen," "sanctions." It should be noted that these terms are not
limited to fines.
16
Art. 172. Whether the Council may establish penalties and give the Court "full
jurisdiction" with regard to them for violation of the antitrust provisions only ( cf.
art. 87, 2a) or whether it may establish penalties for all its regulations and give the
Court "full jurisdiction" with respect thereto, depends on how art. 172 is interpreted.
The language of art. 172 admits of an extensive interpretation which appears preferable in order to render the Council's regulations effective. The meaning of "full
jurisdiction" will be discussed later.
18
Art. ISS·
17
Art. 173. See Part II, Section A, Subsections 3-4, infra.
18
Art. 172.
19
Daig, Die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der
Europiiischen Atomgemeinschaft, 44 ARCHIV DES OFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 132, at 184-186
(19s8) (hereinafter cited as Daig, ARCH. D. o. R.). Cf. E.C.S.C. Court competence of
review under art. 36 and 66 (4) of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. See also case 8-56 [19s8]
Journal Officiel de Ia Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de l'Acier 5, at 9·
According to Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europ'iischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jahren I956 und I957, 13 ]URISTENZEITUNG 204,
at 207 (I9S8), this conceptual difference in the scope of review by the Court was
modeled after French administrative law, which distinguishes between recours pour
exces de pouvoir (appeal against administrative acts with ordinary scope of review)
and recours de pleine juridiction ("full jurisdiction").
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3) The Council may determine that the penalties for infraction
of its regulation should be imposed by the Court itself exercising
"full jurisdiction" within the meaning described above. If this alternative is adopted, the Commission presumably would act as
prosecutor before the Court. 20
A further question arises, whether the Commission has an independent power to institute penalties for the violation of its own
regulations or of Council regulations, without being authorized to
do so by the Council. 21 The Treaty contains no express provision
- granting the Commission such power; it does accord the Commission a power "to ensure the application of the provisions of the
Treaty and of the provisions enacted by the institutions of the
Community in pursuance thereof" as well as "a power of decision
of its own" but only "under the conditions laid down in this
Treaty." 22 The Commission, composed of appointed and independent administrators, is conceived of predominantly as an "executive" and not a "law-making" institution. It is, therefore, doubtful
whether the Treaty could and should be interpreted so extensively as
to accord the "executive" an implied independent power to prescribe
penalties.
The Council and, in case of disagreement, the Community Court
will provide authoritative answers to these problems of Treaty interpretation. But it may be safely concluded that the Council has
the power to prescribe penalties for violation of any of its regulations and to authorize either the Commission or the Court to impose
such penalties.
It has been suggested that in the antitrust field at any rate the
Community Court exercising "full jurisdiction," rather than the
Commission, should have the original authority to impose penalties
because the Court's procedures more effectively safeguard rights of
the affected enterprises. 23 Under certain circumstances an enterprise
""Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. 185.
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21
The conferral of such broad discretionary law-making powers, which are ordinarily within the competence of the legislator, on the executive may also create difficulties
with regard to the constitutionality of such acts under the constitutions of the Member
States. This question has already been raised with regard to a regulation issued by
the Commission of the European Atomic Energy Community. See Everling, Die ersten
Rechtsetzungsakte der Organe der Europaischen Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER
52 (1959) No. z, and Meibom, Die Rechtsetzung durch die Organe der Europiiischen
Gemeinschaften, 14 BETRIEBS-BERATER 127 (1959) No. 4·
The E.E.C. Council Regulations Nos. 3 and 4 concerning the social security of
migrant workers, [1958] Journal Officiel 561, 597, have been said to raise questions of
constitutionality in France.
""Art. 155 para. 3·
23
Nebolsine et a!., The "Right of Defense" in the Control of Restrictive Practices
under the European Community Treaties, 8 AM. J. CaMP. L. 433 at 461 (1959).
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may prefer, however, to "accept" a penalty imposed by the Commission rather than to face the publicity of a public proceeding before the Court, particularly since the Commission may be more
indulgent than the Court.
2. COLLECTION OF MONETARY OBLIGATIONS

Only those administrative acts which create monetary obligations
are enforceable against an enterprise in the territories of the Member States under an express provision of the E.E.C. Treaty. These
acts include Council or Commission decisions creating monetary obligations or imposing fines for the violation of administrative acts. 24
These decisions as well as money judgments of the Community
Court are enforceable in the Member States. 25 Domestic authorities
in the Member State where execution takes place are authorized by
the Treaty only to require verification of the authenticity of the document containing the decision or judgment. Once the document is
verified they must grant execution in accordance with their own rules
of civil procedure. 26 Thus, the enforcement of judgments of the
Community Court is quite different and substantially easier than the
enforcement of foreign judgments. National courts cannot examine
whether the Community Court had jurisdiction, whether, on the
merits, the Community law was correctly applied, or whether the
enforcement would-be contrary to the "public policy" of the forum. 27
A collateral attack on Community acts or judgments therefore is
not possible in the course of the enforcement procedure. Only the
Community Court may suspend execution.
"'Under the E.C.S.C. Treaty pecuniary obligations other than fines were imposed
upon enterprises for instance by decisions setting forth the contributions to be made
by enterprises to the compensation scheme for scrap. See E.C.S.C., SEVENTH GENERAL
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITY 88-94 ( 1959),
25
Arts. 192 and 187.
.. For a discussion of the applicable national law, see OsTERHELD, DIE VoLLSTRECKUNG
VON ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DER E.G.K.S. IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 7o-84
( 1954).
27
This procedure can be explained by the fact that the Community Court is not
regarded as a "foreign court" in· the Member States. See MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA
CoMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 97 (1958). The requirement
of verification of the authenticity can thus not even be assimilated to an exequatur proceeding. See Dumon and Rigaux, La Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes
et /es juridictions des Etats membres, 19 ANNALES DE DROIT ET DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES
7, at 21 ( 1959). For the competence of German courts to go behind an ordinary
foreign judgment, see Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO) § 328; it might also be said that
German courts would not be able to go behind a Community judgment even absent
the express provision of art. 192 of the Treaty, on the ground that the Community
Court is not a "foreign" court but a supranational court for purposes of ZPO § 328.
Cf. in a different context, OsTERHELD, op. cit. supra note 26, at 73, n. 258.
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II. LEGAL REDRESS OF ENTERPRISES AGAINST
ADMINISTRATIVE ACfS
A. SUIT FOR ANNULMENT IN THE COMMUNITY
COURT OF JUSTICE

The composition of the Court and its diversified jurisdiction have
been described in general terms in the chapter dealing with the institutions of the Community. The experience with the Coal-Steel
Community Treaty has shown that from the viewpoint of an enterprise the most important aspect of the jurisdiction of the Court
is its power to review and annul administrative acts rendered by
the institutions. This will no doubt also be the case under the E.E.C.
Treaty; one must keep in mind, however, that since the E.E.C.
Treaty contains fewer rules directly applicable to enterprises, there
will be fewer occasions for enterprises to appeal to the Court in
the earlier stages of the Community at any rate and pending the
issuance of regulations by the Community institutions.
I. THE ENTERPRISE AS PARTY BEFORE
THE COMMUNITY COURT

The question of who may bring an appeal before the Court has
been of importance in the Coal-Steel Community, since there the
right to appeal is limited to coal and steel producers, while certain
distributors and buyers of coal and steel are able to sue in special
circumstances only. 28 A much disputed question was the extent to
which "outsiders," such as industrial users of coal and steel or labor
groups, would have access to the Court. In one case the Court refused to consider an appeal from an association of coal consumers. 29
This problem does not exist under the E.E.C. Treaty. The right
to appeal under the E.E.C. Treaty is granted under specified cir28
E.C.S.C. Treaty arts. 33 and 65-66 in connection with art. So and art. 63(2) (b).
See joint cases 7-54 and 9-54, Sammlung der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes [hereinafter cited as Sammlung], Vol. II, 53 and case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. Ill, 9, at 36.
29
Joint cases 8-54 and 10-54, Sammlung, Vol. II, 155 at 184. STEINDORFF, DIE
NICHTIGKEITSKLAGE IM RECHT DER EuROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FVR KOHLE UND STAHL
so-52, 127-129 ( 1952), who pleads for an application by analogy of the exceptions of
arts. 65 and 63 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty to all "outsiders" who are affected; MucH, DIE
AMTSHAFTUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT Fi.iR KoHLE UND STAHL 93
(1952), however, believes that outsiders have no enforceable claim for damages
against the Community arising out of the latter's administrative acts. See Schiile,
Grenzen der Klagebefugnis vor dem Gerichtshof der Montanunion, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT
FVR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 227 (1955-56). Steindorff,

Montanfremde Unternehmen in der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl,
8 }URISTENZEITUNG 718 (1953).

466
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE COMMON MARKET
cumstances to "any natural or legal person," 30 obviously because
the Community may affect almost any person or any type of enterprise within its jurisdiction.31 This right does not depend on any
specific legal status, nationality, or type of activity of the plaintiff
enterprise. Thus the Court will be open to American citizens or companies organized in the United States or to foreign companies controlled by American capital if the rights or interests of such citizens
or companies are affected in a manner specified in the Treaty.
There is reason to assume that the Court will interpret liberally
the provisions governing access to the Court. This expectation is supported by the clause of the Treaty, referred to above in the introduction to this chapter, which is called the "Magna Carta" of the Court;
it charges the Court with the duty of ensuring "observance of law
and justice in the interpretation and application of" the Treaty. 32
This expectation is also encouraged by the constitutional requirement of broad access to legal remedies inherent in any democratic
system of government under law. 33
2. ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS SUBJECT TO APPEAL

Since the object of legal redress is the protection of rights, an enterprise may appeal against regulations and decisions but not against
recommendations or opinions which are not binding and therefore
in law cannot affect rights. 84

J. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS
If, for example, an enterprise applies for exemption from the
antitrust provisions and the application is denied, on what grounds
can an appeal be taken to Court? 35 The Treaty provides four
grounds of appeal.3 6
I) The first ground is "incompetence" which consists of an ac30

Art. 173.
Cf. Pinay, La Cour de Justice des Communauth Europeennes, 1959 REVUE nu
MARCHE CoMMUN 138, at 143 (No. 12).
32
Art. 164; Daig, ARCH. D. 5. R. supra note 19, at I5D--I54·
32
The concept of "Rechtsstaatlichkeit." E.g., German Grundgesetz art. 19; cf. also
in a different context Everling, supra note 21, at 55, 58 and Meibom, id. at 131.
34
See note 68 infra concerning appeals against non-binding acts which are, in fact
"disguised decisions." Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der Europiiischen
Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jaltren I956-I957, 13 ]URISTENZEITUNG
31

204-205 (1958).
35
It is assumed here that in regulations to be issued under art. 87 the Council will
charge the Commission with the task to pass upon such application in the first instance.
•• Art. I73·
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tion by a Community institution "outside the defined limits of [its]
legal power" 37 and may perhaps be analogized to the concept of
ultra vires. 38
2) The second ground for appeal is the violation of a substantial
procedural requirement, such as the failure to adopt the administrative act by the requisite number of votes, the failure to comply
with requirements of publication or consultation with other bodies
(such as the Economic and Social Committee), or the failure to
give sufficient reasons for the act. 39 These requirements are based
on express provisions of the Treaty. However, this ground of appeal
may possibly be available not only in case of a violation of a procedural requirement set forth in the Treaty (i.e., "statutory requirement"), but also in case of a violation of a procedural requirement
to which the administrative act is "inherently [subject] from its
nature," 40 a concept which has its American analogy in the notions
of "due process" and "fair play." 41 It may well be that should the
competent institution refuse an application for exemption from the
antitrust provisions without according an opportunity to the applicant enterprise to present evidence, the decision will be subject to
annulment because of a defect in form even though the Treaty and
all applicable regulations are silent on the point. 42
3) The third ground, violatio':l of the Treaty, serves to contest
the administrative act because of an incorrect interpretation of the
Treaty or "of any legal provision relating to its application," such
37
VALENTINE, THE CoURT OF }USTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY,
71 (1954).
38
For instance the plaintiff argued the High Authority's incompetence in the E.C.S.C.
case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 197, at 228, 307-314, but the Court rejected this alleged
ground.
•• In E.C.S.C. case 6-54 plaintiff charged that the High Authority's decision was
not based on sufficient reasons as required by arts. 5 and 15 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
The Court held that the reasons given were sufficient. Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 232233; a similar allegation in E.C.S.C. case 2-56 was rejected by the Court on the
ground that the High Authority was not bound to meet all possible arguments in its
reasons, but needed only state the factual and legal considerations on which it bases
its decision. Sammlung, Vol. III, 9, at 37-38. Finally, in the more recent E.C.S.C.
case 9-56 the Court held that the recital of reasons in two short paragraphs did not
constitute compliance with the requirement to give reasons; having found, inter alia,
that the lack of sufficient reasons constituted a major violation of procedure, the
Court annulled the High Authority's decision. Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 28-31. The
requirement to give reasons for regulations, directives and decisions is contained in
E.E.C. Treaty art. 190.
0
' VALENTINE, op. cit. supra note 37, at 72.
41
Cf. Administrative Procedure Act 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958); F.C.C. v. Potsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, at 143 (1939).
•• Cf. Nebolsine, 8 AM. ]. CoMP. L. supra note 23, at 462.
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as a regulation, or because of a complete absence of facts to support
the act. 43 Violation of the Treaty has been argued extensively in
many cases involving the Coal-Steel Treaty and the Court has developed a sizable body of law. 44
4) Finally an administrative act may be attacked for detournement de pouvoir, best translated as "misapplication of power,"
which results whenever an organ has exercized its power to achieve
an end not envisioned in the grant of power. Although alleged in
several Coal-Steel cases, 45 thus far the Court has not relied on it as
a basis for annulment. 46
These grounds for appeal are modeled on those of French administrative law in which they are known collectively as appeals for
exces de pouvoir/1 that is, appeals to prevent governmental agencies
from exceeding their powers. They show considerable similarity to
the administrative law of the other Member States 48 and even of
England and the United States. Belgian and Luxembourgian administrative laws in this area are almost exactly like the French. 49 The
43
Cf. the excellent analysis by Steindorlf, op. cit. supra note 29, at r3o-13I, with
regard to the E.C.S.C. as well as his comparative analysis of French law, id. at 55-76.
See also case 6-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 235-236.
44
In case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 9, at 38 the Court had to decide whether the
High Authority's reference to the general principles of E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 4 in
applying and interpreting the anti-cartel provisions of the Treaty constituted a violation of the Treaty. The Court held that the High Authority did not violate the Treaty
by interpreting the specific prohibition against discrimination of art. 65 in conformity
with the general principles of art. 4· Id. at 44, 45· Any other interpretation would
have led the Court to the untenable proposition that some parts of the Treaty are
contrary to other parts of the Treaty. Daig, Die Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofes der
Europiiischen Gemeinschaft fiir Kohle und Stahl in den Jahren I956 und I957, 13
]URISTI!NZI!ITUNG 238 at 239· On the other hand, the Court annulled the High Authority's decision concerning price publication because it was based on an incorrect interpretation of E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 6o (case 1-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, at 23-33); the
Court also annulled the decision involved in case 9-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at
32-33, inter alia, because the High Authority had violated arts. 5 and 47 of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty by not publishing certain information and data as it was required
to publish. For ·a discussion of cases 1-54 and 2-56 see Stein, The Court of Justice of
the European Coal atzd Steel Community: I95¢-I957, 51 AM. J. INT'L. L. 821, at 821824 and 828-829 ( 1957) and Stein, The EuroPean Coal and Steel Community: The
Beginning of its Judicial Process, 55 CoL. L. REV. 985 (1955).
""'E.g., cases r-54, 6-54, 8-55, 9-55. See Stein, articles cited in note 44 supra.
'"See text at notes 54-56 infra for discussion of case 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung,
Vol. IV, 9, at 34-47 and 51, at 73-85 where plaintiff charging detournement de pouvoir
prevailed.
07
STI!INDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 53-83 and literature cited there.
48
With regard to the E.E.C. Treaty see Erliiuterungen der Bundesregierung zum
I' ertrag zur Griindung der Europiiisc!zen JVirtschaftsgemeinschaft, HANDBUCH FUR
EUROPAISCHI! WIRTSCHAFT I/Teil A/3o at 77, where it is said that the grounds of
appeal of art. 173 are the same as in German constitutional and administrative law.
Cf. Daig, ARCH. o.o.R. supra note 19, at 173-174·
49
WIGNY, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 371-375 (1953). Lievens, The Cotzsei/ d'Etat in
Belgium, 7 AM. ]. COMP. L. 572, at 586, 587 (1958).
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Italian law provides for similar grounds of appeal with the difference that detournement or sviamento di potere, is not an independent
ground for appeal but may be asserted only in support of one of the
other grounds of appeal-for example, violation of law-which
are collectively known as eccesso di pot ere. 50 Detournement is an
independent ground for appeal under Dutch law together with the
other three grounds included in the E.E.C. Treaty. 51 German law,
finally, recognizes as grounds for appeal the administrator's incompetence to act, the violation of statutory procedural requirements,
and violation of law, 52 as well as misapplication of power which is
understood in very much the same way a:s the French detournement
de pouvoir. 53 In those cases under the Coal-Steel Treaty where the
ground of detournement was pressed the Court tended to employ
the French definition of the term. In one case the plaintiff attacked a
decision of the High Authority establishing a subsidiary organ on
the ground of detournement de pouvoir. The Court upheld the plaintiff and annulled the decision primarily because of an unlawful delegation of power. 54 The Court intimated that the Treaty had been
violated since "the guarantee of the balance of power" among the
institutions had been upset by the unlawful delegation of power by
the Authority to the new organ. 5 5 The Court did not inquire whether
or not there was a detournement but having found an irregularity
proceeded to decree the annulment. 56
Detournement de pouvoir has also served the Court as a basis
for broadening the right of appeal of enterprises under the CoalSteel Community Treaty.
Grounds for appeal similar to those of the E.E.C. Treaty are
found in common law countries. Although review of administrative
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

50

MATHIJSEN, LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER

119 (1958).
51
/d. at 120.
•• I FORSTHOFF, LEHRBUCH DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 2II-215, 218, 225 (7. Auflage
1958).
53
Lagrange in the conclusions in case 3-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 131, at 177, 178; but
see Laun, Bemerkungen zum freien Ermesscn. und zum detournement de pouvoir im
staatlichen und im J'o/kerrecht, in: MENSCH UND STAAT IN RECHT UND GESCHICHTE,
FESTSCHRIFT FUR HERBERT KRAUS 128, at 147, 148 (1954).
54
Case 9-56 and 10-56, Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 34-47.
55
Case 9-56, id., at 44· As Prof. Reuter, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 142
(1958-1959), points out, this case is especially interesting since the issue of a subsidiary
organ brings to mind the famous case of Montpeurt of French administrative law
(C.E. 31 July 1942, [1942] Sirey, Jur. III, 37) and the Advisory Opinion of the l.C.J.
on the Effect of awards of compensation made by the U.N. Administrative Tribunal,

Advisory Opinion of July I]tlz, I954: I.C.J. Reports I954, p. 47·
56
Cf. Rivero, Le probleme de /'influence des droits internes sur Ia Cour de Justice
de Ia C.E.C.A., (1958) ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 295, at 304-305.
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acts in England is now usually provided for in the statutes establishing administrative agencies-and in terms which often differ substantially from one statute to the next-some general observations
can perhaps be made. English law of judicial review revolves around
the question of whether the administrative agency has "exceeded its
jurisdiction." 57 Exceeding jurisdiction includes exceeding its powers
(ultra vires), procedural defects, that is, failure to observe mandatory procedural requirements or rules of "natural justice" (due
process), and "error of law on the face of the record," that is, violation of law. 5 8 "Abuse of discretion," finally, includes the increasingly
important element of "improper purpose" which seems to be similar to detournement de pouvoir in Community law. As is true of
Community administrative law, English law grants no right of appeal when the agency can show that it pursued in good faith a proper
as well as an improper purpose. 59 In the United States where judicial
review of federal administrative acts is treated as are appeals from
lower courts, 60 judicial review of administrative acts may be obtained on the grounds of ultra vires, violation of law, disregard of
the requirements of procedural due process, and abuse of discretion.61 "Improper purpose" does not seem to offer a ground for
review. However, because of the relatively broad scope of review
asserted by American courts, adoption of an act for an "improper
purpose" perhaps might be challenged as an abuse of discretion. 62
4·

SCOPE OF THE RIGHT OF APPEAL OF ENTERPRISES

a. Direct Appeal Against Binding Acts
An enterprise may appeal against a decision addressed to it. In
addition, it may appeal against a decision which, although in the
form of a general regulation or a decision addressed u to another
person," is "of direct and specific concern" to it. 63 Thus if an inGRIFFITH AND STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 212-229 (2d ed. 1957).
I d. at 212, 215, 218.
Cases I-54 and 2-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 7, at 34 and 79, at III; case 8-55,
Sammlung, Vol. II, I97, at 314-319; cf. Westminster Corp. v. L.N.W. Ry., [1905]
A. C. 426; Municipal Council of Sydney v. Campbell, [I925] A.C. 338.
60
SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW I09 (I950).
61
I d. at II3; cf. also STEINDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 90 and 95-96. Administrative Procedure Act§ 9(e), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958) .
.. The "Hoover Commission" recommended that the scope of review should be
broadened to permit the courts to reverse for "unwarranted exercise" of discretion.
This was intended to permit review where it was alleged that agency action was
taken for an improper purpose. Report on Legal Services and Procedures of U.S.
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government (1953-1955)
215-217.
83
Art. 173, para. 2. Cf. the French text: ". . . les decisions qui, bien que prises
so us l' apparence d'un reglement ou d'une d6cision addressee a une autre personne,
57
58

59
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stitution issues what purports to be a regulation, but which in fact
affects a single enterprise only, an appeal would lie. Again, an enterprise should be able to appeal a decision addressed to its competitors authorizing a cartel agreement among them if a similar
authorization has previously been denied to it, but there may be
some question whether the language of the Treaty permits such appeal. If such appeal does not lie, the only recourse remaining to the
enterprise would be to re-submit its application for an authorization
to the Commission with a view to appealing a second denial to the
Court. Thus defined the right of appeal is narrower than that
granted under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty. 64
The language of the E.E.C. Treaty seems to exclude an appeal
against regulations except where they affect a single enterprise. Nor
does it allow an appeal against a decision or a directive addressed
to aM ember State which will cause the latter to take administrative
or legislative action against an enterprise. If an enterprise has no
way in national courts to restrain its national government from
complying with an illegal Community directive and if it is barred
from an appeal to the Community Court, it will be without any
remedy. As is true of American courts which refuse to review administrative action where the plaintiff is "anyone who asserts no
more than his interest as a member of the public" 65 (absent a "case
or controversy"), the Treaty understandably seeks to exclude appeals based on insubstantial and remote interests. A problem might
arise, however, of reconciling the requirement contained, for instance, in the German constitution that legal redress must be available against every administrative act 66 with the necessity of avoiding abuse of the judicial process. The Court may in due course define "direct and specific concern" of enterprises claiming the right of
appeal. It is difficult to foresee whether the Court will be able to
elevate the concept of "direct and specific concern" to a general test
by which it would measure the right of appeal in those cases where
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

Ia concernant directement et individuellement." The German text: ". . . Entscheidungen . . . , die, obwohl sie als Ferordnung oder als eine an cine andere Person
gerichtete Entscheidung ergangen sind, sie unmittelbar und individuell betreffen."
[Emphasis added.]
64
E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 33 grants enterprises a right of appeal not only against
decisions addressed to them and against "general decisions" (i.e., decisions purporting to contain general rules roughly comparable to regulations under the E.E.C.
Treaty) which are "concealed decisions" but also against "recommendations" (comparable to directives under the E.E.C. Treaty) and "general decisions" in which a
detournement de pouvoir was committed against the enterprise.
65
ScHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON LAW WoRLD 191
(1954); cj. GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND COMMENTs 20'f-242
( 1954).
66
German Grundgesetz art. 19 (4).
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such right is claimed by an enterprise but is not expressly accorded
in the Treaty. From the viewpoint of an enterprise it would certainly be more desirable to permit it to appeal whenever its interests
were directly affected than to limit arbitrarily the right of appeal
to appeals against specified administrative acts. 67

b. Collateral Attack Against Regulations
An appeal must be brought within two months from the date of
the publication of the regulation in the official journal of the Communities or from communication of the directive or decision to the
addressee or, absent such communication, from the day the addressee obtained knowledge of the act. Since regulations are in the
nature of general laws, it may be impossible to determine within
two months whether an enterprise is "affected" in the sense that permits it to appeal. For this reason the Treaty provides that whenever a regulation becomes the subject of a dispute in any legal proceeding, any party may question its validity on any ground on which
the regulation could have been attacked directly, regardless of the
lapse of time since its publication. 68 It may well be that this broad
right of "indirect appeal" will be used as a substitute for direct appeals against regulations which enterprises may not be permitted to
bring. Despite the specific Treaty language an effort might also be
made to make "indirect appeals" available not only against regulations but against other acts as well in order to create legal protection
against acts which cannot be attacked directly. 69
The Court is not given the power to annul an indirectly contested
61
An attempt to arrive at a general test of "interest" was made under the E.C.S.C.
Treaty for the purpose of resolving the difficult question of whether a given administrative act was "individual" or "general" in character and thus did or did not entitle
enterprises to appeal. Such a test has been urged repeatedly by writers, (Rivero, supra
note 56, No. 14 at 302; Steindorff, Die EuroPiiischen Gemeinschaften in der Rechtsprechung, 8 ARCHlY DES VoLKERRECHTS 50, at 66 (1959); Court Advocate Romer in cases
7-54 and 9-54, Sammlung, Vol. II, 105, at III and IZD-127. Court Advocate Lagrange
in case 8-55, id., 231, at 248 and in case 15-57, id., Vol. IV, 205, at zn), and in at
least one case the E.C.S.C. Court seemed to have accepted this test (case 7-54 and 954, Sammlung, Vol. II, 53, at 84). Cf. also Belgium, Conseil d'Etat, 8 juin 1951, 5-6
Recueil de Jurisprudence du Droit Administratif 281; Lievens, AM. ]. CoMP. L. supra
note 49, at 585; LAUBADERE, TRAITE ELiiMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF Nos. 635-643,
623, 626 and 629; FoRSTHOFF, op. cit. supra note 52, at 501.
""Art. 184. The E.C.S.C. Treaty recognizes such an indirect appeal against general
decisions in appeals against fines only. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 36 par. 3· Cf. case 9-56,
Sammlung, Vol. IV, 9, at 25-28.
66
Daig (ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 177) seems to favor extending availability
of the indirect appeal beyond the language of art. 184, which limits it to regulations,
to all other acts of the Community organs, where the time limitation for the bringing
of a direct appeal has run. He argues that the indirect appeal is designed to broaden
the available legal protection rather than merely provide for special situations.
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regulation. It is merely authorized to hold it "inapplicable." It has
been argued, however, that the result will be essentially the same
because Community institutions as well as national courts are bound
to comply with the legal interpretations rendered by the Court.'0
c. Appeal Against Decisions "Disguised" as
Recommendations or Opinions
A recommendation or opinion, although not binding and not appealable, may in effect reflect a policy which the Community institution has adopted and will enforce by means of binding administrative acts, for example, if the recommendation or opinion is not
heeded. For purposes of legal certainty and commercial security, an
enterprise may therefore desire a determination of the legality of
the position taken by the institution in the recommendation or opinIOn.

Several situations of this kind seem possible. For example, the
Commission might address a recommendation to an enterprise to
desist from what it considers dumping practices. The enterprise
knows that if it disobeys the Commission may authorize "the Member State injured" to take "protective measures" defined by the
Commission. 71 Or, the Community institution for reasons of its
own might choose to recommend action in the antitrust field which
it has the authority to make obligatory by a binding appealable deCISIOn.

In several cases arising under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty
it was argued that the Court could not consider an appeal because
the contested act of the Community institution was not binding. The
Court has held, however, that acts will be considered binding and
thus appealable ("disguised decisions") if they contain provisions
which can be applied. In other words, where the High Authority
had made abundantly clear in administrative acts what position it
would take, should stated conditions later obtain, those acts were
considered appealable. In several cases the Court, following this
reasoning, has found acts appealable. On the other hand it refused
to entertain an appeal against an "opinion" in which the High Authority took a negative view of certain investment plans of a steel
70
It is argued further that the Court may also adjudicate which parts of the regulation are to remain in force, a competence which the Treaty confers on the Court
expressly only in the case of annulment of regulations on direct appeal. Ibid.
71
Art. 91 ( 1). It could possibly be argued on the basis of the general Treaty framework that the Commission may address a recommendation to a Member State only
rather than to an enterprise.
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producer. The Court did so despite the fact that the "opinion" had
grave economic consequences for the enterprise concerned and was
thought by some to contain a clearly implied threat of sanctions. In
this case the Court stressed the fact that the "opinion" did not impose any legal obligations on the enterprise. 72 It is interesting to
compare this latter approach with the recent judgment of a U.S.
District Court. It held a "report" by the Interstate Commerce Commission reviewable because of its "immediate and practical impact"
on the enterprise concerned. 73
The E.E.C. Treaty provides expressly that only "acts other than
recommendations or opinions" are subject to judicial review. 74 However, this provision was hardly intended to exclude appeals against
such recommendations and opinions which are in fact "disguised
decisions," since decisions remain decisions regardless of the form
in which they are issued. 75
A different situation may arise where the Commission renders an
unfavorable opinion with regard to a project which forms the basis
for an application by an enterprise for a loan from the European
Investment Bank. In such event the Board of Directors may grant
a loan by a unanimous vote only which means that the opinion may
prejudice the applicant in a very real sense. 76 This case may be distinguished on the ground that a grant of a loan is a privilege rather
than a right or legally protected interest. Thus an enterprise would
not have a legal remedy against an unfavorable opinion of the Commission even if in fact the opinion was the cause of the denial of the
application by the Board of Directors of the Bank. Nor would the
enterprise have recourse to the Court against the negative decision
of the Board of Directors. 77
72
Case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 197, at 224 and conclusions of Advocate General
Lagrange id. 231, at 245; case 9-55, id. 331, at 363; joint cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57,
Sammlung, Vol. III, 83, at II5-II6; joint cases 1-57 and 14-57, id., 213, at 234-235.
See a comment by Jerusalem, Die Rechtslage der Unternehmen in der Montanunion, II
NEUE }URISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 410 ( 1958); MATHIJSEN, op. cit. supra note so, at
6o-62. Cf. Bebr, The Development of a Community Law by the Court of the European
Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REV. 845, at 869 ( 1958) on extensive interpretation of what is an appealable "individual decision" under the E.C.S.C. Treaty.
73
Garden City Floral v. United States, (D. C. Mont.) 143 F. Supp. 609, at 6u
(1956) relying on Frozen Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40, at 43-44 (1956),
involving a determination of "agricultural commodities" within the meaning of
§ 203 (b) (6) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
"E.E.C. art. 173. Cf. E.C.S.C. art. 33· For a definition of "recommendations" in the
E.C.S.C. Treaty see art. 14.
75
See note 72 supra, particularly cases 8-55 and 9-55.
7
"Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank art. 2r (6).
77
The conclusions of the Board of Directors may only be contested by Member States
or the Commission and only on the ground of infringement of specified procedural requirements. Art. r8o(c).
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d. "Unclassified" Acts
Closely connected with the last problem is the question of the
appealability of Community acts "other than recommendations or
opinions" which do not fit the categories of "regulation," "directive," or "decision." Although in many cases it may be possible to
draw analogies to these categories, it may be difficult to do so in
some. In numerous cases the Treaty provides that the Council or
Commission is to "authorize," "approve," "decide," "provide,"
"lay down rules" or "adopt measures" without specifying the form
of the administrative act. 78 Again, the Treaty authorizes the Council to conclude international agreements on behalf of the Community without specifying the form of the act by which the Council
gives final approval to such agreements. 79
The problem is twofold: Is the Community free to choose any
form where the Treaty does not specify the type of act and, secondly, how does this affect an enterprise's right of appeal? The
choice of the form of an act was discussed earlier in the chapter on
"The New Institutions." With respect to the enterprise's right to
appeal against such "unclassified acts," it will be recalled that the
right is given in general terms with regard to ''acts other than
recommendations or opinions." The use of such a broad term without a defined meaning should be a sufficient basis to allow appeals
against those acts of the Council or the Commission which do not
fit the above categories but require judicial control because of their
legal impact on the enterprise.

5·

THE SUIT FOR INACTION

Since the Treaty requires the Community to exercise certain
powers, a provision had to be included whereby the Council and the
Commission may be compelled to act when they fail to exercise their
powers. This type of suit is familiar to the common lawyer in the
form of a mandamus proceeding whereby an official may be compelled to perform a statutory duty or to exercise a discretionary
18
Everling, BETRIEBS-BERATER supra note 21, at 52, footnotes 18, 19. Art. 51 provides
that the Council shall "adopt . . . measures" in the field of social security for migrant workers. The Council enacted two regulations on the basis of this article: Regulations Nos. 3 and 4, [1958] Journal Olliciel 561, 597·
79
Art. 228 and art. 238. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 167, recognizes the
possibility of an appeal against such acts of approval under art. 173 but doubts whether
this was intended. It seems that appealability of such acts of approval merely depends on
whether they can be assimilated to other binding Community acts and appealed on
the same conditions.
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power but not to exercise such power in any particular manner. 80 In
the E.E.C. the legal means for compelling such action is the suit for
inaction. Its scope is wider than that of a similar suit under the
Coal-Steel Community Treaty. 81
In order to institute such an action the enterprise must allege
that the Community institution has failed to address a decision to
it ("an act other than a recommendation or an opinion") and that
the inaction is in violation of the Treaty. Thus after the Council
has issued the regulations implementing the antitrust provisions as
envisaged in the Treaty, an enterprise, relying on the regulations,
would be able to sue if the Commission should fail to act on its application for exemption from the antitrust provisions. 82 Two observations must be made in this context. First, the language of the
Treaty is specific enough to exclude a suit by the enterprise for a
failure of the institution to address a decision to another enterprise
or to a Member State, or to issue a directive or a regulation. Such
a suit is reserved to the Member States only. Secondly, of the four
grounds enumerated above on which appeal can be taken against an
administrative act, "violation of the Treaty" seems to be the only
ground on which a suit for inaction may be instituted.
Yet there are cases where choice by the Commission of a recommendation (or opinion) rather than a decision would not of itself
constitute a violation of the Treaty. In making this choice, the Commission may nevertheless be guided by improper motives. Thus,
while an enterprise may not be able to sue for annulment of the
opinion (since it is a non-binding act), it is arguable that it should
be able to bring what would amount to a suit for inaction (for fail80
GRIFFITH AND STREET, op. cit. supra note 57, at 233-236; cf. Wade, The Courts
and the Administrati'Ve Process, 63 LAW Q. REv. 164 at 170 (1947); Reg. v. Belfast
Corp., 1954 N.I. Rep. 122 at 125-126. American cases are collected in GELLHORN AND
BYsE, op. cit. supra note 65, at 379-424. Two recent New York cases are fairly representative of the American position. In Berger v. Dumper, 160 N.Y.S. 2d. 530 (1957),
and in Corrigan v. Jansen, 173 N.Y.S. 2d. 894 (1958), the applications for mandamus
were dismissed because the defendants had neither failed to act in violation of a duty
imposed by law nor had made an "arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious" use of their
discretionary power. Corrigan case at 897.
81
Art. 175. The E.C.S.C. Treaty regards the suit for inaction merely as a particular
aspect of the suit for annulment. It is likened to an appeal for the annulment of an
"implied negative decision." E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 35· Daig, JuRISTENZEITUNG supra
note 34, 204 at 206-207. The E.E.C. Treaty provides for two separate actions, As a
result, the scope of the suit for inaction under that Treaty cannot be determined by
analogies to the suit for annulment. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 178. See also
the appeal lodged recently by the Chambre Syndicale de Ia Siderurgie Fran~aise in
[1959] Journal Officiel 683.
""It is assumed for the purpose of this illustration that in the regulations which the
Council is required to issue under art. 87 the Commission will be charged with the task
of passing upon such applications.
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ure to issue a decision) by urging that the choice of the opinion constituted a detournement de pouvoir. Such a right could be justified
on the ground that only incomplete legal protection would be afforded if the Community institutions could refuse to issue appealable acts for demonstrably improper motives with immunity from
judicial control. 83
No remedy is available to an enterprise in the Community Court
against a Member State which has failed to act in violation of its
Treaty obligation. Only other Member States and the Commission
are given the right to sue before the Community Court for a determination that a Member State has failed to fulfill its obligation
under the Treaty; the enterprise concerned would therefore have
to induce a government or the Commission to institute action on its
behal£. 84 Nor, as shown above, can the enterprise bring suit for inaction in the Community Court against the Commission for failing
to sue the Member State. To the extent that a remedy exists at all, it
would have to be sought through national procedures.
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

6.

RELIEF IN A SUIT FOR INACTION AND
APPEAL FOR ANNULMENT

The purpose of the suit for inaction is to establish the duty of the
institution to act. The Court therefore may determine the existence
and timing of the duty to act but the contents of the required act
must be left to the institution itself. Thus, in the example used earlier, the Court may find that the institutions must act on the application for authorization of a cartel agreement; the institution is left
free, however, to grant or deny the application.
The same principle applies in appeals for annulment. The Court
may only annul the contested Community act, but it may not substitute its own judgment as to the kind of act required; the institution concerned has the duty to substitute an appropriate act for the
annulled one.
In practice, of course, the judgment of the Court in a suit for inaction or on appeal will frequently indicate at least by implication
the elements of the act which the defendant institution will be required to issue "for the implementation of the judgment." 85
83
See Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 179. The Court will have to rule on the
scope of the suit for inaction in joint cases 24-58 and 34-58 now pending before it.
84
Arts. 170 and r69. Judgments rendered against Member States are not enforceable.
These types of suits are known as Feststellungsklagen in German law since they do
not carry any sanction.
85
Arts. 176 para. r, 174, 175 para. r.
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Claims for damages against the Community arising from the act
annulled by the Court are not affected by the judgment of annulment
but may be pressed against the Community in a separate action. 86

7·

THE SCOPE OF REVIEW BY THE COURT

The Coal-Steel Community Treaty provides that the Court may
not review "the High Authority's evaluation of the situation, based
on economic facts and circumstances," which led to the administrative act, unless detournement de pouvoir or clear misinterpretation of the Treaty law is alleged. Only in such circumstances was
the Court authorized to examine, for instance, whether the decision
of the High Authority to fix maximum coal prices was warranted
economicallyY An express limitation of this type was not included
in the E.E.C. Treaty which is, indeed, wholly silent on the point.
The question thus arises whether the Court-for instance in reviewing a decision denying an application for exemption from the
cartel provisions-is free to inquire whether the institution has
evaluated correctly the economic circumstances and conditions, or
whether it must accept the economic conclusions of the institution
and is limited to a review of the legality of the decision. The lack
of an express authorization such as was included in the Coal-Steel
Treaty might be interpreted as barring the Court from any review
of the economic conclusions; or, at the least, it might be taken to
indicate that the power of the Court to review conclusions is limited.
On the other hand, it appears fairly clear that the absence of an
express provision should not be interpreted as depriving the Court
of any and all power to review economic conclusions. The Court
must be free-as it is under the Coal-Steel Community Treaty-to
review such conclusions where the subjective motivation of the administrator is an issue determinative of the legality of this act, that
is, when the administrative act is attacked by an allegation of detournement de pouvoir. At least in that case the Court must be able
to inquire into the conclusions if it is to determine whether the administrator has applied his power to an improper end. 88 In those
86

Arts. 176 para. 2 and 215.
E.C.S.C. art. 33 par. 1. Case 6-54, Sammlung, Vol. I, 213, at 235-236. See Matthies,
Zur Nachpriifungsbe/ugnis des Gerichtshofs der Montanunion, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND Vi:iLKERRECHT 427, at 443-450 (1955/56).
88
See Daig, ARCH. D. i:i. R. supra note 19, at 175. Contra Bebr, The Development of a
Community Law by the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 845, at 858, n. So (1958), who regards art. 172 as the only instance where the
Court may be given an unlimited right of review. It has been suggested that the Court
should be given "full jurisdiction" to review the facts in cases where an application
for exemption from antitrust provisions was denied. Nebolsine, 8 AM. ]. COMP. L. 433
supra note 23, at 461.
·
87
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instances, of course, where the Court exercises "full jurisdiction," its
right with respect to the review of facts and economic conclusions is
in no way limited.
In this context, English and American parallels are of interest.
In English courts, as in the Community Court, the scope of review
extends merely to testing the legality of administrative acts. As a
result, an administrative decision unsupported by any facts whatsoever may not be quashed on that ground; however, a total lack of
facts may provide sufficient basis for quashing on other grounds
such as "error of law on the face of the record," "bad faith," or "unreasonableness." 89 In the same situation the Community Court
could annul an administrative act for violation of the Treaty or
perhaps also for detournement de pouvoir.
The scope of judicial review in the United States is substantially
wider than in England or in the Community.90 On the basis of the
Administrative Procedure Act the United States Supreme Court
has held in several recent cases that while the findings of an administrative agency are entitled to respect, "they must nevertheless be set
aside when the record before a Court of Appeals clearly precludes
the. . . . [agency's J decision from being justified by a fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed
judgment on matters within its special competence or both." 91 A
review of this breadth could be undertaken by the Community Court
apparently only upon a showing of detournement de pouvoir.

B.

REDRESS IN NATIONAL COURTS
I. JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATION ON NATIONAL COURTS

An enterprise may not seek the annulment of a Community act
in national courts. The Treaty vests exclusive jurisdiction in the
Community Court to review the validity of and strike down the administrative acts of the Community institutions. It bars any assertion of similar jurisdiction by national courts. On the other hand,
national courts are not deprived of their jurisdiction over cases
89
GRIFFITH AND STREET, op. cit. supra note 57, at 224-225; cf. R. v. Furnished Houses
Rent Tribunal for Paddington and St. Marylebone, Ex parte Kendal Hotels, Ltd.,
( 1947) I All E.R. 448, 450. Cf. Re The London County Council Order 1938, ( 1945)
2 All E.R. 484.
90
SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 6o, at 109.
91
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, at 490 (1951); this test was
followed in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, at n2 (1956), and in
F.T.C. v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, at 40o-4oi (1958) where it was said that
the Court of Appeals is required to make a "fair assessment" of the record. Also Administrative Procedure Act,§ 9(a) and (c), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958). Cf. Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44 A.B.A.}. 945 (1958).
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which may involve the application of the Treaty or of a Community
act. But under Article I77 the Community Court has exclusive jurisdiction to render a final and binding interpretation of the Treaty
and the acts of the Community institutions.
Thus, if any question concerning the interpretation of the Treaty
or of an act of the Community institution or of the validity of such
act arises in national judicial proceedings, the national court may,
"if it considers that its judgment depends on a preliminary decision
on this question, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling
thereon." But when such question arises before a national court from
whose judgment there is no further appeal, such court is bound
to refer it to the Community Court which renders a binding decision
on the point. 92 Any move by an enterprise to attack a Community
act collaterally in the course of a proceeding before a national court
would therefore be ultimately determined under the Community
law by the Community Court. This pivotal arrangement is designed
to preserve the integrity of the Community system in relation to
Member States. It is designed to assure the uniform interpretation
of the Treaty and of the Community acts which is necessary for the
development of a uniform "quasi-federal" law. 93 It recalls the
American concept of federal jurisdiction over "federal questions"
arising in state courts.
Two factors may limit the efficacy of this provision. Article I 77
leaves to the national court the decision whether the law suit before
it can or cannot be adjudicated without reference to the Treaty or
to a Community act. The Article does not provide for a procedure
akin to the American writ of certiorari whereby a party to the proceeding could seek a determination by the Community Court. Consequently, while paying lip-service to the principle of Article I 77, a
German court of last resort was able to determine that the Treaty's
antitrust article did not apply to the case before it and that it
was therefore not bound to refer the case to the Community Court. 94
02

Art. 177.
Cf. Morelli, La Cour de Justice des Communauth Europiennes en tant que juge
interne, 19 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UNO ViiLKERRECHT
(MAKAROV-FESTGABE) 269, at 271 (1958).
04
In its judgment of October :n, 1958, the Court of Appeals ( Oberlandesgericht)
Dusseldorf held that the issue of the Treaty interpretation was only incidental to
the main question and would not influence the decision in any way. It therefore refused
to submit the question to the Community Court. Docket No. 2 W 47/58, reported in
1958 EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT 493 (No. 24), and 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER
IIIO (No. 31, Nov. ro, 1958); Steindorff, AcHiv DES ViiLKERRECHTS, supra note 67, at
son. 3· Cf. also the decision of the Court of Zutphen (Netherlands) reported and commented on (by Steindorff) in 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 931-933 (No. 26, Sept. zo, 1958).
03
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While a national court has undoubtedly the power to dispose of a
case exclusively on what U.S. federal law would call "state law
grounds," 95 its freedom to decide the case without reference to the
Community Court ends when it begins to interpret the Treaty law. 9 G
In the instant case, the German court interpreted the Treaty in
order to hold it inapplicable and thus failed to give effect to the mandate of Article 177. It is arguable that a procedure of certiorari
must be introduced in order to avoid such incorrect decisions. Although the parties do not possess the right to have the "Community
law question" reviewed, the Commission could sue the Member
State of the national court for violation of the Treaty thus helping
the Court preserve its power over the uniform development of
Community law.
Again, the Community Court passing upon the conformity of a
national law with the Treaty very likely will consider itself bound
by the interpretation of that law as laid down by the national courts
concerned-another factor lim,iting the scope of review of the Community Court somewhat as compared with a right of review of a
court of last resort in a unitary state. 97 It will be recalled that the
United States Supreme Court, in passing upon the conformity of a
state law with federal law or the federal Constitution, insists as a
rule on affording the state court concerned an opportunity to interpret the state law.
2. SUIT FOR UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMUNITY

ACTS OR OF NATIONAL ACTS ISSUED
PURSUANT TO THE TREATY

The question to be considered here is whether an enterprise has,
as an alternative to a suit for annulment in the Community Court,
the choice of attacking the Community act in national courts on the
ground that the act (or for that matter the Treaty itself) is contrary to the national constitution. A somewhat different, but analogous, problem is whether an enterprise may attllck as unconstitutional
05
Cf. Fox Films Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, ex. rei. Patterson Att'y Gen., 357 U.S.
449 (1958); Minnesota v. National Tea Co. et al., 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
""Article 177 speaks of questions of "interpretation of Treaty." Article 219 dealing
with disputes settlement refers to disputes concerning "interpretations and application"
of the Treaty. Could it be argued that where the Treaty rule is so clear as not to require any interpretation reference to the Community Court is not required when such
rule is applied in a national proceeding? But cf. 177(b) which deals with "The validity
and interpretation" (emphasis added).
97
Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at ISS·
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in national courts an act issued pursuant to the Treaty by a national
authority.
The question is of little interest in France, where treaties have
constitutional dignity and cannot be reviewed by the courts, 98 in
the Nether lands and Luxembourg, where the question was resolved
by constitutional amendments and where courts are also precluded
from a review for unconstitutionality, 99 or in Belgium, where the
Constitution is little more than an aggregate of "maxims of politic_al morality" which impose no restrictions on parliamentary authority.100 In Germany and Italy, however, constitutionality may be
raised by an individual or an enterprise by means of a special judicial
procedure.
An act issued by German authorities pursuant to the E.E.C.
Treaty could be subject to an attack before the Federal Constitutional Court by reference from a German court on the ground that
the German federal statute ratifying the Treaty is contrary to the
Federal Constitution, but it is unlikely that such an attack would
succeed. 101 A successful recourse to the Constitutional Court is even
•• Bebr, The Relation of the European Coal and Steel Community Law to the Law
of the Member States: A Peculiar Legal Symbiosis, 58 CoL. L.R. 767, at 778 (1958).
FRANCE, CoNSTITUTION OF 1958, art. 55· Title VII of the Constitution of 1958 provides
for a Constitutional Council which may be asked to pass on the constitutionality of
laws before their enactment. The same applies to statutes ratifying treaties. CoNSTITUTION art. 54· The Council must pass on the constitutionality in cases of special measures
taken during national emergencies (art. 16), certain decree laws (art. 37), and certain organic laws (art. 46). See also, Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et
d'lnformation, French Affairs, No. 82, March 1959· In no case is a control a posteriori
by the Constitutional Council envisioned. The existing system, noted in the main text,
whereby questions of treaty interpretation and constitutionality are not passed upon
by ordinary courts, but for reasons of "ordre public" are referred to the executive
branch, does not seem to have been disturbed by the new Constitution.
99
For the Netherlands and Luxembourg: Bebr, id., at 776-777, n. 43-44, 49-54·
100
Lievens, AM. ]. COMP. L. supra note 49, at 572.
101
An act issued by German authorities pursuant to the E.E.C. Treaty could
conceivably be attacked on the basis of Art. 100 Bonner Grundgesetz (Basic Law).
This article provides: "If a court considers unconstitutional a law, the validity of
which is relevant to its decision, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall
be obtained from the Federal Constitutional Court if the matter concerns a violation
of the Basic Law." (Translation of the Basic Law by the Legal Staff of the Allied
High Commission, Bonn, 1955). According to this provision, only a court before which
a proceeding is pending, may refer the question of constitutionality of a Statute (not
of an administrative act or order) to the Federal Constitutional Court. But in a pending case it could be argued that the basis of the attacked act; a statute, is invalid.
Referring to Articles 20, 24 (I), 59 ( 2) and 79 ( 3) of the Grundgesetz an enterprise could claim that the statute ratifying the E.E.C. Treaty in effect amended the
Grundgesetz (because of the far-re-aching impact of the Treaty) and thus should
have been (but was not) adopted by the larger majority required for constitutional
amendments. In the alternative, the enterprise could argue that the changes in the
structure of the Federal Republic brought about by the Treaty are absolutely precluded by Art. 20 of the Basic Law and could not be effected even by a constitutional
amendment (e.g., transfer of power to bodies which are not subject to adequate parliamentary control).
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less likely if the attack on the ground of unconstitutionality is directed against a Community act. 10 ~ In the first place, decisions of the
Constitutional Court indicate that acts emanating from "German
public authority" only are within its jurisdiction 103 and Community
acts are not likely to be considered as emanating from such a
source. 104 In the second place, even if the Constitutional Court
should take jurisdiction, the complainant would have to show that
one of its basic rights (for instance freedom of expression, free
choice of profession, property right) has not only been restricted
but destroyed "in essence" by the Community act. 105 Thirdly, appeals based on unconstitutionality can be brought before the Constitutional Court only after all other remedies have been exhausted.106 This would seem to require the complainant to seek
annulment of the Community act in the Community Court on Treaty
grounds (at least where a plausible argument may be made that any
such ground exists) before he may contest the act for unconstitutionality in the German court. The Community Court will, of course,
not consider any allegation of unconstitutionality based on German
law. 107 If the Community Court refuses annulment and the plaintiff
does finally appeal to the Constitutional Court, Article 177 of the
Treaty, which requires the national court to refer to the Community Court any question concerning the validity of a Community
act, might conceivably be held to come into play. Thus the ComNEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

102

The complaint would be in the form of a f7 erfassungsbeschwerde.
I
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts IO No. 7: ". . . Offentliche
Gewalt im Sinne des § 90 Abs. I Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz ist nur deutsche
iiffentliche Gewalt. Besatzungsrecht und Massnahmen, die deutsche Behiirden auf
Anweisung der Besatzungsmiichte treffen, unterliegen der Verfassungsbeschwerde
ebensowenig wie Massnahmen ausliindischer iiffentlicher Gewalt." LECHNER, BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTSGESETZ 258 (I954); GEIGER, GESETZ UBER DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 277 (I952).
104
The Federal Republic transferred its public functions (H oheitsfunktionen) to the
Community as a "supranational" organization. Mosler, Die Wen dung zum supranationalen Gedanken im Schumanp/an, 3 RECHT, STAAT, WIRTSCHAFT 245-259 at 256
(I95I); Schlochauer, Der iibernationale Charakter der Europaischen Gemeinschaft
fiir K ohle und Stahl, 6 }URISTENZEITUNG 289-290 at 290 ( I95 I).
105
Art. 19(2) Bonner Grundgesetz (Basic Law).
106
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz § 90.
107
Case I-58 as yet unpublished. It would seem that the Community Court, as a
practical matter, would, under the circumstances of the case suggested in the main
text, attempt a Treaty interpretation which would be compatible with the national
constitution. However, in one case Court Advocate Romer argued that art. I9 of the
German Constitution was not controlling for the Community Court. Case I8-57, Sammlung, Vol. III, 247 at 266. In this context the interesting question arises to what extent
the Court's competence under art. I77, par. I, (a) and (b), to "interpret" the Treaty
and to pass on the "validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions," when such
questions are referred to it by national courts, encompasses the authority to render a
restrictive interpretation for the purpose of avoiding unconstitutionality under national
law.
103
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munity Court might have two chances to give the Community act
an interpretation compatible with the national constitution before
the case could be decided by the German court. At any rate, the likelihood of success of an appeal against a Community act to the Constitutional Court is minimal.
Requirements of a constitutional test in the new Italian Constitutional Court are less stringent. Review of any law or any act having the force of law-for instance, a statute ratifying an international agreement-may be sought in the Constitutional Court
upon certification of the question from any court ( autorita giurisdizionale) .108 While the constitutional question may not be raised in a
recours populaire but only within an actual adversary proceeding, 109
there is no requirement that all other remedies be exhausted before
the Constitutional Court may consider the question. The Community Court would consider the question if it is referred to it perhaps
by the Italian Constitutional Court itself as the national court of
last resort. 110
III. REDRESS UNDER NATIONAL LAW FOR VIOLATION
OF THE TREATY OR OF A COMMUNITY ACT BY
GOVERNMENTS OR OTHER ENTERPRISES

A.

REDRESS FOR VIOLATION BY
NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS

If a Member State fails to enact a measure required by the
Treaty or by a Community act or issues a measure contrary to the
108
Law No. 87 of March 11, 1953, art. 23, [1953] I Raccolta Ufficiale delle Leggi e
dei Decreti della Repubblica Ita Iiana 298, 304. See generally, Cassandro, The Constitutional Court of Italy, 8 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 1-14 (1959).
"'"Thomas, Italien: Der neue Verfassungsgerichtshof, 17 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND Vi:iLKERRECHT 327, at 336, n. 52 (1956-1957); Farelli
and Chan, Italy's Constitutional Court: Procedural Aspects, 6 AM. J. CoMP. L. 314,
at 318 (1957).
110
As indicated- initially in this section, the French Constitution of 1958 accords to
treaties a position superior to statutes. Any treaty as domestic law cannot be changed
by subsequent legislation but enjoys a position similar to the Constitution itself. In
turn, the E.E.C. Treaty (which enjoys such constitutional standing in France) provides
for regulations to be issued by Community institutions. These regulations-because
of the position of the Treaty upon which they are based-partake of the position of
the Treaty, i.e. cannot be modified by French legislation. It has therefore been said
that the French Constitution consists of the Constitution of 1958 and the E.E.C. Treaty.
In contrast, acts of the Community institutions enjoy a position of superiority only over
previous national legislation in those Member States where the Treaty's position is
the same as that of an ordinary statute. Thus, regulations issued by the institutions
in the proper exercise of their Treaty powers would supersede a previous national law.
REUTER, CoURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 171 (1958-1959).
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Treaty or a Community act, does an enterprise which suffers damage
from such violation have a remedy in a national court or before an
administrative agency against the government? For instance, if
during the transitional period a French exporter to Germany can
show that he had to pay higher customs duties to German authorities
because the German Government had failed to reduce its tariff as
required by the Treaty, does he have a remedy in Germany?
The Treaty became national law of the Member States by virtue
of ratifying acts of their national parliaments. The existence of a
national remedy depends in the first place on whether the relevant
Treaty provision imposes an obligation which is completely and
clearly enough defined to be directly enforceable; and, secondly, on
whether or not the provision was designed to give rights to individuals and enterprises which are enforceable by an appeal to national
remedies. This is a matter of Treaty interpretation. 111 Beyond that
national law will determine the nature of the remedy. An analysis of
this latter question would require a detailed inquiry into national
laws not contemplated here.
An attempt may be made to classify the Treaty provisions, dividing them into those which were and those which were not intended
to modify national law directly upon ratification. The former require no implementing action subsequent to ratification whereas the
latter do. 112
Some provisions merely embody declarations of economic and
social policy and are not intended to create independent legal obligations.113 Other provisions, imposing broad obligations on Member States 114 or even obligations defined in fairly specific terms, require implementing action by the Member States, in the form of
national legislative or administrative acts, or by the Community
institutions; and these provisions cannot be interpreted as modifying national laws directly. The obligation to reduce internal tariffs
by stages during the transitional period, 115 falls into this category
since it requires periodic implementing action by Member States.
This is apparent not only from the language of the Treaty, 116 but
m Cf. SPENGLER, DIE WEITBEWERBSREGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT I6 ( I957) ·
ru On ratification in national parliaments see E.C.S.C., Assembil!e Commune, INFORMATIONS MENSUELLEs, Numero special, decembre I957; Numero special, janvier I958;
for ratification legislation see Chapter I, note I, supra.
118
E.g., art. I8 in which Member States "declare their willingness" to contribute to
the development of international commerce. Similarly: arts. so, I 17 and I20.
114
Cf. arts. 5, 220.
1
:u; Art. I4.
116
Arts. 14 and II.
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also from the entire scheme which was designed to establish the
Common Market by progressive steps to be taken by the Members
and from the flexibility of action left to Members. Consequently
if a French exporter to Germany is forced to pay higher customs
duties because the German government failed to reduce its tariff in
accordance with its Treaty obligation, the French exporter would
have no legal remedy in Germany against the German government.
A similar conclusion would apply to other Treaty obligations imposed on Members with a view to the progressive abolition of restrictions within the Community. 117
Some Treaty provisions may be construed as becoming directly
applicable at the end of the transitional period. Thus, to change the
above example, if the German Government continues to collect
customs upon imports from France after the expiration of the transitional period without an authorization from the Community institutions, the French exporter may be in a position to appeal
through German administrative procedure for annulment of the
national administrative act imposing the customs charges on the
theory that the Treaty prohibition of internal tariffs became absolute and directly applicable at the end of the transitional period. 118
Again, certain Treaty articles prohibiting the imposition by a
Member State of new restrictions which did not exist when the
Treaty came into force, may be interpreted as directly applicable
from the effective date of the Treaty. Thus it might be argued that
a French exporter to Germany has a right of appeal before German
authorities if the German government, contrary to the prohibition
of Article I 2, has introduced and sought to collect from him "new
customs duties" which did not exist at the time the Treaty came into
effect. 119 In this case the result would be different (and a national
remedy would not lie) in those Member States where any treaty
(including the E.E.C. Treaty) is considered of no more effect than
an ordinary statute so that a subsequent national law contrary to
the Treaty would supersede the Treaty provision as domestic law. 120
117

E.g., arts. 33, 48, 49, 5Z, 54, 59, 63, etc.
Arts. 8(7), 13(1). Perhaps a clearer example of a "self-executing" provision at
the end of the transitional period is the provision relating to quotas. Art. 30: "Quantitative restrictions on importation and all measures with equivalent effect shall, without
prejudice to the following provisions, hereby be prohibited between Member States."
Cf. also arts. 48 and 49·
119
Article xz provides that "Member States, shall refrain from introducing, as between themselves, any new customs duties . . . ." For other "prohibitions" see e.g.,
arts. 31, 53, 6z, 76, ro6(3). On the German constitutional law question see v. MANGOLDT-KLEIN, DAS BONNER GRUNDGESETZ, 1, 676 (znd ed., 1957) and references therein.
1.00 In this case, the Member State would have violated its international obligation,
but the enterprise would have no remedy under national law.
118
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Whether or not there may be a remedy in national law, in practice
a violation of a Treaty prohibition against new restrictions may be
taken up by the Commission with the delinquent Member State
and, if necessary, brought before the Community Court by the Commission or any other Member.
One provision-Article 22 1-seems designed to become directly
applicable three years after the effective date of the Treaty unless
the Member States issue implementing measures earlier. The Article provides for national treatment of nationals of Member States
as regards financial participation in the capital of companies. Again,
where the Treaty contains new conflict of laws rules, such rules
appear directly and immediately applicable. 120a
Certain other provisions impose obligations upon Member States
which not only are fairly clearly defined and capable of direct application, but appear designed to benefit a class or group of individuals.121 Thus, under Article 119 "[e]ach Member State shall in the
course of the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle" of equal pay for women workers with
men. Where a Member State fails to enact the necessary legislation,
could a woman worker, who as a result suffers discrimination, claim
a remedy, after the expiration of the first stage, which would bring
about the application of the Treaty provision with respect to her?
In order to establish such right she would have to show that the
obligation involved was imposed upon the Member State for the
benefit of persons or a class of persons to which she belongs and
with a view to conferring rights directly on them. A rule of international law recognized by German 122 and French courts 123 holds
that the conferral of rights on individuals must be clearly expressed
in international agreements to overcome a presumption to the contrary. Unless the intention to benefit individuals is clear from the
Treaty, the obligation of a Member State runs only to other Member States but does not give individuals an enforceable right. The
language of Article 119 and the fact that it appears ancillary to the
general provisions dealing with social matters would indicate that
the woman would not be entitled to a remedy against her government.124
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'"'• E.g., art. 21 5·
=Arts. 76, 106 (I), 119.
122
117 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 280; 143 id. 57·
123
Dame Kirkwood, Conseil d'Etat, May 30, 1952 [1952] Recueil des Arrets du
Conseil 291.
124
By like token, it may be said that art. 76 is ancillary to art. 75 and art. 106 to
arts. 63-65. Cf. Katzenstein, Der Arbeitnehmer in der europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemcinschaft, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 1081 (No. 21, Nov, 10, 1951).
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Article 7 of the Treaty deserves particular attention in this context. It provides that " [ w] ithin the field of application of this
Treaty and without prejudice to the special provisions mentioned
therein, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited.125 The Council may . . . lay down rules in regard to the
prohibition of any such discrimination." It could be argued that this
provision was intended by the parties to the Treaty to modify national laws directly and bind individuals and enterprises in the Community as well as the Member States with an immediate effect in
those fields where the Treaty does not contain special provisions
for a gradual removal of discrimination based on nationality; the
fact that the Council may (but is not required) to issue implementing rules does not impair this conclusion. 126 On the other hand,
others contend that this Article included in the part on "Principles"
contains only a policy declaration or at most an obligation imposed
exclusively upon Member States, to be implemented by subsequent
measures. Those supporting this position point to the limiting language in Article 7 quoted above and to the Council's authority to
issue implementing rules. 127 It would seem that at least some immediate and direct effect of this Article was intended by the Member States in those areas within the scope of the Treaty where
neither the Treaty itself nor Council rules provide otherwise. 128
The extent to which the antitrust provisions ("Rules applying
to enterprises" in the Chapter on "Rules governing competition")
may be considered as affording a national remedy is explored elsewhere in this book. 129
12
' The English translation reads: " . . . shall hereby be prohibited." The German
and French originals read: " . . . ist . . . verboten"; " . . . est interdite .•." If read
literally, Article 7 would prohibit discrimination against nationals of third states as
well as of Member States. (Text published in Brussels; see note 199 infra.)
'""Everling, Die Regelung der selbstiindigen beruf/ichen Tiitigkeit im Gemeinsamen
ivfarkt, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 817 (No. 23, Aug. 20, 1958); von Boeckh in HANDBUCH
DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFT, KOMMENTAR, Art. 7 Anm. 5, 1A41, 21 (1958). Note
also art. 90 ( r) of the Treaty prohibiting certain measures which are "contrary to
the . . . rules provided for in article 7· . . ."
127
SPENGLER, DIE WETTBEWERBSREGELN DER EUROPAISCHEN WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT
33; SteindorfF, Das 17 erbot von Wettbewerbsbeschriinkungen in der Anfangszeit der
Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 89, at 92 (No. 3, Jan. 30,
'958).
128
But see Kahn-Freund, "Labor Law and Social Security," Chapter VI supra.
129
Riesenfeld, "Protection of Competition," Chapter X, infra. The provisions in question are arts. 85-90. See also the decision of the Court of Dusseldorf, supra, note 94;
the decision of the Court of Zutphen {Netherlands) reported and commented on (by
SteindorfF) in 13 BETRIEBS-BERATER 931-933 (No. 26, Sept. 20, 1958); Koch, Das l"er-

ltiiltnis der Kartellvorschriften des EWG-l"ertrages zum Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbesclzriinkungen, 14( I) BETRIEBS-BERATER 241-248 (No. 7, March ro, 1959), particularly n. 3·
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Thus one may conclude that only the few Treaty provisions, some
of which were mentioned above, which are capable of direct application and confer rights upon individuals, enable an enterprise to contest through national remedies a national administrative act based
on a previous-and probably, as in France, 130 on a subsequentnational law contrary to these provisions. Such an appeal can probably also be brought if national authorities issue administrative acts
which are at variance not with the Treaty itself but with administrative acts of the Community institutions provided that the Community acts are directly applicable in the Member States (as in the
case of regulations) and are intended to benefit the appellant enterprise.
Professor Reuter suggests another national remedy which may
be open to an enterprise if, for instance, the government of Belgium,
in violation of the Treaty, enacts a measure favoring Belgian enterprises and discriminating against French enterprises on the ground
of nationality. In this situation a French enterprise might be able
to institute an action for unfair competition against a Belgian enterprise before a French court with a view to obtaining compensation
for the damages caused by the defendant's activity based on the illegal Belgian measure. The plaintiff could obtain execution of the
judgment on defendant's property in France.
It should be observed that where the remedies considered here
involve an interpretation of the Treaty or a Community administrative act, the national court of last resort will have to refer this
issue to the Community Court.
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

B.

REDRESS FOR VIOLATION BY AN
INDIVIDUAL OR ENTERPRISE

If an enterprise acts in violation of the Treaty or of a Community
act to the prejudice of another, does the injured party have a national remedy? 131 Obviously, the question would arise only under
those provisions of the Treaty or under those Community acts which
are held to be capable of direct application and to confer rights and
impose obligations directly upon individuals and enterprises. The
first phase of this inquiry would thus parallel that pursued in the
preceding section. The second phase would require an analysis of
national laws of the Member States with a view to determining
whether a remedy would be available to the injured party in a na° CoNSTITUTION OF 1958, art. 55·
13

=The possibility of a remedy before the Community Court was explored above in
connection with a suit for inaction. (Part II, Section A Subsection 5 above).
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tional court or administrative agency. Such remedy could, for instance, take the form of an action for restitution where a contract
contrary to a Treaty provision is held void or of an action in damages caused by a Treaty violation. Actions of this type based on the
Coal-Steel Treaty and German law have already lead to decisions
in German courts. Because the cases concern rules of competition
they are more appropriately discussed in the chapter on Protection
of Competition in the European Economic Community. 132 The conclusion reached there is that a violation of at least one Coal-Steel
Treaty provision-the prohibition of restrictive agreements-may
constitute tortious conduct involving liability for damages under
German law. A similar conclusion with respect to the corresponding provision of the E.E.C. Treaty is suggested in a very tentative
manner only.
IV. LEGAL REMEDIES IN CONTRACT AND TORT CASES
TO WHICH THE COMMUNITY IS A PARTY

A.

SuiTs IN THE CoMMUNITY CouRT

In addition to its exclusive jurisdiction to annul administrative
acts, the Community Court also has exclusive jurisdiction in tort
actions (actions for "non-contractual liability") brought against
the Community. 133 The rules for these actions are much less detailed
than diose governing the complaints for annulment. Thus an enterprise may sue the Community in the Community Court if it suffers
damages from an act of a Community employee in the performance
of his duty (negligent driving of a Community truck, disclosure of a
trade secret by an official, etc.) as well as from an act of a Community institution. The latter category includes damages arising from
administrative acts which are annulled by the Community Court and
damages arising from the Community's unlawful inaction. The
Treaty specifically provides that a judgment of annulment or a judgment finding that the Community failed to act in violation of the
Treaty shall not prejudice any claims for damages. 134 A suit for
132

Riesenfeld, Chapter X infra.
Arts. 178 and 183. Daig, ARCH. o. o. R. supra note 19, at 159.
,.. E.E.C. Treaty art. 176 para. 2, art. 215 para. 2; Protocol on the Statute of the
Court of Justice of the E.E.C. art. 43· The Treaty, in its broad statement of the Community's tort liability in art. 215 differs from th.e provisions of arts. 34 and 40 of the
E.C.S.C. Treaty. For the E.C.S.C. tort liability see Kautzor-Schroeder, Public Tort
Liability under the Treaty Constituting the European Coal and Steel Community Compared with the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 VILLANOVA L. REV. 198, at 235, (1958/59).
See also MUCH, DIE AMTSHAFTUNG IM RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FUR
KOHLE UNO STAHL (Frankfurt/Main, 1952).
133
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annulment is not a prerequisite to a suit for damages. Whether or
not the Community is liable will be determined on the basis of "the
general principles common to the laws of Member States." 135
Similarly, the Community Court has jurisdiction in cases involving contracts concluded under public or private law by the Community or on its behalf, but only if that Court's jurisdiction is stipulated
by the parties in an "arbitration clause" 136 contained in the contract. The Community institution entering into a contract with an
enterprise has the opportunity to insist on a stipulation of Community Court jurisdiction if the institution believes that the national
court which would otherwise be competent might favor its own
nationals. 137 Other motivations might be considerations of convenience and the desire to develop uniform jurisprudence in the field
of contracts involving the Community. One author, subject to dark
forebodings, foresees that the Community might insist on such a
stipulation in order to complete its control over all transactions in
which its institutions are involved, with the consequent overcrowd'ing of the Community Court's docket. 138 The identical provision in
the Euratom Treaty may have a greater impact because of the more
extensive operational responsibilities of Euratom, envisaging the
conclusion of contracts of purchase and sale particularly by its Supply Agency.
The Coal-Steel Treaty contains a similar provision allowing stipulation of the Community Court jurisdiction, and the Court adjudicated several cases arising from employment contracts between the
Community institutions and their employees on the basis of such
stipulation. 139 It is interesting to note that the bonds and notes issued
by the High Authority in the United States are governed by a stipulation extending the jurisdiction of the Community Court to disputes
between the holders of these obligations and the High Authority;
the High Authority, however, has also waived any claim of immuNEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

135
Art, 215.
,.. "Schiedsklausel," "clause compromissoire," "clausola compromissoria," "arbitragebeding." Art. 18I.
187
LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER, PAR UN GROUPE D'ETUDE
DE L'!NSTITUT DES RELATIONS lNTERNATIONALES, 223 (Bruxelles, I953).
188
Croquez, Aspects Juridiques du Marchi Commun, I LE DROIT EUROPEEN 65, at 7I
(No.2, I958).
139
Case I-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 9; case I0-55, id. 379; case I-56, id. +4I. The stipulation was contained in the employment contract or in the Reglement du personnel to
which the contract referred. E.C.S.C. Treaty art. 42. DELVAUX, LA CouR DE JusTICE
DE LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L' ACIER 36 ( I956) j Antoine,
La Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A. et la Cour Jnternationale de Justice, 57 REVUE GENf.RALE DE DROIT lNTERNATIONAT. PUBLIC 2IO, at 25I ( I953). Cf. E.E.C. Treaty art. I79·
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nity to suit in a state or federal court.l4° The practice of the High
Authority, in this respect, has varied in its various financial operations.
As confirmed by the cases under the Coal-Steel Treaty the proceeding before the Community Court arising under a contractual
stipulation of jurisdiction does not differ from that instituted under
the jurisdictional provisions of the Treaty. In this respect the Treaty
terminology describing the stipulation as an ((arbitration clause"
is misleading.

B.

Suns IN CouRTS oF MEMBER STATES

From the foregoing it is clear that the Treaty limits the jurisdiction of national courts in the Member States in cases to which the
Community is a party. National courts have no jurisdiction over the
Community in tort; they do, however, have jurisdiction in contract
unless the contract stipulates the jurisdiction of the Community
Court. Even where the national courts have jurisdiction over the
Community for purposes of the suit, 141 they have no jurisdiction
over Community assets for purposes of execution. In this respect
the Community enjoys immunity.14 2 A judgment of a national court
must be submitted to the Community Court which has exclusive authority to allow execution against the Community.
In the obvious interest of enhancing its credit standing, the European Investment Bank of the Community has been made subject
to action in national courts as any legal person, and its assets have
been made liable to execution by order of such courts.l4 3 As a general practice, when a Bank extends a loan for the financing of a project within the European territory of a Member State, the loan contract stipulates that the courts of that Member State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising out of the contract and that
the contract shall be governed by the law of that Member State.
This practice is not necessarily followed in the guarantee or security
agreements supporting the loan contract. The Bank has not, as yet,
140
Art. 3 sec. 3 and 5, High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community
and the Bank for International Settlements, Tenth Supplemental Indenture to the
Act of Pledge dated November z8, 1954, 5% Secured Bonds (Eleventh Series), Due
July I, 1978. SALMON, LE ROLE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES EN MATIERE DE
Pd:Ts ET D'EMPRUNTS-PROBLEMES }URIDIQUES 303 (1958). Cf. Delaume, Jurisdiction of
Courts and International Loans, 6 AM.]. CaMP. L. 189, at zo8-zo9 (1957). Blondeel
and Van der Eycken, Les Emprunls de Ia C.E.C.A., 1955 LA REVUE DE LA BANQUE
(Belgium) z5o-287.
141
Cf. art. 183.
142
Protocol on Privileges and Immunities of the European Economic Community
art. 1.
143
Protocol on the Statute of the European Investment Bank art. 29.
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developed a practice with respect to loan contracts concerning projects located outside the European territory of Member States.
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C.

SuiTs IN CouRTs oF NoN-MEMBER STATEs
I. SUITS AGAINST THE COMMUNITY IN
AMERICAN COURTS

An American enterprise which suffered damages at the hand of
the Community might prefer to sue the Community in tort in an
American court since courts of Member States have no jurisdiction
and an action before the Community Court may be inconvenient. It
would be necessary, of course, for the American court to acquire
jurisdiction by attachment of Community assets or otherwise. Again,
an enterprise may wish to bring a contract claim before an American
court in the hope that a judgment could perhaps be satisfied out of
the Community's American assets. Obviously the jurisdictional provisions of the Treaty by themselves would not be a bar to such suits
because the United States is not bound by the E.E.C. Treaty. 144
A number of questions would arise in connection with a suit in an
American court. The limited scope of this survey allows mere listing of some of these questions without any attempt at an examination:
I) Will the plaintiff enterprise be able to sue the Community in
a state court only or will the federal courts be also available? While
federal jurisdiction may be desirable as a matter of policy it is
questionable whether it could be sustained under the Federal Constitution or present law.l4 5
2) If the contract between the enterprise and the Community
stipulates jurisdiction of the Community Court, will an American
court nevertheless accept jurisdiction? If the court should consider
the stipulation as an arbitration agreement within the scope of an
arbitration statute applicable in the jurisdiction it might grant a
stay of the proceeding if such remedy is available under that statute.146 However, because of the nature of the Community Court as
a judicial body, because of the direct enforceability of its judgments
144
See generally Wengler, Die volkerrechtliche Stellung der M ontanunion gegeniiber dritten Staaten und Staatenverbiinden, 3 AcTES 0FFICIELS DU CONGRES INTER-

NATIONAL n'ETUDES SUR LA C.E.C.A. 9 (1957).
145
For a discussion see Note, The Status of International Organizations under the
Law of the United States, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1300, at 1301-I306 ( 1957-1958). Cf. Inti.
Refugee Organization v. Republic S.S. Corp., 189 F. zd 858 (4th Cir. 1951).
146
Domke lists fifteen State Arbitration Statutes in addition to the Federal Arbitration Act. UNION INTERNATIONALE DES AVOCATS, ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
197 (Dalloz, Sirey 1956). KELLOR, ARBITRATION IN ACTION, Annexes 1-Il, at 217-358
( 1941).
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within the Community, and despite the misleading Treaty terminology, the American court is more likely to view the stipulation not
as an "arbitration clause" but as an agreement specifying jurisdiction of a "foreign court." In that event a modern American court
might decide whether or not to take jurisdiction not on the basis of
the so-called rule against "ouster" of jurisdiction but rather in the
exercise of its discretion under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, perhaps taking also into account the equality of the bargaining positions of the parties.14 7
3) Will the Community be able to maintain successfully a claim
of immunity against suit in an American court? It is possible, if not
likely, that the legal status of the Community in the United States
will be determined by special Congressional legislation which would
simultaneously authorize accreditation of a Community diplomatic
mission in Washington. In the absence of such legislation the following observations may be pertinent.
Traditionally, American courts grant immunity from suit to states
under a rule of international law originally founded on the concept
of the equality and sovereignty of states. 148 The courts have been
liberal in according this immunity, responding to and at times going
beyond the wishes of the executive branch.l4 9
On the other hand, surveying the practice of the United States in
1946, a distinguished American commentator concluded that the
United States has denied the existence of any obligation under customary international law to extend to public international organizations or their officials any immunities; a demand for a special status
has been "uniformly resisted" on the ground that such status "is
147
Application of Hamburg-American Line, 135 Misc. 715, 238 N.Y. Sup. 331, affirmed
without opinion, 228 App. Div. 802, 239 N.Y. Sup. 914 (1930) holding that a clause
stipulating exclusive jurisdiction of "Hamburg Courts" and German law as the applicable law is not an agreement to arbitrate within the meaning of the Arbitration Law.
The Court observed that "[I]n any event, the clause cited in the contract herein is not
sufficiently broad to be construed as an agreement to arbitrate." Contra an earlier opinion of a lower court in Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y.
Sup. 10 ( 1925). On agreements attempting to give exclusive jurisdiction to foreign
courts see I EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 145-150 (1959); Case-Notes, 23 So. CAL.
L. REV. 595 (1950); Sudburg v. Ambi Verwaltung K.A.A., 213 App. Div. 98, 210 N.Y.
Sup. 164 (1925) and other cases in 56 A.L.R. 2d 300 (1957). But see Wm. H. Muller
and Co. v. Swedish American Line, 224 F. zd 8o6 (2d Cir. 1955) cert. den. 350 U.S.
903, 76 Sup. Ct. 182 (1955) and Learned Hand in Kreuger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 174
F. 2d 556, at 561 (2d Cir. 1949).
148
Harvard Research in International Law, Competence of Courts in Regard t.o
Foreign States, P. C. Jessup, Reporter, 26 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPPL. 451-738 (1932).
For a recent expression of this thought see Loomis v. Rogers, 254 F. 2d 941 (D.C. Cir.
1958).
u.• Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 ( 1926) ; Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); Ex parte Peru: The Ucayali, 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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as yet dependent upon treaty or upon the municipal law and practice of the state concerned, and . . . there is, therefore, no justification under the law of the United States for conceding any privileged position to international organizations . . . in this country." 150 Since 1946 the United States has become a party to anumber of treaties creating international organizations which grant to
these organizations in the territories of the member states privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfillment of their purposes.151 Such grant is based not on the extension of the concept of
sovereign immunity but rather on the recognition that independence
from local authority is necessary for the organizations to fulfill
their international functions. 152 The International Organizations
Immunities Act enacted in 1945 accords immunity in American
courts to public international organizations in which the United
States participates pursuant to a treaty or under authority of an act
of Congress and which have been designated by the President
through an executive order. The immunity includes "the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by
foreign governments" except insofar as immunity may be waived. 1 " 3
It has been vigorously argued that whatever the state of international law may have been in the past a new rule of customary international law has been established by consistent national practice
in recent years which requires non-member states to grant immunity to any international organization which they have "recognized." 154
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Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332,
at 333 (1946); 4 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 419-423 (1942). Cf. Note,
The Status of International Organizations under the Law of the United States, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1300, at 1309-1312 (1958). In one case before a lower court arising
prior to the Immunities Act judicial immunity was granted to an international organization of which the United States was a member without a treaty provision requiring
immunity. In that ca~e a writ of attachment, directed to the Pan American Union as
garnishee and based on judgment against an employee of the Union, was struck down
in the attachment proceeding before the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia,
the Court having sustained the plea to the court's jurisdiction. Penfield, The Legal Status
of the Pan American Union, 20 AM.]. INT'L. L. 257 (1926).
151
E.g., Charter of the U.N. art. 105.
152
Kunz, Pri'Vileges and Immunities of International Organizations, 41 AM. ].
INT'L. L. 828, at 847 ( 1947) ·
153
International Organizations Immunities Act Sec. 2(b), 59(1) Stat. 669 (1945), 22
U.S.C. Sec. 288a(b) (1958).
1M La live, L'Immunite de juridiction des hats et des organisations internationales,
84 RECUEIL DES CouRs 293, 304, (1953, Vol. III); on U.S. practice id. 319-324; on
Coal-Steel Community id. 376-383; for a more recent survey of American and foreign
practice see Dinh, Les pri'Vileges et immunitis des organismes internationaux d'apres
les jurisprudences nationa/es depuis I945, 1957 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;:AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 262.
1
""
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The Community could not assert immunity from judicial process
in American courts on the basis of any treaty or under the Immunities Act. 154 a Whether or not it could prevail on the basis of customary international law is a question. 155 However, it is likely that
the courts would follow a request for immunity from the Department of State. Whether or not the Department would make such
a request is another question. The United States has "recognized"
the Communities in the sense that it has had considerable dealings
with them as entities endowed with international legal personality.
The United States has concluded agreements with the Coal-Steel
Community 156 and Euratom 157 and maintains official relations with
all three Communities through a special diplomatic mission in Brussels. 158 The United States is expected to negotiate agreements on
tariff concessions with the Community rather than with the individual Member States within the framework of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (G.A.T.T.) 159 It could also be argued that
immunity ought to be granted because the Community may be more
nearly likened to a "state" than any other international organization. In the absence of new legislation the Department may nevertheless be reluctant to do more than to point generally to the United
States relations with the Communities but refrain from a specific
'"'• It could hardly be argued that the U.S. "participates" in the Community within
the meaning of the Immunities Act.
155
In one case where immunity was claimed by the International Refugee Organization before an American court in the U.S. Zone of Occupied Germany, the Court
denied the existence of any obligation to accord on German territory immunity on
the basis of a treaty or the Immunities Act but nevertheless granted immunity on the
basis of a policy statement by the United States High Commissioner, "the highest
executive authority" in the U.S. Zone, which the Court held it could not question.
Apparently as a make-weight argument the Court added: " . . . because of the fact
that I.R.O. is an agency of many foreign governments, it would seem all the more
reasonable that the High Commissioner should not permit an action in our courts that
would directly affect other sovereign powers." The opinion certainly does not indicate
that the Court recognized any obligation to grant immunity under customary international law. Anton Schaffner v. International Refugee Organization, Civil Case No. 11,
Opinion 665, U.S. Ct. App., Allied High Commission for Germany, Aug. 3, 1951, in 46
AM. J. lNT'L. 575 (1952). Had the case arisen in the United States I.R.O. could have
claimed immunity under the Immunities Act and Executive Order 9887, 3 C.F.R.,
1943-1948 Compilation.
156
Loan Agreement signed at Washington April 23, 1954, entered into force April
23, 1954, T.I.A.S. 2945; Agreement Supplementing and Amending the Loan Agreement of April 23, 1954, signed at Luxembourg Dec. 8 and at Washington Dec. 16,
1954, entered into force Dec. 16, 1954, T.I.A.S. 3126.
7
w Agreement Relating to Cooperation for Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy
signed at Brussels May 29 and at Washington June 18, 1958, entered into force Aug.
27, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 4091 [1959]; [1959] Journal Officiel 312.
:u;s EURATOM CoMMISSION, FIRST GENERAL REPORT 78-81 ( 1958), E. E. C. COMMISSION,
FIRST GENERAL REPORT 126 (1958), E.C.S.C., SEVENTH GENERAL REPORT 38 (1959).
"'°Cf. E.E.C. art. 111(2), 113(3).
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request for immunity, leaving it to the courts to decide the immunity
issue on the basis of common law. One factor which may be considered relevant is the provision in the E.E.C. Treaty to the effect
that subject to the powers conferred upon the Community Court by
the Treaty "cases to which the Community is a party shall not for
that reason alone be excluded from the competence of domestic
courts or tribunals." 160 One could argue that since the Community
in principle is subject to suit in contract before domestic courts, it
should not enjoy immunity in American courts. 161 On the other hand,
the availability of a remedy against the Community either in the
Community Court or in a national court within the Community
would reduce the importance of the American forum for the plaintiff suing the Community and thus the need for denying immunity.
It has been suggested that the uncertainty as to the immunity of the
Coal-Steel Community in American courts was one of the reasons
for stipulating the jurisdiction of the Community Court in disputes
arising from obligations issued by the High Authority in the United
States. 162
Even if immunity is granted in principle to the Community, the
question arises whether it may nevertheless be disallowed in a given
case-and the suit permitted-on the ground that in the matter
before the Court the Community has acted in a "proprietary" function (for instance, when it entered into a contract to buy securities
for purposes of investing funds for which it is responsible) rather
than in a "governmental" function. This distinction, which applies
to activities of states under the more recent commercial treaties concluded by the United States and which is advocated by the United
States Department of State, regrettably has not been established
by judicial decision as a rule of American law as yet. 163
The Community has been endowed with sufficient "domestic"
legal personality in the Member States and we may assume that the
court would recognize the Community's capacity to sue. 164
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

160

E.E.C. Treaty art. 183.
Judge Mack in the Pesaro case, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, at 363 (1955).
162
Delaume, 6 AM. J. COMP. L., supra note 140, at 208-209.
163
Treaty of Commerce, Friendship and Navigation between the United States and
Japan of Oct. 30, 1953, art. XVIII (z). T.l.A.S. No. 2863. The distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions was adopted in a 1952 Department of State
policy declaration, the "Tate Letter," 26 DEP'T. STATE BuLL. 984 (1952). See Berizzi
Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Ex parte Peru, The Ucayali, 318 U.S.
578 (1943); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, The Baja California, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
1
. . Art 2II. Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, 22 BRIT.
Ys. lNT'L. L. 267, 273-'79 (1945); Preuss, supra note 150, at 333.
161
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2. ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST
THE COMMUNITY

If an American enterprise obtains a judgment against the Community, how can it be enforced? As pointed out above, under the
Treaty the courts of the Member States may not levy execution
against the Community assets without an authorization from the
Community Court regardless of whether the judgment was rendered
by a domestic or foreign court or by the Community Court itself.
Thus if enforcement of the judgment is sought within the Community an application for authorization will have to be made to the
Community Court.
In considering the application the Court will have to decide
whether the foreign judgment should be given effect (i.e., whether it
should be accorded exequatur) .165 Since the law governing the recognition of foreign judgments varies in the Member States, the Court
may seek to develop its own rules based on principles common to
the national laws. Unless the Court adopts the French rule authorizing in fact a complete review of the foreign judgment, it may limit
itself to considering whether the recognition of the foreign judgment would be contrary to public policy of the Community, whether
the foreign court had jurisdiction, and possibly whether reciprocity
exists in the recognition of foreign judgments. 166 It could, however,
be argued that the exequatur proceeding must take place in the competent national court which ultimately will direct the execution upon
the Community assets and that the Community Court has no other
function than to decide whether immunity against execution will be
waived. Under the first of the two possible interpretations suggested
above an "authorization" by the Community Court would have the
force of its judgment. The competent national court in the Community would be required to perform the execution against Community assets on a showing of nothing more than the authenticity
of the "authorization" paper.
If enforcement of a judgment against the Community is sought
in a non-Member State such as the United States with respect to the
Community's assets located there, the outcome will depend in the
first place upon the question, discussed above, whether the Community is given immunity from judicial process. It may be of interest to
note, however, that American courts deny execution against assets
belonging to a foreign state even where they disallow the immunity
""'REUTER, LA COMMUNAUTE EUROPEENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L'ACIER 80 (1953).
160
NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE lNTERNAT!ON AL LAW 236-238 ( 1943).
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of such state from suit. International organizations to which the
Immunities Act is applied would presumably enjoy similar immunity.
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167

3·

ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS OBTAINED
BY THE COMMUNITY

If the Community obtains a judgment against an enterprise either
in a national court of a Member State or in the Community Court,
will such judgment be enforceable outside the Community and specifically in the United States? If the judgment was rendered by a court
in a Member State, the American court would apply its rules concerning suits on foreign judgments. 168 If the judgment was rendered
by the Community Court, the American court will consider it more
likely a "foreign judgment" than an arbitral award. If the Community Court's judgment was rendered in a suit on a contract in
which that Court's jurisdiction was stipulated; it is difficult to conceive of reasons based on lack of jurisdiction or public policy justifying an American court's denying enforcement. 169
It is most improbable that an American court would allow enforcement of a Community Court judgment imposing, for instance,
a penalty against an American enterprise for violation of an antitrust provision of the Treaty. Such judgment would very likely be
refused enforcement on the general principle refusing enforcement
of foreign penalties. 170
V. THE COMMUNITY COURT: PROCEDURE AND
SOURCES OF LAW

An enterprise seeking relief in the Community Court will be
directly concerned with the procedures applicable in cases before the
Court and the sources of law upon which it will draw.

A.

PROCEDURE AND FINALITY
I. TIME LIMITATIONS

An enterprise must bring its appeal for annulment within two
months from the time it was notified or had knowledge of the act
167
Dexter & Carpenter Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705, at 708 (2d
Cir. 1930), cert. den. 282 U.S. 896 (1931).
168
STUMBERG, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 13o-133 (zd. ed., 1951).
160
1£ the Court follows the doctrine of reciprocity under Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.
113 (1895), lack of reciprocity would be difficult to establish before the Community
Court has had occasion to pass upon the conclusiveness of an American judgment.
170
STUMBERG, supra note 168, at 118-119, 130.
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it seeks to contest. 171 Suits for inaction of an institution may be
brought only after the institution has failed to act during a period
of two months following a request for action; the suit must be
brought within two months after the lapse of that period. 172 A
party with residence habituelle outside of Europe is given an additional month. Actions in tort must be brought within five years
from the "occurrence of the circumstance giving rise thereto," 173
while the limitation on contract claims, where jurisdiction of the
Court has been stipulated, presumably will be determined by the
"law applying to the contract." 174 The bar resulting from the lapse
of the time limitations may be overcome by proof of an "Act of
God or force majeure." 175
2. PROCEDURE

The proceeding before the Court is divided into a written and an
oral stage. 176 Like the French Conseil d'Etat, the Court is grouped
into chambers to which the President of the Court assigns cases and
which prepare the cases for public hearing and final disposition.
This procedure differs from that of the International Court of Justice where chambers may be utilized with the consent of the parties
only. 177 The Court may appoint a rapporteur from among the judges
to guide the case through the preliminary investigation ( "instruction") after the basic documents, such as the complaint, the answer,
and replies, have been filed. 178 As is true in cases before the French
Conseil d'Etat, 179 but not in those before the International Court of
Justice/ 80 the written proceeding and the preliminary investigation
171

Art. 173 para. 3·
Art. 175 paras. 2-3. These time limitations are increased by specified periods of
time to allow for the distance of the parties from the Court. Reglement de procedure
art. 81 § 2 (hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure), [1959] Journal Officiel 350, at
368. (For certain modifications of the texts of the Rules in the four languages see
[r96o] Journal Officiel 13-16.) A decision of the Court provides for an additional two
days if the parties reside in Belgium, six days for Germany, Metropolitan France and
the Netherlands, ten days for Italy, fifteen days for other European countries, and one
month for all other countries. [1959] Journal Officiel 378.
173
Protocol on the Statute of the Court art. 43 (hereinafter cited as Protocol).
17
• Art. 2 r 5·
175
Protocol art. 42.
176
Protocol art. 18.
177
Rules of Procedure arts. 24 and 46; for the French Conseil d'Etat see SCHWARTZ,
FRENCH ADM!N!STRAT!VE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW WoRLD 131-149 ( 1954). Statute
of the I.C.J. arts. 26(3) and 29. The United States Supreme Court does not utilize
chambers.
178
Rules of Procedure arts. 45-54.
1
7ll ScHWARTZ, op. cit., supra note 177, at qr-r4r.
180
Statute of the I.C.J. art. 43 ( 5) which shows the large scope of the oral proceding
before that Court.
172
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of the case by the chamber are more important than the oral hearing.
During this preliminary investigation witnesses are called either by
the parties, or-in keeping with the inquisitional nature of the
Court's procedure-by the Court; expert testimony may be taken
upon a Court order calling for expertise. 181 Oral hearings are
scheduled only after all relevant information has been collected,
testimony heard, and expert reports received in the preliminary investigation.182 During the oral hearing the parties have a final chance
to argue their views and the Court Advocate General presents his
conclusions and observations to the Court, 183 but evidence may be
submitted only by order of the Court. 184 Both the preliminary investigation and the oral hearing are public unless otherwise ordered
by the Court. 185
In all proceedings an enterprise, whether a natural or legal person, must be represented by counsel who is a member of the bar of
one of the Member States or who is a professor of law whose national law allows him to practice before national courts. 186 There
is no separate bar of the Community Court. 187 Thus, the conditions
for admission to practice before the Community Court are midway
between the strict requirements of the United States Supreme Court,
which has a special bar of its own, and the much looser provisions of
the International Court of Justice which require that parties be
represented by "agents" without specifying their qualifications. 188
The legal department of the High Authority has defended the
Authority before the Court and has acquired an outstanding reputation in presenting the Community view in the face of what at times
appeared to be cryptic complaints by some plaintiffs. The legal departments of the Authority and of the E.E.C. and Euratom Commissions have now been consolidated into a "common service" composed of some forty-nine lawyers. Since so much of the formal power
181
Rules of Procedure arts. 47 and 49; SCHWARTZ, op. cit. supra note 177, at 127-138,
explains that in the Conseil d'Etat an "order for expertise" means the calling of expert
witnesses, by the Court, from a permanently established list of experts in particular
professional fields. These experts have the power to conduct their own investigation
and to submit a report on their findings. The latter is also true of the Community Court
procedure. Rules of Procedure art. 49·
182
Rules of Procedure arts. 54-55·
183
Rules of Procedure arts. 56-59.
104
Rules of Procedure art. 6o.
180
Rules of Procedure arts. 46 § 2 and 56.
186
Protocol art. 17 pars. 2 and 5; Rules of Procedure art. 36.
187
Riese, Die Verfahrensordnung des Gerichtshofes der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft
fiir Koh/e und Stahl, 6 NEUE }URISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 521 1 at 524 (1953).
188
Rules 5-6 of the United States Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. Appendix 1958; Statute
of the I.C.J. art. 42.
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of decision has been shifted in the new treaties from the "executive"
to the Councils of Ministers, some appeals may now have to be
directed against acts of the Councils. The question will therefore
arise as to who will conduct the defense of the Councils against such
appeals: will it be the "common service" which has the legal talent
with accumulated valuable experience or will the Councils be defended by the small legal section in the Secretariat of the Councils?
For purposes of service all parties must elect domicile at the seat
of the Court and specify persons who are authorized to accept service of all communications and documents. 189 The proceeding is conducted in one of the four official languages of the CommunityDutch, French, German, Italian. If the defendant is a Member
State, or a person, natural or legal, of the nationality of a Member
State, the language of that state will be used; if the defendant is an
institution of the Community, or a person, natural or legal, of the
nationality of a third country, the language of the plaintiff will be
used. In all cases, the Court may, however, make special arrangements.190

3· THE JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT
The judgments of the Court are final. They are not subject to
review except in three specified cases. (I) A judgment may be reviewed by the Court upon the application of a third party which is
affected by the judgment but was not represented in the case. 191
( 2) The Court may be asked by an interested party or institution
to interpret its judgment if difficulties arise as to its meaning and
scope. 192 Strictly speaking, this is not a case of review of the judgment, since the request for an interpretation may not be used as a
means for obtaining another determination of the case on the merits.193 ( 3) Finally, a case may be re-opened and judgment reviewed
in the sense of a proceeding de novo-if, within a ten year period,
a new fact is discovered which would have "decisive influence," but
the appeal must be instituted within three months after the appellant
learned the new fact. 194
189

Rules of Procedure arts. 38 § 2 and 40 § 1 last par.
Rules of Procedure art. 29 § 2.
'"'Protocol art. 39; Rules of Procedure art. 97·
102
Protocol art. 40; Rules of Procedure art. 102.
'""See E.C.S.C. case 5-55, Sammlung, Vol. I, 275, at 292-293. A similar provision is
included in the Statute of the I.C.J. art. 6o.
"''Protocol art. 41 ; Rules of Procedure arts. 98-roo. Art. 61 of the Statute of the
I.C.J. provides for a review in identical terms. Both provisions envision a procedure
in two stages: (a) a judgment finding the existence of a previously unknown fact, and
(b) the proceeding reviewing the original judgment. Curiously enough, the Treaty
100
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Judgments vary in form. Some follow the syllogistic pattern of
French courts while others are in the narrative form of German
(and American) courts as well as of the International Court of
Justice.
In striking contrast to the rights of litigants in an American court,
parties before the Community Court have a right to a decision by
the Court which takes account of their main lines of argument. If
a judgment fails to consider one of the party's principal arguments,
the party concerned may request the Court for a ruling. 195
The Court has the power to render judgments by default. Like
the International Court of Justice, the Court in such cases is required to examine not only whether it has jurisdiction but also
whether the claim "seems to be well founded." 196 As pointed out
previously, the judgments of the Court are enforceable in Member
States on the same conditions as administrative acts of the Community institutions.

B.

THE CouRT's SouRcEs OF LAw 197

The Treaty contains no general and comprehensive statement of
the sources of law analogous to Article 3 8 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. 198 The Community Court draws
upon the Treaty and extrinsic aids to its interpretation, upon international law, national laws of the Member States, and general
principles common to these national laws, and upon acts and practices of the Community institutions.
I. THE TREATY

The most important source of Community law is, of course, the
Treaty, to which several lists, protocols, and supplementary conventions are annexed. 199 It is the standard by which all activities of the
omits the limitation contained in the Statute of the I.C.J. whereby a review is excluded if the party failed to discover the fact through its own negligence.
1915
Rules of Procedure art. 67.
106
Rules of Procedure art. 94 §§ 1-2; Statute of the I.C.J. art. 53·
107
Steindorff, ARCH!V DES VoLKERRECHTS supra note 67, at 52-55.
109
Statute of the I.C.J. art. 38: "x. The Court. . . . shall apply:
(a) international conventions, . . . ;
(b) international custom, .•. ;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) ••. , judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists. . . ."
199
The Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and
Euratom lists the relevant texts. See Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community as published by the Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common
Market and Euratom 365-368 (Publication 1931 bis/s/57/4, Brussels).
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institutions are tested. Its provisions are to be interpreted in the
light of the provisions laying down the general principles and objectives of the Community. 200 The practice in the United Nations
where Charter provisions are consistently interpreted in the light
of the "Purposes and Principles" of the United Nations offers an
analogy. In the Geitling case, for example, the Court utilized the
general principles stated in Article 4 of the Coal-Steel Community
Treaty to interpret the concept of "discrimination" of the anti-cartel article. 201
Some clarification may be also gained by comparing the text of a
provision in the French, German, Italian, and Dutch versions of
the Treaty, all of which are equally authentic. The purpose of such
a comparison {which at times may compound the confusion rather
than clarify) is not to arrive at a majority vote but to seek clarification of the true scope of the provision, to find that version which
serves the ends of the Treaty best. 202
Of the preparatory materials commonly used as extrinsic aid for
the interpretation of a treaty relatively few documents are available reflecting the opinions of the negotiators of the E.E.C. Treaty
and the positions of the governments during the negotiations. Foremost among them is the "Spaak Report." 203 On the other hand, a
number of reports of Member Governments to their parliaments,
their statements at the time of the ratification debates, and records
of these debates are available. They have, however, a limited value
for purposes of establishing the intent of the Treaty framers, and
most of these materials are in any case not very enlightening.
The four volumes of judgments of the Court rendered under the
Coal-Steel Community Treaty offer an important "extrinsic aid"
since many of its provisions were included verbatim in the E.E.C.
Treaty. This use of precedent would be justified on the presumption
that the continued use of a term indicates the intent to accept its
established interpretation. Caution is in order, however, when the
200
E.q., Part One of the Treaty is entitled "Principles." See Lagrange, L'Ordre
juridique de Ia C.E.C.A. vu a traevrs Ia jurisprudence de sa Cour de Justice, 74
REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SciENCE POLITIQUE 841, at 844-847 (1958).
201
Case 2-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 9· Cf. Bebr, The Development of a Community
Law by the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community, 42 MINN. L. REV. 845
( 1958}.
202
Daig, ARCH. D.o. R. supra note 19, at 157. See art. 248. Polach, On the Margin of
the Rome Treaties, 7 AM. J. CoMP. L. 593 ( 1958).
2 3
" Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres ( Spaak
Report}, published by the Comite Intergouvernemental cree par Ia Conference de
Messine (1956); see also the Messina Declaration and other documents collected in X
CHRONIQUE DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, Nos. 4-6 (Brussels 1957),
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connotation of an identical term is varied in the new Treaty, however slight the variation may be. Thus, as shown above, detournement de pouvoir (misapplication of power) is a ground for appeal
against administrative acts in both Treaties. To the extent that a
definition of its meaning is needed under the new Treaty, the CoalSteel jurisprudence will serve as a valuable precedent although it
must be used with circumspection. 204
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW

It has been suggested that to the extent that the Court applies
international law it should look to Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice as the best general statement of
sources of internationallaw. 205
Several types of international agreements may provide a source
of Community law: those concluded by the Community as a person
under international law with third states (for example, trade agreements), those concluded among Member States, 206 and finally those
to which the Treaty makes explicit reference. Such reference is contained, for example, in Article 131, paragraph 3 of the Treaty which
provides for the association of the overseas territories with the
Community "in conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble" to the Treaty; the Preamble, in its eighth paragraph, refers
to the Charter of the United Nations. The result of this reference
is that the association of the overseas territories under the Treaty
must not only conform to the particular provisions of the Treaty
but also take into consideration the principles of the United Nations
Charter, such as the principle of self-determination, 207 however
limited the legal content of this principle may be at this time.
The Court will resort to customary rules of international law and
general principles when interpreting the above international agreements, when defining the relations of the Community with third
countries (such as the right of active and passive legation), and
perhaps as a subsidiary source when enunciating a rule applicable to
= Pinay, La Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes, 1959 REVUE nu
MARCHE CoMMUN 138, at 144 (No. 12).
200
MATHIJSEN, op. cit. supra note so, at 90 and 157-158. Fitzmaurice, Some Problems
regarding the Formal Sources of International Law, SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 161-168, 173176 ( 1958) includes natural law as one of the sources of international law.
206
Cf. art. 220.
207
Germany, Deutscher Bundestag, 2 Wahlperiode, Schriftlicher Bericht des J.
Sonderausschusses Gemeinsamer Markt/Euratom iiber den Entwurf eines Gesetzes
zu den Jlertriigen vom 25 Miirz I957 zur Griindung der Europiiischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ... (1957), Drucksache 366o, at 56.-U.N. Charter art. 73·
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the relations between Member States in matters not arising directly
under the Treaty-not unlike the United States Supreme Court
when it resorts to rules of international law in adjudicating controversies among the States of the Union. 208 In one instance, without
drawing a sharp distinction between sources, the Court applied a
rule of interpretation which it held was "generally recognized both in
international law and national law." 209

3·

NATIONAL LAWS OF MEMBER STATES AND GENERAL
PRINCIPLES COMMON TO THEM

The Treaty refers explicitly to national law, for instance when it
provides that forced execution of a pecuniary obligation imposed
upon an enterprise by an institution shall be governed by the rules of
civil procedure in force in the Member State where it takes place. 210
The Treaty refers explicitly to the "general principles common
to the laws of the Member States" as the source of law to govern
Community tort cases. The Court is required to scrutinize the six
national legal systems for common principles, a task of some magnitude considering the differences among these systems. 211 This source
is reminiscent of the general principles of law of civilized nations
included in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice.
In cases of contracts to which the Community is a party the Treaty
requires reference to "the law applying to the contract concerned."
How will the Community Court determine the choice-of-law rule
pointing to the applicable law? One possibility would be for the
Court to refer to the choice-of-law rule of some other forum-as
American federal courts since Erie v. Tompkins 212 have done in
diversity-of-citizenship cases, applying the choice-of-law rule of the
State in which they are sitting. The Community Court could, for
instance, refer to the choice-of-law rule of the national court which
would have had jurisdiction if the contract had not stipulated the
jurisdiction of the Community Court. 213 Another possibility would
008
Cf. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 ( 1893) ; Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S.
158 (1917); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
"""Case 8-55, Sammlung, Vol. II, 297, at 312.
210
Art. 192.
211
Art. 215 par. 2. Daig, ARCH. D. o. R. supra note 19, at 183-184. Braband, Liability
in Tort of the Government and its Employees: a Comparative Analysis, 33 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 18 (1958).
212
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1938) ; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 ( 1941).
213
Daig, ARCH. D. 0. R. supra note 19, at 203 j cf. RAAPE, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
527 (4th ed. 1955).
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be for the Court to apply the substantive law of the court of the
jurisdiction in which, in the absence of the Community Court, the
plaintiff would presumably have sought relief-an approach followed at times by special international tribunals. 214 Since courts in
more than one state may well have jurisdiction with respect to the
contract case in question, as well as for other reasons, the better rule
might be for the Community Court to develop its own choice-of-law
rules from the general principles common to the laws of the six
Member States. 215 Since the jurisdiction of the Community Court
in contract cases must in any event be stipulated by the parties, the
contract may stipulate also the law which the parties wish to govern
the contract. New York law, for example, was stipulated as governing High Authority obligations issued in the United States. 216 The
Coal-Steel Community Treaty contains no provision concerning the
applicable law in tort or contract cases involving the Community
comparable to the provision in the E.E.C. Treaty discussed above.
Where will the Community Court seek a rule of law in those instances in which the Treaty is silent and contains no specific reference to national law or to the common general principles? The
answer to this question will have a profound effect on the growth of
Community "common law." When the Treaty provides that "any
. . . legal person" has the right of appeal to the Community
Court, 217 the Court most likely will look to the national law of the
appellant to determine whether or not it is a "legal person." In
most instances, however, the Court may be well advised to look
to the common general principles rather than to an individual na214

NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (1943), referring to decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal instituted by the Treaty of Versailles. WoLFF,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-94 (1945).
21
" The Permanent Court of International Justice stated in the Serbian and Brazilian
Loan Cases:
"The Court, which has before it a dispute involving the question as to the law which
governs the contractual obligations at issue, can determine what this law is only by
reference to the actual nature of these obligations and to the circumstances attendant
upon their creation, though it may also take into account the expressed or presumed
intention of the Parties. Moreover, this would seem to be in accord with the practice
of municipal courts in the absence of rules of municipal law concerning the settlement
of conflicts of law."
Serbian Bonds Issued in France, P.C.I.J. ser. A, No. 14 at 41 (1929).
216
High Authority and Bank for International Settlements, Tenth supplemental Indenture to the Act of Pledge dated November 28, 1954, s% Secured Bonds (Eleventh
Series), June 1958, Art. III, sec. 10. However, questions with respect to the interpretation or application of the Act of Pledge are to be determined "in accordance with
the law which would otherwise be appropriate for such determination." See Salmon,
note 140 supra, at 278.
7
!11 Art. 173 para. 2.
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tionallaw in order to develop Community definitions of such concepts as "worker," "non-wage-earning activities," "current payments," and the like. 218 In one case the Coal-Steel Community Court
applied a principle common to the laws of the Member States, that
is that a party is deemed to have notice of a letter when it has come
in regular course "within the internal sphere of the addressee." 219
In another case the Court, faced with an administrative law question
for which it could not find a rule in the Treaty itself felt compelled
to make the decision "taking into account the rules recognized in
the legislation, doctrine and jurisprudence of the Member
States." 220
Even where the Treaty concept may have been adopted from a
particular national system, such as the French notion of detournement de pouvoir} the Coal-Steel Community Court has sought to
devise a Community definition rather than looking to French law
only.221
4·

ACTS AND PRACTICES OF THE INSTITUTIONS

The acts of the Council and the Commission adopted in the exercise of their power are a vital source of Community law. The regulations and other acts of the institutions will eventually have to
fill important gaps in the Community legal framework. The "lawmaking" process is dependent upon more or less specific authorization in the Treaty. It may extend somewhat beyond these confines, however, under the "general clause" of Article 235 which
authorizes the Council to take measures, which while not expressly
sanctioned in the Treaty, are necessary for the achievement of its
objectives. The same clause in the Coal-Steel Treaty has already
been invoked by the High Authority. 222 Finally, the practices of the
institutions may lay a basis for customary rules.
To what extent does the Court itself "make law" drawing upon
218
Arts. 48(2), 52 para. 2, 67(2). See Reuter, Aspects de Ia Communaute Economique Europtfenne, 1958 REVUE DU MARCHE COMMUN 161, at 168 (No. 3).
219
E.C.S.C. case 8-56, Sammlung, Vol. III, 189, at 200.
""'Joint E.C.S.C. cases 7-56 and 3-57 to 7-57, id. 83, at 118-119.
221
Lagrange, supra note zoo, at 857 and n. 14. Perhaps the same approach could
apply to the Coal-Steel provisions concerning the tort liability of the Community which
employ the French distinction between faute de service and faute personnel/e. See
generally, Kautzor-Schroeder, supra note 134, at 201. MucH, op. cit., supra note 134,
particularly at 3 r, 67-77.
222
The provision is art. 95 of the E.C.S.C. Treaty. In its decision 27-58, [1958]
Journal Officiel 486, the High Authority, with the unanimous consent of the Council
utilized art. 95 to institute a subsidy to the coal industry in order to prevent unemployment resulting from the extraordinarily high stock piling of coal. In decision 22591 [1959] Journal Officiel 418, art. 95 was used to grant temporary unemployment
compensation to Belgian coal workers.
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the sources indicated above? The jurisprudence of the Court itself
is unquestionably an important source of law particularly where the
Court interprets incomplete and ambiguous provisions of the
Treaty. "Wherever there are courts, the law grows in the hands of
the judges." 223 Some view the Court's power to "make law" with
misgivings. Since the Court is not subject to any control, these
critics are not prepared to concede that it can "make law" in the
sense that the other institutions make law. 224 Continental legal
theory is more strongly opposed to judge-made law 225 than is the
common law tradition. Yet it seems likely that the Community
Court, in due course, will play a significant role in the development
of Community law. The need for the Court to assist in adapting the
broad Treaty provisions to concrete situations is accentuated by the
fact that there is no Community legislature endowed with general
legislative power and that the Treaty may be formally revised only
through a cumbersome amendment process requiring the ratification by all Member States.
NEW LEGAL REMEDIES OF ENTERPRISES

CONCLUSIONS

Enterprises-whether natural or legal persons, whether nationals
of a Member State or of a third State such as the United Statesare accorded the right to appeal to the Community Court against
administrative acts of the Commission and of the Council which
directly and specifically affect them on the grounds defined in the
Treaty. Similarly, under specific circumstances enterprises may contest the failure of the institutions to issue an administrative act. The
adequacy of these legal remedies will depend to an important degree
on the jurisprudence of the Court, whether it will, for instance, continue the practice of the Coal-Steel Community Court and interpret
broadly the right of appeal. The Coal-Steel Community Court
utilized the concept of detournement de pouvoir to give private
parties standing to contest general decisions. In view of the limiting
language of the E.E.C. Treaty, the question may arise whether the
Court will be able or willing to grant appeals under that Treaty in
all situations where "direct and specific concern" of the enterprise
affected would warrant it.
Under an arrangement resembling somewhat a federal system
228 Mathijsen, op. cit. supra note 50, quoting Schwarzenberger at 105-106; Ophiils,
Gerichtsbarkeit und Rechtsprechung im Schumanplan, 4 NEUE ]URISTISCHE WocHENSCHRIFT 693-694 (1951).
224
STEINDORFF, op. cit. supra note 29, at 16-17.
220

For two classic statements, see LAUN, DAS FRE!E ERMESSEN UNO SEINE GRE!'ZEN

105 (1910), and HAURIOU, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PUBLIC 33-40 (1916).
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national courts of last resort must refer to the Community Court for
binding determination questions concerning the Treaty or acts of
the Community institutions which arise in proceedings before these
courts. Where the right of a party depends on the proper application of the Community law, the adequacy of its legal remedy may
depend on the compliance by the national courts with the Treaty
mandate. In at least one case a national court gave less than the intended effect to this Treaty mandate and refused to submit certain
questions to the Community Court. A possible solution would be
the development by the Community Court of a procedure similar to
the writ of certiorari in American law whereby the Community
Court on request of a party could direct the national court of last
resort to submit to it the record. Such procedure would deepen the
"breach" in the "integrity of national systems."
Where the Community becomes liable to an enterprise for damages on account of an act of a Community employee or of a Community institution, the enterprise may seek recovery in the Community Court only. This Court will decide the case in accordance with
the general principles common to the laws of the Member States.
Where, on the other hand, an enterprise has entered into a contract
with the Community, it may sue on such contract in the competent
national court only, unless the jurisdiction of the Community Court
is stipulated in the contract. In case of such stipulation, the Community Court will decide the question of contractual liability in
accordance with "the law applying to the contract concerned."
Thus from the viewpoint of the development of a "quasi-federal
legal system," the Court has the potential to develop a "Community law" not only in the sphere of the administrative and constitutional law of the Community, but also in the private law
sphere by drawing upon general principles common to the laws of
the Member States.
The armory of legal remedies will, of course, not depend only on
the attitude of the Court. The regulations and other administrative
acts which the institutions are required to issue for the implementation of the Treaty will have an important impact on the remedies of
the enterprises in the Community.

